

## FEASTS, CITIZENS, AND CULTIC DEMOCRACY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

### INTRODUCTION

The impact of religious customs in the lives of human beings is difficult to measure fully. Religious experience is in many ways subjective, and access to that subjective experience is severely limited for anyone who wishes to study the customs of classical antiquity. Fortunately, religious customs also create larger social consequences that are easier for scholars to trace, although the meanings of these customs and their consequences are a matter of debate. Above all, the study of religious practices during classical antiquity is raising questions for modern scholars about the boundaries between public and private, domestic and political.

A recent disagreement about the experience of women in classical Greece illustrates well how scholars have been unable to reach a consensus about the larger social meaning of one religious custom, the custom of *thusia*. An impasse has arisen, despite several decades of copious research into Greek religion and its role in Greek society<sup>1</sup>. The significant point of contention that has arisen between British and French scholars concerns the role that gender played in the distribution of, and access

<sup>1</sup> More general studies of Greek religion: J. MIKALSON, *Athenian Popular Religion*, Chapel Hill 1983; W. BURKERT, *Greek Religion* (trans. John Raffan), Cambridge 1985 (German edition *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche*, Stuttgart 1977), with an updated supplement by J. BREMMER, *Greek Religion*, Oxford 1999; S. PRICE, *Religions of the Ancient Greeks*, Cambridge 1999. Religion in the polis: Louise BRUIT ZAIMAN – Pauline SCHMITT-PANTEL, *Religion in the Ancient Greek City* (trans. P. Cartledge), Cambridge 1992 (French edition *La religion grecque*, Paris 1989); Christiane SOURVINOU-INWOOD, *Further Aspects of Polis Religion*, *AION(archeol)* 10 (1988), p. 259-274, and *What is Polis Religion?*, In O. MURRAY – S. PRICE (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, Oxford 1988, p. 295-322; W.R. CONNOR, 'Hiera and Hestia': *Sacred and Secular and the Classical Athenian Concept of the State*, *AncSoc* 19 (1988), p. 161-188; H.S. VERSNEL, *Religion and Democracy*, in W. EDER, (ed.), *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr.*, Stuttgart 1995, p. 367-387; W. BURKERT, *Isonomia und Polisreligion im Kleisthenischen Athen*, in M. SAKELLARIOU (ed.), *Démocratie athénienne et culture*, Athens 1996, p. 51-65; M.H. JAMESON, *Religion in the Athenian Democracy*, in I. MORRIS – K. RAAFLAUB (eds.), *Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges* (Archaeological Institute of America Colloquia and Conference Papers, 2), Dubuque (IA) 1998, p. 171-195; Deborah BOEDEKER, *Athenian Religion and Democracy* (unpublished paper delivered at the Brown Seminar on Culture & Religion in the Ancient Mediterranean

to, meat<sup>2</sup>. The French side argues that women and non-citizens are seen to be on the outside of the politico-religious community with little access to the meat consumed at public feasts; men feared the loss of political power that could follow if women were allowed access to the tools of sacrifice<sup>3</sup>. On the British side of the debate, the presence of women is not so categorically excluded, and the «theology of sacrifice» is seen as «a domestic understanding of the world and not a political one.»<sup>4</sup>

In some ways the ground of this debate reflects continuing interest in one aspect of the study of ancient religion that re-emerged in the 1970s, namely sacrifice and the importance of ἑορταί (*heortai*), or feasts<sup>5</sup>.

World, 3 December 2002). For book length studies on Athenian religion with a historical focus see H.W. PARKE, *Festivals of the Athenians*, Ithaca (NY) 1977; R. PARKER, *Athenian Religion: a History*, Oxford 1996; R. GARLAND, *Introducing New Gods: the Politics of Greek Religion*, Ithaca 1992. For scholars working in the field of ancient magic see the work of Fritz Graf, John Gager, Christopher Faraone, and most recently Naomi JANOWITZ, *Magic in the Greco-Roman World*, London–New York 2001. R. BUXTON (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion*, Oxford 2000, is a collection of essays by different authors and includes archaeological contributions. Book length studies on Greek religion and women: M. DILLON, *Girls and Women in Classical Greek Religion*, London–New York 2002; Jennifer LARSON, *Greek Heroine Cults*, Madison 1995, and *Greek nymphs: myth, cult, lore*, Oxford–New York 2001; R. KRAEMER, *Her Share of the Blessings*, New York 1992. Susan COLE also has some excellent essays on gender differences in Greek cult practices, e.g. *The Social Function of Rituals of Maturation: the Koureion and the Arkteia*, *ZPE* 55 (1984), p. 233–244; *Gunaiki ou Themis: Gender Differences in the Greek 'Leges Sacrae'*, *Helios* 19 (1992), p. 104–118; *Women, Dogs and Flies*, *AncW* 26 (1995), p. 182–191. In this essay I draw from all of the above scholarship, with the exception of ancient magic.

<sup>2</sup> R. OSBORNE, *Women and Sacrifice in Classical Greece*, *CQ* 43 (1993), p. 392–405 (reprinted in R. BUXTON, *op. cit.*, p. 294–313, but all references below are to the 1993 *CQ* publication), frames his direct response to M. DETIENNE, *The Violence of Wellborn Ladies*, in M. DETIENNE – J.-P. VERNANT (eds.), *The Cuisine of Sacrifice Among the Greeks* (trans. Paula Wissing), Chicago 1989, p. 129–147 (French edition *La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grecs*, Paris 1979); Nicole LORAUX, *Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division between the Sexes* (trans. Caroline Levine), Princeton 1993 (French edition *Les enfants d'Athéna*, Paris 1981); and L. BRUIT ZAIMAN – P. SCHMITT-PANTEL, *op. cit.* One of Osborne's main criticisms (p. 395) is that the view proposed by the French has recently become accepted without question. This debate about gender (and, to a lesser extent, class differences) is indicative of larger differences in the contemporary study of classics, differences that arise from methodological preferences and responses to structuralism and post-structuralism.

<sup>3</sup> M. DETIENNE, *art. cit.*, p. 147; N. LORAUX, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> R. OSBORNE, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 404.

<sup>5</sup> W. BURKERT, *Homo Necans*, Berlin 1972 (*Homo Necans: the Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth* [trans. P. Bing], Berkeley 1983); ID., *op. cit.* (n. 1); and the collection of essays in M. Detienne – J.-P. Vernant, *op. cit.* (n. 2). Specialized book length studies of different aspects of *thusia* have appeared more recently, e.g. V. ROSIVACH, *The System of Public Sacrifice in Fourth Century Athens*, Atlanta 1994, and F.T. VAN STRATEN, *Hiera Kala: Images of Animal Sacrifice in Archaic and Classical Greece*, Leiden

The work of philologists was augmented by epigraphists, who studied Athenian inscriptions and documented how festivals, especially civic festivals which featured the central act of *θυσία* (*thusia*) or blood sacrifice, played a significant role in the Athenian culture of the classical period. Other academic specialists have likewise conducted research into the subject of food and food supply in classical antiquity. These epigraphists, art historians, sociologists and economic historians can continue to offer classicists new insights<sup>6</sup>. Food has multiple meanings, and some of the meanings that food had for the ancient Greeks may not be immediately recognizable to a modern classical scholar. Unlike us, the Athenians lived at a time when the superabundance of food resources was not the norm<sup>7</sup>.

Familiarity with the multiple meanings of food and feasting can help flesh out our understanding of social practices and their impact in the ancient world. In this essay I will examine the role of specific cultic activities, using classical Athens (with its abundance of literary and physical evidence) as my example<sup>8</sup>. I will explore the question of what and who constituted the political community in classical Athens by examining the place and function of feasts in Athenian society. I hope to show that public feasts were as central for the formation of citizen identity as they were for the constitution of the polis community<sup>9</sup>. I would suggest that most of us have not yet fully appreciated this fact as we continue to study the extant ancient record. While those who study religion are comfortable discussing the political aspects of cult practice, those who study politics and history are not quite as comfortable discussing the impact of cult practice<sup>10</sup>.

1995. These late 20th-century scholars were in many ways building on the work begun by early 20th-century scholars like Deubner, Nilsson, and Harrison.

<sup>6</sup> P. GARNSEY, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge 1988, and *Food and Society in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge 1999; V. ROSIVACH, *op. cit.*; J. MIKALSON, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year*, Princeton 1985.

<sup>7</sup> P. GARNSEY, *Food and Society*, discusses the «multiple meanings» best in his introduction, p. 1-11.

<sup>8</sup> Athens is not typical of all ancient poleis, but it is where a good deal of our sources come from. I will supplement literary evidence from 5th and 4th-century Athens with physical evidence, when it can be found.

<sup>9</sup> Issues of inclusion in (and exclusion from) the polis community applied to both men and women, although women were sometimes excluded for different reasons than were men. General differences in the terms of exclusion have been best discussed by S. COLE, *artt. citt.* (n. 1) 1992 & 1995. See Part Five below.

<sup>10</sup> *Thusia* and the distribution of meat afterwards had a public and political face; this can no longer be overlooked or brushed aside as «domestic», as done most recently in 2000 (in the reprinted 1993 Osborne essay [n. 2]). Recently some scholars have begun looking

In the course of reviewing the classical Athenian evidence I will also bring current scholarship to bear, and explore why scholars have not been properly listening to or directly addressing each other when discussing the interweaving of politics and cult practices in classical Athens. As the impasse (alluded to above) has developed in the scholarly discourse, scholars have come to use, and abuse, the word ‘religion’, and they have come to different understandings of ‘religion’ as a category of thought and sphere of human activity. If we take ‘religion’ out of the discussion, and with it all the largely Christian assumptions we have inherited, and then look at the evidence again, Athens can be better viewed as a ‘cultic democracy’<sup>11</sup>. While this formulation may appear to be an irritating oxymoron for some in a post-Enlightenment world, we should recall that classical Athens was a pre-Enlightenment, and indeed pre-Christian society. Citizens understood themselves, their civic institutions, and their ritual behavior according to their own categories of thought. Our task is not to force modern categories onto their culture, but to try and understand their culture on its own terms.

#### 1. *THUSIA*, *HEORTE*, AND ANCESTRAL CUSTOMS

*Thusia* can be defined as Greek alimentary blood sacrifice, and is distinguished from other forms of dedicatory behavior, for example those dedications that also provided nourishment for the human body but did not include the shedding of animal blood, and those dedications that did not involve food at all. *Thusia* was followed by the butchery of the animal and then a public banquet, *ἐορτή* (*heorte*), and this series of actions was universally considered by the Greeks to be among their most ancient ancestral customs, or τὰ πάτρια<sup>12</sup>. The most visible positive functions of

at the democratic aspects of Greek religion. Although no clear consensus has yet emerged in the scholarship about how democratic Athenian religion was, as D. BOEDEKER (n. 1) points out there can be little doubt that «religious procedures» played a significant role in the democracy itself.

<sup>11</sup> Replacing ‘religion’ with ‘cult’ or ‘ritual’ will of course not solve all the conceptual problems inherent in studying another culture. Catherine BELL, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, New York–Oxford 1992, discusses the problem of using the word ‘ritual’ when studying culture. She chooses to retain the use of the word while remaining conscious of its limitations. Bell also suggests the restoration of ritual to its larger social context of social activity.

<sup>12</sup> Τὰ νομιζόμενα is another common expression the Greeks use to talk about their ancestral customs, see e.g. Herodotus I 35 and V 42; Thucydides I 25; Aristophanes,

*thusia* and the subsequent *heorte* were bound up in Greek culture with the conviction that mortal existence entailed laborious drudgery. Hesiod in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* gives us our first glimpses into the fully wretched state of human beings who, unlike the gods, must toil all their lives in order to eke a living from the earth. *Thusia*, and the meaty portion that was allotted to men, is one of the few delights that humans can count on in Hesiod<sup>13</sup>.

The notion that *thusia* and *heortai* provided a break from ceaseless work occurs again later in both Thucydides and Plato. In Thucydides' report of Pericles' famous funeral oration in book II of his history of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles outlined all the things that made Athens a great city, and included a fact widely acknowledged among all the Greeks at that time: the Athenians publicly celebrated many occasions of *thusia* throughout the year as a «respite from toil»: καὶ μὴν τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μὲν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες (Thuc. II 38). Likewise Plato used the same language, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς (*Laws* 653c-d), when he described why the gods pitied miserable mortals and designated feast days, *heortai*, for them. In Plato's idealized state, the lawgiver sees to it that these festive *heortai* are publicly funded and overseen. The pleasures of feasts, music and drinking should all be associated with the immortal gods; it is taken for granted that mortal life, even from earliest childhood, is one of pain (λύπη) interspersed with pleasure (ἡδονή; *Laws* 653).

The connections in the literary record from Hesiod through Plato — and beyond<sup>14</sup> — are clear. *Thusia* and the feast bring pleasure and provide a break from life's necessary and mundane tasks. The archaeological record likewise gives a glimpse of the centrality of the festivals

*Plutus* 1185; Aeschines 1.13; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* IV 5.14. For τὰ πάτρια see n. 19 and 22 below.

<sup>13</sup> *Works and Days* states that mortal men once lived without pain, ζώεσκον ... ἄτερ χαλεποῦ πόνου (W&D 90-91). The stories of Prometheus, Pandora (W&D 42ff.), and the subsequent Five Ages of Man (W&D 109-201), relate how mortal men received the unhappy lot that they did. On the Mekone episode, including the *aitia* for humanity's portion at a sacrifice, see *Theogony* 532ff. According to this myth, *thusia* remained a source of ambivalent delight for Zeus: while he enjoyed the savor of the smoke, he also remembered the deceit of Prometheus who tricked him into taking the lesser portion of the ox.

<sup>14</sup> By the time of Plutarch several centuries later, *thusia* was not spoken of as a «respite from toil», but had developed into an occasion for unalloyed, public delight. In a sharp anti-Epicurean polemic against religious superstition motivated by fear, Plutarch encourages his readers' expectations for divine felicity. All will find delight in the presence of the gods at temples, contests, holidays, dances, sacrifices and initiations. For Plutarch it is

in communal life. Some of the most significant archaeological sites were designed to be festival locations (e.g. the Acropolis, Olympia, temple complexes, stadia and theaters). The overall frequency and importance of *heortai* and feast-days in the historical Athenian calendar of the classical period is evident from the extant epigraphic evidence: one scholar estimates that about one half of all days in the Athenian calendar were public festival days of one sort or another<sup>15</sup>.

While fragments of calendars and so-called 'sacred laws' can give us a sense of how many feasts were celebrated in Athens at public expense (δημόσιος, δημοτελής), it is impossible to estimate the frequency of feasts that were celebrated privately<sup>16</sup>. Similarly, it is difficult to trace how or when the tradition of public feasting originated in the early history of Attica, although at least one scholar has proposed that publicly funded feasts developed from public feasts that were privately funded by wealthy individuals in the small communities of the Archaic period<sup>17</sup>.

essential that the gods be felt to be present at such times, otherwise the feast, ἑορτή, would become a «definite-not-feast», ἀνεόρταστον (*Moralia* XIV 1102b). Although this is a late source, Plutarch does at least give us some idea — surely an idealized one — of the psychology expected of the common people as they feasted and celebrated the gods. Like Plato's *Laws*, Plutarch maintained that a true feast must include the presence of the gods. If the god were not present at the sacrifice as the master of rites then the occasion would bear no mark of sanctity or holy day, and would leave the spirit untouched by the divine influence: ἄθεόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνεόρταστον καὶ ἀνενθουσίαστον τὸ λειπόμενον. For more on celebratory feasts and 'Heortology' see J. MIKALSON, *The 'Heorte' of Heortology*, *GRBS* 23 (1982), p. 213-221, which likewise stresses the joy of public celebrations, and also addresses the few 'penthimos' feasts, or the sadder moments in the larger festival system.

<sup>15</sup> J. MIKALSON, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 197-203. According to Mikalson's reckoning, not all festival days provided a day off from work, or were major festivals attended by more than an inner circle of officials. The same author (*art. cit.* [n. 14], p. 214) notes an essential distinction between *thusia* and *heorte*: while every feast included a sacrifice, not every sacrifice resulted in a big, glorious public feast. See also Erika SIMON, *Festivals of Attica: an Archaeological Commentary*, Madison 1983, and H.W. PARKE, *op. cit.* (n. 1) for fuller discussions of the Athenian festivals.

<sup>16</sup> For the importance of 'private' feasts and parties as a companion to the public ones, consider the δέ clause in Thuc. II 38: καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μὲν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες, ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὧν καθ' ἡμέραν ἢ τέρψιν τὸ λυτηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει.

<sup>17</sup> V. ROSIVACH, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 145, speculates that the origin of the system of Athenian sacrifices goes back to the archaic period when local 'big men' sacrificed animals and distributed the meat to their dependents. This big man theory, borrowed from anthropology, postulates that over time the private feasts funded by wealthy individuals were transformed into public ones financed by the demes. In a similar vein J. MIKALSON, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 215, sees a transition to state-financed *heortai* emerging from festivals funded by clans.

Again Thucydides in book II gives us a glimpse into the Athenians' self-understanding of their own customs when he records a tradition of how Theseus established the Sunoikeia as a publicly funded Athenian festival: *ἐορτὴν δημοτελῆ* (Thuc. II 15). In this account, the polis of Athens evolved from a group of independent towns in Attica, each with its own town hall and local magistrates, into a single polis with a centralized government and prytany (public dining hall) in Athens. The Athenians celebrated the Sunoikeia as the annual polis-wide commemoration of the political unification of their state. Within this newly centralized state organization, the inhabitants of smaller demes and villages throughout the countryside of Attica were still allowed to honor their local ancestral customs<sup>18</sup>. Thucydides records that the Athenians were reluctant to change this traditional pattern once the Peloponnesian War broke out and everyone was forced to move into the urban center of Athens. They did not wish to leave behind their homes, temples and localized, ancestral ways, i.e. *τὰ πάτρια* (Thuc. II 16).

During the fifth century when Thucydides was writing, Athens was said to be different from all the other Greek states in how often it provided even poor men with the opportunity to feast at lavish, publicly funded banquets. Athens and her democracy was said to be great precisely because of *τὰ πάτρια*, which included the ancestral customs that demanded sacrifice to the gods and heroes, and the public banquets that followed<sup>19</sup>. Oligarchical types, who thought that the democratic Athenian customs were becoming excessive and dangerous, complained that the sacrifices and feasts got in the way of public business<sup>20</sup>. And by the fourth century, Theopompos could write about how corrupt governmental officials took advantage of the public's desire for feasts, and squandered far too much money in an effort to curry favor with the masses<sup>21</sup>.

The Athenians explained to themselves in their public discourse (above all in court) that these ancestral customs had been handed down to the

<sup>18</sup> See R. Parker, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 10-17, on Theseus and the reliability of the oral account recorded in Thuc. II. Absolute historicity matters less for the present argument than the consideration that Thucydides offers us an account of how the Athenians imagined their own early society, and explained their origins.

<sup>19</sup> On the greatness of *τὰ πάτρια* see e.g. Lysias 30.18; Old Oligarch (= pseudo-Xenophon), *Constitution of the Athenians* 2.9; Isocrates, *Areopagitus* 66.

<sup>20</sup> Old Oligarch (= pseudo-Xenophon), *Constitution of the Athenians* 3.2, 3.8.

<sup>21</sup> Theopompos fr. 213 claims that under the corrupt administration of Chares the *demos* spent more money on *thusia* and feasts than on the administration of the state. See V. ROSIVACH, *op. cit.* (n. 5), for the details of state financing of such feasts.



polis from recognized divine oracular authorities, especially the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. Demosthenes 21 cites this oracle as well as the oracle of Zeus at Dodona as the two definitive sources that prescribe for the Athenians all that is bound up in τὰ πάτρια. The cultic behaviors prescribed by these oracles include sacrificing, dancing, and the wearing of garlands (Dem. 21.52-53)<sup>22</sup>. These same oracles also established the received tradition that authorized an individual to perform cultic acts on behalf of the polis (Dem. 21.55)<sup>23</sup>. Once we take into account that individuals performed what we think of as ‘private’ acts on behalf of the state, the boundary that we assume exists between ‘public and private’ starts to look a little blurry. Can dancing be a civic behavior, and even a civic duty? What about prayer?

## 2. *HIERA, HOSIA, AND CULTIC DEMOCRACY*

Western post-Enlightenment categories of thought that divide human activities into two separate and mutually exclusive categories like ‘public and private’, or ‘secular and sacred’, lead to fundamentally flawed conclusions when applied to ancient cultures<sup>24</sup>. Evidence from antiquity clearly indicates that the required, public business of the Athenian state included building and maintaining altars and temples; publishing official sacred calendars; selecting priests; making prayers and libations; administering sacrifices; reading omens; overseeing Mystery cults (e.g. Eleusis); fixing oaths, and authorizing embassies to make treaties with foreign states<sup>25</sup>. Even contests — athletic, musical, and dramatic contests — were cultic occasions, and sessions of the assembly opened with prayer and

<sup>22</sup> Ancestral rites performed κατὰ τὰ πάτρια (or πατρίοισι νόμοισι) in Dem. 21.51-53 include: ἑορτάς, χορούς, ὕμνους; κνισᾶν, στεφανηφορεῖν, θύειν. Plato’s lawgiver in the *Laws* also mentions Delphi and Dodona as his sources for divine advice on gods, shrines and temples (*Laws* 738b-c). On the role of oracles in the development of Athenian religion as reported in Herodotus see D. BOEDEKER (n. 1), p. 9-11.

<sup>23</sup> Indeed this tradition is what the whole case of Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* rests upon. See the fuller discussion below in Part Four.

<sup>24</sup> The ‘secular and sacred’ thesis was popularized by Durkheim in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; its inadequacy in the face of ancient evidence has been duly noted by e.g. J. MIKALSON, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 203; W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 161; M.H. JAMESON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 171.

<sup>25</sup> Note that the actual word for treaty is σπονδή, libation. Treaties of course were not signed as they are now, but were authorized by all the parties involved with prayer and libation to the gods. See W. BURKERT, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 70-71.



sacrifice. Magistrates prayed to Zeus as they entered the Bouleuterion<sup>26</sup>; inscribed laws and decrees that dealt with public finance were organized by *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια*, conventionally rendered «public and private» or «sacred and secular»<sup>27</sup>. But such a conventional understanding of *hiera kai hosia* is misleading. W.R. Connor has convincingly documented how the ‘public’, ‘secular’ concerns of the classical Athenian polis — above all the obligations of civic justice and citizenship rights — had ‘sacred’ acts attached to them<sup>28</sup>. The polis was consistently concerned with bringing the world of human affairs into alignment with the affairs of the gods. Cultic behaviors and rituals were the means to bring about this balance.

And it can no longer be assumed, as some classical scholars and ancient historians have done for decades, that these rites and behaviors were empty rituals; nor were they «taboos or ways of magically assuring divine support.»<sup>29</sup> Cult and ritual were quite simply considered essential for the continuing existence and health of the Athenian polis<sup>30</sup>. For instance, cult practices that were tied to the rural countryside of Attica and the calendar of agricultural festivals were of central importance to the state as a whole, even once Athens grew into a large urban center.

<sup>26</sup> Antiphon 6.45 *On the Choreutes*: καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ Διὸς Βουλαίου καὶ Ἀθηναίων Βουλαίας ἱερὸν ἔστι καὶ εἰσιόντες οἱ βουλευταὶ προσεύχονται.

<sup>27</sup> W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 164.

<sup>28</sup> W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 173. His critique of enlightenment and 20th-century readings starts with Durkheim’s sociological discussion as they relate to the two categories *hiera kai hosia*, and then looks at how the application of Durkheim has mislead some 20th-century ancient historians. Connor also examines the over-determined translations of *hiera* and *hosia* in LSJ. His own translation of these words takes *hiera* and *hosia* to be «parallel and coordinate realms» that are not sacred and secular in our mutually exclusive sense, but sacred as concerned with the gods (*hiera*) and (*hosia*) concerned with human social norms of justice. Both cover religious rites and civic privileges, i.e. Athenian society as a whole (p. 168).

<sup>29</sup> W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 181. For a very interesting analysis of Enlightenment era misunderstandings of early Christianity and the religions of late antiquity see J.Z. SMITH, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity*, Chicago 1990, chapter 1. On p. 34 Smith draws attention to a tradition of 18th-century Protestant anti-Catholic polemic that even now still allows scholars to transfer ritual characteristics attributed to ‘Popery’ to the religions of antiquity. Pre-Christian mediterranean religion is then faulted for being magical or merely ceremonial. M.H. JAMESON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 188-191, and W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 184, both critically discuss the alleged decline of piety in Athenian society during and after the 5th century.

<sup>30</sup> «Myth, language and civic practice all reflect a common mentality that sees the sacred and the secular as two realms whose coordination is extremely important to civic well being»: W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 168.

The reluctance of the Athenians to leave the countryside at the start of the Peloponnesian War and modify their ancestral ways of rural life demonstrates these deep roots of τὰ πάτρια<sup>31</sup>. Later, as the war was grinding to a close, one of the first tasks identified as necessary by the Council of 5000 was the reestablishment of the Athenian calendar of sacrifices and festivals, and the reinscribing of the Solonian laws — both the ‘secular’ laws and the ‘sacred’ ones. One man responsible for republishing these laws, a certain Nicomachus, was said to have corrupted the laws of Solon as he reinscribed them, and thereby done great harm to the city (Lysias 30.26)<sup>32</sup>.

This reexamination of the categories of sacred and secular opens up the possibility to consider Athens a ‘cultic democracy’. Spheres of interest that we view as distinctly separate, namely political activities among humans and cultic activities aimed at the gods, overlapped in the lives and behaviors of the Athenians, and Athenian democracy could only function well when political and cultic activities were properly combined in the balanced way demanded by τὰ πάτρια<sup>33</sup>. Perhaps one of the best witnesses for cultic democracy is found in Antiphon 6, *On the Choreutes*. In the course of defending himself in a wrongful homicide suit, the defendant describes all of his official duties during the month that he served as a prytanis (Antiphon 6.45):

καὶ ἱεροποιῶν καὶ θύων ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας, καὶ ἐπιψηφίζων  
καὶ λέγων γνώμας περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ πλείστου ἀξίων τῇ  
πόλει φανερός.

I was seen to be sacrificing and making offerings on behalf of the democracy; I was seen to be putting motions to the vote; I was seen to be voicing my opinion on the most momentous and the most vital public questions.

For this defendant, as for his audience of Athenian jurors, doing sacred acts, performing *thusia*, and preparing for a feast were democratic activities on par with giving counsel and chairing a meeting.

<sup>31</sup> Thuc II 16, discussed above.

<sup>32</sup> Lysias 30 *Against Nicomachus*. Nichomachus was the «transcriber of both secular and sacred», καὶ τῶν ὁσίων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναγραφεύς (30.24), charged with impiety for changing the laws as he transcribed them, adding some occasions for *thusia*, and deleting others.

<sup>33</sup> W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 171-177, discusses the primary evidence that supports his reading of *hiera kai hestia*.

## 3. CITIZENS AND THEIR 'PRIVATE' LIVES IN CULTIC DEMOCRACY

Occasions that we may think of as private or personal invariably included both the gods and the official state apparatus in ancient Athens — what W.R. Connor defined as *iera kai hosia*. Cultic democracy was expressed at the polis level, and in the many functions of the polis' subgroups of deme, tribe, and phratry (brotherhood) which oversaw transitions in the human life cycle. These life-cycle occasions were also times of public feasting. Marriage between citizens included a civic element: in the autumn after the actual wedding a citizen was obligated to introduce his wife into the phratry and sponsor a feast in her honor at the annual fall festival of the Apatouria<sup>34</sup>. When marriage resulted in pregnancy and birth, public rites for family and neighbors in the deme were held when the new-born was ten days old and the husband decided whether or not to accept as his own the child just delivered by his wife<sup>35</sup>. Another time for celebrating the arrival of children into the phratry occurred at the Apatouria, where the rites again included *thusia* and a feast<sup>36</sup>. At the other end of the life cycle, funerals also provided an opportunity for combining the

<sup>34</sup> Isaeus 3.79; 8.18; 8.20. This evidence indicates that private wedding banquets for family were followed by marriage feasts organized for the entire phratry at the annual Apatouria. Isaeus 8.18-19 contains two formulations for the types of wedding feasts: γάμους εἰστίασε (when the bride was transferred from the household of her father to that of the groom), and the feast for the phratry, τοῖς φράτορσι γαμηλίαν, which was done κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνων νόμους. See S. COLE, *Social Function* (n. 1), on the Apatouria as a maturation festival. According to H.W. PARKE, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 88-90, each phratry had its own customs at the Apatouria, and held the three day festival at its own convenience during the month of Pyanepsion. Interestingly, Parke and Cole do not assume that women were present at the festival of the gamelia.

<sup>35</sup> In Dem 39.20-22 the speaker calls up witnesses from his deme to testify that his father had publicly accepted him at ten days, and named him in the presence of phratry and deme members, thereby publicly declaring his legitimacy. Paternity was a central issue for Athenians. This defendant in Dem. 39 makes a point of saying his father would not have named him if he had had questions about his paternity. This type of custom is perhaps alluded to in Euripides, *Electra* 654 and 1125, where Electra tells her mother that she has just recently given birth, and then persuades her mother to arrange for the accustomed rites, including *thusia*, on the (alleged) child's tenth day. Of course this is a trick; there is no child, and Electra and Orestes use the sacred, sacrificial opportunity to kill their mother. Here is a tragic example of perverted *thusia*, based on real, and familiar, Athenian custom.

<sup>36</sup> Isaeus 8.19 also stresses that it was the duty of the phratry to scrutinize the civic status of the mother at the time when the child was being accepted into the community of the polis. He may be referring to the Apatouria, although he does not mention it by name. Some form of the rite of paternal and civic acceptance seems to have been held for legitimate new-born daughters as well as sons: see Isaeus 3.79. S. COLE, *Social Function* (n. 1),

private realm of the family with the larger civic community by featuring *thusia* and feasts at the close of burial rites<sup>37</sup>.

Coming-of-age provided another important opportunity to celebrate in the civic community with feasts. When male youths reached the age of legal majority and officially became citizens, sacrificial rites and *heortai* were again held for the phratry at the Apatouria<sup>38</sup>. Officially enrolling as a citizen in the deme happened separately from this festive tribal occasion<sup>39</sup>. Adoption of adult (or nearly adult) male citizens also presents an interesting case that further illustrates how both civic and personal concerns were ritually combined in Athens. Like biological sons, adoptees were introduced into the phratry, and enrolled on the list of clansmen at the Apatouria<sup>40</sup>. Registering with the deme was distinct from joining the phratry for adoptees (as it was for biological sons), though the presence of fellow demesmen alongside phratry members was necessary for an adoption to be considered fully legitimate<sup>41</sup>. Isaeus provides us with some interesting reasons for why the Athenians believed that adoption was a good thing for their society, and this perhaps best highlights the ties between ‘private and public’ interests (or ‘sacred and secular’). An adopted son would not only someday inherit the estate of the citizen who adopted him, but he would also have access to his adopted father’s ancestral altars, and would perform all the customary rites after the father’s death for all the forefathers<sup>42</sup>. In brief, it was the obligation of an adopted

p. 235-236, argues that this single known instance of introducing a girl into the phratry is an exception because the woman in question is an *epikleros*.

<sup>37</sup> Isaeus 8.21, 8.25-27; Isaeus 9.3-4. See R. GARLAND, *The Greek Way of Death*, Ithaca 1985, on the customs for funerals and feasts.

<sup>38</sup> On youths being introduced into the phratry at the Apatouria, and enrolled as new citizens, see Dem 39.4. Lysias 30.2 and 30.30 offer some interesting evidence for how one man (Nichomachus) was allegedly admitted to a phratry as a citizen even though his father was a public slave. Nichomachus apparently attached himself to his *mother’s* phratry, and carried out his citizen duties in that community. His questionable civic status eventually became an issue when he was brought up on impiety charges involving the wrongful transcription of the Solonian lawcode at the close of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>39</sup> See M.H. JAMESON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 182-184, for a discussion of cultic activities in the deme. He makes the case that the cultic program of the democracy was parallel to that of the polis, while remaining largely independent: «Religion was no small part of the deme’s, and the democracy’s, business.»

<sup>40</sup> Dem. 39.4, Dem. 44.35-7; Isaeus 3.72.

<sup>41</sup> Isaeus 9.8.

<sup>42</sup> καὶ τὴν τε οὐσίαν, ὃν ἂν ἐκεῖνος εἰσποιήσῃται, οὗτος ἔξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς βωμοῖς τοῖς πατρώοις οὗτος βαδιεῖται καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου προγόνοις τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσει (Isaeus 9.7). See R. OSBORNE, ‘*Demos*’: the

son to carry on as a partner in the full range of cultic and civic acts: καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων κοινωνόν (Isaeus 9.13).

It is interesting to observe how, in a society without a long tradition of written records, it was the ritual practice of feasting that helped Athenian citizens determine and verify civic status and membership in the polis group. By the time of Demosthenes in the 4th century there is some evidence for written records, or γραμματεῖα, that were kept by the deme; these *grammateia* apparently listed both biological sons and adopted ones<sup>43</sup>. But some earlier cases of adoption that were contested in the fifth-century Athenian courts show no hint of any official written registry that citizens could refer to<sup>44</sup>. In the fifth century, if you had to prove who you were in a court case — if you had to verify your civic status and identity — then you brought into court as witnesses fellow citizens and demesmen who could testify that they had seen you feasting and observing civic cultic occasions alongside your family members<sup>45</sup>. Being a citizen, especially a male citizen, meant taking part in the cultic democracy, and being at cultic events in the acknowledged presence of other citizens. The structure of the Athenian polis (perhaps both before and after Cleisthenes) was based on the demes and the tribes, and the small size of these cultic communities ensured that citizens could carry out the crucial civic function of vouching for each other's civic status. There was no way for any citizen to avoid taking part in cultic occasions. Being a citizen necessarily meant taking part in cultic democracy.

Being a good male citizen, especially for those who had wealth, also meant extra obligations, liturgies, and gifts for fellow citizens<sup>46</sup>. The most

*Discovery of Classical Attika*, Cambridge 1985, chapter 7, for the importance of adoption in Athenian society.

<sup>43</sup> R. OSBORNE, *op. cit.*, p. 72, argues that the *grammateia* during the classical period were not just lists of citizens, but also included other notable items of deme business. In Dem 44.35-6 an adoptee goes to the deme to enroll himself (ἐκκλησιαστικὸν ... καὶ ληξιαρχικῶ γραμματεῖῳ), while in Dem 39.4 adoptees are brought to register with the tribe at the Apatouria. The confusing situation with the two men claiming to be Mantitheus in Dem. 39 assumes that enrolling in the deme involved actual written registers of some sort maintained by the deme, and separate from the phratry.

<sup>44</sup> See e.g. Isaeus 9.13.

<sup>45</sup> Isaeus 3.72 ff. In Isaeus 8.15-21 a citizen claims to have been with another family member at occasions of θυσία and ἑορταί, and at the rural Dionysia; in Isaeus 9.21 witnesses are called to testify that one citizen was *not* seen with family members at occasions of θυσία (where οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστιῶνται) where he might have been expected.

<sup>46</sup> See the nice list of liturgies given in Dem 39.7: choregos, gymnasiarch (who funded the deme's team), and hestiator (who gave an annual dinner). See also Isaeus 3.80, and Isocrates 19.36.

obvious sort of public gift involved food and public feasting. Being choregos for a dramatic festival was another particularly visible public service wealthy men offered; during the war wealthy individuals even funded triremes for the navy. But at all times the wealthy continued to fund banquets for their communities. Likewise conspicuous wealth obligated a man to fund feasts and civic festivals for the citizen-wives of his peers, for example feasting the demeswomen at local celebrations of the annual Thesmophoria<sup>47</sup>.

But of course not all citizens were wealthy enough to sponsor big public feasts. Beyond the life-cycle rites discussed above, being considered a good citizen in classical Athens still meant taking part in the many practices of cultic democracy, including activities that may not immediately occur to us today as particularly political or democratic. Xenophon (*Hellenica* II 20) provides a revealing glimpse into what good citizens did together early in the fourth century:

Ἄνδρες πολῖται, τί ἡμᾶς ἐξελαύνετε; τί ἀποκτεῖναι βούλεσθε; ἡμεῖς γάρ ὑμᾶς κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποιήσαμεν, μετεσχέκαμεν δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἱερῶν τῶν σεμνοτάτων καὶ θυσίων καὶ ἑορτῶν τῶν καλλίστων, καὶ συγχορευταὶ καὶ συμφοιτηταὶ γεγενήμεθα καὶ συστρατιῶται, καὶ πολλὰ μεθ' ὑμῶν κεκινδυνεύκαμεν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας.

In many ways this is the most elegant and colorful expression of cultic democracy and Athenian citizenship. Citizens were acknowledged cultic actors in their polis; they participated jointly at sacrifices, feasts, and holy rites. These occasions for cultic activities are mentioned on an equal footing with education and military service. Even dancing together was considered a sign of being a good citizen. Above all, being a citizen meant that πολῖται «shared in», μετεσχέκαμεν, their common activities. There is no notion of the individual or individual rights, another hallmark of early modern Europe and the Enlightenment<sup>48</sup>. For an Athenian, the first things to come to mind when appealing to an audience of fellow citizens are communal cultic behaviors, sacrifices and feasts above all.

The combination of feasts, dancing and citizenship occurs in other classical texts as well. This particular constellation of activities brings into

<sup>47</sup> Funding women's' festivals: Isaeus 3.80; Isaeus 8.19-20.

<sup>48</sup> This language of «citizens sharing in the polis» occurs even in the Periclean citizenship laws of 451/0 as recorded by Aristotle. See Cynthia PATTERSON, *Hai Attikai: the Other Athenians*, *Helios* 13 (1987), p. 49-67, esp. 49, and 64 n. 5.

focus one of the most important, and often overlooked, functions of feasting and banqueting in classical Athens. Feasting established and maintained community and civic intimacy, both of which promote the necessary goal of finding mates for the members of the younger generation, thereby ensuring the continuity of the polis itself. When Plato in the *Laws* and Aristotle in his *Politics* theorize about how a sound polis is established, among the first institutions they include in their discussions are *thusia* and the public feasts, *heortai*<sup>49</sup>. Sacrifice and feasting help determine the health of the community, and maintain the proper balance between the world of humans and that of the gods. *Thusia* and *heortai* encourage familiarity and intimacy, and ensure the future of the polis by supporting inter-marriage among families. Civic feasts are venues for the rituals of courtship and the promise of the next generation of citizens.

#### 4. BAD CITIZENS AND EXCLUSION FROM CULTIC DEMOCRACY

A political community that institutionalized cultic observance into a democratic form of government likewise included cultic behaviors in its concept of what it meant to be publicly branded as a bad citizen. Accordingly, *thusia* and feasting privileges figured into why and how individuals were excluded from their communities. One particularly common strategy for publicly attacking and prosecuting an enemy was to charge him (or her) with impiety, ἀσεβεια<sup>50</sup>. Accusing someone of being ‘shameless’ or even ‘most shameless’ in court was also a tactic that had a similar purpose, namely impugning a citizen’s commitment to upholding his civic duty of worshipping the gods and performing *thusia* in the proper, ancestral fashion.

One of the most famous charges of impiety is found in Lysias 6, *Against Andocides*. Andocides was charged with desecrating the Mysteries of Demeter and Kore; in this speech, Andocides is being accused of reaching such heights of shamelessness, ἀναισχυντίας, as to attend the Boule and continue serving the polis by officially participating in sacrifices, processions, prayers and oracles: καὶ συμβουλεύει τὴν βουλὴν

<sup>49</sup> Plato, *Laws* 738b-d and 770-771; Aristotle, *Politics* III 1280b; *Politics* VI 1321a.

<sup>50</sup> Examples of people who were brought up on more or less trumped up charges of asebeia include Aeschylus, Socrates, and Pericles. M.H. JAMESON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 189-190, discusses the rash of impiety cases at the end of the 5th century; on the tradition that Pericles’ mistress Aspasia was accused with impiety see p. 189.



εἰσιῶν περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ προσόδων καὶ εὐχῶν καὶ μαντείων (Lysias 6.33). Lysias argues that a citizen guilty of openly flouting any ancestral customs, above all the customs of the Mysteries, ought not show his face among the other members of the deliberative body that passed laws on all aspects of Athenian civic life: *hiera kai hosia*, sacrifices and other civic and cultic matters. The argument of this Lysianic speech, meant to persuade and appeal to the Athenian jury's common sense of proper citizen conduct, highlights the close connection the Athenians felt between political duties and cultic functions<sup>51</sup>.

Likewise charges of civic shamelessness and impiety occur in Demosthenes 21, *Against Meidias*. By charging Meidias with assault, Demosthenes in this oration turned the tables on his political enemy, who himself was unjustly charging Demosthenes with murder. Demosthenes' argument rests on the claims of τὰ πάτρια and the connection between *hiera kai hosia*: if Demosthenes had in fact been a murderer (and if Meidias were indeed a pious person) then Meidias was under obligation to prohibit Demosthenes from carrying out his civic duties. The fact that Meidias knowingly let Demosthenes discharge his civic and cultic duties, including those as choregos, is evidence that he, Meidias, is truly the impious person. Meidias' impiety allowed him to permit an elected official, whom he maintained was criminal, to carry out cultic acts on behalf of the polis: εἶασε μὲν μ' εἰσιτητήρι' ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς ἱεροποιῆσαι καὶ θῦσαι καὶ κατάρξασθαι τῶν ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως (Demosthenes 21.114)<sup>52</sup>. A central part of these cultic acts involved sacrifice: θῦσαι καὶ κατάρξασθαι τῶν ἱερῶν.

Cultic democracy and τὰ πάτρια required citizens to examine each other's fitness and qualifications for any publicly held office. This is one

<sup>51</sup> Another example illustrating the links between the responsibilities of civic leaders and their sacral functions (*hiera* and *hosia*, or cultic democracy) is recorded in a late source, Plutarch, *Pericles* 32. The so-called Diopieithes decree levied charges of impeachment against those, like Pericles, who allegedly did not believe in the gods.

<sup>52</sup> Meidias' impiety is expressed as ἀσεβῆς καὶ μιᾶρός. Further aspects of cultic democracy evident in this oration can be found listed in Demosthenes 21.114. Meidias allowed the allegedly guilty Demosthenes to conduct rites and sacrifices on behalf of the Boule and even the whole polis, and he permitted Demosthenes to represent Athens at a shrine of Zeus, and at a sacrifice to Demeter and Kore. This passage is full of the language of polis and sacrifice: εἶασε μὲν με εἰσιτητήρια ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς ἱεροποιῆσαι καὶ θύσαι καὶ κατάρξασθαι τῶν ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως ... ἀρχιθεωροῦντ' ἀγαγεῖν τῷ Διὶ τῷ Νεμείῳ τὴν κοινὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως θεωρίαν, περιεῖδε δὲ ταῖς σεμναῖς θεαῖς ἱεροποιὸν αἰρεθέντ' ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων τρίτον αὐτὸν καὶ καταρξάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν.

place where Meidias failed. But in a similar late fifth-century case recorded by Antiphon, oration 6 *On the Choreutes*, another choregos is brought up on murder charges, this time involving the death of a chorus boy. This defendant argues that he is not guilty of murder since his fellow citizens had examined his fitness and not found it lacking. Therefore he continued during the year to discharge his civic duties, including performing *thusia* on behalf of the polis during a month as prytanis (Antiphon 6.45). Like Demosthenes, this defendant claims that the murder charge is politically motivated, and the men prosecuting him are ἄνοσιώτατοι (Antiphon 6.51). His fellow Athenians' deliberate association with him itself bears witness to his innocence of the murder charge; the death was purely accidental.

Cultic democracy demanded the ritual fitness of those who performed sacred acts on behalf of the city. Any citizen who had good evidence of an official's wrongdoing (which would impede that official from carrying out his duties in accordance with custom) was under obligation to stop the official from acting. Failing to do so put the whole polis at risk. Such charges of impiety linked the alleged wrongdoer with miasma, the symbolic pollution that had serious civic and sociological consequences<sup>53</sup>. The political nature of this symbolic pollution was very real to the Athenians, and those considered tainted with miasma were expressly forbidden from public gatherings, including participation in the sacrificial community and its public *heortai*. The social and cultic consequences of miasma determine the plots of some of the most famous fifth-century tragedies, including Aeschylus' *Oresteia* trilogy and Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannos*. At the start of this play, Oedipus forbids the citizens of Thebes from associating with the (yet) unknown murderer. Included in the list of forbidden activities is participation in any part of civic sacrifice, μήτ' ἐν θεῶν εὐχαῖσι μήτε θύμασιν, κοινὸν ποεῖσθαι, μήτε χέρνιβος νέμειν (Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannos* 239-240)<sup>54</sup>. Of course the dramatic irony is that Oedipus eventually recognizes himself as the guilty party tainted

<sup>53</sup> Miasma had many meanings in Greek culture, and not just the civic one I focus on here. See R. PARKER, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*, Oxford 1983.

<sup>54</sup> The steps involved in sacrifice include the preparatory ritual hand-washing, prayer, and then the ritual slaughter: see W. BURKERT, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 55ff. Compare this to the full quote of OT 236-240: τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον, ὅστις ἐστί, γῆς τῆσδ', ἧς ἐγὼ κράτη τε καὶ θρόνους νέμω, μήτ' ἐσδέχεσθαι μήτε προσφωνεῖν τινα μήτ' ἐν θεῶν εὐχαῖσι μήτε θύμασιν κοινὸν ποεῖσθαι, μήτε χέρνιβος νέμειν.

with miasma, but even before this recognition the prophet Teiresias calls Oedipus a «polluter» (ὥς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ' ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι, *OT* 353)<sup>55</sup>.

Political pollution, and its remedy of symbolic purification, were also powerful metaphors used in the courtroom during the classical period. After accusing the impious Andocides of shamelessly attending civic sacrifices (θυσιαῶν) and meetings of the Boule (Lysias 6.33), Lysias concludes his speech by bringing in purificatory language<sup>56</sup>. If he could make Andocides a scapegoat, φαρμακός, who must be cleansed from the city, Lysias could ensure that Andocides would be prohibited from taking part in *thusia* and civic banquets in the future. The link between *thusia* and murderers as sources of civic miasma is made painfully clear in Antiphon's *On the Murder of Herodes*. The speaker reminds the jury that a murderer with «unclean hands or some other type of miasma» causes a whole host of serious problems for a polis and its citizens; murderers cause shipwrecks and otherwise imperil their fellow men, and their very presence prevents the proper performance of the ancestral rites at a sacrifice (Antiphon 5.82)<sup>57</sup>. As was the case in tragedy, murderers and those tainted with miasma must be exiled and excluded from the rites of *thusia* and from the pleasures shared by the eating community of citizens.

## 5. WOMEN, FEASTS, AND CULTIC DEMOCRACY

Charges of pollution, impiety, or 'shameless' behavior had striking gender-based differences in classical Athenian society. Like men, women took part in at least some of the *heortai* that were publicly funded civic occasions<sup>58</sup>. But the position of women in Greek society, which required

<sup>55</sup> Compare Teiresias' confrontation with Oedipus to a scene between Teiresias and Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone* (lines 998-1032) where Teiresias recounts to Creon a sacrifice that went awry when the fire would not light. The prophet's interpretation of the ill-omened *thusia* is that Creon as king is at fault, and brings sickness to the city since he refuses to allow Antigone to bury her brother's body.

<sup>56</sup> Lysias 6.53: τὴν πόλιν κιθαίρειν, καὶ ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι καὶ φαρμακὸν ἀποπέμπειν καὶ ἀλιτηρίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

<sup>57</sup> Antiphon 5.82: ἄνθρωποι μὴ καθαροὶ χεῖρας ἢ ἄλλο τι μίasma ἔχοντες ... τοῦτο δὲ ἱεροῖς παραστάντες πολλοὶ δὴ καταφανεῖς ἐγένοντο οὐχ ὅσοι ὄντες, διακωλύοντες τὰ ἱερὰ μὴ γίνεσθαι τὰ νομιζόμενα. Compare this to the *Antigone* scene quoted above in note 55 where Creon's miasma prevented a sacrifice from going as it should.

<sup>58</sup> Women were surely not a part of every *thusia* and festival, and men were also excluded from all-female festivals like the Thesmophoria; on some gender exclusions at festivals see R. OSBORNE, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 397. I am here assuming that reputable citizen women did

that every female citizen be legally dependent on her male next-of-kin, meant that women were included in the feasting community — or could be excluded — for different reasons than was the case for citizen men. As is often the case when studying women in antiquity, our literary sources are somewhat problematic, but can be augmented by introducing physical evidence<sup>59</sup>. Combined, the evidence shows that a female πολῖτις had a role in the cultic democracy which permitted her to share in feasts and *thusia*, but this role was far more complicated and restricted than it was for citizen men.

Fifth-century Attic tragedians often depicted female characters who had no male guardian, or whose legal male guardian was not a sympathetic family member — tragic figures such as Antigone, Electra, Medea and Hecuba. The vulnerability of these women reflects their precarious social status and dependent civic identity. Electra was a particularly attractive figure for all three fifth-century tragedians. After the death of her father, Electra was immediately subject to the authority of Aegisthus, the man who helped her mother murder Agamemnon. It was Aegisthus who determined the circumstances of Electra's life, including the basic human needs for shelter and nourishment<sup>60</sup>. Sophocles' Electra specifically relates how Aegisthus is depriving her of clothing and food; she is dressed in rags, and her table is empty<sup>61</sup>. With no male relative to look out for her better interests, she is reduced to the status of a worthless foreigner, τις ἔποικος ἀναξία (Sophocles, *Electra* 189). Equally painful to Electra is the fact that she is wasting away without children, and unable

appear in public on particular and permitted occasions. I do not agree with S. GOLDHILL, *Representing Democracy: Women at the Great Dionysia*, in R. OSBORNE – S. HORNBLOWER (eds.), *Ritual, Finance, Politics*, Oxford 1994, p. 347-370, who argues (*contra* J. HENDERSON, *Women and the Athenian Dramatic Festivals*, *TAPA* 121, 1991, p. 133-147) that there is no evident role for women at public festivals, including theatrical festivals.

<sup>59</sup> Most legal and sociological evidence from the orators does not concern female citizens, so I will have to turn to literary evidence, especially tragedy. This evidence must be handled with care. I assume tragic drama represented social situations that were somehow plausible and believable to an Athenian audience, and reflected (if only to a limited extent) the realities of the Athenian legal and social systems. I will also use iconographic evidence, and the conclusions of a more obscure field, palaeodiet, which analyses human bones and teeth in an effort to trace ancient dietary patterns.

<sup>60</sup> Sophocles, *Electra* 262-265: εἴτα δώμασιν ἐν τοῖς ἐμαντῆς τοῖς φονεῦσι τοῦ πατρὸς ζύνημι. κάκ τῶνδ' ἄρχομαι κάκ τῶνδ' ἐμοὶ λαβεῖν θ' ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τητᾶσθαι πέλει.

<sup>61</sup> Sophocles, *Electra* 187-192: ἄτις ἄνευ τεκέων κατατάκομαι, ἄς φίλος οὔτις ἀνὴρ ὑπερίσταται, ἀλλ' ἄπερὶ τις ἔποικος ἀναξία οἰκονομῶ θαλάμους πατρός, ὧδε μὲν ἀεικεῖ σὺν στολᾷ, κεναῖς δ' ἀμφίσταμαι τραπέζαις.

to fulfill her crucial social role as wife and mother. Likewise Euripides' Electra complains of many of the same things in his *Electra* play. Speaking to the incognito Orestes, Electra asks him to give a message to her brother. Among the things she wants her brother to know about are the dirty rags she is dressed in, and the fact that she is deprived of food<sup>62</sup>.

Euripides' Electra is more precise about her sources of food; she is not simply hungry, but she is forced to go without festivals and dances. What is notable here from the standpoint of cultic democracy and gender roles is not that Electra petulantly whines about being prevented from attending parties and pursuing the social life she feels she is entitled to as a princess. More to the point, Electra is being cut out of the sacrificial community, deprived of the meat that was available at civic *heortai*, and deprived of the public occasions where young women danced and young men found brides<sup>63</sup>.

Attending public festivals was the prerogative of citizen women, whose most important social function was legitimate citizen marriage leading to motherhood. At civic *heortai* young, unmarried women could be seen in public, respectable and in the company of their protecting families. Non-citizen and slave women had no place at such civic affairs because they were not responsible in this society for producing the next generation of citizens. Emphasizing the point that Electra has had her citizen position in the cultic democracy rightfully restored once she and Orestes kill Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, both Sophocles and Euripides depict Electra as a full female citizen, πολῖτις, at the end of each *Electra* play. As a πολῖτις, Electra addresses her fellow citizen-women, πολίτιδες, in the chorus, and even the polis itself<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> See Euripides, *Electra* 300–313, where Electra gives a message to Orestes: «I beg you stranger, tell Orestes of my troubles and his. Tell him first in what clothing I am dressed, with what dirt I am encrusted, in what sort of a house I dwell after life in a royal palace, myself toiling at the loom to make my garments [or I shall be naked and go without], myself carrying water from the river, *bereft of festivals and deprived of dances*.» 310: ἀνέορτος ἱερῶν καὶ χορῶν τητῶμένη.

<sup>63</sup> See the discussion above in Part Three (p. 14–15) on festivals as venues for dancing and finding mates. Elsewhere, at *Trojan Women* 452, Euripides makes explicit the link between a woman's reduced social status and her inability to attend a festival, as Cassandra cries out: «I have left behind the festivals in which I once used to exult», ἐκλέλοιψ' εορτὰς αἷς πάροιθ' ἡγαλλόμεν.

<sup>64</sup> See Sophocles, *Electra* 1227 where Electra addresses πολίτιδες, her «fellow citizen women»; at Euripides, *Electra* 1335, Electra addresses her πολίτιδες and then the πόλις itself. On women and citizenship in Athens see C. PATTERSON, *art. cit.* (n. 48), and Josine BLOK, *Becoming citizens. Some Notes on the Semantics of 'Citizen' in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens*, forthcoming in *Klio* 2004. A more tragic figure like Antigone, who remains unable to fulfill her role as wife and mother, does not reclaim her

Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannos* gives us another interesting glimpse of how and why women could be excluded from the sacrificial community. In this case, Ismene and Antigone are excluded because of the miasma incurred by their father. When Oedipus grieves that because of him his daughters will be unable to obtain husbands, he also mentions that they will not be accepted at gatherings of citizens. They will be shunned, unable to enjoy the feasts, or to receive their share of the public banquets, *heortai* (Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannos* 1486-1491).

καὶ σφῶ δακρύω, προσβλέπειν γὰρ οὐ σθένω,  
νοούμενος τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ πικροῦ βίου,  
οἷον βιῶναι σφῶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων χρεῶν.  
ποίας γὰρ ἀστῶν ἤξετ' εἰς ὁμιλίας,  
ποίας δ' ἐορτάς, ἔνθεν οὐ κεκλαυμένοι  
πρὸς οἶκον ἵξεσθ' ἀντὶ τῆς θεωρίας<sup>65</sup>.

Oedipus sees that Antigone and Ismene will be deprived of food, specifically meat available at *heortai*, just the same way that Electra is deprived before the return of her brother. Since citizen women were dependent on male guardians to obtain their portion of meat at most *heortai*, women like Antigone and Ismene, whose guardian was excluded from the community for ritual reasons, were out of luck. Cultic democracy managed the diet by regulating citizens' access to meat distributed at feasts, and this could potentially restrict the diet of women.

If this conclusion sounds harsh or far-fetched, it may be surprising to learn that far different types of classical scholarship buttress the observation that women's diets (especially their access to meat protein) were easily, perhaps even regularly, restricted because of the ways in which the Athenian cultic democracy distributed its resources<sup>66</sup>. Peter Garnsey has made significant contributions in this regard<sup>67</sup>. His conclusions are

citizenship but rather becomes a «bride of death». See the excellent discussion in J. LARSON, *op. cit.* (n. 1).

<sup>65</sup> Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannos* 1486-1491. «I weep for you both, although I can not see you, when I consider the remainder of your bitter life, the sort of life that men will make you live. For what gatherings of townspeople will you join, what festivals, without returning home in tears instead of watching the holy rites?»

<sup>66</sup> This is neither to argue that women were relegated to being vegetarians (Osborne's criticism of Detienne's conclusions: *art. cit.* [n. 2], p. 405), nor that men feared what would happen if women were allowed access to the tools of sacrifice. Rather we must keep in mind women's total dependence on their male guardians, even for the most basic necessities in life.

<sup>67</sup> P. GARNSEY, *Food and Society* (n. 6), especially chapters 7 and 8. Garnsey's method is eclectic, certainly broader than most ancient historians. He combines literary and

beyond sobering: he makes a strong case for the endemic malnutrition of all but elite men in Greek society<sup>68</sup>. Citizen males had, for the most part, sole access to the most valuable food resource, the meat distributed after *thusia*; these men were given the task of procuring meat for all the other members of their household. Other segments of the population depended largely on grains for caloric energy<sup>69</sup>. Malnutrition started early and was present in all social classes; in infancy persistent malnutrition began even with nursing customs, and the belief that colostrum was bad for newborns<sup>70</sup>.

Other classicists and economic historians have conducted research that reinforces Garnsey's claims about women and diet. Jameson has looked at meat in the ancient Greek economy, concluding that «the Greeks derived virtually all their meat from the ritual of sacrifice»<sup>71</sup>. Rosivach studied the whole system of Athenian sacrifice; noting that Athenians rarely ate fresh meat except at sacrifices, he analyzes inscriptions that detail the nuts-and-bolts economics of how the democratic polis funded sacrifice, redistributed the food resources, and thereby nourished the Athenian population. While the Athenians, especially Athenian men, may have gotten more meat than Greeks in other cities, they still did not get a great deal<sup>72</sup>. As for the reliance on grain in the ancient diet, another study concludes that men received sufficient rations to support an active lifestyle, but women did not<sup>73</sup>.

documentary historical evidence, osteology, palaeopathology and palaeodiet with comparative studies of dietary customs of other pre-industrial societies.

<sup>68</sup> See Garnsey's discussion of the 'Mediterranean diet' in *Food and Society* (n. 6), chapter 1. The problem with this diet in antiquity is that there really was very little meat consumed (even given the large number of festivals in the calendar), especially by certain social groups, notably women, children and slaves.

<sup>69</sup> P. GARNSEY, *Food and Society* (n. 6), p. 17-21 and 100-112, discusses dependence on grains and women's diets. When sufficient protein is missing from the human diet, serious health problems arise: eye and bone diseases, high infection and mortality rates (see p. 43-61).

<sup>70</sup> See P. GARNSEY, *Food and Society* (n. 6), p. 106ff., for a discussion of nursing customs. The osteological evidence from bones, teeth and skull bones especially, bears the marks of malnutrition throughout childhood (p. 51-60).

<sup>71</sup> M.H. JAMESON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 87. But Jameson goes on to caution (p. 105): «We should not overestimate the amount of meat the ritual added to the diet.» Athenians may have consumed more than others, but it was still not a significant amount, especially by modern standards.

<sup>72</sup> V. ROSIVACH, *op. cit.* (n. 5), examines *thusia* not as a system with religious meanings, but as a complex economic system that redistributes wealth, both at the city-wide, polis level, and at the individual deme level. Most of his evidence is epigraphic.

<sup>73</sup> A study done by Foxhall and Forbes (which admittedly relies on scanty evidence) concludes that «the standard Greek ration [of grain] provided about 2800 cal/day and



Finally, a look at sacrifice in the classical polis from the completely different angle of Art History and iconography underscores these conclusions about culturally defined roles for men and women at occasions of *thusia* and *heortai*<sup>74</sup>. Women are depicted as present only rarely, and when they are visible, it is in their function as *kanephoros*, the young female basket-carrier who kept the sacrificial knife hidden from the animal victim. Only men are depicted wielding the knife and handling the animal as it is being slaughtered, and only men have the privilege of roasting and tasting the *splanchna*. And it is always a man or a youth who carries away the portion of the meat from the table where it is butchered. Presumably this indicates how meat was distributed at a civic banquet, or at least how the Athenians pictured the distribution of meat and the celebration of community at *thusiai* and *heortai*. This is not to say that women were absent from these occasions, only that their roles were limited and, like most spheres of activity in Athenian society, dependent on the status and good-will of their male guardians.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Occasions of *thusia* and *heortai* in classical Athens were occasions for traditional cultic activity that balanced the divine and human, and as such sacrifice and civic festivals were activities that the polis was very interested in. *Thusia* performed vital social and political functions for citizens, especially for elite males but for female citizens, too. It provided a

was adequate for a moderately active adult man»: L. FOXHALL – H.A. FORBES, *Sitometreia: the Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity*, *Chiron* 12 (1982), p. 41-83, esp. 73. There is little extant evidence for women — but what little there is is grim. To fill out the gaps in the ancient evidence Foxhall and Forbes looked to modern Greek comparative data on diet, where they found that an active adult female requires 2400 cal per day, significantly more than the 1300 allotted in the ancient sources (p. 72, 86).

<sup>74</sup> F.T. VAN STRATEN, *op. cit.* (n. 5), examines the Greeks' self-representation of their cultic sacrificial behaviors by collecting and analyzing visual evidence from votive plaques and vases — both published vases and vases in private collections. Women are more often depicted in the votive plaques; in the vases, women are only rarely present at scenes of sacrifice. On p. 115-160 he discusses the post-kill phases when meat was butchered and then consumed by the community; in this phase there are images of men butchering the carcass at a table, and then roasting and eating the *splanchna* (innards), and images of men and boys taking away their portion of the meat. Women are not depicted in the 'post-kill' catalogue of images, with the possible exception of an image of Athena helping Herakles at a sacrifice.

sense of belonging and community; it provided opportunities where civic identity and status within the community could be created, maintained and validated. Public feasts even provided a forum for the selection of spouses. And of course *thusia* and civic banquets provided citizens with calories and protein. These multiple meanings of food and feasting help flesh out our understanding of civic cult practices in the ancient world. Participation in the cultic democracy defined the citizen (male and female), and reinforced a citizen's identity as a member of a family, of a phratry, of a deme, and of the polis.

Looking back to the impasse about women and *thusia* created by the French and British scholars: One side's structuralist claim that there is a strict 'homology' between the political and the religious spheres of life in Greek culture assumes we can actually detect a separation between sacred and secular in the ancient world that does not reflect our own modern categories. The other side's claim that there was a distinct separation between Athenian religious and political behaviors, and that food was a domestic not political issue, makes the same assumption. Perhaps our word and concept 'religion' causes more problems than it solves when we look at social and cultic activities in the Athenian polis, and is simply better left out of the discussion. As others have pointed out, the workings of the Athenian state needed 'religion', and the polis cannot be analyzed with our concepts 'sacred' and 'secular'<sup>75</sup>. It was the job of the state — the polis, the demos, and the phratry — to keep human affairs and divine affairs in their proper balance. Without the proper balance, the polis would not and could not flourish.

The complex rituals of *thusia* accomplished many functions for the Athenians, one of which was maintaining this precise balance between the social world of humans, and the supernatural realm of the gods. Given the unknown exact social circumstances of women in Athenian society, it seems safe to conclude that when women did get to include meat in their diet, it was at those civic festival occasions where their husband, father or male guardian wished to procure it for them. As in most of life's affairs, women were dependent on citizen males.

Athenian democracy was cultic in that various functions of the democracy were committed to upholding the ancestral practices of public, communal worship. The democratic state accomplished this goal at the larger

<sup>75</sup> «Indeed almost all civic activities which we might term secular or profane are carefully linked to a sacred realm» in classical Athens: W.R. CONNOR, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 171.

scale of the centralized polis, and at the smaller, local scale of the demes and phratries. In fact, the traditional practices called τὰ πάτρια and τὰ νομιζόμενα in time came to express the core democratic and imperial values that the Athenians of the fifth century prided themselves in. Feasts constituted the community in classical Athens, and nourished the Athenians' commitment to the polis, its gods, and cultic democracy<sup>76</sup>.

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## A PHOENICIAN KING IN THE SERVICE OF THE PTOLEMIES: PHILOCLES OF SIDON REVISITED

Since the publication some years ago of the present author's paper on king Philocles of Sidon<sup>1</sup>, several related studies have appeared<sup>2</sup>, which prompt some reflection and updating.

Phoenician by birth and Greek by culture, the Sidonian ruler was vested by the first two Ptolemies with far-reaching military, diplomatic and administrative powers. As far as we can infer from the scattered (almost exclusively epigraphical) evidence, Philocles' career covered at least three decades, from about 310<sup>3</sup> to ca. 279/8 BC. Embracing, as it seems, the Aegean as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, his high command can be envisaged as a plenipotentiary generalship or even as a kind of viceroyship of the North<sup>4</sup>.

Polyaenus (III 16), the only literary source in which he appears, styles him 'strategos', whereas in official, epigraphical documents, the title, when mentioned, is always the by far more prestigious 'King of the Sidonians'. As a matter of fact Philocles must have had some fleet squadrons

<sup>1</sup> H. HAUBEN, *Philocles, King of the Sidonians and General of the Ptolemies*, in E. LIPINSKI (ed.), *Phoenicia and the East Mediterranean in the First Millennium B.C. (Studia Phoenicia, V = Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 22)*, Leuven 1987, p. 413-427 [hereafter simply *Philocles*]. Cf. *SEG XXXVIII* (1988) 2005.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. W. HUSS, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit, 332-30 v.Chr.*, München 2001, p. 171-172 n. 603; p. 204 with n. 112; p. 205 n. 122; p. 209 n. 160; p. 211-212; p. 239 n. 13; p. 262 n. 61 and 64.

<sup>3</sup> For the most recent critical edition of the Theban subscription list (cf. *Philocles*, p. 414 n. 4; p. 416-417 n. 18; p. 418 n. 22; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 171 n. 603), see W. AMELING, in K. BRINGMANN – H. VON STEUBEN (edd.), *Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer I*, Berlin 1995, p. 131-133, KNr. 83 [E 1]. For the text as well as a good commentary, see also Brigitte GULLATH, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen (Europäische Hochschulschriften, III 169)*, Frankfurt a.M.–Bern 1982, p. 91-97 (stressing the fact that the same person occurs in l. 18 and 27 and that this person is certainly the Sidonian king; considering 309/8 a possible alternative to 310 [Holleaux] as date of the first gift; cf. p. 165 n. 4). The restoration of Philocles' name in l. 18, where only Φιλο[ ] is preserved, is basically certain since a *politikon* is virtually excluded. The sole sensible possibility would have been Φιλο[μελεΐς], were it not that Philomelion was only founded in the course of the 3rd century BC.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Philocles*, p. 420 with n. 34. For a short overview of his career, see H. HAUBEN, art. *Philoklès*, in E. LIPINSKI (dir.), *Dictionnaire de la civilisation phénicienne et punique*, [Turnhout] 1992, p. 352; W. AMELING, art. *Philokles* 6, in *DNP IX* (2000), col. 831.

at his disposal, for without them it would have been impossible to exercise a command like his. However, there is insufficient reason to define his function as an 'admiralship' (his powers being much more extensive than those of an average fleet commander) and still less to call him 'nauarchos' (as the title is completely lacking in the sources)<sup>5</sup>. But as scholars in the past generally considered Philocles an 'admiral' or 'nauarch', we should not be surprised to find comparatively recent studies still labeling him this way<sup>6</sup>. On principle, especially in this case, such

<sup>5</sup> See *Philocles*, p. 420 n. 36; *SEG XXXVIII* (1988) 2005; W. AMELING, art. *Philocles*.

<sup>6</sup> The list given in *Philocles* (see preceding note) can be expanded now: S.M. BURSTEIN, *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII* (Translated Documents of Greece and Rome), Cambridge 1985, p. 92; W. TRAN-SIER, *Samiake. Epigraphische Studien zur Geschichte von Samos in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit*, Diss. Mannheim 1985, p. 27 and 72; Charis KANTZIA, in *AD* 35 (1980) [1986] (see n. 10), p. 14 n. 87; p. 15; Marie-Françoise BASLEZ, *Cultes et dévotions des Phéniciens en Grèce: les divinités marines*, in Corinne BONNET – E. LIPINSKI – P. MARCHETTI (edd.), *Religio Phoenicia (Studia Phoenicia, IV)*, Namur 1986, p. 289-305, esp. 301 (the statement that in the inscription on the Athenian base in honour of Philocles, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 3425* [= L. MORETTI, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche I*, Firenze 1967, p. 36-37 no. 17], «l'Aphrodite Euploia du Pirée est honorée par le navarque Philoclès de Sidon» is completely unfounded); G. SHIPLEY, *A History of Samos, 800-188 BC*, Oxford 1987, p. 298 («Philadelphus' chief admiral»); J.D. GRAINGER, *Hellenistic Phoenicia*, Oxford 1991, p. 62-64 (dating Philocles' death to 278 [p. 63] or «soon after 278» [p. 64], in fact a pure — for devoid of any explicit evidence — but not completely senseless hypothesis based on the subsequent silence of the sources); Nina JIDEJIAN – E. LIPINSKI, art. *Sidon*, in *Dict. civ. phén. pun.*, p. 413-417, esp. 416; B. DREYER, *Der Beginn der Freiheitsphase Athens 287 v.Chr. und das Datum der Panathenäen und Ptolemaia im Kalliasdekret*, in *ZPE* 111 (1996), p. 45-67, esp. 55 n. 70 («Nauarch und 'Vizekönig'»); Marie-Françoise BASLEZ, *Le sanctuaire de Délos dans le dernier tiers du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle. Etude historique des premiers inventaires de l'indépendance*, in *REA* 99 (1997), p. 345-356, esp. 351, 353, 354; A.G. WOODHEAD, *The Athenian Agora XVI. Inscriptions: The Decrees*, Princeton (NJ) 1997, p. 248-249 no. 173 (still based on Tarn's obsolete but uncommonly tenacious theory concerning the alleged ten years' duration of the Ptolemaic *nauarchia* [*JHS* 53, 1933, p. 61-68]: in fact we do not know when exactly Philocles' mandate came to an end, although the proposed date 278/7 is not impossible in itself); Marie-Françoise BASLEZ – F. BRIQUEL-CHATONNET, *Un exemple d'intégration phénicienne au monde grec: les Sidoniens au Pirée à la fin du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in *Atti del II Congresso Internazionale di Studi Fenici e Punici I*, Roma 1991, p. 229-240, esp. 236; B. DREYER, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des spätklassischen Athen (322-ca. 230 v.Chr.)* (*Historia*, Einzelschr. 137), Stuttgart 1999, p. 210 n. 64; p. 231 (also following Tarn: «der erste Bekannte einer Reihe von ptolemäischen Nauarchen und 'Vizekönigen' ..., dem Kallikrates [278/7] und Patroklos [etwa 268ff] folgten»); p. 457; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 204 with n. 112 (suggesting that Philocles could have been the admiral of the Ptolemaic fleet [150 ships] off Aegina in 295 [Plut., *Demetr.* 33.7]); p. 211 n. 181 (but rightly considering him «Vizekönig» as well: p. 171 n. 603; p. 239 n. 13). Though obviously rejecting Tarn's theory and underlining that «eine Bezeichnung für die Stellung des Philokles in den ägäischen

designations should be avoided since it is still not completely clear how the early Ptolemaic admiralty was organized nor what the specific meaning was of the term 'nauarchia' in each particular instance. Let us, therefore, only speak of a 'nauarchos' when the sources expressly allow us to do so<sup>7</sup>.

Sporadically we still encounter the famous story according to which it was Philocles (allegedly in Demetrius' service) who at a certain moment handed over the Sidonian, Phoenician, or Demetrius' fleet to Ptolemy I, thus lending him full control over the seas<sup>8</sup>. Needless to repeat that the story is a typical factoid<sup>9</sup>.

Very promising was the discovery in 1982 of a bilingual Coan inscription. Published four years later by Charis Kantzia and M. Sznycer<sup>10</sup>, it

Besitzungen» is lacking in the sources, R. BEHRWALD (*Der Lykische Bund. Untersuchungen zu Geschichte und Verfassung* [Antiquitas, I 48], Bonn 2000, p. 70 n. 219; cf. p. 71) still contends that the Nesiotic League was under the higher command of Ptolemaic admirals, implying that Philocles was one of them.

<sup>7</sup> On this kind of issues, see H. HAUBEN, *Callicrates of Samos. A Contribution to the Study of the Ptolemaic Admiralty* (Studia Hellenistica, 18), Leuven 1970, p. 67-70; *Het vlootbevelhebberschap in de vroege diadochentijd (323-301 vóór Christus). Een prosopografisch en institutioneel onderzoek* (Verhand. Kon. Acad. Wet., Lett. en Schone Kunsten v. België, Kl. Lett., Jg. 37, Nr. 77), Brussel 1975, p. 125-142; *Onesicritus and the Hellenistic 'Archikybernesis'*, in W. WILL – J. HEINRICHS (edd.), *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*, I, Amsterdam 1987, p. 569-593; *Timosthène et les autres amiraux de nationalité rhodienne au service des Ptolémées*, in G. GIZELIS (ed.), *Proceedings of the International Scientific Symposium Rhodes: 24 Centuries, October 1-5, 1992*, Athina 1996, p. 220-242, esp. 229-234.

For analogous reasons similar reticences are to be recommended when dealing with presumed *naukleroi*: see my remarks in *ZPE* 28 (1978), p. 106-107; *AfP* 43 (1997), p. 32-33; cf., on the other hand, Marie-Françoise BASLEZ, *Le rôle et la place des Phéniciens dans la vie économique des ports de l'Egée*, in E. LIPINSKI (ed.), *Phoenicia and the East Mediterranean* (n. 1), p. 267-285, esp. 274-275, although well aware of the terminological problem, explicitly attributing the status of *naukleros* to Zenon (*Pros. Ptol.* VI 16387), the brother of Abdemoun of Sidon in *P. Ryl.* IV 554 (ca. 260 BC; cf. Catherine APICELLA, *Sidon à l'époque hellénistique: quelques problèmes méconnus*, in *La Syrie hellénistique* [Topoi Orient-Occident, Suppl. 4], Paris 2003, p. 125-147, esp. p. 140).

<sup>8</sup> Thus A. MEHL, *Zypern und die grossen Mächte im Hellenismus*, in *AncSoc* 26 (1995), p. 93-132, esp. 113-114: «Demetrius' Flotte unter dem Kommando des sidonischen Stadtkönigs Philokles ging zu Ptolemaios über»; B. DREYER, *Untersuchungen* (n. 6), p. 231.

<sup>9</sup> On its origins and evolution, see *Philocles*, p. 416-417 with n. 19. To be added to the list: Susan M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Cos. An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* (Hypomnemata, 51), Göttingen 1978, p. 90 n. 47 (only presented, however, as a possibility).

<sup>10</sup> Charis KANTZIA, ... ΤΙΜΟΣ ΑΒΔΑΛΩΝΥΜΟΥ [ΣΙΔΑ]ΩΝΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ. Μια δῆγλωση ελληνική-φοινικική επιγραφή από την Κω, in *AD* 35 (1980) [1986],

provided the first epigraphical attestation of king Abdalonymos (Abdalonim) of Sidon<sup>11</sup>, who had been appointed in 332 by Alexander to replace Straton (Abdastart) II or III<sup>12</sup>. The inscription shows that Abdalonim's son [Dio?]timos (henceforth: 'Diotimos'), after having some object made, dedicated it to Lady Aphrodite-Astarte<sup>13</sup> in Cos «on behalf and to the benefit of (all) the sailors». The text likely refers to some public utility intended to facilitate and support navigation<sup>14</sup>. After a recent revision of the Phoenician text by Sznycer leading to some improvements in reading and interpretation<sup>15</sup>, it has become certain «qu'il s'agit d'un terme en rapport avec l'activité maritime dans le port de Cos», probably an embankment or mole in or at the entrance to the harbour<sup>16</sup>. As this «monument maritime»<sup>17</sup> was obviously an important construction, it must have taken several months to build it, implying that Diotimos' presence was protracted or repeated: «la flottille sidonienne, sous le commandement du fils du roi Abdalonim, était stationnée à Cos durablement, peut-être même à demeure». But whether we are allowed to conclude that the works were executed «sous la direction des ingénieurs et des spécialistes sidoniens, utilisant sans doute la main-d'œuvre locale»<sup>18</sup> is another matter.

p. 1-16, and M. SZNYCER, *La partie phénicienne de l'inscription bilingue gréco-phénicienne de Cos*, *ibid.*, p. 17-30; *SEG XXXVI* (1986) 758 (where «Artemis» in the title is to be corrected of course). Cf. Corinne BONNET – E. LIPINSKI, art. *Cos*, in *Dict. civ. phén. pun.*, p. 121; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 173 n. 609.

<sup>11</sup> Not the last king of Sidon, as erroneously claimed by C. KANTZIA, in *AD 35* (1980) [1986], p. 6 and 10; more correctly p. 14 n. 87. The same mistake is made in the commentary on *SEG XXXVI* (1986) 758.

<sup>12</sup> On these kings, see R.A. BILLOWS, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1990, p. 444-445 no. 129; E. LIPINSKI, art. *Abdalonymos*, in *Dict. civ. phén. pun.*, p. 1; H. HAUBEN, art. *Straton*, *ibid.*, p. 427-428.

<sup>13</sup> On the cult of Aphrodite in Cos, see Vinciane PIRENNE-DELFORGE, *L'Aphrodite grecque* (*Kernos*, Suppl. 4), Athènes–Liège 1994, p. 120; 372 n. 7; 385; 434. The goddess always had a special connection with the sea: *ibid.*, p. 433-437.

<sup>14</sup> C. BONNET – E. LIPINSKI, art. *Cos* (n. 10): «une jetée (?) ou un autre ouvrage d'art devant servir aux navigateurs». Cf. M. SZNYCER, in *AD 35* (1980) [1986], p. 23-24.

<sup>15</sup> M. SZNYCER, *Retour à Cos. Nouvel examen de la partie phénicienne de la bilingue gréco-phénicienne*, in *Semitica* 49 (1999) [2000], p. 103-116; *SEG XLIX* (1999) 1119 bis.

<sup>16</sup> M. SZNYCER, *Retour à Cos*, p. 111.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113. No longer should we think of offerings like an altar or so (C. APICELLA, *Sidon* [n. 7], p. 132).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.



Like Philocles and his father Apollodoros<sup>19</sup>, as well as the two or three Stratons of the previous generations, the young prince bore a Greek name, implying that Abdalonim's dynasty too was quite Hellenized<sup>20</sup>.

Whereas the palaeography points to the last quarter of the 4th century<sup>21</sup>, 332 being the absolute *terminus post quem*, the exact historical setting remains obscure<sup>22</sup>. It is practically sure that Diotimos' father was still alive and in office at the moment of the dedication<sup>23</sup>. On the other hand, we do not know when or in what circumstances Abdalonim's reign came to an end<sup>24</sup>: we are still ignorant about the date of his death — some have suggested that he was killed in the battle of Gaza in 312, which would provide a *terminus ante quem* for the inscription, but this remains highly hypothetical<sup>25</sup> — as we are about the date of his — equally

<sup>19</sup> For possible Phoenician names underlying those of Philocles and Apollodoros, see now W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 172 n. 603.

<sup>20</sup> There is no positive evidence for J.D. GRAINGER's cautious suggestion (*Hellenistic Phoenicia* [n. 6], p. 63-64) that Philocles, if not related to the Straton/Abdastart line, might have been a Greek or Macedonian, 'externally' appointed by Ptolemy I to the throne of Sidon. Hellenizers among the Phoenician elite in Phoenicia and Cyprus were not that exceptional: see *Philocles*, p. 424-427, where the relevant bibliography is given; cf. Cl. BAURAIN–Anne DESTROOPER–GEORGIADIS, in Véronique KRINGS (ed.), *La civilisation phénicienne et punique. Manuel de recherche (Handbuch der Orientalistik, I 20)*, Leiden 1995, p. 628. See also now C. APICELLA, *Sidon* (n. 7), p. 132 (cf. 136), rightly stressing the probability of Philocles' Phoenician origin. The Macedonian Menelaos as king of Salamis (Grainger, p. 64) is not a good parallel as he was Ptolemy's own brother: *Philocles*, p. 424 n. 60.

<sup>21</sup> C. KANTZIA, in *AD 35* (1980) [1986], p. 3, 11; M. SZNYCER, *ibid.*, p. 20 («à dater, en gros, de 300 av. J.-C.») and 22; *Retour à Cos* (n. 15), p. 114. Cf. *SEG XXXVI* (1986) 758.

<sup>22</sup> See esp. J.D. GRAINGER, *Hellenistic Phoenicia*, p. 61-62; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 173 n. 609.

<sup>23</sup> According to J.D. GRAINGER (*Hellenistic Phoenicia*, p. 61), the text, strictly speaking, does not prove that Abdalonim was still reigning at the time; conversely: C. KANTZIA, in *AD 35* (1980) [1986], p. 11; M. SZNYCER, *Retour à Cos* (n. 15), p. 114: «l'inscription phénicienne indique clairement que la mission du fils du roi Abdalonimos a eu lieu encore du vivant de son père, car ce dernier y porte la titulature habituelle des rois sidoniens, à savoir, le nom royal y est précédé et suivi du terme 'roi'». Apart from that, even if we assume that Abdalonim was still alive, this would in itself not rule out the possibility that he was already out of office. (In the same way is it perfectly conceivable that Philocles was still only a king *in partibus* at the time of his generous donations in Thebes.) However, if Szzyner's new reading of l. 3 of the Phoenician text (*Retour à Cos*, p. 113 [«sous toutes réserves»]) is correct, the funds for the construction were taken from the treasury of the Eshmun temple, which would mean that Abdalonim was actually in power when the donation was made.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Philocles*, p. 416, where possible dates are given. See also W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 162-163 n. 536.

<sup>25</sup> This view is based on specific interpretations of the so-called Alexander sarcophagus of Sidon that ascribe it to Abdalonim: see E. LIPINSKI, art. *Abdalonimos*

uncertain — deposition<sup>26</sup>. So we can hardly guess when, for what reason and for how long Diotimos came to the island of Cos. In view of the *pleontes* he is referring to, his activities have in all probability to be set in a maritime (military<sup>27</sup> or commercial<sup>28</sup>?) context<sup>29</sup>. Was his gift intended mainly for the local people, their port, their ships, their seamen<sup>30</sup>? Or should the dedication be linked (also) to the fleet interests of some Diadoch, his war operations or commercial activities? At any rate, Diotimos' intervention confirms the traditional involvement of Sidonian kings in maritime affairs<sup>31</sup>.

We are also completely ignorant of possible family ties as well as of the exact political relationship between Philocles and the house of Abdalonim. However, as far as we can conjecture from the history of Sidon in that period, it may be wise not to ally Philocles too closely with Abdalonim's family, which was probably pro-Antigonos<sup>32</sup>. That means

(n. 12), and fig. 1, p. 1; J. FERRON, art. *Sarcophages*, in *Dict. civ. phén. pun.*, p. 391-393. Whereas this attribution now seems widely accepted, in spite of remaining doubts (cf. *Philocles*, p. 422 n. 43; M. SZNYCER, in *AD* 35, 1980 [1986], p. 25, obviously still sceptical at the time), it is far from certain that it is the battle of Gaza which is represented on one of the scenes of the sarcophagus and that Abdalonim was killed there (thus M. SZNYCER, *Retour à Cos* [n. 15], p. 114-116, now cautiously endorsing to a certain extent the well-elaborated view of V. VON GRAEVE, *Der Alexandersarkophag und seine Werkstatt* [Istanbuler Forschungen, 28], Berlin 1970 [cf. *SEG* XLIX, 1999, 1119 bis, turning Sznycers's hypothesis into a certainty]; cf. C. KANTZIA, in *AD* 35, 1980 [1986], p. 11): see H. LAUTER's critical remarks in *Gnomon* 45 (1973), p. 178-184, esp. 182-183.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Philocles*, p. 416.

<sup>27</sup> Thus M. SZNYCER, *Retour à Cos* (n. 15), p. 114: «dans le cadre d'une mission diplomatique et militaire officielle».

<sup>28</sup> According to W. HUSS (*Ägypten*, p. 173 n. 609), Diotimos «scheint kaum in militärisch-politische, sondern eher in ökonomische Geschäfte verwickelt gewesen zu sein», but in fact we do not know. Aphrodite, for that matter, patronized sailors of both categories. For an analogous case, see H. HAUBEN, «*Ceux qui naviguent sur la mer extérieure*» (*SB* III 7169), in *ZPE* 59 (1985), p. 135-136.

<sup>29</sup> No more than in the case of Philocles (cf. n. 7 above) is it advisable to see in Diotimos a 'nauarch', as do M.F. BASLEZ — F. BRIQUEL-CHATONNET, *Un exemple d'intégration* (n. 6), p. 239.

<sup>30</sup> On Cos as a small but well-organized maritime power in the Hellenistic period, see, e.g., P. BAKER, *Cos et Calymna, 205-200 a.C.: Esprit civique et défense nationale*, Québec 1991, *passim* and esp. p. 28-30, 58-60; ID., *Remarques sur la défense à Cos à l'époque hellénistique*, in *REA* 103 (2001), p. 183-195, esp. 187-188.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. H. HAUBEN, *The King of the Sidonians and the Persian Imperial Fleet*, in *Anc-Soc* 1 (1970), p. 1-8; J. ELAYI, *Sidon, cité autonome de l'Empire perse*, Paris 1989, p. 113-114 and 137-195 (*passim*).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. J.D. GRAINGER, *Hellenistic Phoenicia* (n. 6), p. 62-63. W. HUSS (*Ägypten*, p. 173 n. 609), on the other hand, remains rather agnostic: «Es ist keineswegs ausgemacht, daß

that Diotimos' dedication in Cos can only have happened under specific conditions.

We have to make a distinction between the period before and that after ca. 310, when the pro-Ptolemaic Philocles made his first appearance on the international scene as a possible rival of Abdalonim. Between 332 and ca. 310 any occasion seems fitting, except when Cos and/or Sidon were under Ptolemaic sway, and if at the same time a state of war existed between Ptolemy and the Antigonids. That means that the period 320-315 (or 314), when Sidon was controlled by Ptolemy — until the outbreak of the Third War of the Diadochi<sup>33</sup> — is perfectly adequate but that the last months of 314 (or 313<sup>34</sup>), when, during that same war, Seleucus was stationed in Cos with a Ptolemaic fleet<sup>35</sup>, are not. Also excluded is a short period in late 312/spring 311 when Sidon was again Ptolemaic<sup>36</sup>. After ca. 310 the situation becomes different, as Abdalonim (if still alive) is definitely *persona non grata* with Ptolemy: any period during which Cos and/or Sidon were controlled by Ptolemy is out of the question now, whether or not he was at war with Antigonus and Demetrius. That was the case during the (fall and) winter of 309/8 and the ensuing spring, when Ptolemaic headquarters were established in Cos, where Berenice gave birth to Ptolemy II<sup>37</sup>. So we may be sure that Diotimos did not turn up to bring her a present. Conversely, since the island was under Antigonid rule from the Ptolemaic débâcle off Salamis (306) — or shortly

(der Sohn des Abdalonymos) zu Philokles in einem politischen Gegensatz stand». At any rate, the fact that it was not Diotimos, but Philocles who became the new king of the Sidonians (and/or was recognized as such by Ptolemy) clearly points to a certain animosity between both local dynasties as well as between Ptolemy and the family of Abdalonim (at least at the moment of Philocles' accession); cf., for that matter, *Ägypten*, p. 162-163 n. 536.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Philocles*, p. 415; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 146.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 153-154.

<sup>35</sup> Diod. XIX 68.4; cf. H. HAUBEN, *Vlootbevelhebberschap* (n. 7), p. 87; as to the significance of this episode, see H.-U. WIEMER, *Krieg, Handel und Piraterie. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos* (Klio, Beihefte N.F. 6), Berlin 2002, p. 76.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. J.K. WINNICKI, *Militäroperationen von Ptolemaios I. und Seleukos I. in Syrien in den Jahren 312-311 v.Chr. (I)*, in *AncSoc* 20 (1989), p. 55-92, esp. 62-64; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 162-164.

<sup>37</sup> Diod. XX 27.3 (cf. 37.1); *Marmor Parium* (FGrHist 239) B 19 (309/08); Theocritus 17.58-76; Callimachus *H.* 4 (*Del.*) 160-170. Cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 176-177; H.-U. WIEMER, *Krieg* (n. 35), p. 228-229. For more details on the often unclear position of Cos during the Diadochian period, see S.M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Cos* (n. 9), p. 82-90 (suggesting that Cos could have remained under Ptolemaic sway for the whole period between 314 [313] and 309).

before — until the battle of Ipsos (301)<sup>38</sup>, if not until Demetrius' final disappearance (286)<sup>39</sup>, the years 306-301<sup>40</sup> and even 301-286<sup>41</sup> (if we accept a very long reign for Abdalonim) are a real possibility. In short, Diotimos' dedication belongs either to the period before late 314 (313), or (less probably<sup>42</sup>) to that between 313 (312) and mid-309 (except for a short time in 312/1), or to that from mid-308 (or, at the latest, 306) on. Further speculation about the exact circumstances is irrelevant.

Anyway, at the time of the second Ptolemy's birth in Cos<sup>43</sup> Philocles was already in the running<sup>44</sup>. It is obvious that he was staying at or near Ptolemaic headquarters at Cos: taking part as Sidon's king or future king<sup>45</sup> in Ptolemy's 308 expedition to Greece, he contributed lavishly, for a second time, to the reconstruction of Thebes, a city Greek tradition linked with his own<sup>46</sup>. It is tempting to believe that it was thanks to him, and because of his close ties with Thebes, that the Boeotian Bacchon<sup>47</sup> was appointed Nesiarch, governor of the Islands<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> Cf., e.g., Sheila L. AGER, *A Royal Arbitration between Klazomenai and Teos?*, in *ZPE* 85 (1991), p. 87-97, esp. 94.

<sup>39</sup> S.M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Cos* (n. 9), p. 85-88.

<sup>40</sup> Thus C. KANTZIA, in *AD* 35 (1980) [1986], p. 14.

<sup>41</sup> The history of Sidon is of little help here, as the date of her return into Ptolemaic obedience is debated: see *Philocles*, p. 415; cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 204-205 with n. 121.

<sup>42</sup> See n. 37.

<sup>43</sup> According to E. GRZYBEK (*Du calendrier macédonien au calendrier ptolémaïque. Problèmes de chronologie hellénistique* [Schweiz. Beitr. zur Altertumswiss., 20], Basel 1990, p. 97 n. 53; p. 168 and 175; cf. H. HAUBEN, *La chronologie macédonienne et ptolémaïque mise à l'épreuve*, in *CE* 67, 1992, p. 143-171, esp. 159), Ptolemy II was born on 12 Dystros, which means, according to his table on p. 182, 12 November 309.

<sup>44</sup> As is proven by the Theban subscription list (n. 3) and as can be deduced from Philocles' dedications in Delos, one of which was probably made on the occasion of the 308 expedition: see *Philocles*, p. 419 n. 330.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Philocles*, p. 415.

<sup>46</sup> See *Philocles*, p. 416 n. 18.

<sup>47</sup> *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15038; K.J. RIGSBY, *Bacchon the Nesiarch on Delos*, in *AJPh* 101 (1980), p. 194-196. Cf. also P.M. NIGDELIS, *Πολίτευμα και κοινωνία των πόλεων των Κυκλάδων κατά την Ελληνιστική και Αυτοκρατορική εποχή*, Thessaloniki 1990, p. 211 n. 57; p. 267 n. 310. The restitution ναύαρχου in l. 2-3 of the *Iscrizioni di Cos* (M. SEGRÉ, posthumous edition), Roma 1993, ED 129 (*IG* XII 5, p. XVI, 1310 = *OGIS* 43 = W.R. PATON – E.L. HICKS, *The Inscriptions of Cos*, Oxford 1891, 16) is of course unwarranted. We find similar slips in P.M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, Oxford 1972, II, p. 53 n. 121 («Bacchon, the earliest of the Ptolemaic nauarchs»), and in J. TRÉHEUX, in *BCH* 109 (1985), p. 496 n. 48 («navarque béotien»).

<sup>48</sup> To some extent already suggested by F. DURRBACH, *Choix d'inscriptions de Délos*, I, Paris 1921, p. 28-29.

Until a few years ago, the Telmessos decree published by Wörrle<sup>49</sup>, the only document of the Philocles files to offer a precise time indication (4 Dios, year 4 of Ptolemy II), was considered the possibly latest testimony concerning the Sidonian king, the date being interpreted as September 279. In the meantime the studies of Hazzard and Grzybek have made clear that the decree is to be situated in August/September 282<sup>50</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> M. WÖRRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen zur Geschichte Lykiens*, II. *Ptolemaios II. und Telmessos*, in *Chiron* 8 (1978), p. 201-246, esp. 201-202 (= *SEG XXVIII* [1978] 1224 = Haritini KOTSIDU, *TIMH KAI ΔΟΞΑ. Ehrungen für hellenistische Herrscher im griechischen Mutterland und in Kleinasien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der archäologischen Denkmäler*, Berlin 2000, KNr. 291); cf. p. 212-216. See also M. WÖRRLE, *Telmessos in hellenistischer Zeit*, in *Actes du colloque sur la Lycie antique (Bibliothèque de l'Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 27)*, Paris 1980, p. 63-72; G.M. COHEN, *The Hellenistic Settlements in Europe, the Islands, and Asia Minor*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1995, p. 54 with n. 90.

<sup>50</sup> R.A. HAZZARD, *The Regnal Years of Ptolemy II Philadelphos*, in *Phoenix* (Toronto) 41 (1987), p. 140-158, esp. 146-147; E. GRZYBEK, *Calendrier* (n. 43), p. 124-129; cf. p. 184; M. WÖRRLE, in *Chiron* 21 (1991), p. 229 n. 122. See the discussion in H. HAUBEN, *Chronologie macédonienne* (n. 43), p. 163-164. Cf. J. KOBES, «Kleine Könige». *Untersuchungen zu den Lokaldynastien im hellenistischen Kleinasien (323-188 v.Chr.)* (Pharos, 8), St. Katharinen 1996, p. 59, 146, and a lapse p. 147 (still 279 instead of 282); R. BEHRWALD, *Der Lykische Bund* (n. 6), p. 61, 64, 66, 70; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 254 with n. 18, and p. 262 n. 61; M. DOMINGO GYGAX, *Untersuchungen zu den lykischen Gemeinwesen in klassischer Zeit* (Antiquitas, I 49), Bonn 2001, p. 21, 159-160; W. TIETZ, *Der Golf von Fethiye. Politische, ethnische und kulturelle Strukturen einer Grenzregion vom Beginn der nachweisbaren Besiedlung bis in die römische Kaiserzeit* (Antiquitas, I 50), Bonn 2003, p. 308 n. 59 (wrongly 281/0); p. 342 n. 264 (giving the correct year: 282/1). [In the same way the inscription of Termessos mentioning a Pamphyliarch published by L. ROBERT, *Documents de l'Asie Mineure méridionale. Inscriptions, monnaies et géographie* (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain, 2), Genève-Paris 1966, p. 53 (cf. Jeanne & L. ROBERT, *Bull. épigr.* 1967, 601; *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15084) belongs to Audnaios 281 — September-October, according to the table of Grzybek (*Calendrier*, p. 184) — (thus, correctly, Robert; cf. Elizabeth KOSMETATOU, *Pisidia and the Hellenistic Kings from 323 to 133 B.C.*, in *AncSoc* 28, 1997, p. 5-37, esp. 19) and not to 278 (thus G.M. COHEN, *Hellenistic Settlements* (n. 49), p. 54, also giving the obsolete date of 279 for the Telmessos inscription).]

At present the Samian decree *SEG* I (1923) 363 *could* be (one of) the latest document(s) on Philocles. The *terminus a quo* generally given is 279 or 279/8 (cf. *Philocles*, p. 418 n. 24, referring to I.L. MERKER, *The Ptolemaic Officials and the League of the Islanders*, in *Historia* 19, 1970, p. 141-160, esp. 149, and T.L. SHEAR, Jr., *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.* [*Hesperia*, Suppl. 17], Princeton [NJ] 1978, p. 44) since it refers to Milesian judges coming to Samos. We know that Miletus, still Seleucid in 280/79, was in the next year under the control or influence of Ptolemy II (see W. AMELING, *Schenkungen* [n. 3], I, p. 324-326, KNr. 275 [E 1], with balanced commentary). Although the argument is not wholly conclusive — in principle these external dikasts did not necessarily have to come from inside the Ptolemaic sphere of influence — the conclusion seems the most likely: cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 262 with n. 64 (situating the Samos decree «etwa im J. 279»). A date «about 280» (thus G. SHIPLEY, *History of Samos* [n. 6], p. 223; J. KOBES, «Kleine Könige», p. 215 n. 32) looks a little bit too early. It is very tempting to

Whereas the Telmessians' extreme fear of being assigned by Ptolemy II as a *dorea* is completely understandable in the international context of late 279<sup>51</sup>, the historical circumstances appear to have been quite different three years before<sup>52</sup>. In 279 Arsinoë (II), frustrated in her ambitions, had just returned to Egypt as a fugitive queen and dismissed *dorea* holder (Heraclea Pontica)<sup>53</sup>. At that moment her brother was obviously trying to tighten his grip on southern Asia Minor, thus endangering the stability in the region<sup>54</sup>. In 282, on the contrary, the world was still looking quiet and peaceful. But this could be a false impression, as the tragedy at the Lysimachean court might already have taken place<sup>55</sup>. If it did not directly affect conditions in southern Asia Minor or in Alexandria<sup>56</sup>, it was nevertheless the first serious shock announcing the end of the Diadochian era. Was it perhaps that shock that filled the Telmessians with fear about

situate the Samian decree as early as possible (279/8) in order to make it contemporaneous with the Nicuria decree (on which see *infra*) because of Philocles' presence on the island. At any rate, there is no particular reason to date the decree specifically to 278/7 as does B. DREYER, *Untersuchungen* (n. 6), p. 232 n. 170 (referring to W.W. TARN, *The First Syrian War*, in *JHS* 46, 1946, p. 155-162, esp. 158 n. 14, where the date is based on Tarn's obsolete chronology of the first Syrian War and of the second Ptolemy's letter to Miletus, *Milet* I 3, 139).

<sup>51</sup> See M. WÖRRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 216-218.

<sup>52</sup> A short discussion on this issue is given by J. KOBES, «*Kleine Könige*» (n. 50), p. 61-63, concluding that the problem must remain unsolved.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 306-307.

<sup>54</sup> Although it does not seem appropriate to speak any longer of a so-called 'Carian War' or 'Syrian War of Succession' in the years 280-279: see W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 261-262. Cf. H. HEINEN, in *CAH* VII 1<sup>2</sup>, Cambridge 1984, p. 415: «there are many indications that Ptolemy exploited the temporary weakness of Antiochus to acquire or extend Ptolemaic possessions in western and southern Asia Minor. However, the exact extent of Ptolemaic acquisitions cannot be ascertained».

<sup>55</sup> The murder of Agathocles is currently situated in 283/2, although the chronology is not completely certain: H. HEINEN, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. Zur Geschichte der Zeit des Ptolemaios Keraunos und zum Chremonideischen Krieg* (*Historia*, Einzelschr. 20), Wiesbaden 1972, p. 17-20; cf. Elizabeth D. CARNEY, *Arsinoë before she was Philadelphus*, in *AHB* 8.4 (1994), p. 123-131, esp. 125 («c. 283-2»); W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 256 («wohl im J. 283/82»); M. DOMINGO GYGAX, *Untersuchungen* (n. 50), p. 152 n. 13 («283/282, aber es sind sämtliche Jahre zwischen 286 und 282 vorgeschlagen worden»). At any rate, the Telmessos decree was issued shortly before Seleucus' crossing of the Taurus («wohl gegen Ende des Jahres 282»: W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 257), only four to six months before the battle of Corupedium (about Jan./Febr. 281) and one year before the assassination of Seleucus (Aug./Sept. 281: cf. Huss, *ibid.*).

<sup>56</sup> As there was in 282 still no question of a possible return of Arsinoë II to Egypt, Ptolemy's *dorea* plans cannot possibly have concerned his sister, as is wrongly maintained by M. DOMINGO GYGAX (*Untersuchungen* [n. 50], p. 158 with n. 47; p. 160 n. 69), basing himself on M. WÖRRLE (*Epigraphische Forschungen* II [n. 49], p. 217-218), who, as we saw, initially put the episode in 279.



their future<sup>57</sup>? If it is true, as Huss thinks<sup>58</sup>, that (secret?) negotiations took place between Ptolemy and Seleucus before the latter's intervention in the Lysimachean tragedy, it does not seem strange that the Telmessians for one reason or another became suspicious. Or had some reports reached them about the internal troubles at the Ptolemaic court during the last months before and the first few months after the death of Ptolemy I<sup>59</sup> (late in 283 or, rather, early in 282<sup>60</sup>), making them worry about the political stability of their city<sup>61</sup>? A sensible, albeit hypothetical explanation<sup>62</sup> could also be sought in some initiative taken by the elder Ptolemy: if we imagine that he promised the city as a kind of consolation prize to a member (but who?) of the disadvantaged clan of his former wife Eurydice (who, for that matter, may have received a Ptolemaic *dorea* in the neighbourhood of Miletus between ca. 290 and 286<sup>63</sup>) and their son Keraunos, the king's death could have been an excellent occasion for the Telmessians to send an embassy to his successor requesting the outright

<sup>57</sup> It is somewhat strange to find that precisely one of the main actors of the drama, Arsinoe and Lysimachus' son Ptolemaios, the murderer of Agathocles, would end his career, from the early 50s (Huss) or, rather, the middle or late 40s (Wörle, Kobes, Behrwald, Tietz) of the third century, as Ptolemaic *dorea* holder of Telmessos, the first of a petty dynasty: see M. WÖRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 218-221; J. KOBES, «Kleine Könige» (n. 50), p. 146-148; R. BEHRWALD, *Der Lykische Bund* (n. 6), p. 66; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 312; W. TIETZ, *Der Golf von Fethiye* (n. 50), p. 309. A kind of compromise has been proposed by R.A. BILLOWS (*Kings and Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995, p. 101-103) and M. DOMINGO GYGAX (*Untersuchungen* [n. 50], p. 157-160), basically endorsing Wörle's view: perhaps Ptolemaios got some landed property near Telmessos as *dorea* since 258/6 whereas he received the city only shortly before 240.

<sup>58</sup> W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 257-258, 261. Cf. n. 71 and 73 below.

<sup>59</sup> Concerning «die erbitterten Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den beiden Thronprätendenten und ihren Fraktionen», see W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 249-250, 253-255; cf. p. 265, 304-306.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 249 n. 11.

<sup>61</sup> On these troubles, see R.A. HAZZARD, *Regnal Years* (n. 50), p. 148-151.

<sup>62</sup> I am particularly indebted to my colleague Lucia CRISCUOLO (Bologna) for this interesting suggestion.

<sup>63</sup> The assumption is based on Plut., *Demetr.* 46.5 (marriage of Demetrius to Ptolemy and Eurydice's daughter Ptolemais; cf. W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 210 with n. 172; p. 255): see M. WÖRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen zur Geschichte Lykiens* I, in *Chiron* 7 (1977), p. 43-66, esp. 56 n. 75 («aus ptolemäischen Landbesitz» near the city); cf. ID., *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 207; M. DOMINGO GYGAX, *Untersuchungen* (n. 50), p. 160 n. 69. On that marriage, see also M. OBRADOVIC, *Milet I 3, 139: Alliance between Ptolemy and Miletos and the Marriage of Demetrios and Ptolemais*, in *Mélanges d'Histoire et d'Epigraphie offerts à Fanoula Papazoglou*, Beograd 1997, p. 257-274, esp. 264, not taking into account, however, that it was contracted not in, but in the neighbourhood of (περι), Miletus.



cancellation of this plan. The whole diplomatic operation could have taken several months. To the new monarch the situation would have offered a welcome opportunity to strengthen his ties with a well-situated Greek city as well as give a clear signal to his half-brother and (latent) opponents within the dynasty.

The most famous inscription in which we see Philocles at work is the so-called Nicuria decree<sup>64</sup>, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> I 390 = *IG* XII/7, 506<sup>65</sup>, by which the delegates of the League of the Islanders<sup>66</sup>, summoned to Samos by Philocles and Bacchon<sup>67</sup>, formally recognized the newly established<sup>68</sup> Alexandrian *Ptolemai(ei)a* as isolympic, i.e. equivalent to the Olympic games. For various reasons the decree is usually dated to the period 280-278, i.e. to 280, 280/79 or, at the latest, 279/8, the year in which the first Alexandrian *Ptolemaia* are generally believed to have been celebrated<sup>69</sup>. A date

<sup>64</sup> *Philocles*, p. 418 n. 24. It is of course a mistake (quite understandable, for that matter) to speak in terms of «action» performed by Philocles in Nicuria, as does C. APICELLA, *Sidon* (n. 7), p. 141.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. H. KOTSIDU, *Ehrungen* (n. 49), KNr. 131 [E 1]. There cannot be the slightest doubt about the restoration of Philocles' name in l. 2 (B. DREYER, *Untersuchungen* [n. 6], p. 245: «relativ wahrscheinlich ergänzt»), as it is fully preserved in l. 9.

<sup>66</sup> For a good overview of the first Ptolemaic hegemony in the Cyclades, from 288/6 (cf. *Philocles*, p. 415 n. 10) to ca. 260, see G. REGER, *The Political History of the Kyklades 260-200 B.C.*, in *Historia* 43 (1994), p. 32-69, esp. 39-41.

<sup>67</sup> Whether an Athenian delegation was also summoned by Philocles to Samos, as B. DREYER suggests (*Untersuchungen* [n. 6], p. 232), cannot be ascertained. At any rate, Bacchon the Nesiarch had nothing to do with the Athenians. T.L. SHEAR (*Kallias* [n. 50], p. 33-34), to whom Dreyer refers, thinks rather of a Ptolemaic embassy (probably led by Philocles) travelling to Athens in order to present the invitation.

<sup>68</sup> See B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 53 n. 57: «im Text, Z. 20ff. [ist] von einer Einrichtung, nicht von einer Veränderung an einem bestehenden Fest die Rede»; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 320 with n. 124.

<sup>69</sup> A few examples taken at random from the recent bibliography should suffice: M. WÖRRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 216 n. 73: «280/79»; S.M. BURSTEIN, *Hellenistic Age* (n. 6), p. 92: «about 280-278»; G. SHIPLEY, *History of Samos* (n. 6), p. 298: «in 280»; P.M. NIGDELIS, *Πολίτευμα* (n. 47), p. 12 n. 5; p. 13 n. 9; p. 209 n. 49; p. 210 n. 52: ca. 280; J.-M. BERTRAND, *Inscriptions historiques grecques*, Paris 1992, p. 162 and 164: «vers 280», «en 280»; P.J. RHODES – D.M. LEWIS, *The Decrees of the Greek States*, Oxford 1997, p. 298: «c. 280»; H. KOTSIDU, *Ehrungen* (n. 49), p. 203 and 206: «280/79»; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 262 n. 61: «280/79?». On the date of the first games (279/278), see, e.g., T.L. SHEAR, *Kallias* (n. 50), p. 37 with n. 93; Victoria FOERTMEYER, *The Dating of the Pompe of Ptolemy II Philadelphus*, in *Historia* 37 (1988), p. 90-104, esp. 93; Françoise PERPILLOU-THOMAS, *Fêtes d'Égypte ptolémaïque et romaine d'après la documentation papyrologique grecque* (*Studia Hellenistica*, 31), Lovanii 1993, p. 153-154; P. GOUKOWSKI, *Sur la «Grande Procession» de Ptolémée Philadelphus*, in C. BRIKHE (ed.), *Hellènika Symmikta. Histoire, linguistique, épigraphie* II (*Études d'archéologie classique*, 8), Paris 1995, p. 79-81, esp. 80; B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), *passim*; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 320 n. 123.

early in 282, as once advocated by Nerwinski<sup>70</sup>, seems out of the question<sup>71</sup>. The decree implies that at the moment of the convention Samos already belonged to the Ptolemaic empire<sup>72</sup>, which means that a date before the spring of 281 is absolutely, and one before the autumn of that year very probably, ruled out<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>70</sup> L.A. NERWINSKI, *The Foundation Date of the Panhellenic Ptolemaea and Related Problems in early Ptolemaic Chronology*, diss. Duke Univ. 1981, p. 6-47 and *passim*. The author assumes (p. 41-47) that at the time Ptolemy II, having become Lysimachus' ally against Seleucus before Corupedium, had Ptolemaic forces (with their commanders) stationed on Samos. The war situation would explain why the meeting took place on Samos and not, for example, on Delos.

<sup>71</sup> See esp. the thorough argumentation of B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), *passim*, esp. p. 50-56 and p. 53 n. 57. See also W. HUSS (cf. n. 58 above), who, instead of an alliance between Ptolemy II and Lysimachus (see previous note), rather envisages the possibility of a secret (?) alliance between Ptolemy and Seleucus.

<sup>72</sup> In line with Nerwinski's reasoning (see n. 70), one might imagine that a Ptolemaic high commander like Philocles, e.g. within the context of preventive military measures against Seleucus (for which, to be sure, there are no indications at all!), would have established his headquarters on a Lysimachean island recognized as such. But what about Bacchon? What was his business there, as the mere governor of a Ptolemaic 'province' outside the boundaries of the empire? Was he, like the *synedroi*, also summoned to the island by Philocles in view of the meeting? But the text explicitly says that the invitation to the *synedroi* was sent conjointly by him and Philocles. And would it not be strange — and would it have been acceptable to Lysimachus — that delegates were convoked to Ptolemaic military headquarters in Lysimachean territory only to discuss purely Ptolemaic civic and religious matters that had nothing to do with the military protection of Samos? If the reasoning is perhaps not wholly conclusive, it may surely offer an additional consideration to the arguments of Dreyer (see previous note) against a date before 281. In any event, from the moment that Samos formally and fully belonged to the Ptolemaic empire (see next note), the situation becomes different. In that case it is easy to understand that in the war or post-war context just after the islands' acquisition matters concerning the neighbouring islands were settled there.

<sup>73</sup> The absolute *terminus post quem* is the battle of Corupedium (about Jan./Febr. 281) because until that moment Samos belonged to the realm of Lysimachus (cf. T.L. SHEAR, *Kallias* [n. 50], p. 37 with n. 92; B. DREYER, *Untersuchungen* [n. 6], p. 245). On the other hand, due to the silence of the sources, we do not know exactly when and under what circumstances Samos came under Ptolemaic control (cf. G. SHIPLEY, *History of Samos* [n. 6], p. 182-183: «Whether or not the Seleucids held Samos for a few months ... remains uncertain»). According to K. HALLOF – C. MILETA (*Samos und Ptolemaios III.*, in *Chiron* 27, 1997, p. 255-285, esp. 283), «Samos [stand] seit 281 ununterbrochen unter ptolemäischen Einfluß». However, even if there was no 'War of Succession' between Ptolemy II and Antiochus I (cf. n. 54 above), it seems perhaps more likely (as there was obviously a secret (?) agreement between Seleucus I and Ptolemy II, on which see W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 257-258, 261; cf. n. 58 above) that the island was only acquired during the short period of Ptolemaic expansion in southern Asia Minor after the death of Seleucus (Aug./Sept. 281), i.e. in late 281(?), 280 or 279. About 279 nearby Miletus also came (again) under Ptolemaic influence (above, n. 50). See also H. HAUBEN, *Callicrates* (n. 7), p. 33-34 («280-279»);

In his fascinating and innovative book on Ptolemaic propaganda<sup>74</sup>, which has been properly welcomed as «a major contribution to scholarship»<sup>75</sup>, R.A. Hazzard advocates the date 263 for the Nicuria decree, while the celebration mentioned in it would have occurred in January 262. In his view the first *Ptolemaia* were already celebrated in 282, shortly after the death of the first Ptolemy, whereas it was only in 263 that the deceased king was officially styled *Ptolemaios Soter* and the festival raised to Olympic status and recognized as such by the Greeks. In spite of the circumstantial evidence and the strength of Hazzard's reasoning, the present author, being still unconvinced, is of the opinion that we should stick to the traditional setting and interpretation of the document<sup>76</sup>.

Even if it is true that the locution *Ptolemaios Soter* does not occur in official titulature before 263/2<sup>77</sup>, it may already have existed<sup>78</sup>. It was the first time that an official surname (which was also the cult name), was given to an individual, deceased Ptolemaic king. There was no tradition concerning its use, there were no established rules to fall back on, so that the king in office had to invent them gradually<sup>79</sup>, just as he and his successors had to elaborate, step by step, the royal and dynastic cults that would be decisive for the next generations<sup>80</sup>.

M. WÖRRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 216 n. 73 (during the 'War of Succession'); G. SHIPLEY, *op. cit.*, p. 181-182 («281 or 280»).

<sup>74</sup> R.H. HAZZARD, *Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda* (Phoenix, Suppl. 37), Toronto 2000. Cf. already R.H. HAZZARD – M.P.V. FITZGERALD, *The Regulation of the Ptolemaia: A Hypothesis Explored*, in *Journ. Roy. Astron. Soc. Can.* 85 (1991), p. 6-23, esp. 20.

<sup>75</sup> S.M. BURSTEIN, in *Phoenix* (Toronto) 56 (2002), p. 187.

<sup>76</sup> See already H. HAUBEN, *Chronologie macédonienne* (n. 43), p. 159; cf. B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 53 n. 57; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 320 n. 123.

<sup>77</sup> See R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination* (n. 74), p. 3-24.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. S.M. BURSTEIN, in *Phoenix* (Toronto) 56 (2002), p. 187 (arguing against the mis-use of the *argumentum ex silentio*): «The fact that the *cognomen* 'Soter' first entered official Ptolemaic usage in 283/2 [a lapsus for 263/2] B.C. by itself can provide only a *terminus ante quem* for the origin of the title, not proof of the date of its creation». Even in Hazzard's reconstruction there is a gap between the introduction of the locution 'Ptolemaios Soter' (263/2) and its use in the preamble of legal documents (259) (cf. R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination* [n. 74], p. 54).

<sup>79</sup> Cf., for that matter, R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 45: «If he took some twenty years to develop his scheme of presentation, the delay was due to the lack of any obvious precedent to guide him». The introduction of the locution 'Ptolemaios Soter' in the second Ptolemy's official filiation can e.g. be explained as a psychological reaction to the setbacks suffered during the Chremonidean War. Cf. *Imagination*, p. 44: «Piety towards [his father] was Ptolemy's way of compensating for his own defects as a sovereign».

<sup>80</sup> It is striking in this respect that the cult of the *Theoi Soteres* was only incorporated into the dynastic cult by Ptolemy IV: see H. HAUBEN, *Aspects du culte des souverains à*

Let us return to the Nicuria decree. Contrary to what Hazzard thinks, an open-minded reading of the decree's considerations (ll. 10-26) points to a recent assumption of power by Ptolemy II<sup>81</sup> as well as to an establishment — not a reform<sup>82</sup> — of the *Ptolemaia* festival<sup>83</sup>. And as we saw, the convocation of the councillors to the excentrically situated island of Samos, where Philocles' presence was needed, can best be explained by the complex and uncertain military situation just after the deaths of Lysimachus and Seleucus in 281<sup>84</sup>.

The decisive argument, however, lies in the careers of king Philocles and of Bacchon the Nesiarch<sup>85</sup>. Hazzard too seems to have felt this, as he goes extensively into this matter<sup>86</sup>, although prosopography is, according to him, «too imprecise a method of dating to rule out the proposed year of 263»<sup>87</sup>.

If Bacchon was still Nesiarch in the late sixties, we have to accept that there were two of them at the same time: Bacchon and Hermias<sup>88</sup>. The parallels adduced by Hazzard<sup>89</sup> are not really convincing. Anyway, two simultaneous governors for an overseas province like the Cyclades seems too much of a good thing.

Furthermore, it is beyond all doubt that wherever we meet Philocles and Bacchon in the sources (most of which, indeed, lack a precise date<sup>90</sup>), we

*l'époque des Lagides*, in Lucia CRISCUOLO – G. GERACI (edd.), *Egitto e storia antica dall'Ellenismo all'età araba*, Bologna 1989, p. 441-467, esp. 453.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. M. WÖRRLE, *Epigraphische Forschungen* II (n. 49), p. 226 n. 123. It is true that «the adverb νῦν modifie[s] παρεχόμενος διατελεῖ rather than διαδεξάμενος» (R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination* [n. 74], p. 50), but the point is that the act of succession is explicitly mentioned.

<sup>82</sup> Thus R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 53 n. 31.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 563 n. 57 (above, n. 68). There is not the slightest hint in the text suggesting the pre-existence of the Alexandrian *Ptolemaia*, no more than there is any proof of their foundation in 282.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. n. 72 above. R.A. HAZZARD (*Imagination* [n. 74], p. 55) tries to explain the choice of Samos in 263 («a port placed far from the scene of conflict») by the troubles caused by the Chremonidean War. But was the place that much safer from Gonatas' fleets than Delos?

<sup>85</sup> On Bacchon, see *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15038; K.J. RIGSBY, *Bacchon* (n. 47), p. 194-196 (cf. J. TRÉHEUX, in *BCH* 109, 1985, p. 496 n. 47-48); D. HENNIG, *Böoter im ptolemäischen Ägypten*, in H. BEISTER – J. BUCKLER (edd.), *Boiotika. Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böötien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (1986) (*Münch. Arbeiten z. Alten Geschichte*, 2), München 1989, p. 169-182, esp. 177-179.

<sup>86</sup> R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination* (n. 74), p. 50-52; 168-175.

<sup>87</sup> R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 168.

<sup>88</sup> *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15042 (= 14915?); cf. R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 55, 175.

<sup>89</sup> R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 52, 169-170.

<sup>90</sup> See the documents listed in *Pros. Ptol.* VI sub 15038 and 15085. Cf. *Philocles*, p. 418 n. 24. The honours conferred on Philocles by Athens, a citizenship decree

find them, as far as we can establish, in the company of persons definitely belonging to the last decade of the first and the first two decades of the third century BC. Think of people like general Leonides (not taken into account by Hazzard), who without any doubt was active during the last decade(s) of the 4th century<sup>91</sup>, or the squadron commander Zenon (first half of the 80s)<sup>92</sup>, and the renowned diplomat and engineer (?), ‘friend of the kings’ (i.e. of both Ptolemy I and II)<sup>93</sup>, Sostratos of Knidos, obviously attested in the 80s and early 70s<sup>94</sup>. They cannot all be exceptions.

(M.J. OSBORNE, *Naturalization in Athens I* [Verhand. Kon. Acad. Wet., Lett. en Schone Kunsten v. België, Kl. Lett., Jg. 43, Nr. 98], Brussel 1981, p. 166-167, D 77 = A.G. WOODHEAD, *The Athenian Agora* XVI, no. 173 = H. KOTSIDU, *Ehrungen* (n. 49), KNr. 48 [E]) and a statue (IG II-III<sup>2</sup> 3425 = L. MORETTI, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche* I, no. 17) (on which see *Philocles*, p. 419-420 n. 33), are indeed best linked in one way or another to the liberation of Athens, rather than to the establishment of the *Ptolemaia*: cf. B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 55 n. 70 («evtl. ... mit Geschenken [food supply or financial assistance after the liberation] verbunden»); A.G. WOODHEAD, *op. cit.*, p. 249 (rightly criticizing T.L. SHEAR, *Kallias* [n. 50], p. 33-34). It is indeed difficult to imagine how only the announcement of the *Ptolemaia* could have induced the Athenians to set up a statue.

<sup>91</sup> Philocles and Leonides: SEG XVII (1960) 639. They were perhaps together at Delos in 308 during a stop on their way to Greece, Philocles offering a crown (cf. n. 44 above) and Leonides a silver-plated iron helmet: cf. M.-F. BASLEZ, *Sanctuaire de Délos* (n. 6), p. 351, 353. On Leonides, see *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15053; H. HAUBEN, *Vlootbevelhebberschap* (n. 7), p. 51-54 no. 19; *Philocles*, p. 417 n. 18; R.A. BILLOWS, *Antigonos the One-Eyed* (n. 12), p. 397 no. 61; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 170, 178, 182 n. 677, 193.

<sup>92</sup> Bacchon and Zenon: IG XII 5, 1004 (= OGIS II 773). On Zenon, see *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15043; T.L. SHEAR, *Kallias* (n. 50), p. 17 n. 30, 20-21, 23, 62-78 *passim*; R.S. BAGNALL, in *AJPh* 101 (1980), p. 246-247; W. AMELING, *Schenkungen* (n. 3), I, p. 32-34, KNr. 14 [E]; B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 47, 49, 50, 63, 66; *Untersuchungen* (n. 6), p. 204-223, *passim*; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 208 n. 148.

<sup>93</sup> Strabo XVII 1.6.

<sup>94</sup> Bacchon and Sostratos: IG XI 4, 1038 (= OGIS I 67 = F. DURRBACH, *Choix* [n. 48] I 21 = H. KOTSIDU, *Ehrungen* [n. 49], KNr. 131 [E2]). On Sostratos, see *Pros. Ptol.* I 185, VI 16555; L. MOOREN, *The Aulic Titulature in Ptolemaic Egypt. Introduction and Prosopography* (Verhand. Kon. Acad. Wet., Lett. en Schone Kunsten v. België, Kl. Lett., Jg. 37, Nr. 78), Brussel 1975, p. 56-57 no. 08 (with relevant bibliography); T.L. SHEAR, *Kallias* (n. 50), p. 22-25 (thorough discussion) and *passim*; B. DREYER, *Beginn der Freiheitsphase* (n. 6), p. 59, 64-66; *Untersuchungen* (n. 6), p. 204-223, *passim*; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 208-209, 218-219; E. BERNAND, *Inscriptions grecques d'Alexandrie ptolémaïque* (IFAO, *Bibl. d'Etude*, 133), Le Caire 2001, p. 21-26 no. 3. Except for Sostratos' intervention with Demetrius at Peiraeus in Athens' interest (fall 287) (SEG XXVIII [1978] 60 [Kallias decree], l. 32-36) and, to a certain extent, the honorific decree issued by the Islanders (F. DURRBACH, *Choix* I 21, probably between 279/8 and 274 [cf. comm. p. 31-32; the *terminus a quo*, however, depends on the dating of the Nicuria decree]), the testimonies, which seem to belong to the first decades of the 3rd century, cannot be exactly dated. But according to a recent study, Sostratos was a close collaborator of the rulers already from the very outset of the Ptolemaic takeover in Egypt: the capture of Memphis, in which he was

Several inscriptions from the islands in which Philocles and/or Bacchon play a crucial role, make mention of or imply social troubles that in most cases are best linked to the difficult economic situation of the mid-eighties, in the aftermath of Demetrius' last years, which were marked by fiscal oppression<sup>95</sup>.

In the Theban subscription list (unfortunately overlooked by Hazzard) we find Philocles already active probably in 310 and beyond doubt in 308<sup>96</sup>. It was possibly in 309 that he took Kaunos for Ptolemy<sup>97</sup>, whom he obviously accompanied on his expedition to Greece in 308<sup>98</sup> with

instrumental, seems to have occurred in the autumn of 323: Y. LITVINENKO, *Sostratus of Cnidus, Satrap Ptolemy, and the Capture of Memphis*, in *Atti del XXII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, Firenze 1998*, Vol. II, Firenze 2001, p. 813-820. As for the passage in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Grammaticos (Mathematicos)* I 276, concerning a certain Sostratos (our man or not?), Ptolemaic ambassador (of the first or the second Ptolemy) to Antigonos (Monophthalmos or Gonatas? After Salamis [306] or after Cos [ca. 261 or a few years later]?), its interpretation remains too controversial to allow any certain conclusion regarding the chronology of the Knidian's career: see, e.g., Th. LENSCHAU, art. *Sostratos* 4b, in *RE*, Suppl. VII (1940), col. 1221, versus F. HEICHELHEIM, art. *Sostratos* 11a, *ibid.*, col. 1221-1222; and E. OLSHAUSEN, *Prosopographie der hellenistischen Königsgesandten. Teil I: Von Triparadeisos bis Pydna (Studia Hellenistica, 19)*, Lovanii 1974, p. 35-36 no. 21, versus H. HEINEN, *Untersuchungen* (n. 55), p. 196-197 («Aus dem Zusammenhang geht nicht der geringste Hinweis darauf hervor, welcher Sostratos, welcher Ptolemäer und welcher Antigonos gemeint ist»).

<sup>95</sup> F. DURRBACH, *Choix* I 18 (= *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> I 391 = *IG* XI 4, 559 = L. MIGEOTTE, *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques. Recueil des documents et analyse critique*, Québec-Paris 1984, p. 161-166 no. 47 [with an excellent and extensive commentary] = H. KOTSIDU, *Ehrungen* [n. 49], KNr. 148 [E]) (Delos; repayment of loans contracted by the Islanders; Migeotte does not consider Demetrius' policy as the only, but at least as a major cause of the island's treasury problems; cf. J.-M. BERTRAND, *Inscriptions historiques grecques* [n. 69], p. 165; Véronique CHANKOWSKI, *De l'argent jeté dans les fontaines?*, in *Εὐεργεσίας χάριν. Studies presented to Benedetto Bravo and Ewa Wipszycka by their Disciples* [edd. T. DERDA-J. URBANIK-M. WECOWSKI], Warsaw 2002, p. 37-49, esp. 46-47; the prominent Delian Mnesalkos, the proponent of the decree in honour of Philocles, belongs to the period ca. 282/279-269: L. MIGEOTTE, *op. cit.*, p. 346-347; and the *Soteria* founded in his honour are obviously to be linked with the recent liberation of the Cyclades in 288-286: *id.*, p. 163; *Philocles*, p. 419 n. 29; W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 211 with n. 185); *IG* XII 5, 1065 (social troubles in Karthaia [Keos]); *IG* XII 5, 1004 (= *OGIS* II 773) (runaway slaves in Ios); *Iscrizioni di Cos* ED 129 (cf. n. 47 above) (problems in Naxos; cf. S.M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Cos* [n. 9], p. 92). As the Samians had belonged to Lysimachus' empire under the obviously benevolent home rule of their tyrants Kaios and Douris since about 294 (see G. SHIPLEY, *History of Samos* [n. 6], p. 175-181), the social problems which arose on the island ca. 279/8 (*SEG* I [1923] 363; cf. n. 50 above) had nothing to do with Demetrius' last years. Were they still the result of some unfavourable measures taken by Lysimachus?

<sup>96</sup> See above with n. 3 and n. 44-46.

<sup>97</sup> Thus *Philocles*, p. 417 n. 18, but see now W. HUSS, *Ägypten*, p. 211 n. 181 (again, although hesitantly, 286).

<sup>98</sup> Above with n. 44.



Leonides and Callicrates the Elder<sup>99</sup>. A few years later he intervened together with Leonides in Aspendos<sup>100</sup>. That means that if we were to follow Hazzard, Philocles, who in 310-308 must have been at least in his 20s, was about 70 or even older<sup>101</sup> at the end of the 260s, at a moment when we expect him to be at the peak of his career. Instead of 30 years (310-279/8) or 40 (as wrongly assumed by Hazzard<sup>102</sup>) that career would have lasted for about half a century (310-263). Although not completely excluded (some people indeed reached very old age<sup>103</sup>), this seems rather unlikely, the more so as there are no other sources that point unequivocally to the late 60s. On the contrary: nowhere does Philocles appear in the sources concerning the Chremonidean War (268-262 or 261)<sup>104</sup>, in which the main operations were conducted by general Patroklos<sup>105</sup>.

And finally, there are the dedications on Delos. Rigsby has rightly established that whereas Philocles made three dedications of a crown, all before 279 BC<sup>106</sup>, Bacchon «dedicated one bowl before 279, a second in the two years preceding 276, and no others»<sup>107</sup>, thus corroborating the traditional 'high' chronology of their careers<sup>108</sup>.

*B-3000 Leuven*

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Afdeling Oude Geschiedenis

<sup>99</sup> On this general, see H. HAUBEN, *Callicrates* (n. 7), p. 21-32; *Vlootbevelhebberschap* (n. 7), p. 42-43 no. 17; cf. M.-F. BASLEZ, *Sanctuaire de Délos* (n. 6), p. 351, 353.

<sup>100</sup> See *Philocles*, p. 417 n. 18.

<sup>101</sup> R.A. HAZZARD (*Imagination* [n. 74], p. 173) even estimates his age at about 40 in ca. 300, which would make him a man of about 80 in 263!

<sup>102</sup> R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 173 («from circa 300 to 260»).

<sup>103</sup> Examples (mostly of kings) are given by R.A. HAZZARD, *Imagination*, p. 51-52 with n. 23, p. 172-173. But if Philocles was indeed king in Sidon, on the central level he acted 'only' as a general, for whom physical condition was of paramount importance.

<sup>104</sup> See, e.g., F.W. WALBANK, in *CAH* VII 12, p. 236-240.

<sup>105</sup> *Pros. Ptol.* VI 15063.

<sup>106</sup> K.J. RIGSBY, *Bacchon* (n. 47), p. 194 with n. 3. Cf. *Philocles*, p. 417-418 n. 22; p. 419 n. 30.

<sup>107</sup> K.J. RIGSBY, *Bacchon*, p. 196. R.A. HAZZARD's exposition on Bacchon's donations at Delos (*Imagination* [n. 74], p. 174; cf. p. 51) should be corrected accordingly. He is also mistaken when he contends that «the account of 274 is ... the earliest dated reference to Bakchon as *nesiarch*». Actually, in the Delian accounts the title occurs for the first time in 240 (cf. K.J. RIGSBY, *art. cit.*, p. 195), long after his disappearance. It is irrelevant for the date of his appointment.

<sup>108</sup> On the different kinds of Delian dedications, see the interesting observations by G. REGER, *The Family of Balakros son of Nikanor, the Makedonian, on Delos*, in *ZPE* 89 (1991), p. 151-154, esp. 152: «Gold crowns were typical dedications of kings and high functionaries like Philokles, king of the Sidonians, .... Lower officials like the *nesiarkhoi* of the Nesiotic League typically offered phialai or established vase-foundations».



## AMICI POPULI ROMANI

### DAS TRIERER PROJEKT 'ROMS AUSWÄRTIGE FREUNDE' STELLT SICH VOR\*

Seit Januar 2002 fördert die *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG) den an der Universität Trier ansässigen Sonderforschungsbereich 'Fremdheit und Armut. Wandel von Inklusions- und Exklusionsformen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart' (SFB 600). In Kooperation mit Soziologen, Juristen und Kunsthistorikern untersuchen Historiker Erscheinungsformen des sozialen Ein- bzw. Ausschlusses von Fremden bzw. Randgruppen in ihren spezifischen gesellschaftlichen Kontexten. Dabei widmen sich derzeit fünf Teilprojekte dem Umgang mit dem Fremden<sup>1</sup>. Eines der beiden von Heinz Heinen geleiteten althistorischen Teilprojekte trägt den Titel 'Roms auswärtige Freunde' (SFB 600/A2); zusammen mit Altay Coskun widmet er sich dort der *amicitia populi Romani*, die seit dem 3. Jh. v.Chr. für die römische Außenpolitik bestimmend wurde und als ein zentrales Medium der Inklusion der Mittelmeerwelt in die Gesellschaft und den Staat der Römer begriffen werden kann<sup>2</sup>.

\* Derselbe Beitrag erscheint in russischer Übersetzung in *Antiquitas Aeterna* 1, 2004 (Kazan, Rußland).

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. <http://www.uni-trier.de/sfb600>. Bei den vier weiteren geförderten Teilprojekten zur Fremdheitsthematik handelt es sich um 'Entstehung und Entwicklung einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft im griechisch-römischen Ägypten' (A1 / Prof. Dr. Heinz Heinen); 'Christen und Juden: Inklusion und Exklusion angesichts religiöser Differenz in Gemeinden und weiteren Organisationsformen (9.-17. Jahrhundert)' (A4 / Prof. Dr. Alfred Haverkamp); 'Fremde Herrscher – Fremdes Volk. Formen von Inklusion und Exklusion bei Herrschaftswechsels in Europa von der zweiten Hälfte des 18. bis zur zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts' (A5 / Prof. Dr. Andreas Gestrich u. Prof. Dr. Helga Schnabel-Schüle); 'Administrative Kontrolle, organisierte Betreuung und (Über-)lebensstrategien mediterrane Arbeitsmigranten in den Montanregionen zwischen Rhein und Maas (1950-1990)' (A6 / Prof. Dr. Lutz Raphael).

<sup>2</sup> Das Konzept des Projekts geht auf Heinz Heinen zurück, die Ausgestaltung und Weiterentwicklung auf Altay Coskun, zum Teil in Verbindung mit Manuel Tröster; für den nordpontischen Sektor zeichnet Heinen allein verantwortlich. Vgl. auch die mit verschiedenen Hilfsmitteln (darunter eine umfangreiche Arbeitsbibliographie und prosopographische Datenbank) ausgestattete Internet-Seite.

# 1. DER UNTERSUCHUNGSGEGENSTAND DES PROJEKTS ‘ROMS AUSWÄRTIGE FREUNDE’ (SFB 600/A2)

Ein entscheidender Faktor für den Aufstieg Roms zu einer auf Dauer beständigen Weltmacht war die Bereitschaft zur Inklusion von Fremden. Dabei wurden, je nach den geographischen, ethnischen und politischen Bedingungen, unterschiedliche Konzepte im Umgang mit diesen gewählt. So war es möglich, einen ehemals gegnerischen Staat völlig aufzuheben, was für die Einwohner schlimmstenfalls ihre Versklavung, günstigstenfalls ihre Einverleibung in die *civitas Romana* — sei es mit oder ohne Wahlrecht (*civitas cum / sine suffragio*) — bedeutete; seit der Provinzialisierung Siziliens im Anschluß an den 2. Punischen Krieg konnte ihr Schicksal zudem durch einen je zu definierenden Untertanenstatus geregelt werden. Daneben wurden verschiedene Formen der indirekten Herrschaft praktiziert: Während Italien vom 5. bis zum 3. Jh. mit einem System bilateraler Bundesgenossenschaften überzogen wurde, welches den *socii* zwar weitgehende Autonomie zugestand, in außen- und militärpolitischen Fragen Rom jedoch die Entscheidungskompetenz überließ, wurde für die außeritalische Politik die *amicitia populi Romani* bestimmend<sup>3</sup>.

Im 4. und 3. Jh. v.Chr. beinhalteten solche diplomatischen ‘Freundschaften’ zunächst die wechselseitige, wohlwollende Neutralität und wurden vor allem mit Gegnern der eigenen Feinde geschlossen. Bald schon erwies sich dieser Beziehungstyp aber als ein dehnbares Instrument, den Mittelmeerraum bei beschränktem Engagement zu kontrollieren. Denn seit dem Ende des Ersten Punischen Krieges (264-241 v.Chr.) und dann gehäuft seit dem Sieg über Hannibal (202 v.Chr.) wurden neben den Kampfgefährten und ‘befreiten’ Städten auch besiegte Mächte — freilich nach Verhängung von Sanktionen — in die ‘Freundschaft’ Roms aufgenommen. Bis zum Dritten Makedonischen Krieg (171-168 v.Chr.) näherte sich die Rolle des Senats immer stärker derjenigen von Patronen an, die von ihren ‘Freunden’ so wie von Klienten unbedingte Gefolgschaft erwarteten, ohne sich zu einer reziproken Gegenleistung zu verpflichten.

Obwohl die Römer die Handlungsfreiheit ihrer *amici* stark einschränkten und bisweilen — wie im Fall Makedoniens und des Seleukidenreichs

<sup>3</sup> Speziell zum Freundschafts- und Klientelbegriff sowie zur Frage des römischen Imperialismus vgl. die untenstehende Übersicht über die Forschung (Kap. 2). Allgemein zur römischen Außenpolitik vgl. die Arbeitsbibliographie (wie Anm. 2), Teil II.

— sogar zusahen, wie befreundete Staaten allmählich zerfielen, vermochten nicht wenige befreundete Dynasten oder Städte, großen Nutzen aus der asymmetrischen Bindung zu ziehen. So führte die Allianz mit Rom zu einer mittelfristigen Stärkung des Pergamenischen Reiches (bes. im ersten Drittel des 2. Jhs. v.Chr.) und später zum Aufstieg des galatischen Tetrarchen Deiotaros zum mächtigsten König Kleinasiens (ca. 63 – ca. 40 v.Chr.); die Ptolemäer verdankten Rom ihre Herrschaft über Ägypten seit dem Tag von Eleusis (168 v.Chr.) und verloren sie erst im Jahr 30 v.Chr.; die romfreundlichen Dynastien in Kappadokien, Kommagene und Judäa überlebten bis ins 1. oder frühe 2. Jh. n.Chr., im Bosporianischen Reich sogar bis ins 4. Jh. n.Chr. Auch der Status einer freien, befreundeten oder konföderierten Stadt existierte — freilich unter den veränderten Bedingungen der römischen Provinzialisierung — bis ins 3. Jh. n.Chr. fort. Schließlich fanden sich *amici populi Romani* und *amici Caesaris* auch jenseits von Rhein, Donau und Euphrat bis in die Spätantike.

Insbesondere die interpersonalen auswärtigen Freundschaftsbeziehungen verdienen Beachtung. Die Quellen sprechen hier von *hospitium*, einer nicht selten formalisierten Art der Gastfreundschaft, aber oft auch allgemein von *amicitia*. Grundsätzlich waren solche auf Dauer angelegten Beziehungen beiderseits durch das Streben nach Prestige und politischen Vorteilen bedingt, wobei für die Römer oftmals materielle Interessen hinzukamen und für die ‘Fremden’ das Bedürfnis danach, sich im Fall der Bedrohung durch äußere Feinde oder unerträglicher Übergriffe durch römische Magistrate Gehör im Senat oder vor dem Repetundengerichtshof zu verschaffen. Ähnliche Motive führten zur Wahrnehmung der Interessen einer Stadt durch einen römischen Aristokraten, der seit dem späten 2. Jh. v.Chr. selbst in griechischen Quellen mit dem lateinischen Terminus *patronus* bezeichnet werden konnte.

Die Breite des Gegenstandes erfordert Schwerpunktsetzungen, die sich an den Desideraten der Forschung und der Ausrichtung des SFB 600 orientieren und zugleich geeignete Zugänge zum gesamten Gebiet eröffnen sollen. Als erste Projektsäule ist eine Konzentration auf die auswärtige Klientel spätrepublikanischer Magnaten bis zum Beginn des augusteischen Prinzipats vorgesehen (ca. 133 – 27 v.Chr.). Die große Bedeutung der auswärtigen Freundschaften für diese Umbruchphase geht nicht allein aus den gewaltigen fremden Kontingenten der Bürgerkriegsparteien hervor, sondern kündigte sich bereits in den 50-er Jahren im Titel eines *amicus Caesaris et populi Romani* an.

Einen zweiten Schwerpunkt des Projekts bilden die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem nördlichen Schwarzmeerraum, hier insbesondere mit dem Bosporianischen Reich. Die Herrscher dieses Reiches, das sich von der östlichen Krim und den nördlichen Ausläufern des Kaukasus bis zum unteren Don erstreckte, gerieten mit dem Untergang Mithradates' VI. Eupators (63 v.Chr.) in die Machtsphäre Roms. Ihr Territorium wurde nie Provinz, ihre Stellung blieb diejenige von *reges amici*. Sie führten bis ins 4. Jh. n.Chr. die Titel *philorhomaioi* und *philokaisar*. Nirgends kann die *amicitia populi Romani et Caesaris* eine längere Kontinuität aufweisen. Es gibt kein Königreich im Schatten der römischen Supermacht, das so lange Klientelstaat war, ohne römische Provinz zu werden. Faßt man die übrigen Territorien des nördlichen Schwarzmeerraums ins Auge: Tyras, Olbia und Chersonesos, so läßt sich in diesem Raum das ganze Spektrum zwischen direkter und indirekter Kontrolle durch Rom beobachten. Im nordpontischen Grenzgebiet wird die Problematik von In- und Exklusion der Randzonen des Imperium Romanum in besonderer Weise deutlich, denn hier stehen die Exklusion 'barbarischer' Feinde und die Inklusion ebenfalls 'barbarischer' *amici* in den *orbis Romanus* direkt nebeneinander.

## 2. FORSCHUNGSGESCHICHTLICHE VERORTUNG DES PROJEKTS SFB 600/A2

### 2.1. *Gelzer, Saller und die Bedeutung der Klientelbindungen für die römische Republik*

Die grundlegende Bedeutung der Klientelbindungen für das Verständnis der sozialen, politischen und kulturellen Verhältnisse der römischen Republik hat zuerst Gelzer erkannt, indem er die «Treu- und Nahverhältnisse» ins Zentrum seiner Beschreibung der «sozialen Voraussetzungen der Nobilitätsherrschaft» stellte<sup>4</sup>. Zwar sind Gelzers Thesen im

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. Matthias GELZER, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (1912), Stuttgart 1983<sup>2</sup>; Zitate z.B. S. 43 u. 115. S. 49f. stellt er sich in die Tradition von Numa Denis FUSTEL DE COULANGES, *Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*, Bd. 5: *Les origines du système féodal*, Paris 1890; vgl. auch die forschungsgeschichtlichen Überblicke von T. Robert S. BROUGHTON, *Senate and Senators of the Roman Republic: the Prosopographical Approach*, in: ANRW I 1, 1972, S. 250-265, sowie von Jean-Michel DAVID (S. 196-210), Jürgen von UNGERN-STERNBERG (S. 211-216) u. Jean-Louis FERRARY (S. 221-232) in: Hinnerk BRUHNS – Jean-Michel DAVID – Wilfried NIPPEL, *Die späte Republik / La fin de la république romaine. Un débat franco-allemand d'histoire et d'historiographie*, Rom 1997. — Obwohl bei Gelzer ungenannt, dürfte auch die auf personenkundlicher Betrachtungsweise fußende Darstellung der späten Republik aus der Feder W. DRUMANNs

Laufe der Jahrzehnte in vielen Punkten relativiert worden, doch trifft die Kritik stärker auf Münzer und Scullard zu, die — über Gelzer hinausgehend — Generationen überdauernde Allianzen von Familienverbänden konstruieren und diese Parteien zudem noch auf inhaltliche Programme festlegen wollen<sup>5</sup>.

Grundsätzlich lassen sich die Positionen Gelzers nur dann negieren, wenn ein allzu enger Klientelbegriff zugrunde gelegt wird, der auf die Vokabeln *patrocinium* und *clientela* fixiert ist oder sich einseitig nach der erklärenden Überlieferung zur frühen Geschichte Roms bzw. streng juristischen Kategorien ausrichtet<sup>6</sup>. Demgegenüber findet seither auch ein breiteres, an der modernen Soziologie orientiertes Verständnis wachsende Zustimmung, mit dem sich die ganze Palette persönlicher Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse der römischen Gesellschaft beschreiben läßt<sup>7</sup>. In diesem Sinne definiert Saller Patronage allgemein als «an exchange relationship between men of unequal social status» und untersucht die Klientelverhältnisse der Prinzipatszeit in einem weiten Feld von verwandten Begriffen (*patronus*, *cliens*, *amicus*, *officium*, *beneficium*, *meritum*, *gratia*)<sup>8</sup>.

(Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung, oder: Pompeius, Caesar, Cicero und ihre Zeitgenossen nach Geschlechtern und mit genealogischen Tabellen, 6 Bde., Königsberg 1834-1844; 2. Aufl. hg. von P. Gröbe, Berlin-Leipzig 1899-1929) ihren Einfluß ausgeübt haben.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. bes. Friedrich MÜNZER, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, Stuttgart 1920, Nd. Darmstadt 1963; H.H. SCULLARD, *Roman Politics 220-150 B.C.*, Oxford 1951, 1973<sup>2</sup> (S. XVII-XXXIII: forschungsgeschichtlicher Rückblick); auch Ronald SYME, *The Roman Revolution*, Oxford 1939. Gegen Münzers Parteibegriff und Scullards überspitzte Vorstellung vom Zusammenhalt aristokratischer Gruppierungen wandte sich bereits Matthias Gelzer in seinen Rezensionen (1950/51 = *Kl. Schr.* I, 1962, S. 198f. bzw. 203-205). Für weitere Kritik oder Modifikation vgl. bes. Christian MEIER, *Res publica amissa. Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik*, Frankfurt/M. 1966, 1980<sup>2</sup>, bes. S. 24-45; Peter A. BRUNT, *Factions*, in: ders., *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, Oxford 1988, S. 443-502; ferner zahlreiche prosopographische Detailstudien wie z.B. Thomas P. WISEMAN, *Factions and Family Trees* (1976), in: ders., *Roman Studies*, Liverpool 1987, S. 83-85.

<sup>6</sup> Zu einem solch engen Klientelbegriff vgl. z.B. Norbert ROULAND, *Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans l'antiquité romaine. Genèse et rôle des rapports de clientèle*, Bruxelles 1979, S. 401-464; P.A. BRUNT: *Clientela*, in: ders., *Fall* (o. Anm. 5), S. 382-442; Claude EILERS, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities*, Oxford 2002, bes. S. 1-18.

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. z.B. Samuel N. EISENSTADT – Luis RONIGER, *Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*, Cambridge 1984, bes. S. 52-64, aufbauend auf Luis RONIGER, *Modern Patron-Client Relations and Historical Clientelism. Some Clues from Ancient Rome*, in: *Archives européennes de sociologie* 24 (1983), S. 63-95. Weiteres in der Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), II.2.2.3.

<sup>8</sup> Richard P. SALLER, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*, Cambridge 1982, Zitat S. 8; ders., *Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome. Drawing the*

## 2.2. Badians 'Foreign Clientelae' und die Kritik an seinem Patronatsbegriff

Bereits zuvor hat Badian — inspiriert durch die Arbeiten Gelzers und Münzers — den Klientelbegriff als zentrales Deutungsmuster auf den Bereich der römischen Außenpolitik übertragen<sup>9</sup>. In seinen *Foreign Clientelae* beschreibt er die Entwicklung der Außenbeziehungen Roms zu Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen, die analog zur innerrömischen Klientel auf der moralischen Grundlage der *fides* und der sich wechselseitig bedingenden Leistungen (*beneficium – officium*) beruht hätten. Daneben seien in zunehmendem Maße persönliche Klientelverhältnisse zwischen römischen *nobiles* einerseits und auswärtigen Gemeinden und Individuen andererseits entstanden. Besonders den extrajuristischen Charakter seines Ansatzes hebt Badian hervor und setzte sich damit von der legalistischen Forschungstradition im Anschluß an Mommsen ab, die einem unzeitgemäßen Vertrags- und Systemdenken verhaftet war<sup>10</sup>.

*Distinction*, in: Andrew WALLACE-HADRILL (Hg.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London 1989, S. 49-62. Vermittelnd zwischen den Positionen sind z.B. die ausgewogenen Stellungnahmen von David KONSTAN, *Friendship in the Classical World*, Cambridge 1997, S. 135-137 und Koenraad VERBOVEN, Rez. zu C. Eilers, *Patrons* (o. Anm. 6), *BMCR* 2003.06.19, Kapitel 2; man beachte ferner, daß derselbe Verboven, *The Economy of Friends. Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*, Brüssel 2002, S. 331 und *passim*, weithin auf eine Differenzierung zwischen *amici*, *patroni* und *clientes* verzichtet.

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Ernst BADIAN, *Foreign Clientelae* (264-70 B.C.), Oxford 1958. Auch zuvor hatte man den Klientelbegriff auf diesen Bereich übertragen und verschiedene Parallelen herausgestellt, vgl. z.B. schon Theodor MOMMSEN, *Römische Geschichte*, Nd. München 1976, I, S. 433 Anm. 9 u. II, S. 307 (= Bd. I, 1902<sup>9</sup>); Percy Cooper SANDS, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic*, Cambridge 1908; M. GELZER, *Nobilität* (o. Anm. 4), S. 70-83; David MAGIE, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*, Princeton 1950, Bd. I, S. 371 (erstmalig mit Pompeius' Wirken im Osten) u. Bd. II, S. 1630 (Register); H.H. SCULLARD, *Politics* (o. Anm. 5), S. 17f. — Im übrigen behauptete Th. MOMMSEN, *Das römische Gastrecht und die römische Klientel*, in: ders., *Römische Forschungen*, Bd. I, Berlin 1864, S. 319-390, 356 sogar: «Client und Clientelgemeinde sind nothwendig Nichtbürger und Nichtbürgergemeinden»; doch gründet diese Ansicht auf einer mittlerweile überholten Vorstellung von der Genese des römischen Staatsvolkes. — Besondere Hervorhebung verdient Adrian N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *The Roman Citizenship*, Oxford 1939, S. 161f. = 1973<sup>2</sup>, S. 187f., der dem Konzept von *clientela* schon vor Badian grundlegende Bedeutung für das Verhältnis der Römer zu ihren Verbündeten zuerkannt hatte, wenngleich er «client states» für eine Metapher hielt; zudem scheint er diese Terminologie 1984 (*Roman Foreign Policy* [u. Anm. 10]) zu vermeiden; vgl. auch seine Kritik ebenda, S. 52: «Badian... tends to interpret the beginning by the end».

<sup>10</sup> Für diese Grundsatzentscheidung beruft sich E. BADIAN, *Clientelae* (o. Anm. 9), S. 5 in Anm. 5 zu Recht auf Alfred HEUSS, *Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Außenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit*, Leipzig 1933. Indes verwarf Badian später (a.a.O. [u. Anm. 16], S. 400-408 mit Anm. 17) den anachronistischen Ausdruck 'Völkerrecht',

Den Blick für die flexible, ja opportunistische Gestaltung der römischen Außenpolitik und die große Bedeutung interpersonaler Beziehungen in ihr geöffnet zu haben, ist Badian's nachhaltiges Verdienst. Erwartungsgemäß blieb auch hinsichtlich seiner Verwendung des *clientela*-Begriffs Zustimmung nicht aus<sup>11</sup>, wenn sich auch gerade an dessen Unschärfe berechtigte Kritik entfachte. Die zentralen Einwände hat schon Bleicken in seiner Rezension vorgebracht<sup>12</sup>: Erstens seien die Begriffe

doch konkretisiert sich seine Kritik in der Sache vor allem gegenüber Werner DAHLHEIM, *Gewalt und Herrschaft. Das provinzielle Herrschaftssystem der römischen Republik*, Berlin 1977. Allerdings droht die Polemik dieser Kontroverse die wertvollen Erkenntnisse auf beiden Seiten zu verdecken. Zuvor schon hatte sich nämlich Werner DAHLHEIM, *Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, München 1968, S. 2f. ausdrücklich von Badian abgesetzt, dessen Klientelbegriff «in nur sehr ungenauer Weise die Auswirkungen und die ideologische Begründung der von ganz anderen Faktoren bestimmten Entwicklung Roms zur Herrin des Mittelmeerraums» kennzeichne. Indem sich Dahlheim in die 'völkerrechtliche' Tradition Eugen TÄUBLERS, *Imperium Romanum. Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des römischen Reiches*, Bd. I, 1913, Nd. Rom 1964 und Heuß' stellte, beabsichtigte er, einen stärker entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Ansatz vorzulegen; zumindest in dieser Arbeit vermied auch er weitgehend zu starre, juristische Erklärungsmuster. Stärker vertragsrechtlich ausgerichtet sind dagegen die Darstellungen von Maria Rosa CIMMA, *Reges socii et amici populi Romani*, Milano 1976 oder Adrian N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East (168 B.C. to A.D. 1)*, London 1984, bes. S. 50-70; jüngst auch Andreas ZACK, *Studien zum «Römischen Völkerrecht». Kriegserklärung, Kriegsbeschluss, Beidung und Ratifikation zwischenstaatlicher Verträge, internationale Freundschaft und Feindschaft während der römischen Republik bis zum Beginn des Prinzipats*, Göttingen 2001, S. 167-242.

<sup>11</sup> Vgl. z.B. David BRAUND, *Rome and the Friendly King. The Character of the Client Kingship*, London 1984, S. 23 mit 29<sup>1</sup>; ders., *Function and Dysfunction. Personal Patronage in Roman Imperialism*, in: A. WALLACE-HADRILL (Hg.), *Patronage* (o. Anm. 8), S. 137-152; John RICH, *Patronage and Interstate Relations in the Roman Republic*, *ibid.*, S. 117-135 (S. 124 mit Verweis auf Saller); R. Malcolm ERRINGTON, *Neue Forschungen zu den Ursachen der römischen Expansion im 3. und 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, HZ 250 (1990), S. 93-106 mit bes. Hervorhebung, daß die Verhaltenswünsche römischer *patroni* gegenüber ihren Klienten normalerweise nicht explizit ausgedrückt worden seien.

<sup>12</sup> Bei aller Anerkennung der sonstigen zahlreichen Erkenntnisse kritisiert Jochen BLEICKEN, *Gnomon* 36 (1964), S. 176-187 neben den im Text genannten Punkten auch den Systemzwang, durch den Badian manche geradezu «abwegigen» Urteile zu treffen gezwungen sei. Überhaupt scheint für Bleicken die Rolle der auswärtigen Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse für den Verlauf der innerrömischen Politik völlig überbewertet zu sein; dabei mögen ihm die relative Passivität der Mittelmeerrainer während der Bürgerkriegsjahrzehnte sowie die zentrale tagespolitische Bedeutung der innerrömischen Heeresklientel tendenziell recht geben; andererseits sollte nicht übersehen werden, daß das Ringen um auswärtige Kommandos auch zum Erwerb auswärtiger Gefolgschaften und vor allem Ressourcen diene; es mag also die genaue Reichweite des Themas für die Entwicklung des römischen Staates von der Republik zum Prinzipat geringer oder (z.B. mit D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* [o. Anm. 11], S. 184f. u. 190 oder Gerhard DOBESCH, *Caesar und Kleinasien*, *Tyche* 11, 1996, S. 51-77) höher eingeschätzt, nicht aber grundsätzlich geleugnet werden; vgl. auch die Diskussion bei Paul J. BURTON, *'Clientela' or 'Amicitia'? Modeling Roman*



*clientela* und *patronatus* in Rom sehr spezifisch verwandt worden und bezögen sich keineswegs auf jede Interaktionsform ungleicher Partner<sup>13</sup>; zweitens setzte Badians Argumentation einen hohen Grad an Bewußtheit seitens der Römer für ihre Patronatsrolle voraus, obwohl die entsprechende Terminologie erst gegen Ende des 2. Jhs. v.Chr. greifbar ist, und dies auch nur in klar definierten Fällen<sup>14</sup>; drittens sei das Klientelkonzept «als Deckmantel» für «politischen Egoismus» ungeeignet, da die Römer sich nicht regelmäßig zur Fürsorge für ihre auswärtigen Untergebenen verpflichtet gesehen hätten und damit ein wesentlicher Bestandteil dieses Beziehungstyps nicht gegeben sei<sup>15</sup>.

In seiner Replik erinnert Badian an die große Bedeutung der *Fides Publica populi Romani*, die seit der Mitte des 3. Jhs. v.Chr. kultische Ehren erhielt; zudem stellt er auf der einen Seite heraus, daß ihre «flexibility» keineswegs bewußt und konsequent ausgeschöpft worden sei «to rob it of all content», während er auf der anderen Seite betont, daß

*International Behavior in the Middle Republic (264-146 B.C.)*, *Klio* 85.2 (2003), S. 333-369, 334 mit Blick auf das 2. Jh. v.Chr. Auf begrifflicher Ebene weist Bleicken ferner darauf hin, daß Patronage mindestens (!) *einen* personalen Bezug haben müsse und nicht zwischen zwei Institutionen bestehen könne. Allerdings ist auch hier anzumerken, daß die verschiedensten Gruppen und Einrichtungen regelmäßig — und stärker als es etwa heute der Fall ist — als Verband von Personen betrachtet wurden.

<sup>13</sup> Erneut hat C. EILERS, *Patrons* (o. Anm. 6 mit weiterer Literatur) diesen Punkt hervorgehoben, wobei er betont, daß die Römer sowohl terminologisch als auch juristisch zwischen *clientela* und anderen asymmetrischen Beziehungsformen unterschieden.

<sup>14</sup> Dies ist aber weitestgehend auf den spezifischen Fall des unten bei Anm. 18/19 erwähnten Städtepatronats oder die wenigen noch späteren vergleichenden oder metaphorischen Verwendungen (s. dazu Anm. 9, 26, 27) beschränkt. Damit wird aber J. RICHES Einspruch (a.a.O. [o. Anm. 11], S. 130f.), daß nämlich oftmals aus Höflichkeit auf die Bezeichnung *cliens* verzichtet worden sei, geschwächt; dieser auf R.P. SALLER (*Personal Patronage* u. *Patronage and Friendship*, o. Anm. 7) basierende Gesichtspunkt setzt im übrigen die fehlende Differenzierung von auf *fides* gründenden interpersonalen Bindungen notwendig voraus. Vgl. auch Eilers' Einwand oben in Anm. 13. Aus anderen Gründen wird diese Deutung von P.J. BURTON, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 342 abgelehnt.

<sup>15</sup> Das einmalige *beneficium* der Freilassung oder Schonung mochte zwar tatsächlich zunächst die Erwartung von Dankbarkeit, auch von konkreten *officia*, begründen, doch dürfte es nicht ausgereicht haben, eine tatsächliche Klientelbeziehung über Krisenzeiten aufrecht zu erhalten, wenn der Patron seiner auch für die Zukunft übernommenen Fürsorgepflicht nicht nachgekommen wäre. Im übrigen hebt J. BLEICKEN, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 183 hervor, daß die hellenistischen Könige ein Klientelverhältnis zu Rom oftmals für erstrebenswert gehalten, der Senat ihnen dies aber verweigert hätte. Ders., *Die Verfassung der römischen Republik*, Paderborn 1995, S. 248 motiviert die römische Entscheidung mit der formellen «Souveränität» der Staaten; abgesehen von der grundsätzlichen Fragwürdigkeit dieser Klassifizierung (vgl. E. BADIEN, a.a.O. [o. Anm. 16], S. 398-400) ist hier einzuwenden, daß auch innerrömische Klienten personenrechtlich frei waren.

auch Patrone römischer Klienten ihren eigenen Vorteil wahrgenommen hätten<sup>16</sup>.

Darüber hinaus löste Badian eine Diskussion über die dem politischen Konzept zugrundeliegende Tradition aus. Vor allem Gruen widerspricht der Ansicht, daß die Patronatsbindungen auf der römischen Vorstellung von *fides* aufgebaut hätten; statt dessen sieht er sie im wesentlichen von griechischen bzw. hellenistischen Ideen inspiriert. Überzeugend ist der Ansatz, nach dem Weiterleben griechischer politischer Traditionen und ihrem Einfluß auf römische Entscheidungen zu suchen<sup>17</sup>. Allerdings ist mit Ferrary zu bedenken, daß sich die römischen und griechischen Vorstellungen von *beneficium* und *officium* keineswegs diametral widersprachen. Im übrigen weist derselbe Forscher darauf hin, daß der aus dem Lateinischen übernommene Begriff ΠΑΤΡΩΝ seit dem Ende des 2. Jhs. v.Chr. auch in griechischen Inschriften begegnet und offenbar eine spezifisch römische Verpflichtung des *patronus* einer Stadt ausdrücken soll<sup>18</sup>. Hier haben jüngst Canali de Rossi und Eilers die genauen Bedingungen für die Aufnahme des Patronats, die auf beiden Seiten gehegten Erwartungen sowie das besondere Inschriftenformular herausgearbeitet<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Vgl. ERNST BADIEN, *Hegemony and Independence. Prolegomena to a Study of the Relations of Rome and the Hellenistic States in the Second Century B.C.*, in: János HARMATTA (Hg.), *Proceedings of the VIIth Congress of the International Federation of the Societies of Classical Studies* (Budapest, 3.-8.9.1979), Budapest 1984, Bd. I, S. 397-414, bes. 408-414.

<sup>17</sup> Vgl. ERICH STEPHEN GRUEN, *Greek 'Pistis' and Roman 'Fides'*, *Athenaeum* 60 (1982), S. 50-68; ders., *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Berkeley (Cal.) 1984, Bd. I, S. 54-95 u. 158-199. Das Weiterleben eigener Traditionen in den griechischen Städten hat bes. auch RAINER BERNHARDT, *Imperium und Eleutheria. Die römische Politik gegenüber den freien Städten des griechischen Ostens*, Diss. Hamburg 1971 hervorgehoben; vgl. auch die Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), II.2.6.2.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. JEAN-LOUIS FERRARY, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique. De la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*, Rome 1988, S. 117-121; ders., *The Hellenistic World and Roman Political Patronage*, in: PAUL CARTLEDGE – PETER GARNSEY – ERICH GRUEN (Hgg.), *Hellenistic Constructs. Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*, Berkeley (Cal.) 1997, S. 105-113; ders., *De l'évergétisme hellénistique à l'évergétisme romain*, in: MICHEL CHRISTOL – OLIVIER MASSON (Hgg.), *Actes du X<sup>e</sup> Congrès international d'épigraphie grecque et latine* (Nîmes, 4-9 Oktober 1992), Paris 1997, S. 199-225, hier 208-212; ferner JOHANNES TOULOU MAKOS, *Zum römischen Gemeindepatronat im griechischen Osten*, *Hermes* 116 (1988), S. 304-324 u. J. RICH, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 11), S. 117-135, hier 130f.

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. FILIPPO CANALI DE ROSSI, *Il ruolo dei patroni nelle relazioni politiche fra il mondo greco e Roma in età repubblicana ed augustea*, München 2001; C. EILERS, *Patrons* (o. Anm. 6).

### 2.3. Braunds 'Friendly King' und das römische Konzept von auswärtiger 'amicitia'

Ein weiteres Korrektiv gegenüber Badian hat Braund mit seiner Behandlung des *Friendly King* in die Diskussion eingebracht. Er vermag durch viele Beispiele zu illustrieren, daß sich in der Beziehung zu einem *rex amicus* potentiell alle Aspekte interpersonaler Freundschaften verwirklichen konnten. Insbesondere die Wechselseitigkeit des Nutzens sowie den in der Praxis durchaus gegebenen Handlungsspielraum kann er hinlänglich belegen. Man mag nur an das in so vielen Facetten bekannte Nahverhältnis der julisch-claudischen Dynastie mit Herodes I. von Judäa und seinen Nachfahren denken, um eine Vorstellung davon zu bekommen, welcher Grad an emotionaler Tiefe erreicht werden oder ein wie großes persönliches Anliegen die Protektion eines auswärtigen Freundes sein konnte<sup>20</sup>.

Neuerdings betont Burton auch für die interstaatlichen *amicitiae*, die Rom im Verlauf des 3. und 2. Jhs. v.Chr. unterhielt, daß sie sich eher mit interpersonalen Freundschaften als mit Klientelbindungen vergleichen ließen. Wesentlich für diesen Ansatz ist zum einen die soziologische, aber durchaus auch mit antiken Theorien in Einklang zu bringende Konzeption von Freundschaft, die entgegen Badian nicht die Gleichheit der Partner voraussetzt, sondern wechselseitige Attraktivität in einer Mischung von Gleichheit und Ungleichheit gegeben sieht; im Gegensatz zum Klientelverhältnis habe man *beneficia* freiwillig und oft auch spontan erwiesen; zudem werde durch jeden Gunsterweis auch der Rang der Freunde untereinander neu definiert<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Vgl. D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* (o. Anm. 11), *passim*; auch Richard D. SULLIVAN, *Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100-30 B.C.*, Toronto 1990. Speziell zu Herodes vgl. Peter RICHARDSON, *Herod, King of the Jews and Friend of the Romans*, Colombia (SC) 1996; D.W. ROLLER, *The Building Programme of Herod the Great*, Berkeley 1997; Joseph GEIGER, *Herodes 'Philorhomaioi'*, *AncSoc* 28 (1997), S. 75-88; Sarah JAPP, *Die Baupolitik Herodes' des Großen. Die Bedeutung der Architektur für die Herrschaftslegitimation eines römischen Klientelkönigs*, Rahden (Westf.) 2000 (rez. Moshe L. FISCHER, *GFA* 6, 2003, S. 1017-1021).

<sup>21</sup> Vgl. P.J. BURTON, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 334-342 zu Definitionen von Freundschaft (wobei der Machtaspekt jedoch überbetont zu sein scheint); S. 343-348 zur Abgrenzung von Klientelverhältnissen (wobei aber ein wesentlicher Aspekt der römischen *clientela* — ihre förmliche Begründung, s. dazu Anm. 6 — außer acht bleibt); S. 349-351 zum relativen Vorzug «konstruktivistischer» gegenüber «realistischen» außenpolitischen Theorien (d.h. die internationalen Verhältnisse würden eher durch die tatsächliche Kommunikation und in ihr ausgedrückten Werte als allein durch ein darwinistisches Machtkalkül geprägt); S. 351 mit Anm. 90 zur Konzentration auf interstaatliche Beziehungen (allerdings darf auch hier die interpersonale Dimension nie weggedacht werden, s. auch unten mit

Allerdings bleibt die Freiwilligkeit angesichts eines wachsenden Mangels an Alternativen problematisch; die Strafaktionen Roms gegenüber den Rhodiern (geschweige denn den Pergamenern oder Achaïern) vermag Burton auch nicht hinreichend zu erklären; wohl nicht zufällig unterbleibt schließlich der Versuch, das Deutungsschema auch auf das späte 2. Jh. v.Chr., in dem Rom wenig Interesse am hellenistischen Osten zeigte, oder gar auf das agonistische 1. Jh. v.Chr., in dem Pompeius oder Caesar nach Gutdünken über das Potential der *amici populi Romani* verfügten, zu übertragen. Man könnte ferner auch die Pflege verzweigter Nahverhältnisse der späteren Könige zu mehreren römischen Aristokraten mit den Überlebensstrategien römischer Proletarier vergleichen, die sich mehreren Patronen gleichzeitig andienten<sup>22</sup>.

#### 2.4. Freundschafts-, Klientel- und Vertragsverhältnisse fließen zusammen

Die Grenzziehung innerhalb der keineswegs kongruenten Begriffspaare: der soziologischen Konzepte von Freundschaft und Patronatsverhältnissen einerseits bzw. der römischen Vorstellung von *amicitia* und *clientela* andererseits, bleibt also mit Schwierigkeiten behaftet. Jedoch haben nach den Studien von Heuß und Dahlheim erneut Braund und Burton in Erinnerung gerufen, daß *amicitia/ amicus* von der mittleren Republik an bis in die Kaiserzeit die quellenmäßig belegten Schlüsselbegriffe sind<sup>23</sup>. Dies war unabhängig davon, ob es sich um 'Freunde' des Senats,

Anm. 32); S. 352-365 zu den Verhältnissen zwischen Rom und Syrakus (3. Jh.) bzw. Rhodos (202-146 v.Chr.). Je weiter sich Burtons Beispiele in das 2. Jh. hineinbewegen, desto fraglicher wird jedoch seine Interpretation. Überraschenderweise bleiben Braunds (o. Anm. 11) und Eilers (o. Anm. 6) Arbeiten unberücksichtigt. Interessante Parallelen hinsichtlich des Freundschaftsbegriffs und der politologischen Prämissen finden sich bei Manuel Tröster – Altay COSKUN, *Zwischen Freundschaft und Gefolgschaft. Vergleichende Beobachtungen zu den Außenbeziehungen des römischen Reiches und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, GFA 6 (2003) [2004], S. 68-72.

<sup>22</sup> Das beste Beispiel gibt hierfür der wendige Galater Deiotaros ab, vgl. die unter 6.2 aufgeführte Studie von A. COSKUN (2003/4). Zu den innerrömischen Verhältnissen vgl. Peter GARNSEY – Greg WOOLF, *Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World*, in: A. WALLACE-HADRILL (Hg.), *Patronage* (o. Anm. 8), S. 153-170; P.J. BURTON, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 346f. spricht vergleichbare Phänomene unter einigen *homines novi* an.

<sup>23</sup> Vgl. die Verweise in Anm. 10-12. Kritisch dazu äußert sich aber z.B. J. RICH, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 11), der diese Bezeichnung mit R.P. SALLER, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 7) für irreführend hält, da sie im Gegensatz zum Klientelverhältnis die Gleichrangigkeit voraussetze. Vermittelnd sind dagegen die Positionen D. KONSTANS, *Friendship* (o. Anm. 7) und P.J. BURTONS, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12).

des *populus*, einzelner Senatoren oder des Kaisers handelte, wobei dieses Prädikat gleichermaßen Privatmännern, Königen und Städten zugelegt wurde.

Dabei hat bereits Dahlheim nachgewiesen, daß die Römer die Titel *amicus*, *socius* und *amicus et socius* für außeritalische Verbündete nach dem Sieg über den Makedonenkönig Perseus (168 v.Chr.) nahezu unterschiedslos gebrauchten, ohne daß daraus Schlüsse auf die Existenz eines wechselseitigen Beistandspaktes (*foedus*) gezogen werden dürften<sup>24</sup>. Derselbe Forscher hat daneben aber auch den Weg zu einem symbolischen Verständnis der nur zögerlich von Rom gewährten *foedera* geebnet, ein Gedanke, der dann besonders von Gruen und Kallet-Marx ausgeführt wird<sup>25</sup>.

Trotz Dahlheims grundsätzlicher Opposition gegen Badian's Klientelbegriff nähern sich ihre Positionen hinsichtlich der 'ungleichen Freundschaften' Roms zumindest für die spätere Phase der Sache nach also durchaus an, und in dieselbe Richtung verweist endlich auch die Studie Burtons, sofern man sie mit den oben gemachten kritischen Anmerkungen liest. Daneben ist festzustellen, daß die Ausdrücke 'Klientelkönig' oder 'Klientelfürst' auch schon vor Badian weite Verbreitung gefunden hatten und weiterhin finden (so neuerdings selbst bei Bleicken)<sup>26</sup>. Bisweilen wird dabei der metaphorische Charakter betont, oder man stellt

<sup>24</sup> Vgl. J. DAHLHEIM, *Struktur* (o. Anm. 10), bes. S. 260-274. Bereits P.C. SANDS, *Client Princes* (o. Anm. 9), S. 10-48 wies die unterschiedslose Verwendung von *amicus* und *socius* in der römischen Literatur seit Polybios nach. Weitere Bestätigung bringt Denvy A. BOWMAN, *The 'formula sociorum' in the Second and First Centuries B.C.*, *CJ* 85 (1990), S. 330-336. Fraglich ist allerdings, inwiefern diese terminologische Unschärfe auch Juristen unterstellt werden darf; jedenfalls scheint — mit A. HEUSS, *Grundlagen* (o. Anm. 10), S. 4-6 und entgegen A. ZACK, *Studien* (o. Anm. 10), S. 179-184 — Pomponius, *Dig.* XLIX15.5, pr. 1f. (... *si cum gente aliqua neque amicitia<m> neque hospitium neque foedus amicitiae causa factum habemus* ...) eher die Regel vertragloser *Amicitia*-Verhältnisse zu suggerieren.

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. J. DAHLHEIM, *Struktur, passim* und *Gewalt*, S. 180 (jeweils o. Anm. 10); E.S. GRUEN, *Hellenistic World* (o. Anm. 17), S. 13-53, bes. 50; Robert Morstein KALLET-MARX, *Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.*, Berkeley 1995, S. 184-197.

<sup>26</sup> Für die Verwendung vor Badian s. Anm. 9. Von einem 'Gleichnis' spricht J. BLEICKEN, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 182; den zweitgenannten Aspekt bespricht er S. 184f., wobei er S. 182 Cic., *ad Q. fr.* I 1.31 als «früheste Äußerung» zur «'Fürsorge' Roms» bezeichnet — vgl. dazu aber bereits Cic., *Manil.* 12f.; ausführlicher dazu Ernst BALTRUSCH, *Auf dem Weg zum Prinzipat: die Entwicklung der republikanischen Herrschaftspolitik von Sulla bis Pompeius* (88-62 v.Chr.), in: Jörg SPIELVOGEL (Hg.), *Res publica reperta. FS Jochen Bleicken zum 75. Geburtstag*, Stuttgart 2002, S. 245-262. Erneut greift J. BLEICKEN, *Verfassung* (o. Anm. 15), z.B. S. 262-264 diese Gedanken auf. Dagegen spricht ders.,

fest, daß die Unterschiede zwischen der inneren und äußeren Klientel in der späten Republik immer stärker verwischten, wenn nicht kommentarlos einfach der weiter gefaßte Klientelbegriff zugrunde gelegt wird<sup>27</sup>.

## 2.5. Weltmacht wider willen? Zur Frage des römischen Imperialismus

Ein weiterer Kritikpunkt in Bleickens Rezension zu Badians *Foreign Clientelae* leitet über zu einem anderen zentralen Thema, das ebenfalls große Relevanz für eine angemessene Beurteilung der 'auswärtigen Freundschaften' Roms hat. Zwar reiht sich Badian wiederholt in die Schar der Historiker ein, die mit Mommsen davon ausgehen, daß Rom wider Willen zur Weltmacht avancierte; tatsächlich könnten sich aber Spannungen zwischen dem traditionellen Konzept eines 'defensiven Expansionismus' und der These eines bewußten Hegemoniestrebens, das Badians Klientelbegriff impliziert, ergeben<sup>28</sup>. Das Verlangen nach Sicherheit hatte im Anschluß an Mommsen trotz vielfacher Differenzierung als Hauptmotiv römischer Außenpolitik gegolten, bis Harris 1979

*Geschichte der römischen Republik*, München 1999<sup>5</sup>, S. 59; 77f.; 91 unbefangen von «Klientelfürsten» u.ä., ohne freilich die Kritik an Badian grundsätzlich aufzugeben (S. 185).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. z.B. T.P. WISEMAN, *New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C.–A.D. 14*, Oxford 1971, S. 30ff., bes. 37: «Personal friends, political supporters, hosts, guests, clients — the categories are ill-defined and run into each other». D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* (o. Anm. 11), bes. S. 185 sieht, wie Titel und Untertitel seiner Monographie zu erkennen geben, keinen unüberbrückbaren Widerspruch zwischen den Konzepten der Freundschaft und der Klientel. Ders., a.a.O. (o. Anm. 11), S. 137–152 konstatiert bereits ab 167 v.Chr. eine sehr enge Anlehnung an die innerrömische Klientel. J.-L. FERRARY, *Philhellénisme* (o. Anm. 18), S. 119 u. Andrew LINTOTT, *Clients, clientes*, *DNP* 3 (1997), S. 32f., die Badian in seinem extrajuristischen Klientelbegriff zustimmen, sprechen z.B. von einer «Metapher» hinsichtlich der außenpolitischen Verwendung. Michaela STEIN-KRAMER, *Die Klientelkönigreiche Kleasiens in der Außenpolitik der späten Republik und des Augustus*, Berlin 1988, die die Spannung zwischen der Rechtsnorm und politischen Wirklichkeit zu beschreiben sucht, spricht von «völkerrechtlichen Klientelverhältnissen» (S. 2). Dagegen scheinen A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Foreign Policy* (o. Anm. 10; anders aber *Citizenship*, o. Anm. 9, S. 187f.) und R. KALLET-MARX, *Hegemony* (o. Anm. 25) die Begriffe Klientel und Patronage zu vermeiden. R.D. SULLIVAN, *Royalty* (o. Anm. 20), S. 13 lehnt es sogar ausdrücklich ab, von *client-kings* oder *clients* zu sprechen.

<sup>28</sup> So vorsichtig J. BLEICKEN, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 12), S. 182; *contra* E. BADIAN, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 16), S. 412, nachdem ders., *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, Oxford 1968<sup>2</sup>, S. 4–15 zwar prononciert gegen die Annahme eines römischen Expansionswillens im 2. und frühen 1. Jh. v.Chr. Stellung bezogen, zugleich aber einen «hegemonialen» Imperialismus eingestanden hatte. In krasser Form war letzterer bereits von Michael ROSTOVITZ, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Oxford, Bd. I, 1941, S. 5, Nd. 1972, S. 70–72 vertreten worden. Zur Position Th. MOMMSENS vgl. neben den Verweisen in Anm. 9 auch den Forschungsbericht R.M. ERRINGTONS (o. Anm. 11).



die Diskussion neu entfachte, indem er dem Senat materielles Gewinnstreben und eine aggressive Haltung als dauerhafte Charaktereigenschaften unterstellte<sup>29</sup>.

Weiterführend ist hier vor allem die Synthese von Kallet-Marx, der den scheinbaren Widerspruch zwischen zurückhaltender Übernahme direkter Verantwortung und einem kontinuierlichen, aktiven Streben nach Hegemonie überwindet. Ein wichtiger Argumentationsstrang besteht dabei in der Korrektur moderner Vorstellungen von Provinzialisierung: Noch bis weit ins 1. Jh. v.Chr. hinein blieb die zentrale Funktion des römischen Statthalters die Sicherung des äußeren und inneren Friedens, während seine Mitverantwortung für Steuereinzug, Rechtsprechung und Verwaltungsangelegenheiten erst sehr langsam an Bedeutung gewann<sup>30</sup>. Damit verwischt die scheinbar klare Trennlinie zwischen direkter und indirekter

<sup>29</sup> Vgl. William V. HARRIS, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford 1979, 1992<sup>3</sup> u. erneut, *Current Directions in the Study of Roman Imperialism*, in: ders. (Hg.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome*, Rom 1984, S. 11-34. Vorangehende Forscher sprechen dagegen — in mehr oder weniger enger Gefolgschaft Mommsens — von einem Umschlag von einer defensiven zu einer aggressiv-imperialistischen Haltung in der Übergangszeit zur späten Republik, vgl. z.B. Thérèse LIEBMAN-FRANKFORT, *La frontière orientale dans la politique extérieure de la république romaine depuis le traité d'Apamée jusqu'à la fin des conquêtes asiatiques de Pompée (189/88-63)*, Brüssel 1969, S. 325 (ab ca. 140 v.Chr. «impérialisme offensif et expansioniste»); eine größere Übergangszeit setzt wiederum Tenney FRANK, *Roman Imperialism* (1914), New York 1921, S. 218-220, 356f. u.a. voraus, der eine «mild form of imperialism» ab dem 3. Jh. wegen der zunehmenden Demokratisierung Roms keimen, dann seit Cato dem Älteren und Marius sowie mehr noch mit Pompeius angesichts der ritterlichen Finanzinteressen wachsen sieht. Während E. BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism* (o. Anm. 28), S. 60-92 den Rittern expansionistische Intentionen abspricht, macht er ähnlich wie Frank die *plebs* für steigende aggressive Absichten verantwortlich, die sich seit den Gracchen und vor allem seit Pompeius erkennen ließen. Untersuchungen im Anschluß an Harris wägen indes stärker systematisch zwischen den defensiven und aggressiven Elementen der römischen Politik ab oder heben ihre partielle Deckungsgleichheit hervor. Vgl. neben R.M. ERRINGTON, a.a.O. (o. Anm. 11) bes. die Positionen von J.A. NORTH, *The Development of Roman Imperialism*, JRS 71 (1981), S. 1-9 u. Kurt A. RAAFLAUB, *Born to Be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism*, in: Robert W. WALLACE – Edward M. HARRIS (Hgg.), *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360-146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian*, Norman (Okla.) 1996, S. 273-314. Ersterer betont, daß Rom ununterbrochen habe reagieren müssen; dabei hätten die Ereignisse eine Eigendynamik entfaltet, ohne von ihren Protagonisten reflektiert worden zu sein, bis man Herrschaftsansprüche im 1. Jh. v.Chr. als selbstverständlich empfunden habe. Zweiterer interpretiert das politische Handeln Roms vor allem von einer besonders intensiv empfundenen Bedrohungsperzeption her. Weitere Literatur findet sich in der Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), II.2.1.

<sup>30</sup> Vgl. R. KALLET-MARX, *Hegemony* (o. Anm. 25) mit Konzentration auf den Osten; für Gallien hatte bereits Charles EBEL, *Transalpine Gaul. The Emergence of a Roman Province*, Leiden 1976, ähnliche Beobachtungen gemacht, die jüngst Bert FREYBERGER, *Südgallien im 1. Jahrhundert v.Chr. Phasen, Konsequenzen und Grenzen römischer*



Herrschaft<sup>31</sup>, und die Tragweite der Freundschaftsbande zwischen römischen Aristokraten und den Städten bzw. Dynasten, die ihre innenpolitische Autonomie weitgehend behielten, wäre um so stärker hervorzuheben.

## 2.6. *Die Rolle individueller Staatsmänner in der römischen Außenpolitik*

Jedoch blendet selbst Kallet-Marx — wie z.B. auch Harris — die Rolle persönlicher Allianzen innerhalb Roms weitgehend aus, obwohl sie (wie könnte es in einer aristokratisch strukturierten Gesellschaft auch anders sein) neben den transnationalen Freundschaften erheblichen Einfluß auf den Verlauf der Unterwerfung und Umgestaltung des Mittelmeerraums hatten. Dies hat Badian und haben nach ihm insbesondere Twyman und Gruen durch die Analyse konkreter Entscheidungsprozesse verdeutlichen können. Die eine oder andere prosopographische Spekulation in ihren Darstellungen (oder auch im eingangs erwähnten Werk Münzers) berechtigt also keineswegs dazu, römische Außenpolitik losgelöst von ihren untereinander rivalisierenden Trägern zu erklären<sup>32</sup>.

Auf diesem komplexen Hintergrund drängt sich also erneut die Frage nach dem Grund für die verhältnismäßig lange Fortexistenz von 'befreundeten Königreichen' sowie den ihnen zugedachten Funktionen auf. In der Literatur begegnet einerseits eine Vielzahl verfassungssoziologischer Deutungen wie die Sorge des Senats um die Gefährdung seiner sozialen

*Eroberung (125-27/22 v.Chr.)*, Stuttgart 1999, vertieft hat (z.B. betont er S. 82, daß eine *lex provinciae* für die Gallia Transalpina bzw. Narbonensis nicht vor Augustus belegt sei).

<sup>31</sup> Vgl. dazu auch die terminologischen Ausführungen von Th. LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *Frontière orientale* (o. Anm. 29), S. 9 mit Anm. 1, sowie den Kommentar Arthur ECKSTEINS, *Ancient Dominions, The International History Review* 19 (1997), S. 359: «Ancient imperial rule was most often (not always, of course) indirect rule».

<sup>32</sup> Vgl. Briggs TWYMAN, *The Metelli, Pompeius, and Prosopography*, ANRW I 1 (1972), S. 816-874 u. E.S. GRUEN, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley (Cal.) 1974. Weitere Arbeiten, die nicht nur hinsichtlich Detailfragen, sondern auch des grundsätzlichen Wertes prosopographischer Studien für das Verständnis politischer Prozesse kontrovers sind, finden sich in der Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), IV. Innerrömische *factiones* kommen z.B. auch bei A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Foreign Policy* (o. Anm. 10) nicht zu ihrem Recht. Im übrigen schließt David F. EPSTEIN, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43 BC*, London 1987, S. 127, seine systematische Untersuchung mit der Erkenntnis: «the pervasiveness and intensity of *inimicitiae* at Rome made them a unique phenomenon». Neuerdings plädiert auch J. BLEICKEN, *Geschichte* (o. Anm. 26), S. 224, mit Blick auf die rezente Literatur zur inneren Entwicklung der römischen Republik ebenfalls dafür, personale Hintergründe bei politischen Entscheidungsfindungen wieder stärker zu berücksichtigen.

Geschlossenheit und politischen Machtbasis; andererseits werden praktische Überlegungen wie die Begrenztheit des Human- oder Finanzkapitals angeführt, die gegen die Übernahme direkter Herrschaft gesprochen hätten; eine Fortsetzung der defensiven Interpretationslinie findet sich in der Erklärung der ‘Klientel-’ als ‘Pufferstaaten’<sup>33</sup>.

Jede dieser Richtungen vermag erhellendes Licht auf so manche außenpolitische Entscheidung zu werfen, freilich nur, solange nicht der Anspruch darauf erhoben wird, die zentrale Grundkonstante zu sein. Einer solchen Deutung widersteht nicht zuletzt auch die Tatsache, daß die persönlichen Interessen der politischen Akteure regelmäßig erheblichen Einfluß ausübten und spätestens seit den Tagen Sullas das Geschehen oftmals geradezu dominierten. Pompeius’ tiefgreifende Neuordnungen, die nun erstmals ohne die Beteiligung des Senats zustande gekommen waren, offenbarten vollends seine Absicht, auch nach der Amtsniederlegung auf die ideellen, materiellen und personellen Ressourcen seiner ‘Freunde’ zurückgreifen zu können, während Caesar seine *amicitiae* dazu nutzte, sein *imperium* überhaupt nicht mehr niederzulegen.

### 2.7. Weitere Desiderate der Forschung und die Schwerpunkte des Projekts SFB 600/A2

Die wissenschaftliche Diskussion über die politische, soziale und kulturelle Bedeutung der Freundschafts- und Klientelverhältnisse ist also

<sup>33</sup> Daß der Senat zum Schutz der städtisch-aristokratischen Ordnung die Ausweitung des römischen Territoriums habe vermeiden wollen, um die Zahl schwer kontrollierbarer Kommandostellen möglichst nicht zu erhöhen, findet sich z.B. bei J. BLEICKEN, *Verfassung* (o. Anm. 15), S. 252. T. FRANK, *Roman Imperialism* (o. Anm. 29), S. 218-220, spricht vom Neid der Senatoren untereinander, der die Expansion im 2. Jh. gehemmt habe; S. 356 bezichtigt er insbesondere «popular leaders», imperiale Ambitionen gehegt zu haben. Eine weitere Spielart verfassungssociologischer Interpretation bietet M. STEIN-KRAMER, *Klientenkönigreiche* (o. Anm. 27), bes. S. 180f., die Klientelkönigen stabilisierende Wirkung beim Übergang von der Republik zum Prinzipat zuschreibt; doch erklärt dieser Ansatz weder die umfangreiche Vorgeschichte noch die lange Fortexistenz der *reges amici populi Romani*; gegen eine solche Ansicht wendet sich bereits D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* (o. Anm. 11), S. 187. — Auf die Begrenztheit der menschlichen Ressourcen verweist z.B. A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Foreign Policy* (o. Anm. 10), S. 52f., während E. BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism* (o. Anm. 28), S. 60-75, einerseits den anfänglichen Mangel an römischem Investivkapital betont und andererseits hervorhebt, daß im späteren Verlauf der Republik Klientelkönigtümer hinreichend lukrative Gewinnmöglichkeiten geboten hätten. — Die Entwicklung einer Pufferstaat-Theorie ist das beherrschende Thema von Th. LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *Frontière orientale* (o. Anm. 29); auch D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* (o. Anm. 11), S. 91-103, untersucht die verteidigungspolitische Funktion, lehnt aber — wie auch Sherwin-White (wie oben) — eine Engführung auf diesen Bereich zu Recht ab.

weder für die römische Innen- noch Außenpolitik abgeschlossen, wie jüngst z.B. auch Bernhardt in seinem Forschungsbericht über das Verhältnis Roms zu den Städten des Reiches gezeigt hat<sup>34</sup>. Während sich die einschlägige Literatur ferner überwiegend auf die Geschichte des (frühen) 2. Jhs. v.Chr. konzentriert, fehlt eine umfassende Darstellung für die großen Feldherren nach Sulla und erst recht eine Synthese für die turbulente Endphase der Republik, die der Bedeutung der Freundschaften für den Aufbau des Imperiums gerecht würde. Von besonderem Interesse wird sein, wie es in der postsullanischen Ära zu der massiven Ausbildung und Konzentration inwärtiger wie auswärtiger Freundschaften gekommen ist, die sich bis zur Schlacht von Pharsalos (48 v.Chr.) nahezu ausnahmslos auf das pompeianische oder caesarianische Lager verteilt haben<sup>35</sup>.

### 3. DER NORDPONTISCHE SEKTOR DES PROJEKTS: DIE BOSPORANISCHEN *REGES AMICI*

#### 3.1. *Einleitung*

Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem nördlichen Schwarzmeerraum sind in mancherlei Hinsicht interessant, denn sie spiegeln in differenzierter Weise die Versuche des Imperiums wider, das Vorfeld der Provinzen politisch und militärisch zu kontrollieren. Im Zuge dieser Politik gerieten Tyras und Olbia im nordwestlichen Pontos zunehmend unter die direkte Herrschaft Roms. Die südwestliche Krim um Chersonesos wurde durch römische Truppenteile gesichert, an der Nordküste des Schwarzen Meeres operierten Geschwader der römischen Flotte. Die Entwicklung dieser Verhältnisse ist in Gesamtdarstellungen der Geschichte des nördlichen Schwarzmeerraumes berücksichtigt sowie in größeren und

<sup>34</sup> Rainer BERNHARDT, *Rom und die Städte des hellenistischen Ostens (3.-1. Jahrhundert v.Chr.)*. Literaturbericht 1965-1995, München 1998.

<sup>35</sup> Vgl. bes. Tadasuke YOSHIMURA, *Die Auxiliartruppen und die Provinzial Klientel in der römischen Republik*, *Historia* 10 (1961), S. 473-495, u. Marianne SCHOENLIN NICOLS, *Appearance and Reality: A Study of the Clientelae of Pompey the Great*, Diss. Berkeley 1992. Der Entwurf Badian reicht bis ins Jahr 70 v.Chr., obwohl eine solche Zäsur mit Blick auf die Karrieren des Lucullus, Pompeius, Cicero und Caesar ungerechtfertigt ist; überdies sind auch die prosopographischen Voraussetzung revisionsbedürftig, vgl. bes. B. TWYMAN, a.a.O. und E.S. GRUEN, *Last Generation* (o. Anm. 32). Weitere Literatur findet sich in der Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), IV.

kleineren Spezialforschungen untersucht worden<sup>36</sup>. Grabungen fördern immer wieder neue Funde zutage, deren Ergebnisse das Bild ergänzen und verändern. Zu den aufschlußreichsten jüngeren Neufunden gehört die Entdeckung eines von Vexillationen des niedermoesischen Heeres errichteten Heiligtums des Juppiter Dolichenus in Balaklawa in der südwestlichen Krim<sup>37</sup>. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen von Tyras, Olbia und Chersonesos zum Imperium, sowohl zur römischen Zentrale als auch zu den politischen und militärischen Behörden der Provinzen (Moesia inferior, Bithynia et Pontus), ist auch im Rahmen des hier vorgestellten Projekts von Interesse. Im Vordergrund stehen jedoch die Beziehungen zwischen dem Imperium und dem Bosporanischen Reich, denn die bosporanischen *reges amici* sind für das zu bearbeitende Thema besonders ergiebig.

### 3.2. Rostovtzeffs Thesen

Schon oben wurde hervorgehoben, daß die Könige des Bosporanischen Reiches als *philorhomaioi* und *philokaisares* die längste Kontinuität eines Klientelverhältnisses zur Supermacht Rom darstellen (vom 1. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 4. Jh. n.Chr.). In der russischen, sowjetischen und postsowjetischen Forschung sind die Rombeziehungen der bosporanischen *reges amici* nicht nur in Gesamtdarstellungen berücksichtigt, sondern auch in Monographien und Aufsätzen thematisiert worden. Den maßgeblichen Ausgangspunkt bilden hier die Arbeiten Rostovtzeffs. Sie beruhen auf

<sup>36</sup> Michael ROSTOVITZEFF, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford 1922, S. 147-180 (*The Greek Cities of South Russia in the Roman Period*); Vitalij M. ZUBAR', *Severnyj Pont i Rimskaja imperija (seredina I v. do n.č. — pervaja polovina VI v.)* («Der nördliche Pontos und das römische Reich [Mitte des 1. Jh. v.u.Z. — erste Hälfte 6. Jh.]»), Kiew 1998; speziell zum römischen Militär: Tadeusz SARNOWSKI, *Wojsko rzymskie w Mezji Dolnej i na północnym wybrzeżu Morza Czarnego* («Das römische Heer in Niedermoesien und am nördlichen Ufer des Schwarzen Meeres»), Warschau 1988; Octavian BOUNEGRU – Mihail ZAHARIADE, *Les forces navales du Bas Danube et de la Mer Noire aux I<sup>er</sup> – VI<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Oxford 1996. David BRAUND hat nicht nur maßgebliche Arbeiten zum östlichen Schwarzmeerraum verfaßt, sondern auch den Norden verschiedentlich behandelt. Genannt sei hier nur sein Aufsatz *Greeks and Barbarians: The Black Sea Region and Hellenism under the Early Empire*, in: Susan E. ALCOCK (Hg.), *The Early Roman Empire in the East*, Oxford 1997, S. 121-136.

<sup>37</sup> Tadeusz SARNOWSKI – Oleg Ja. SAVELJA, *Das Dolichenum von Balaklawa und die römischen Streitkräfte auf der Südkrim*, *Archeologia* (Warschau) 49 (1999), S. 15-54 und Taf. V-XI; dies. und Vitalij M. ZUBAR, *Zum religiösen Leben der niedermoesischen Vexillationen auf der Südkrim. Inschriftenfunde aus dem neuentdeckten Dolichenum von Balaklawa*, *Historia* 47 (1998), S. 321-341, dazu Jerzy LINDERSKI, *Historia* 49 (2000), S. 128f.

einer bewunderungswürdigen Beherrschung aller Quellenkategorien (Autoren und Inschriften, Münzen und archäologische Zeugnisse) und zeichnen ein deutliches Bild des Klientelverhältnisses zwischen den bosporanischen Herrschern und Rom<sup>38</sup>.

Doch die Untersuchung dieses Verhältnisses ist eigentlich nicht das primäre Anliegen Rostovtzeffs. Ihm geht es vielmehr um die besondere Symbiose von Iranertum und Hellenentum, die sich seiner Auffassung nach im Bosporanischen Reich vollzogen hat. Die Betonung der iranischen Komponente verleitet Rostovtzeff jedoch gelegentlich zu einseitigen Urteilen. So vertrat er die Meinung, daß Pharnakes als Sohn und Dynamis als Enkelin des großen Römerfeindes Mithradates' VI. Eupators mit der Berufung auf ihren berühmten Vorgänger notwendigerweise einem antirömischen Ressentiment Ausdruck verliehen hätten<sup>39</sup>.

Dagegen spricht allerdings die gut belegbare Tatsache, daß Pharnakes und Dynamis ihre Abstammung von Mithradates betonten, um die Legitimität ihrer Herrschaft am Bosporos deutlich zu machen. Denn als Sohn und Nachfolger des Mithradates hatte Pharnakes 63 v.Chr. nach dem Verlust des pontischen Stammlandes die Anerkennung seiner Stellung als König des Bosporanischen Reiches von Pompeius verliehen bekommen und sie 47 nach der verlorenen Schlacht bei Zela von Caesar wiedererlangt. Nach dem baldigen Untergang des Pharnakes bestimmte Caesar seinen Anhänger Mithridates von Pergamon zum Nachfolger auf dem bosporanischen Thron, und dies mit ausdrücklicher Betonung der

<sup>38</sup> M. ROSTOVITZ spricht von bosporanischem Vasallentum und römischem Protektorat: *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford 1922, S. 152ff., und detaillierter ders. in: M. ROSTOWZEW, *Skythien und der Bosporus*, Band II. *Wiederentdeckte Kapitel und Verwandtes*, übersetzt und herausgegeben von Heinz Heinen, Stuttgart 1993, S. 88ff.

<sup>39</sup> Diese Auffassung hat M. ROSTOVITZ in verschiedenen Publikationen vertreten, am eingehendsten in seinem Aufsatz *Queen Dynamis of Bosporus*, *JHS* 39 (1919), S. 88-109 = Neubearbeitung einer etwas älteren russischen Fassung: *Bronzovij bjast bosporskoj caricy i istorija Bospora v epochu Avgusta* («Die Bronzebüste einer bosporanischen Königin und die Geschichte des Bosporos in der Epoche des Augustus»), in: *Drevnosti. Trudy Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo Archeologičeskogo Obščestva* 25, Moskau 1916, S. 1-26 (auch Separatdruck Moskau 1914 [erschienen 1916] als Festgabe für Gräfin P.S. Uvarova). In diesem Aufsatz versucht er außerdem nachzuweisen (spez. S. 102-105), daß die Verbindung der Dynamis mit ihrem Partner und späteren Nachfolger Aspurgos ursprünglich ebenfalls gegen die Pläne Roms gerichtet gewesen sei. Diese von Rostovtzeff aufgestellten Thesen haben in der sowjetischen und postsowjetischen Forschung zu den bosporanischen Rombeziehungen in der ausgehenden Republik und im frühen Prinzipat trotz mancher Einsprüche bis heute überlebt. Sie liegen auch der neuesten einschlägigen Monographie von Sergej Ju. Saprykin zugrunde (dazu weiter unten). Siehe andererseits H. HEINEN, *Die mithradatische Tradition* (vollst. Zit. unten Abschnitt 6.1).

Verbindung des Pergameners mit Mithradates VI. Eupator<sup>40</sup>. Als *amicissimus rex* sollte er fortan die Provinzen des römischen Volkes *a barbaris atque inimicis regibus* verteidigen<sup>41</sup>. Mit anderen Worten: Mithradates-Tradition und Romfreundschaft bildeten nicht unbedingt einen Gegensatz.

Mit der Betonung des iranisch-griechischen Dualismus hat auch eine weitere These Rostovtzeffs zu tun: Mithradates VI. war zwar zunächst als Retter der nordpontischen Griechen vor den iranischen Skythen und Sarmaten aufgetreten, doch hatte er sich dann zunehmend auf diese Barbarenstämme gestützt, um seine eigenen Truppen zu verstärken. Mit ihnen hatte er auch sein letztes großes Heer aufstellen wollen, als angesichts seiner Niederlagen die bosporanischen Griechenstädte gegen ihn rebellierten und seinen Untergang herbeiführten. Aus dieser pro-iranischen «mithradatischen Tradition» heraus habe sich, so Rostovtzeff, auch unter den bosporanischen Nachfolgern des Mithradates ein Nahverhältnis zu den einheimischen Barbarenstämmen entwickelt, während andererseits die bosporanischen Griechenstädte bei den Römern Rückhalt gesucht hätten.

Mit den Worten Rostovtzeffs: «After the death of Mithradates the duality of forces acting in the kingdom influenced the whole history of the Bosphorus. The prevailing majority of the population, all the Sarmatian and Scythian tribes included in the kingdom, honoured the memory of Mithradates and were disposed to support his heirs, and the Greeks were ready to submit to any power that would guarantee them the preservation of their nationality and of the remnants of the municipal régime to which they were used»<sup>42</sup>. Aus dieser These Rostovtzeffs ergab sich eine weitere Stütze für die Auffassung, Mithradates-Tradition und Romfreundschaft bildeten im Grunde einen Gegensatz, eine These, die sich trotz ihrer evidenten Schwächen in der sowjetischen Forschung zäh gehalten hat und auch in der postsowjetischen Historiographie noch anzutreffen ist<sup>43</sup>.

### 3.3. Die sowjetische und postsowjetische Forschung

Der weitere Gang der Forschung zu den Rombeziehungen des Bosporanischen Reiches verlief nach Rostovtzeff und seit den 20er Jahren des

<sup>40</sup> Corpus Caes., *bell. Alex.* 78.

<sup>41</sup> Ebda. Für die Herausarbeitung der Zusammenhänge vgl. H. HEINEN, *Mithradates von Pergamon und Caesars bosporanische Pläne* (vollst. Zit. unten Abschnitt 6.1).

<sup>42</sup> *Queen Dynamis* (o. Anm. 39), S. 96.

<sup>43</sup> Zuletzt ausführlich bei Saprykin (dazu weiter unten).

20. Jhs. zweigeteilt: im Westen meist im Rahmen größerer Darstellungen, nur selten als eigener Forschungsgegenstand; in der Sowjetunion dagegen als Teil der eigenen Geschichte, insofern das Bosporanische Reich zu den «ältesten Staaten» auf dem Territorium der UdSSR zählte. Aus dieser Perspektive sind im Laufe der vergangenen Jahrzehnte zahlreiche Arbeiten entstanden, von denen hier nur die wichtigsten und markantesten angeführt werden können. Dabei verwundert nicht, daß die Einschätzung der bosporanischen Rombeziehungen jeweils den allgemeinen Strömungen der sowjetischen Geschichtsschreibung und den vorherrschenden politischen Akzentuierungen folgte. Das bedeutet nicht, daß derartige Forschungsansätze nicht auch neue und zum Teil wertvolle Ergebnisse hervorgebracht hätten. Doch die Gefahr einer Einengung und Verzerrung der Perspektive ist selbst von anerkannten Wissenschaftlern nicht immer vermieden worden. Im übrigen beobachten wir heute ganz ähnliches an westlichen Universitäten, deren Wissenschaftspolitik, Forschungsstrategien und Mittelvergabe nicht selten von «political correctness» und der Bearbeitung von Modethemen geprägt sind.

In den 20er und vor allem in den 30er Jahren des 20. Jhs. wurde in der sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung die Lehre vom historischen Materialismus durchgesetzt und die Auffassung vertreten, die Weltgeschichte verlaufe in einer Abfolge gesellschaftlicher Formationen, wobei die Antike durch die Sklavenhalterordnung geprägt gewesen sei. Rom wurde damit zum 'Sklavenhalterstaat' *par excellence* und dessen herrschende Gesellschaft zu Ausbeutern. Die *amicitia populi Romani* konnte unter diesen Prämissen kaum positiv bewertet werden. Im Gegenteil, die Sympathien gehörten dem Kampf gegen den römischen Imperialismus und die 'Sklavenhalter'. Deshalb wurde jede tatsächlich oder auch nur vermeintlich romfeindliche Maßnahme der bosporanischen Könige sorgfältig recherchiert, wobei man im allgemeinen betont hat, daß diese Herrscher sich nach Möglichkeit gegen die Dominanz der fremden Supermacht gewehrt hätten<sup>44</sup>.

Nach den bitteren Erfahrungen der Sowjetunion im II. Weltkrieg ist dieser Ansatz mit einem deutlich patriotischen Akzent versehen worden. Charakteristisch für eine solche Sichtweise ist beispielsweise die Diktion

<sup>44</sup> Repräsentativ für diese Einschätzung ist Dmitrij P. KALISTOV, *Étjudy iz istorii Bospora rimskogo vremeni (Političeskie vzaimootnošenija Rima i Bospora pri carjach Farnake i Asandre)* («Studien zur Geschichte des Bosporos in römischer Zeit [Die wechselseitigen politischen Beziehungen Roms und des Bosporos unter den Königen Pharnakes und Asandros]»), VDI 1938 (4), S. 174-183.



von Elena S. Golubcova, die 1951 davon sprach, daß die Römer versucht hätten, «auf das Territorium unseres Vaterlandes vorzudringen» und «willfähige Diener Roms» auf den bosporanischen Thron zu setzen. Gegen Rostovtzeff versucht Golubcova nachzuweisen, daß dieser den Vasallenstatus des Bosporanischen Reiches gegenüber Rom unter den Nachfolgern Mithradates VI. deutlich überbetont habe und, spezieller, daß die Mithradates-Enkelin Dynamis sich «nicht völlig ins Fahrwasser der römischen Politik» begeben habe<sup>45</sup>.

Das Spannungsverhältnis von Herrschaft und Gefolgschaft im Falle der auswärtigen Freunde Roms entspricht durchaus antiker Wahrnehmung. Darin ist Golubcova und allen, die ähnlich werten, natürlich recht zu geben. Doch die Überlagerung der antiken Situation durch modernen Patriotismus und den Territorialbestand der Sowjetunion wirkt anachronistisch. Im Klima der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit lagen derartige Perspektiven allerdings nahe. Sie erinnern an vergleichbare Phänomene in der national ausgerichteten Historiographie etwa Frankreichs und Deutschlands mit ihrer Verherrlichung der Gestalten des Vercingetorix und des Arminius. In einem solchen Verständnishorizont gerät die *amicitia populi Romani* leicht in die Nähe des Landesverrats. Es gehört zu den Chancen und Aufgaben des Projekts, die auswärtigen Freundschaften nicht nur in ihrem antiken Kontext zu untersuchen, sondern auch den Wechsel moderner Interpretationsmuster auf dem Hintergrund zeitgenössischer Strömungen und Rahmenbedingungen im Auge zu behalten.

Aus der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit stammt auch das bis heute maßgebliche und als Ganzes unübertroffene Standardwerk *Das Bosporanische Reich* aus der Feder von Viktor F. Gajdukevič<sup>46</sup>. In einer Reihe von Punkten widerspricht Gajdukevič den Thesen Rostovtzeffs<sup>47</sup>, doch den Grundgedanken einer Unvereinbarkeit von Mithradates-Tradition und Romtreue macht auch er sich zu eigen: «Rom versuchte auch diesmal (d.h. im Falle des Aspurgos – H.H.) zu verhindern, daß sich am Bosporos

<sup>45</sup> Elena S. GOLUBCOVA, *Severnoe Pričernomor'e i Rim na rubeže našej èry* («Der nördliche Schwarzmeerraum und Rom um die Zeitenwende»), Moskau 1951; die Zitate auf S. 5 und 118.

<sup>46</sup> Russische Originalausgabe: *Bosporskoe carstvo*, Moskau–Leningrad 1949. Dieses Buch wird heute in seiner «zweiten, neubearbeiteten und wesentlich erweiterten Auflage in deutscher Sprache mit den Ergebnissen der archäologischen Untersuchungen von 1949 bis 1966» benutzt: Viktor F. GAJDUKEVIČ, *Das Bosporanische Reich*, Berlin u.a. 1971, deutsche Übersetzung von Gottfried Janke.

<sup>47</sup> Ebda., S. 330 (betr. der Beziehung Aspurgos – Aspurgianer).

eine Dynastie festsetzte, die sich von Mithridates VI. Eupator herleitete»<sup>48</sup>. Bei aller Ausgewogenheit des Urteils klingt auch bei Gajdukevič eine gewisse Abneigung gegen die Römerfreunde durch, etwa wenn er Polemon I. als «Kreatur der Römer» bezeichnet<sup>49</sup>. Sachlich dürften solche Urteile in der Tat oft genug berechtigt sein, doch sie spiegeln ein tieferliegendes Unbehagen und letztlich ein Ressentiment gegen Rom wider, das einer ausgewogenen, nüchternen Analyse des Phänomens der *reges amici* im Wege steht.

Es würde in dieser Übersicht zu weit führen, im Detail die weitere Entwicklung der sowjetischen Forschung zum Thema der bosporanischen Rombeziehungen auszubreiten. Besonders seit den 70er Jahren ist das Bild sehr viel reicher und differenzierter geworden. Hier wären u.a. die Arbeiten von Dmitrij B. Šelov zu Mithradates und zur bosporanischen Geschichte zu erwähnen<sup>50</sup>. Auch die Archäologie leistet ihren Beitrag zum Thema der *reges amici*, etwa wenn es um die Ikonographie der Herrscher sowie um Zeugnisse für die Präsenz und den Einfluß Roms im Bosporanischen Reich geht. Stellvertretend für viele andere seien hier die Monographie «Bosporos und Rom» von Galina A. Cvetaeva<sup>51</sup> sowie die zahlreichen Arbeiten von Michail Ju. Treister genannt<sup>52</sup>. Von direkter Relevanz für das Projektthema sind die Forschungen sowjetischer Numismatiker, denn gerade in den Münzen der bosporanischen Herrscher spiegeln sich ihr Selbstverständnis und ihr Verhältnis zu Rom. Neben den älteren Arbeiten von Aleksander N. Zograf<sup>53</sup> und Dmitrij B. Šelov<sup>54</sup> sind hier in erster Linie die Monographien von Vladilen A. Anochin<sup>55</sup> und Nina A. Frolova<sup>56</sup> zu nennen.

<sup>48</sup> Ebda., S. 337.

<sup>49</sup> Ebda., S. 337.

<sup>50</sup> Vgl. den Nachruf auf D.B. Šelov und seine Bibliographie von Tatjana M. ARSEN'EVA, *Rossijskaja archeologija* 1994 (2), S. 243-249.

<sup>51</sup> *Bospor i Rim*, Moskau 1979.

<sup>52</sup> Beispielsweise: *The Romans in Pantikapaion*, in: *Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia* 2 (1995), S. 157-181.

<sup>53</sup> *Antičnye monety* («Antike Münzen»), Moskau-Leningrad 1951; engl. Übers.: *Ancient Coins* (Brit. Archaeol. Reports, Suppl. Series 33, 1977).

<sup>54</sup> Siehe oben Anm. 50 zu seiner Bibliographie.

<sup>55</sup> *Monetnoe delo Bospora* («Das Münzwesen des Bosporos»), Kiew 1986; ders., *Istorijskaja Bospora Kimmerijskogo* («Geschichte des Kimmerischen Bosporos»), Kiew 1999.

<sup>56</sup> *Monetnoe delo Bospora (seredina I v. do n.č. – seredina IV v. n.č.)* («Das Münzwesen des Bosporos [Mitte 1. Jh. v.u.Z. – Mitte 4. Jh. u.Z.]»), 2 Bde., Moskau 1977; engl. Übers. früherer Arbeiten Nina A. FROLOVA, *The Coinage of the Kingdom of Bosporus AD 69-238* (Brit. Archaeol. Reports, International Series 56, 1979), und *The Coinage of the*

Dieses Resümee der Forschung hat sich ganz auf die Rombeziehungen unter den Nachfolgern des Mithradates VI. konzentriert, denn dieser Zeitabschnitt soll der Schwerpunkt in der ersten Projektphase sein. Der knappe Rahmen des hier gebotenen Referats zwang dazu, die Namen vieler Gelehrter auszulassen, die sich in der einen oder anderen Weise mit dem bosporanischen Verhältnis zu Rom beschäftigt haben. Dennoch wird man mit Blick auf die ausgehende Republik und den frühen Prinzipat sagen dürfen, daß in der gesamten sowjetischen Zeit keine wirklich grundlegende Revision der Thesen vorgenommen worden ist, die Rostovtzeff seinerzeit in seinem weichenstellenden Aufsatz *Queen Dynamis of Bosphorus*<sup>57</sup> vertreten hatte, trotz aller Kritik im Großen und Kleinen und trotz zahlreicher, zum Teil sehr wertvoller Einzelstudien.

Dies war der Forschungsstand, als Heinz Heinen nach etwas intensiverer Beschäftigung mit einer nachgelassenen Arbeit Rostovtzeffs begann<sup>58</sup>, eigene Beiträge zur bosporanischen Geschichte vorzulegen<sup>59</sup>, und schließlich 2001 das Projekt «Roms auswärtige Freunde» konzipierte. In diesem sollen, wie oben schon dargelegt, die Beziehungen zwischen den bosporanischen *reges amici* und Rom einen eigenen Sektor bilden. Nun ist im Jahre 2002 als Frucht vieler vorangehender Studien eine ganz einschlägige Monographie von Sergej Ju. Saprykin erschienen, die die bei weitem gründlichste Untersuchung zum Thema darstellt: Das Bosporanische Reich an der Scheide zweier Epochen<sup>60</sup>. Allerdings greift der Verfasser bei aller Differenzierung und Weiterentwicklung im Grunde doch wieder die Kernthesen Rostovtzeffs von der mithradatischen Tradition der bosporanischen Könige in der späten Republik und im frühen Prinzipat (bis 45/46 n.Chr.) auf.

Die bosporanischen Nachfolger des Mithradates hätten sich, so Saprykin, permanent gegen die römischen Absichten wehren müssen, den Bosphoros zu einer römischen Provinz zu machen. Da die bosporanischen Griechenstädte geneigt gewesen seien, sich zu ihrem Nutzen auf die römische Seite zu schlagen, hätten die Nachfolger des Mithradates Rückhalt

*Kingdom of Bosphorus A.D. 242 – 341/342* (Brit. Archaeol. Reports, International Series 166, 1983).

<sup>57</sup> Vollständiges Zitat oben Anm. 39.

<sup>58</sup> Siehe die in Anm. 39 genannte Edition.

<sup>59</sup> Vgl. im einzelnen die unten Abschnitt 6.1 zitierten Aufsätze.

<sup>60</sup> *Bosporskoe carstvo na rubeže dvuch epoch*, Moskau 2002; vgl. auch SAPRYKINS frühere Monographie: *Pontijskoe carstvo. Gosudarstvo grekov i varvarov v Pričernomor'e* («Das Pontische Reich. Ein Staat der Griechen und Barbaren im Schwarzmeerraum»), Moskau 1996.

bei den Barbarenstämmen sowie bei den von ihnen planmäßig geförderten Militärsiedlern in den bosporanischen Katoikien gesucht. Unter der Maske der Romfreundschaft hätten die Mithradatiden alles getan, um ihre Selbständigkeit gegen Rom zu behaupten. Man sieht: Die Auffassungen Rostovtzeffs von einem grundlegenden Dualismus iranischer Barbaren und griechischer Städte sowie von der Spannung zwischen Mithradates-Tradition und Romfreundschaft sind im Konzept Saprykins deutlich erkennbar und durchziehen sein Buch als roter Faden. Saprykin hat die Thesen Rostovtzeffs ausgebaut, vertieft und nuanciert. In einem Punkt vor allem hat er sie entscheidend weiterentwickelt: durch die Betonung der Rolle der Militärsiedlungen als Stützpunkte der bosporanischen Herrscher. Hier greift er zum einen auf seine Kenntnis der Verhältnisse im pontischen Stammland des Mithradates und zum andern auf seine Interpretation der Ergebnisse der Siedlungsarchäologie in der bosporanischen Chora zurück<sup>61</sup>. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem neuen Buch Saprykins muß somit das Programm des Trierer Projekts zumindest für die erste Phase des nordpontischen Sektors prägen.

Der vorliegende Überblick hat sich bewußt auf die russische, sowjetische und postsowjetische Forschung konzentriert, denn sie hat die maßgeblichen Beiträge zum Thema der bosporanischen Rombeziehungen in der späten Republik und im frühen Prinzipat geliefert. Die westlichen Debatten um die *amicitia populi Romani* und die Entwicklung einer auswärtigen Klientel sind in den genannten östlichen Arbeiten kaum oder nur wenig verarbeitet worden. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen gilt dies auch umgekehrt<sup>62</sup>. Hieraus ergibt sich für das Trierer Projekt eine Aufgabe, die weiter unten skizziert werden soll.

<sup>61</sup> Vgl. speziell das Kapitel «Aspurgos und die militär-wirtschaftlichen Siedlungen auf Königsland» in: *Das Bosporanische Reich an der Scheide zweier Epochen*, S. 177-203. Siehe auch den aufschlußreichen Hinweis im Vorwort dieses Buches (S. 6) auf die entscheidenden Anregungen, die Saprykin bei der Ausgrabung des Landgutes des bosporanischen Würdenträgers Chrysaliskos auf der Taman-Halbinsel und in den Gesprächen mit dem hier sehr sympathisch gewürdigten Grabungsleiter Nikolaj I. Sokol'skij erhalten hat.

<sup>62</sup> Zu den Ausnahmen zählen neben D. BRAUND, *Friendly King* (o. Anm. 11) einige Einzelstudien, beispielsweise der weiterführende Aufsatz von Andreas LUTHER, *Zwietracht am Fluß Tanais: Nachrichten über das Bosporanische Reich bei Horaz?*, in: M. SCHUOL – U. HARTMANN – A. LUTHER (Hg.), *Grenzüberschreitungen. Formen des Kontakts zwischen Orient und Okzident im Altertum*, Stuttgart 2002, S. 259-277. Polnische Wissenschaftler sind traditionell sehr aktiv an der Nordschwarzmeerforschung beteiligt, vgl. nur Krzysztof NAWOTKA, *Asander of the Bosphorus: his Coinage and Chronology*, *AJN*, Second Series 3-4 (1991-92), S. 21-48, Taf. 3-4. DDR-Historiker spielten oft eine Vermittlerrolle, vgl. etwa Bernd FUNCK, *Das Bosporanische Reich aus der Sicht Strabons*, *Klio* 67 (1985),

## 4. ZIELE UND METHODEN DES PROJEKTS SFB 600/A2

Vor dem aufgezeigten Forschungshintergrund konzentriert sich das Teilprojekt A2 auf die interpersonale Dimension der transnationalen Klientelbeziehungen. Dabei gibt das Rahmenthema des SFB 600 die spezielle Blickrichtung auf inkludierende und exkludierende Aspekte vor. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen stehen folglich die konkrete Interaktion von Römern und Fremden, mit der Freundschaftsverhältnisse begründet, erneuert und ggf. transferiert wurden. Unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Wechselseitigkeit soll dabei besonderes Gewicht auf ihre politische Instrumentalisierung zu Machterweiterung und Herrschaftssicherung sowie ihre Bedeutung für Prestige und soziale Stellung der Partner, aber auch ihre Auswirkungen auf kulturellen Austausch und religiöse Verehrung gelegt werden.

In allen diesen Bereichen stellt sich zugleich die Frage nach dem Verschwimmen der Grenze zwischen Innen- und Außenperspektive: Fremde Akteure beteiligen sich an den römischen Bürgerkriegen, nicht-römische *amici* steigen in den Beraterstab der Magistrate auf, griechische Schriftsteller mehrten den Ruhm römischer Imperatoren. Zugleich erhalten auswärtige 'Freunde' das römische Bürgerrecht, nehmen römische Namen an und ehren römische 'Wohltäter' und die Göttin *Roma* mit Monumenten, Festen und Kulte<sup>63</sup>. Im ganzen sollen Freundschaft und Patronage also nicht allein als juristische Kategorien, sondern vor allem als komplexe politische, soziale und kulturelle Phänomene verstanden werden.

Die letzten Jahre der Republik und der Übergang zum Prinzipat bieten für dieses Untersuchungsfeld ideale Voraussetzungen als eine außerordentlich dicht dokumentierte Hochphase der römischen Expansion, des aristokratischen Wettstreits um Ruhm und Anhängerschaft und der Verwicklung auswärtiger 'Freunde' in innerromische Auseinandersetzungen. Um das überaus umfangreiche Quellenmaterial zu strukturieren, empfiehlt sich eine Orientierung an den bedeutendsten Patronen auf römischer Seite: Lucullus, Pompeius, Caesar, Mark Anton und

S. 273-280, und ders., *Das Bosporanische Reich und Rom zur Zeit des Kaisers Augustus*, *Das Altertum* 32 (1986), S. 27-35.

<sup>63</sup> Vgl. J.-L. FERRARY, *Political Patronage* (o. Anm. 18); Martha Joanna PAYNE, *Aretas heneken. Honors to Romans and Italians in Greece from 260 to 27 B.C.*, Diss. East Lansing (Mich.) 1984; Klaus TUCHELT, *Frühe Denkmäler Roms in Kleinasien. Beiträge zur archäologischen Überlieferung aus der Zeit der Republik und des Augustus*, Teil 1: *Roma und Promagistrate*, Tübingen 1979; Ronald MELLOR, *Thea Rhome. The Worship of the Goddess Roma in the Greek World*, Göttingen 1975.

Octavian / Augustus, wobei die Untersuchung ggf. auf die wichtigsten republikanischen *gentes* wie die Caecilii Metelli, Claudii, Domitii Ahenobarbi und Personen wie Cato Uticensis oder Brutus ausgeweitet werden kann; daneben bieten sich aber auch herausragende Gestalten unter den Freunden Roms wie der Mytilener Theophanes oder der Galaterkönig Deiotaros für eine Darstellung ihrer Verbindungen zur herrschenden Elite an<sup>64</sup>.

Als zweiter Sektor des Teilprojekts A2 liefert der nordpontische Schwerpunkt ein im Westen wenig erforschtes Beispiel für die partielle Inklusion von Randzonen. Neben dem Bosporianischen Reich sollen längerfristig die Städte bzw. Stadtstaaten Tyras, Olbia und Chersonesos Taurike einbezogen werden. Dabei lassen sich alle Stufen der Rombindung beobachten, von der auswärtigen Freundschaft (Bosporianisches Reich) bis zur weitgehenden administrativen und militärischen Inklusion (Tyras am Dnjestr). Voraussetzung ist in jedem Falle eine intensive Beschäftigung mit der einschlägigen russischen, sowjetischen und postsowjetischen Forschung und deren jeweiligen Voraussetzungen. Die Verknüpfung dieser Forschung mit den Fragestellungen und Ergebnissen der westlichen Diskussionen zum Thema Freundschaft und Klientel ist ein ausgesprochenes Desiderat und verspricht interessante methodische Aufschlüsse. Der Dialog zwischen beiden Seiten läßt auch für den engeren Projektbereich noch sehr zu wünschen übrig. In der ersten Projektphase (2002-2004) stehen die bosporianischen *reges amici* der späten Republik und des frühen Prinzipats im Vordergrund, genauer, die Zeit zwischen dem Untergang Mithradates' VI. Eupators (63 v.Chr.) bis zum Regierungsbeginn Kotys I. (45/46 n.Chr.). In den späteren Arbeitsphasen soll die Folgezeit am Bosporos untersucht werden, wobei auch die nordpontischen Nachbargebiete sowie der größere osteuropäische Kontext im Vorfeld der römischen Provinzen im Auge behalten werden sollen.

Durch die Schwerpunkte des Teilprojekts A2 werden reichsweite, synchronische und regional begrenzte, diachronische Perspektiven miteinander verknüpft. Methodisch empfiehlt sich eine Verbindung von prosopographischen Recherchen mit sozial- und begriffsgeschichtlichen Fragestellungen, um so einen geeigneten Zugang zum Gesamtthema der 'Freundschaftsverhältnisse' zu schaffen und es in seinen ein- und abschließenden Momenten zu erfassen. Zu untersuchen sind dabei vor allem

<sup>64</sup> Vgl. die prosopographisch geordnete Literatur in der Arbeitsbibliographie (o. Anm. 2), IV.2.2.

Umfang, Formen und Motive des Austauschs von *beneficia* und *officia*<sup>65</sup>, Auswirkungen auf das Ansehen und die Selbstbestimmung der Partner und auf die Architektur des Reiches sowie die Erscheinungsformen der ‘Freundschafts’-Repräsentationen z.B. durch die Wahl bestimmter Terminologien, Symbole, (Bei-) Namen, inschriftlicher Ehrungen, Bilder und Zeremonien. Diese sind nicht nur als Reflex von politischen und sozialen Verhältnissen zu verstehen, sondern überhaupt auch als Quelle der Konstruktion von ‘Freundschafts-’ oder ‘Klientelbeziehungen’<sup>66</sup>.

Einen besonderen Schwerpunkt bilden Bedeutung, Gebrauch und Entwicklung des vielfältigen Vokabulars der ‘Freundschaftsbeziehungen’ (*amicus, hospes, socius, patronus/ cliens, fides* etc. und ihre griechischen Entsprechungen), die in Zusammenarbeit mit der Zentralstelle des SFB 600 in vergleichender Perspektive analysiert werden sollen. Daneben bestehen verschiedene Querverbindungen zu den weiteren Teilprojekten des Bereichs ‘Fremdheit’. Dabei werden übergreifende Themen wie Zugehörigkeitsrechte und die Inklusion von Fremden in politische Räume, Partizipationformen unter Fremdherrschaften sowie Personennamen im Kontext kultureller oder politischer Inklusion in speziellen Arbeitskreisen vertieft; im letztgenannten Fall ist zudem auf die enge Kooperation mit dem internationalen *Netzwerk Interferenzonomastik* (NIO) zu verweisen<sup>67</sup>.

## 5. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Bereitschaft zur Integration von Fremden begünstigte Roms Aufstieg zur Weltmachtstellung erheblich. Im Bereich der römischen Außenpolitik wurde seit dem Ende des 3. Jhs. v.Chr. die *amicitia populi Romani*

<sup>65</sup> Die rezente Arbeit von K. VERBOVEN, *Economy of Friends* (wie Anm. 8) bietet eine solide Grundlage für einen Vergleich mit den innerrömischen Formen des Austauschs materieller Güter.

<sup>66</sup> Vgl. Jeremy TANNER, *Portraits, Power and Patronage in the Late Roman Republic*, *JRS* 90 (2000), S. 18–50.

<sup>67</sup> Vgl. <http://www.nio-online.net>. Zur Interferenzonomastik in der Galloromania vgl. Monique DONDIN-PAYRE – Marie-Thérèse RAEPSAET-CHARLIER (Hgg.), *Noms, identités culturelles et romanisation sous le Haut Empire*, Brüssel 2001 (mit der Rezension von Altay COSKUN, NIO-GaRo 2003.2, unter <http://www.nio-online.net/revnncr.pdf>) sowie demnächst Altay COSKUN – Jürgen ZEIDLER, *Acculturation des noms de personnes et continuités régionales ‘cachées’: l'exemple des ‘Decknamen’ dans l'anthroponymie gallo-romaine et la genèse du ‘Netzwerk Interferenzonomastik’*, in: RION ca. 2004/5



bestimmend, die ursprünglich ganz allgemein gute und friedliche Beziehungen implizierte, sich allmählich aber als ein elastisches Instrument erwies, um die Völker des Mittelmeerraumes bei begrenztem direkten Engagement zu kontrollieren und in das Imperium Romanum einzubeziehen. Über mehrere Jahrhunderte spielte das weite Netz der 'Freundschaften' nicht nur in politischer und militärischer Hinsicht eine entscheidende Rolle, sondern strahlte auch auf die soziale Stellung der beteiligten Partner aus und trug zur kulturellen Romanisierung weiter Gebiete bei. Daneben profitierten aber auch nicht wenige auswärtige Freunde erheblich von ihren Beziehungen, die sich keineswegs auf juristische oder politische Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse reduzieren lassen. Das hier vorgestellte Vorhaben soll den Blick für die sehr vielfältigen Spielarten dieser 'Freundschaftsbeziehungen' schärfen, die sowohl auf zwischenstaatlicher als auch auf interpersonaler Ebene begründet werden konnten.

Die Verbindung von Dynasten, Städten und lokalen Aristokraten mit führenden Römern der späten Republik soll einen von zwei Schwerpunkten des Teilprojekts bilden. Besonderes Interesse gilt den auswärtigen 'Klientelen' der großen Imperatoren von Lucullus bis Augustus, an denen zu zeigen ist, wie die wachsenden innerrömischen Rivalitäten allmählich auch zu einer stärkeren Inklusion der Mittelmeeranrainer in das Reich führten. Dabei sind die jeweiligen *amici* nicht nur als Faktoren der römischen Innenpolitik, sondern vielmehr in ihrer komplexen Position sowohl als abhängige Träger der römischen Herrschaft wie auch als selbständige Akteure mit begrenzter Autonomie zu betrachten. Als zweite Projektsäule sollen Art und Umfang des römischen Einflusses auf den nördlichen Schwarzmeerraum vom 1. Jh. v.Chr. bis zum 4. Jh. n.Chr. erforscht werden. Im Zentrum dieses Komplexes stehen die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und den bosporianischen Königen, für die sich die längste Kontinuität der programmatischen Beinamen *philokaisar* und *philorhomaioi* belegen läßt.

## 6. ÜBERSICHT ÜBER ABGESCHLOSSENE STUDIEN UND LAUFENDE PUBLIKATIONSVORHABEN DER PROJEKTGRUPPE SFB 600/A2

### 6.1. Abgeschlossene Arbeiten (1990-2004)

COSKUN, Altay: *Inklusion und Exklusion von Fremden in den Gerichtsreden Ciceros. Zugleich ein Einblick in das Projekt 'Roms auswärtige Freunde'*,

- demnächst in: *Corona Coronaria. Festschrift für Hans-Otto Kröner zum 75. Geburtstag*, hg. von Johannes Schwind und Sabine Harwardt, ca. 2004.
- COSKUN, Altay: *Die tetrarchische Verfassung der Galater und die Neuordnung des Ostens durch Pompeius* (Strab. geogr. 12,5,1 / App. Mithr. 560), demnächst in *FS Gerhard Dobesch*, Wien ca. 2004.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Mithradates VI. Eupator und die Völker des nördlichen Schwarzmeerraums*, *HBA* 18 (1991 [1996]), S. 151-165.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Mithradates von Pergamon und Caesars bosporanische Pläne. Zur Interpretation von Bellum Alexandrinum 78*, in: *E fontibus haurire. Beiträge zur römischen Geschichte und zu ihren Hilfswissenschaften* (= FS H. Chantraine), hg. von R. Günther und St. Rebenich, Paderborn 1994, S. 63-79.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Rome et le Bosphore. Notes épigraphiques*, *CCG* 7 (1996), S. 81-101.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Fehldeutungen der 'anabasis' und der Politik des bosporanischen Königs Aspurgos*, *Hyperboreus* 4 (1998), S. 340-361.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Zwei Briefe des bosporanischen Königs Aspurgos aus dem Jahre 16 n.Chr. (AE 1994,1538). Übersehene Berichtigungsvorschläge Günther Klaffenbachs und weitere Beobachtungen*, *ZPE* 124 (1999), S. 133-142.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Die mithradatische Tradition der bosporanischen Könige. Ein Missverständener Befund*, in: K. Geus – K. Zimmermann (Hgg.), *Punica – Libyca – Ptolemaica. FS Werner Huß*, Löwen 2001, S. 355-370.
- HEINEN, Heinz: *Greeks, Iranians and Romans on the Northern Shore of the Black Sea*, *Colloquia Pontica* 6 (2001), S. 1-24.
- TRÖSTER, Manuel – COSKUN, Altay: *Zwischen Freundschaft und Gefolgschaft. Vergleichende Beobachtungen zu den Außenbeziehungen des römischen Reiches und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, *GFA* 6.3, 2003 [Anfang 2004] (<http://www.gfa.d-r.de/6-3/troester-coskun.pdf>).
- TRÖSTER, Manuel – COSKUN, Altay: *Amerika auf den Spuren Roms? Zum Thema der Freundschaft in den Außenbeziehungen der Vereinigten Staaten und des römischen Reiches*, demnächst in *GWU* 2004.

## 6.2. In Vorbereitung befindliche Arbeiten (2004-2008)

Altay Coskun bereitet eine Monographie zu den auswärtigen Freundschaften der römischen Aristokraten während der ausgehenden Republik vor; unter den kleineren, in Bearbeitung befindlichen Studien sind zu nennen: *Deiotaros Philorhomaïos*, erscheint 2004/5. Die exemplarische Karriere eines erfolgreichen 'Freundes der Römer'; *Amicitia* und *clientela* in Caesars Gallischem Krieg; *Civitas Romana* und die Inklusion von Fremden in den römischen Staat.

Heinz Heinen schreibt zur Zeit an einem Buch über die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Bosporanischen Reich von Mithradates VI. Eupator bis Mithradates VIII.; daneben plant er einen kleinen Beitrag zu Kleopatra als *regina amica Caesaris et populi Romani*.

Gemeinsam bereiten Altay Coskun und Heinz Heinen den Sammelband 'Roms auswärtige Freunde in der späten Republik und im frühen Prinzipat' vor, der u.a. Beiträge von David Braund (betr. Polemon I., Dynamis und Pythodoris), Boris

Dreyer (betr. *Amicitia populi Romani* im Kontext des Aristonikos-Krieges), Gustav Adolf Lehmann (betr. Kolophon und Rom im späten 2. Jh. v.Chr.), Frank Leßmeister (betr. Pompeius in Lucans *Pharsalia*), Brian McGing (betr. Herodes I.) und Manuel Tröster (betr. Lucullus' auswärtige Freunde) enthalten wird.

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## WAR AT SEA IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR\*

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is this to find out how the Roman and Carthaginian navies worked in the Second Punic War. From a naval point of view, the Second Punic War is very different from the first one, as there are very few naval battles. Consequently, this war has traditionally been viewed as a war on land. The role of the navies is, however, very important, and the control of sea and harbours was decisive in terms of winning the war. Both states still operated with large fleets; the fleet numbers are about the same as in the First Punic War<sup>1</sup>.

I shall consider the role of the navies in overall strategy on both sides, especially on the Carthaginian, where it has usually been seen as non-existent<sup>2</sup>. We must start by looking at the situation at the beginning of the Second Punic War in the western Mediterranean. As Rankov has pointed out, ancient warships were coast-bound and needed to be able to beach or enter harbour at relatively short intervals; thus, only control of beaches and harbours along an intended route could allow the movement of a fleet<sup>3</sup>. After the First Punic War, the Romans had conquered the Ligurian seaboard and part of the Gallic seaboard as well as gaining con-

\* I am grateful to Peter Derow for a number of helpful comments on this paper.

<sup>1</sup> For fleet numbers, see Appendix II. The main sources for this study are Polybius and Livy. The basic problem with their narrative is that they do not seem to have much interest in war at sea, but concentrate on war on land and the deeds of certain commanders like Scipio Africanus. Most of Polybius' text is lost and where we can compare Livy's version with Polybius' original text, we can see how Livy has shortened the text and omitted many details. Polybius, on the other hand, was no marine historian either. As we can see in his description of the First Punic War, he cites things correctly from his sources but makes mistakes in analysing what happened, simply because he did not have practical experience or interest in seafaring. See C. STEINBY, *The Roman Boarding-Bridge in the First Punic War. A Study of Roman Tactics and Strategy*, *Arctos* 2000, p. 193-210, and *Polybios Rooman laivaston kuvaajana*, *Dialogus — Historian taito*; Matti Männikön juhlaKirja, Turku 2002, p. 116-132, for a discussion on Polybius as marine historian. Basically, our sources do not tell the things we would want to know about the navies.

<sup>2</sup> For instance J.H. THIEL, *Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times*, Amsterdam 1946, *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> B. RANKOV, *The Second Punic War at Sea*, in *The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal*, edd. T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, London 1996, p. 55.

trol over Sardinia and Corsica. Consequently, the beaches and harbours between Spain and Italy and Africa and Italy were all subject to Roman domination. Owing to this conquest the Romans were able to make it practically impossible for the Carthaginian navy to operate. Hannibal's strategy responded to this situation; the only way to defeat the Romans would be to attack them in Italy, and if it was not possible to transport the troops by sea then he would have to take the route over the Alps. He was not the first one in the ancient world to cross the Alps, but this was the first time an entire organised army tried it<sup>4</sup>.

The Romans controlled the sea, and their plan was to open two fronts right at the beginning of the war, one in Spain and one in Carthage's area in Africa. They intended to fight Hannibal and also attack Carthage directly<sup>5</sup>. Fleets and harbours along the route were needed for this.

Hannibal's attack on Italy was something the Romans did not expect; and, generally, the first years of the war show how shocked and unprepared the Romans were. Consequently, they had to abandon the plan for an invasion of Africa, a plan that was executed only towards the end of the war; nevertheless, Roman troops were sent to Spain.

So, at the beginning of the war, Hannibal was able to surprise the Romans and gain a superior position despite the fact that the Romans were controlling large parts of the coast and islands in the western Mediterranean. The sea was blocked; but that did not stop Hannibal from getting to Italy, with the consequence that the Romans had to change their plans. What then went wrong? We must look at the situation of the Roman navy: how well did the Romans actually master the sea, the coastal areas and landing places, to prevent the Punic navy from operating?

<sup>4</sup> Polybius lists earlier attempts (the Celts), see Pol. III 48.

<sup>5</sup> For the Ebro treaty in 226, see Pol. II 13.7. For the treaty with Saguntum, see Pol. III 30. We do not know when the Romans made the treaty with Saguntum, whether it was before or after the Ebro treaty. See W.V. HARRIS, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford 1979, p. 202. Polybius writes about the Ebro treaty stating only what the Carthaginians were not allowed to do, but clearly there must have been a similar clause forbidding the Romans to cross the river. F.W. WALBANK, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. I, Oxford 1957.

## 1. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR

1.1. *Hannibal's strategy*

During the first years of the war, Hannibal gained a series of victories in Italy, starting with Trebia in 218 and ending with Cannae in 216. According to the standards of that time, that should have been enough to convince the peoples of Italy that the Carthaginians had clearly won the war. Accordingly, after Cannae Hannibal expected to begin peace negotiations with the Roman senate. He had thousands of captives, many of high rank. The fate of the captives was an important feature in all peace treaties ending conflicts between the great states and kingdoms of the third century BC. The terms on which the prisoners would be returned and the amount of paid to redeem captives was as much a gauge of victory and defeat as the forfeiture of territory or the payment of an indemnity<sup>6</sup>.

However, there was a basic difference in the way these two states saw warfare. Roman wars ended only when the enemy ceased to be a threat by admitting total defeat and accepting their future as a subordinate ally (or, in Carthage's case, accepting unconditional surrender). The only alternative was for the Romans themselves to suffer such a defeat. The Carthaginians acted like any other Hellenistic state, as their attitude to warfare was less rigid. They expected war to be ended with a negotiated treaty, which reflected the actual balance of power<sup>7</sup>. The Romans refused to admit defeat in spite of enormous losses, and won through sheer determination and the willingness to expend massive resources in their war effort. The entire Roman state went to war, mobilising an exceptionally high proportion of its manpower, marshalling all of its wealth and resources to pay, feed, clothe and equip its armies and construct great fleets of warships. The Carthaginian effort, on the other hand, was never so wholehearted. It was not because the Carthaginians remained at heart a nation of merchants, but theirs was closer to the normal attitude towards warfare of every civilised state in the Mediterranean. Only the Romans

<sup>6</sup> A. GOLDSWORTHY, *The Punic Wars*, London 2000, p. 217.

<sup>7</sup> A. GOLDSWORTHY, *op. cit.*, p. 92. From the Carthaginian perspective, there was no reason to behave as a subordinate ally to Rome, since they did not expect the result of wars to be so final. This difference in attitude is clearly visible at the beginning of the Second and the Third Punic War as well. See A. GOLDSWORTHY, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

viewed every war as a life and death struggle, refusing to consider defeat whilst they had any means of carrying on the fight, and always pursuing total victory<sup>8</sup>.

If both states had had same idea about warfare, the Romans should have agreed to make peace after Cannae in 216. The war could have been ended with a peace treaty, which reflected the balance of power. However, the Romans were by no means ready to give up. It is at this stage that the role of the navies becomes crucial. Had the war ended after the battle of Cannae, then the Carthaginians had won despite the fact that the Romans controlled the sea. It would not have mattered that the Carthaginians were not able to establish a sea route to Italy.

### 1.2. *The Barcids and the navy*

Hannibal had achieved all his victories without the help of the Carthaginian navy. However, the Roman refusal to surrender forced the Carthaginians to rethink. The sea was closed to the Carthaginians and Hannibal's strategy had responded to that. After Cannae, the Carthaginians were forced to develop a new plan, in which the efforts of the Carthaginian navy were intensified.

We do not know how much effort the Barcids had put into renewing the navy after the First Punic War. The Carthaginian navy had collapsed at the end of that war, as the arms race in equipping one navy after another had apparently been too much for them. Polybius states that the Carthaginians had neglected the maintenance of their fleet, since they had expected that the Romans would not again attempt to dispute their supremacy at sea<sup>9</sup>. In my view, the Carthaginians were probably just waiting for the Romans to become tired with the war and give up. This was the case with previous wars against the Greeks in Sicily, since they, like the Romans, could not conquer the last Punic strongholds in western part of Sicily. The Carthaginians did not have the resources to maintain their

<sup>8</sup> A. GOLDSWORTHY, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 366. Normally wars, particularly wars between states as large as Carthage or Rome, ended when one side lost the willingness to fight on, not the ability to do so. The objective of any war was to force the enemy to a position where they would give in. Hannibal attacked Italy to win the war. It was rarely possible in this period for one side to destroy its enemy utterly in war, unless the states involved were very small and one had an overwhelmingly advantage, as was the case in the Third Punic War. A. GOLDSWORTHY, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

<sup>9</sup> Pol. I 61.



fleet at this crucial moment<sup>10</sup>; consequently, they could not stop the Romans from taking not just Sicily but also Sardinia.

As we do not have any Carthaginian sources from this period, we do not know what kind of plans the Barcids had<sup>11</sup>. It is apparent that the Carthaginians did not accept the fact that they had lost Sicily to the Romans. However, in Barcid politics, it seems that the leaders were concentrating on building up a strong army, and there is no information about equipping the navy. It is also unclear how Hamilkar intended to fight a war against Romans, if indeed he was planning one. Anyway, Hannibal did not inherit any ready-made plans. As Rich points out, the construction of a strong fleet would have run the risk of provoking Roman retaliation before the Barcids were ready, since such a navy could only have been directed against Rome<sup>12</sup>. On the other hand, one of the most important things that made the Romans concerned about the growth of Carthaginian power in Spain was the foundation of Nova Carthago. Polybius was aware how convenient it was for the operations in Spain as well as in Africa<sup>13</sup>. It could be used as both a military and naval base.

### 1.2.1. Spain

The Carthaginians had a navy in Spain: according to Polybius, Hannibal had left to Hasdrubal 50 quinqueremes, two quadriremes and five triremes, of which 32 quinqueremes and all of the triremes had a crew<sup>14</sup>. There is also evidence that the Carthaginian navy was active again and the Romans tried to defeat it at the beginning of the war on the Spanish coast.

*The battle of the Ebro* — One of the very few battles at sea was fought off the Spanish coast in 217. According to Polybius, Hasdrubal had repaired during the winter thirty ships left by Hannibal and had manned

<sup>10</sup> The Carthaginian navy was in a very poor condition in the last battle in the First Punic War. See Pol. I 61.

<sup>11</sup> However, it should be clear that the Barcids were not building up a dynasty of their own but acting on directions from Carthage. See S. LANCEL, *Hannibal*, Oxford 1998, p. 113.

<sup>12</sup> J. RICH, *The Origins of the Second Punic War*, in *The Second Punic War* (n. 3), p. 15.

<sup>13</sup> Pol. II 13.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius gives detailed information about troops and ships that Hannibal left to Hasdrubal. He states that he got this information from a bronze tablet he found at the Lacinian promontory. Livy gives the same figures. Pol. II 33.7-13; Liv. XXI 22.4. See F.W. WALBANK, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 364-365.

ten additional ones and had thus got a fleet of forty ships. The Romans and the Carthaginians departed from their winter quarters; the Romans in the north from Tarraco and the Carthaginians in the south from Nova Carthago. According to Polybius, the Romans used two swift-sailing Massilian ships for intelligence. The navies met at the mouth of the Ebro. We do not have much information about the battle. Hasdrubal had 40 warships and Gaius Cornelius Scipio had 35. Polybius states that after a short struggle the Carthaginians, losing two ships with their crews and oars and sailors of four others, ran their ships ashore when the Romans pressed on, and took refuge with the troops on land. The Romans towed off 25 of the Carthaginian ships. Livy tells basically the same story<sup>15</sup>. From Livy we get the idea that the Carthaginian sailors were badly prepared since they did not expect any fighting to take place that day. Both Polybius and Livy state how the Romans in one easy battle had made themselves the masters of the sea (Pol.) or masters of all that coast (Liv.)<sup>16</sup>.

This battle was decisive, since as a consequence the Carthaginian navy lost its position on the Spanish coast. The Roman navy started to dominate the area, and we can see here the same thing that had happened elsewhere in the western Mediterranean; the Romans started controlling the coast so that the Carthaginian navy could no longer operate in the area. Having control over the coastline was especially important in Spain since the inland was inhabited by various tribes that not even the Carthaginians could conquer and the mountainous landscape also caused difficulties. So the only way to proceed involved taking control over the coast.

According to Livy, the Romans sailed to Onusa where they stormed and sacked the city and then continued to Nova Carthago, devastating the country around it. The Roman navy that was *praeda gravis*, filled

<sup>15</sup> According to Livy, The Roman ships were first detected from the Spanish watch towers, which were used to protect the coast against pirates.

<sup>16</sup> Pol. III 95-96; Liv. XXII 19-20.1-2. We do not know what source Polybius used for this. Livy probably used Coelius, who used the same source as Polybius, possibly Silenos. There are also reports in Frontinus and Dio. They contain information that cannot be credible, however; we can see from Dio's text that the battle was tougher and lasted longer than what Polybius and Livy state (J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* [n. 2], p. 51; F.W. WALBANK, *op. cit.* [n. 5], p. 430). A fragment of Sisylos gives a different picture of what happened; He gives valid details about the battle which Polybius has omitted and, generally, the idea that it was a fierce battle, and not just something where the Punic navy immediately gave in. The Massilian ships formed the important second line of the Roman fleet, the line in which the Punic diekplous-attack was stopped. F. JACOBY, *FGHHist* 176 F1.

with booty, arrived in Longuntica, where the Romans found a great quantity of *spartum*, esparto-grass, which Hasdrubal had collected for the use of the ships. The Romans took what they needed and burned the rest<sup>17</sup>.

The Carthaginians had problems with their army and navy as well. Livy states that Hasdrubal did not trust either part of his force (the navy and the army) and stayed at a distance from the enemy. As he got reinforcements from Africa, he wanted to take up a position closer to the enemy and told the navy to be prepared in order to protect the coast and the islands. At that point, however, the naval captains started a revolt. They had been punished after the battle of the Ebro for their cowardly behaviour and ever since that they had been loyal neither to their commander nor to the Carthaginian cause<sup>18</sup>. So there was, after all, something wrong in the way the battle was fought even if we take into account the Sisylos fragment, according to which it was a real battle. Or perhaps all this just stresses the importance of the battle and the consequences it had for the Punic warfare in Spain.

As Thiel points out, this means that if the officers were Spanish, the rowers and sailors must be Spanish as well<sup>19</sup>. Thus, Hasdrubal was facing trouble with mercenaries, or should we call them allies? We do not know whether it was about money or something else. The Spanish tribes had the tendency to support the side that was winning in the war, exactly as the tribes in north Italy.

Thus, when we try to find out what was the situation with the Carthaginian navy, we can see that the Carthaginians had all the basic elements. They had a navy, ships that Hannibal had left to Hasdrubal, manned with Spanish mercenaries or allies. We do not know the exact number of the ships<sup>20</sup>. There were ships, crews and materials and, what is perhaps most important, the base, the city of Nova Carthago. The Romans attacked and defeated the Punic navy approaching the walls of Nova Carthago, destroyed the store of supplies and did their best to make

<sup>17</sup> Liv. XXII 20.4-7. *Spartum* was a plant valued for its fibrous stems, used as material for rope: OLD. See Plin., *Nat. Hist.* XIX 26.

<sup>18</sup> Liv. XXIII 26.2-5. In 216 the Romans had divided the command so that P. Scipio conducted operations at sea and Gn. Scipio on land.

<sup>19</sup> J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 51.

<sup>20</sup> We cannot count the ship numbers so that they would form a coherent story, like Thiel has tried to do, since we simply do not have enough information to succeed. See J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), *passim*. This goes for both the Roman and the Carthaginian navy. Nevertheless, we can still make an approximate list of fleets sailing in each year, see Appendix II.

the Spanish tribes abandon the Carthaginians. Thus, there is all the evidence we need to show that the Carthaginians had a navy on this coast and that it was extremely important for the Romans to eliminate it if they wanted to challenge the Carthaginian army. This raises a question as to why Polybius does not say anything about the Carthaginian navy when he discusses the outbreak of the war? The Romans must have learnt about it when they did their inspections between the wars, and, as we can see, the Romans straightaway attacked the Carthaginian navy to clear the coast. This must have been a part of their original plan that included sending a fleet and an army to Spain<sup>21</sup>.

### 1.2.2. The islands

Next we must look at the situation in the islands. From the beginning of the war, the Carthaginian navy had been operating in Sardinia and Sicily as well. Sicily, Sardinia and the smaller islands between Italy and Africa were strategically extremely important, since a navy wanting to sail from Africa to Italy or from Italy to Africa needed to have a harbour on the way.

*Sicily* — When the war started, one of the consuls in 218, Ti. Sempronius Longus, was sent to Sicily with an army and 160 quinqueremes. Their task was to attack Carthage and, obviously, to fight the Punic navy off the African coast. The Romans were in Lilybaeum preparing for this when the senate called them back after Hannibal had attacked Italy, and so the mission of the fleet was not completed. This had serious consequences for the Romans in following years, as the war at sea, concerning the islands and the coast of Italy, turned out to be very different from what the Romans had planned, and thus very different from the situation at the Spanish coast.

The contest for the control of the most important landing places had begun right at the beginning of the war. According to Livy, before the consul Sempronius had got to Sicily, the Carthaginians had sent twenty quinqueremes to lay waste the coast of Italy. Nine of them reached

<sup>21</sup> Roman control over the Spanish coast was not complete, as we know that messengers sailed from Spain to Carthage and back. E.g. in 216, Hasdrubal received the order from Carthage that he should at the first opportunity lead his army to Italy, which, according to Livy, made nearly all the people in Spain to incline to the side of the Romans. Hasdrubal sent a letter to the senate explaining the situation. In response, the Carthaginian senate sent Himilco with a complete army and an enlarged fleet to hold and defend Spain by land and sea. He arrived in Spain, beached his ships and reached Hasdrubal. Liv. XXIII 27.9-28.3. The Romans reacted first after they heard about this but had done nothing to stop the messengers and Himilco from arriving in Spain.

Liparae, eight the Isle of Vulcan, and three of them the current diverted into the Straits. The Syracusan king Hiero, who happened to be in Messana at that time, captured them and brought them to the harbour in Messana. By interrogating the prisoners it became clear that thirty five other quinqueremes were sent to Sicily to meet with the old allies. In particular, their mission was to occupy Lilybaeum. Hiero warned the Romans, who then started guarding the coast from watch towers. The crews in Lilybaeum were on alert. The Carthaginian ships tried to sail in at night, but they were discovered in the moonlight. There followed a battle at sea in the morning. According to Livy, seven Punic ships were instantly cut off and captured, and the rest took to flight. Moreover, Livy states that the Roman navy was intact<sup>22</sup>.

After the battle, Sempronius arrived in Messana. As he was entering the straits, king Hiero put out to meet him with his navy, *classem ornatam armatamque*, and informed Sempronius about the conditions in the island and what the Carthaginians had intended to do. He reported the danger that Lilybaeum and other cities of the coast were in. The consul decided to sail without delay to Lilybaeum, and the king with his fleet sailed with him<sup>23</sup>. At Lilybaeum, after Hiero had left with his fleet, the consul left the praetor to protect the coast and sailed to Malta, which was under Carthaginian control. Livy does not give any details about what happened next; he just states that on his arrival Hamilcar, Gisco's son, surrendered himself and the soldiers with the town and island. Sempronius returned to Lilybaeum. He made a short expedition to the Isles of Vulcan searching for the Punic fleet, which already had sailed to attack the Italian coast, threatening the town of Vibo. When he was returning to Sicily, he received the letter from the senate telling him to come back as soon as possible<sup>24</sup>.

So, what can we say about all this? The Romans took Malta and secured the situation in Sicily. This is all very important when we think about the strategy, the Carthaginians trying to open a route to Italy and the Romans trying to prevent it. The Romans were also securing their positions as they were planning an invasion of Africa. Livy does not give any information about the Roman fleet that confronted the Carthaginians at Lilybaeum, nor does he give any details about Hiero's navy. However,

<sup>22</sup> Liv. XXI 49-50.6.

<sup>23</sup> Liv. XXI 50.7-11.

<sup>24</sup> Liv. XXI 51.1-5.

the Romans had at the beginning of the war two allied navies assisting them, Massilia in the west and Syracuse in Sicily.

It seems that here again, the Romans were late. At the beginning of the war they had confidently made plans about sailing to Spain and Africa and having the war there, far away from Italy. However, Hannibal managed to get to Italy and even here, in Sicily, the Carthaginians were the first to arrive. This seems to me to show that the Romans did not, after all, have a total control over the sea. It is very reasonable that the Carthaginians tried to conquer back Lilybaeum, which was one of the best fortified harbours in Sicily, and which the Romans, despite a long siege, had failed to take in the First Punic War. Livy tells how the Carthaginians tried to attack the city at night. They knew the difficult sailing route that led to the harbour very well<sup>25</sup>.

*Sardinia* — At the beginning of the war, the Carthaginians tried to get a harbour in Sardinia as well. In 217, according to Polybius, the Carthaginians, after hearing about the Ebro battle, despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design now that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commander believing they would find Hannibal there. The Romans, however, sent a fleet of one hundred and twenty quinqueremes from Rome. On hearing this, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia and returned to Carthage<sup>26</sup>. According to Livy, the Carthaginian navy captured transport ships that were on their way to Spain, off the port of Cosa. The consul was ordered to go to Ostia and to man all the ships that were in Rome or Ostia, to pursue the enemy's fleet and protect the coasts of Italy<sup>27</sup>. In the same year the consul sailed around Corsica and Sardinia with 120 ships, taking hostages from both. Then he continued to Africa to pillage the countryside. The Romans were ambushed and were forced to flee suffering great losses, and the fleet returned to Lilybaeum<sup>28</sup>.

It seems that the Carthaginian navy could sail at that time quite freely, reaching even the coast of Italy. The Carthaginians were supported by the

<sup>25</sup> For the siege and the sailing route in the First Punic War, see Pol. I 46-47. Thiel rejects Livy's story about a sea battle, mainly because the numbers about the Roman navy do not fit with his calculations. See J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 43-46. In my opinion, this is not reasonable since, basically, we do not have enough information to tell us exactly how the ships were disposed in the western Mediterranean.

<sup>26</sup> Pol. III 96.8-10. Polybius does not tell the name of the commander.

<sup>27</sup> Liv. XXII 11.6-8.

<sup>28</sup> Liv. XXII 31.

people in Sardinia and Corsica, enabling the Carthaginian navy to land on the coast. So here again, the Carthaginians had found a way to interfere with Roman traffic between Spain and Italy and to get support from people that were subject to Rome. The Romans were quick to close this route and by taking hostages tried to secure the islands from further attempts of rebellion.

Both Sicily and Sardinia were areas the Romans thought to be under their control and still we find the Punic fleets operating there from the beginning of the war. How was this possible? One of the first things the Romans did in Spain was to fight the Carthaginian fleet, and they must have been prepared to fight the Punic navy off the coast of Africa as well if they were going to land in there. This would explain the large number of warships the Romans had in Sicily. However, this did not happen, as Hannibal's arrival in Italy changed all that — not only the situation on land, placing major land battles in Italy, but also the situation at sea. Hannibal's arrival in Italy forced the Romans to defend their own territory and saved the Punic navy from a major Roman attack off the African coast. Thus the undefeated Punic navy, divided into smaller fleets, was able to cause all the trouble for the Romans in Sicily, Sardinia and at the coast of Italy in the following years, forcing the Romans to fight the Punic fleets in areas where according to their plans they should not have been<sup>29</sup>.

## 2. INTENSIFIED CARTHAGINIAN EFFORTS AT SEA AFTER CANNAE

We have seen that the Carthaginian navy was active even before Cannae, although we cannot say how much co-operation there was between the Hannibal's army and the Carthaginian navy. As far as we can see, Hannibal's strategy was based on the fact that at least in 218 there was no way to transport the army from Spain to Italy by ship. Did Hannibal even consider taking the sea route? There is nothing about it in the sources; although that way the Carthaginians could have arrived in Italy a few months earlier and the Roman shock would have been even greater<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> There is no information about the size of the Carthaginian fleet in Africa, however, from Africa, considerable Punic fleets were sent to Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. The Roman army and fleet that were sent to Lilybaeum to make preparations on landing in Africa consisted of 160 quinqueremes. See Appendix II.

<sup>30</sup> Taking the sea route would have saved Hannibal at least three months. J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 37. The losses on the route over the Alps were high, not only in casualties,



It seems that this possibility was excluded, since Hannibal's plan was that his brother would follow him to Italy, taking the same route cross the Alps. According to the plan he should have been there soon after the battle of Cannae in 216.

As we have seen, the Carthaginian navy had been in many areas one step ahead of the Romans, and the Romans just had to resolve the situation quickly. Their basic problem still remained, as they had not been able to defeat the Punic navy. However, Hannibal's success did not depend on the fleet. When the Romans refused to surrender after Cannae, the efforts of the Carthaginian navy were intensified. At that point, the co-operation between the army and navy must also be intensified.

### 2.1. *Carthaginian reinforcements sent by sea in 215*

After Cannae, Hannibal sent Mago from Italy to Carthage to make a report. Mago asked for reinforcements and consequently the Carthaginian senate decided to send additional troops with three separate fleets.

The first of these fleets was sent to Sardinia, which the Carthaginians tried to take back in 215. The Punic navy had already been there at the beginning of the war, getting support from the local people; consequently the Romans had taken hostages to keep the people on their side, but they were still rebelling. (One of the reasons for this was Rome's endless need of grain, to which I will return.) The Carthaginians sent to Sardinia about the same number of troops as to Mago<sup>31</sup>, that is 12,000 foot soldiers, 1500 horsemen, twenty elephants and sixty war ships.

However, the Carthaginians had bad luck, as, according to Livy, their navy was sailing towards Sardinia, but was blown off course and ended up in the Balearic Islands. Hasdrubal Calvus, who was leading the fleet, repaired the damage, sailed back to Sardinia, landed with his army and fought the Romans together with the rebels, but he was defeated<sup>32</sup>. When the Punic navy was returning to Africa, it confronted a Roman fleet. The Romans, led by T. Otacilius Crassus, had crossed from Lilybaeum to the African coast to pillage the country around Carthage; they then sailed for Sardinia. In the battle that Livy simply describes as *levique certamine*, seven Carthaginian ships were captured. The rest of the ships broke

but as many of the newly recruited soldiers were not used to snow and the difficult circumstances in general, they just deserted.

<sup>31</sup> Liv. XXIII 32.12.

<sup>32</sup> Liv. XXIII 32.12, 34.16-17, 34.10-17, 40-41,7.

the formation and fled<sup>33</sup>. The Carthaginians lost their opportunity to conquer Sardinia.

However, in summer 215, 4000 Numidian cavalry, forty elephants, money and provisions were transported to Hannibal; Bomilcar was in charge. This is the one and only time (as far as we know) when the Carthaginians actually succeeded in sending help to Hannibal in Italy. While the battle for Sardinia was going on, Bomilcar managed to arrive in Locri with the troops, elephants and supplies. He left right away, before Ap. Claudius arrived from Messana. Livy states that Bomilcar had already left to join Hanno in Bruttium<sup>34</sup>. How did the Punic navy manage to get through? According to Thiel, it was possible because Otacilius was routing the Sardinian transport fleet and could not be at two places at the same time<sup>35</sup>. This Punic transport was scheduled for summer 215 and it arrived in that period, that is, everything went just according to plan.

In addition to these two shipments, the Carthaginian senate decided to send another shipment to Italy in spring 215, including 12,000 footsoldiers, 1500 horsemen, twenty elephants and sixty warships. Mago was making preparations for this in Carthage, but he was sent to Spain instead, since, as Livy states, recent Roman success forced the Carthaginians to change their plans. Hasdrubal had suffered a great defeat, and almost all the Spanish tribes had revolted to Rome<sup>36</sup>.

The Romans were not able to stop Mago from arriving in Spain. He fought in Spain from 215, playing an important part in events that led to the death in 211 of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus and P. Cornelius Scipio. Thus in Spain, the Carthaginians were still able to use their navy to bring in reinforcements to help their army.

The sea route to from Italy to Spain, on the other hand, seemed to be secured by the Romans, since we know of an insurance fraud that took place in 215-212. The task of sending money and supplies in Spain was given to contractors, on the condition that the state should accept all risks from tempest or enemy action to goods sent by sea<sup>37</sup>. Later two men were charged for reporting imaginary shipwrecks. Even those losses that

<sup>33</sup> Liv. XXIII 41.8-9.

<sup>34</sup> Liv. XXIII 41.10.

<sup>35</sup> J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 70-71.

<sup>36</sup> Liv. XXIII 32.5-12.

<sup>37</sup> Liv. XXIII 48-49.4. Livy praises the patriotic sentiment and the honesty and generosity with which the contracts were carried out.

actually occurred were often due not to accident but to sabotage. They had loaded small and more or less worthless cargoes into old rotten vessels, sunk them at sea after taking off the crews on boats standing by for the purpose, and then, in reporting the loss, exaggerated the value of the cargoes<sup>38</sup>.

This story shows that Roman warships did not escort transport ships on their way to Spain. Had the warships been there, the merchants would not have been able to carry out the trick. In the following years the Romans sent new ships and troops to Spain. Livy usually just states that the ships were put on shore at Tarraco. This was the routine thing to do every time ships were used. The fact the Roman ships in most cases were just left on the shore and the soldiers were moved to the army, to fight on land, shows how secure a position the Roman navy had on the coast<sup>39</sup>. The Romans had fought the Punic fleet off the Spanish coast; this is something they had failed to do on the African coast, with serious consequences.

In Sicily, the Carthaginian navy operated very well. There we can also trace some genuine Carthaginian naval tactics. Soon after the battle of Cannae, according to Livy, T. Otacilius Crassus reported that a Carthaginian fleet was doing serious damage to the dominions of Hiero. When Otacilius was preparing to answer Hiero's request for assistance, a message arrived that a second Punic fleet was lying fully equipped and ready for action at the Aegates Islands. The obvious intention was to attack Lilybaeum and the rest of Roman territory there as soon as it was seen that Otacilius had turned his attention to protecting the Syracusan coast. According to Livy, a fleet was therefore needed if Sicily and their ally were to be given protection<sup>40</sup>. The Carthaginians were still trying to get back Lilybaeum. Syracuse itself would also have made an excellent harbour for the Carthaginian navy on its way to Italy.

The Punic navy had been active even before the battle of Cannae, but after it the Carthaginians clearly intensified their efforts at sea. The Carthaginian senate answered to Hannibal's request for reinforcements

<sup>38</sup> Liv. XXV 3.8-4. M. Postumius Pyrgensis and T. Pomponius Veientanus were charged.

<sup>39</sup> This was not a sign of the Roman land lubberist character, as Thiel puts it, as if the Romans would put the ships on shore as soon as possible just because they did not like sailing. See J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 70, 107.

<sup>40</sup> Liv. XXII 56.6-8.

by sending three fleets with soldiers. In Sardinia and in Sicily as well, the Punic fleets apparently had good intelligence, so that they knew where the Roman fleets would be and as soon as they found a gap in Roman defence, the Carthaginians would take their chance. It is also important to notice that all this help was going to be transported by sea: there was no hesitation on the Carthaginian side as to how to effect the shipments.

## 2.2. *Embassies visiting Hannibal*

In 215, many important embassies visited Hannibal in Italy. The Romans had put more ships on guard on the Italian coast after Bomilcar had landed at Locri. In 215, the praetor urbanus Q. Fulvius Flaccus was given 25 ships. His mission was to secure the coast around Rome, *ad suburbana litora tutanda*. The praetor M. Valerius Laevinus was given another 25 ships with which he was supposed to defend the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum, *quibus oram maritimam inter Brundisium ac Tarentum tutari posset*<sup>41</sup>.

Now, these ships caught ambassadors that Philip of Macedon had sent to meet Hannibal in 215. According to Livy, they avoided the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum since they were guarded by Roman ships. They landed at the Temple of Lacinian Juno and continued by land to Capua where they met Hannibal. A treaty was made and the Macedonian ambassadors, accompanied by Carthaginian ambassadors reached the temple of Juno Lacinia, where the ship lay in hidden anchorage. When they set out for the open sea they were, however, sighted by the Roman fleet, which was defending the coasts of Calabria. The Macedonian ship was stopped<sup>42</sup> and the ambassadors with a letter from Hannibal to Philip were sent to Rome<sup>43</sup>.

After this, it was decreed to add 25 ships to Publius Valerius Flaccus' fleet. 30 ships (including the five, which had been used to transport the prisoners) sailed from Ostia to Tarentum. Valerius was ordered not merely

<sup>41</sup> Liv. XXIII 32.16-18.

<sup>42</sup> The Roman fleet was led by Valerius Flaccus.

<sup>43</sup> With five swift ships, commanded by L. Valerius Antias. Liv. XXIII 33-34. About the contents of the treaty, see Pol. VII 9. Livy's text is not credible. At Cumae, the ships were stopped by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and his fleet, since, as Livy states, it was uncertain whether they belonged to enemies or friends. The prisoners were brought before the consul, who was at Cumae. The consul sent the papers under seal by land to the senate, and ordered the ambassadors to be carried on the ships. Liv. XXIII 38.1-4.

to defend the coast of Italy but to get information in regard to the Macedonian war<sup>44</sup>.

In the same year another embassy went to find Hannibal. Hiero II of Syracuse died in 215: his grandson Hieronymus was influenced by Hannibal's success, consequently he sent ambassadors to Italy to meet Hannibal. After negotiations, Hannibal sent back the ambassadors, and with them three Carthaginians. Through these men an alliance was made between Hannibal and Syracuse. After this, Hieronymus sent ambassadors to Carthage to make a treaty in accordance with the alliance arranged with Hannibal<sup>45</sup>. Our sources do not tell where the ambassadors met Hannibal. It is obvious that the Romans did not stop this embassy, nor even know about it before the ambassadors had already returned from Italy; then the Romans sent legates who protested against this<sup>46</sup>.

So, in 215, both Syracuse and Macedon, impressed by Hannibal's victories contacted him in Italy. Hannibal got help from the Punic navy as he had requested, and he was very much running things from there: He could both receive and send embassies and negotiate treaties that were confirmed in Carthage. The Romans had no means of stopping this. They were able to capture the Macedonian embassy, but not the one from Syracuse, and in the end, they could not prevent the Carthaginians from making these treaties. The Romans had not been able to defeat the Punic navy

<sup>44</sup> Liv. XXIII 38.7-10. According to Livy, one of the ships that had been sent to Rome was able to escape and return to Philip. Since he was not aware of what had been agreed upon between his ambassadors and Hannibal, and what message the latter's ambassadors would have brought to him, he sent another embassy with the same instructions. They succeeded in carrying and bringing back instructions. Liv. XXIII 39.1-4. Livy states that the summer was over before the king could make any active preparations and stresses how effectual was the capture of a single ship and ambassadors in postponing a war which threatened the Romans. Could there be a duplicate in Livy's text?

<sup>45</sup> Liv. XXIV 6. Pol. VII 2-5. Livy gives only the names of the Carthaginian ambassadors, Polybius tells also the names of the Syracusan ambassadors. According to Polybius, ambassador Hannibal was a trierarch. We do not know whether these three men had been with Hannibal from the beginning or whether they had arrived to confirm the treaty. See S. LANCEL, *op. cit.* (n. 11), p. 117.

<sup>46</sup> Other voyages also took place in these years. After Cannae, Fabius Pictor was sent to Delphi to consult the oracle. Liv. XXII 57.5; his return to Rome, Liv. XXIII 11.1-6. Decius Magius, a Capuan who resisted the city's defection to Hannibal, was arrested by the orders of Hannibal and was sent to Carthage. A storm, however, carried the ship to Cyrenae, and Magius eventually was taken to Ptolemy in Alexandria. He was freed and allowed to return to Rome or to Capua, but decided to stay in Egypt. Liv. XXIII 10. Livy lists the terms on which the Capuans made an alliance with the Carthaginians. Among other things, 300 Roman prisoners would be exchanged for the Capuan horsemen engaged in Sicily. Liv. XXIII 7.2. I do not know whether this exchange ever took place.

at the beginning of the war and it had caused many problems in Sicily, Sardinia and off the Italian coast. Now, in addition to that; both Syracuse and Macedon made an alliance with Hannibal; consequently, the Roman navy had to take on two additional tasks<sup>47</sup>.

### 2.3. *The siege of Syracuse*

Despite all their efforts, the Romans had lost Syracuse, and could easily also have lost the rest of the island. It was essential for the Romans to take back Syracuse, as Hannibal had at the same time in Italy laid siege to Naples and had taken over the ports in southern Italy, including Locri, Caulonia and Croton. By 212, he also held Thurii, Heraclea, Metapontum and Tarentum except for the harbour<sup>48</sup>. If the Carthaginians had at the same time been able to take Lilybaeum or Syracuse, they could easily have opened a route to Italy.

Rome built 100 new ships in 214, of which 30 ships were sent to Syracuse, where a fleet of 100 ships was already blockading the city<sup>49</sup>. The Roman siege of Syracuse took several years. In 213, the Romans tried to enter the city. Syracuse was defended, however, very efficiently with the machines invented by Archimedes. The Romans had to give up the idea; consequently they continued to besiege the city by land and by sea<sup>50</sup>.

There was lots of traffic in different ports in Sicily. In 213, Himilco was able to sail into Heraclea Minoa bringing reinforcements for the Carthaginian army<sup>51</sup>. About the same time, Bomilcar sailed into the big harbour in Syracuse with 55 warships. According to Livy, the

<sup>47</sup> I will only deal with the war in Sicily in this article. The First Macedonian War I will discuss in another paper.

<sup>48</sup> One reason as to why Hannibal succeeded in this was the fact that the Romans did not have any fleets in this area in those years, since from 214 onwards Laevinus' fleet was operating on Illyrian and Greek coasts and the whole fleet in Sicily participated in the siege of Syracuse. So again the Carthaginians noticed a gap in Roman defence and used it.

<sup>49</sup> For the first time, the new ships were manned by slaves. Liv. XXIV 11.7-9. This shows how difficult the situation was for the Romans. After Cannae, the Romans had lowered the census ranking in order to qualify people who previously could not have served in army, and they even recruited criminals. *Spolia opima* were taken from temples, partly to arm the newly recruited troops, partly to finance the war. Rome minted gold coins, which was rare, and shows that the Romans were short of silver. The gold probably came from temples. The introduction of denarii also took place in these years.

<sup>50</sup> Plut., *Marc.* 15-17; Pol. VIII 5-7; Liv. XXIV 34.

<sup>51</sup> Liv. XXIV 34.3.

Roman army with thirty quinqueremes landed at Panormus and continued from there, escorted by the fleet, until they joined App. Claudius<sup>52</sup>.

What is especially interesting is how Bomilcar sailed to Syracuse in 213, 212 and for the last time 211, always carrying supplies and bringing more and more soldiers and ships. The Romans were unable to stop this. The Carthaginians were skillful sailors: for instance, in 212, Livy states that as there was a violent storm in the night the Roman navy could not ride at anchor in open water. Consequently, Bomilcar was able to sail for Carthage; he sailed out with thirty five ships and arrived at Carthage, reported about the situation and returned a few days later with one hundred ships<sup>53</sup>.

In 211, Bomilcar again sailed out to Carthage and returned with 130 warships and 700 transport ships. Because of a storm, he was unable to sail around Cape Pachynum in the southeast corner of Sicily, and had to wait. Meanwhile, M. Claudius Marcellus was informed about the situation and sailed south to stop the Carthaginian navy from reaching Syracuse. After the easterly wind began to subside, Bomilcar was the first to move. According to Livy, it looked for a time as if he were putting out to sea in order the more readily to round the promontory; but later, seeing the Roman ships making towards him, he was assailed by some sudden misgiving and carried on straight out to sea, then rounded Sicily and steered for Tarentum. Previously he had sent orders to Heraclea for the transports to return to Africa<sup>54</sup>.

The Romans occupied Syracuse and in that they did not use their navy. Now the question is, what happened with Bomilcar, what made him leave? Thiel sees the situation as a tragicomedy, and states that Bomilcar's behaviour stamps him as one of the most inferior admirals Carthage ever possessed<sup>55</sup>. I think this is not the case. First of all, there is the

<sup>52</sup> Liv. XXIV 36.4-6.

<sup>53</sup> Liv. XXV 25.11-13

<sup>54</sup> Liv. XXV 27.2-12. A few days before Syracuse was taken in 211, Titus Otacilius crossed over from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes. He entered the harbour of Utica before daylight and captured cargo ships with grain. He also ravaged the area around Utica and collected all kind of booty in the ships. He returned to Lilybaeum with 130 cargo ships filled with grain and booty and he sent the grain immediately to Syracuse, which was suffering from famine. Liv. XXV 31. Our sources do not tell anything about the Punic navy, it did not try to stop the Romans, although Utica is very close to Carthage. We do not know either where the Carthaginians had intended to send the grain, was it for the army in Sicily or was it intended for the army in Spain or in Italy?

<sup>55</sup> J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 83-85.



question of sources. Unfortunately, we only have Livy's version of the story; it is based on Polybius, but we do not know how much he has shortened or revised it. When we look at the story of the siege of Syracuse and the machines that Archimedes created to protect the city, we can compare Polybius and Livy. There we can see that Polybius gives all the technical details, Livy on the other hand, has largely omitted them, shortening the account to about one fifth of its original length and producing a very readable and exciting story, without too many details. I suspect that something like that has happened here as well.

Bomilcar had sailed in and out of the harbour for years, and the Roman navy had been unable to stop him. We cannot say that the Carthaginians were just sailing around because they did not know what to do. Clearly, the Carthaginian navy was working according to a plan. They tried to take Lilybaeum and Syracuse at the same time and almost succeeded. The Romans were forced to bring in new ships to the area and still they could not stop the traffic. Bomilcar did not want to risk the cargo that he was transporting. He sailed to Tarentum, which was one of the key ports in Italy. According to our sources, he did not achieve anything, but still there must be a reason why he sailed there. He perhaps had a double mission, given that he constantly sailed to Carthage to report about the situation in Sicily and especially Syracuse. We could expect that he received information about the situation in Italy as well. The whole scheme came very close to success. The Carthaginians controlled Syracuse for a few years and also got hold of Tarentum (among many other coastal cities in Italy), except for the port. Our sources tell only about how the Punic navy sailed between Syracuse and Carthage, but was there anything to stop them from sailing from Syracuse to Italy as well? One may suggest that there could have been triangular traffic between Carthage, Syracuse and southern Italy. If there was, how does it show? On the other hand, if there was such traffic, were the Romans able to stop it? Apparently not.

The Carthaginian navy seemed to be very mobile. Thus, when we go back to the question, how strong a position did the Roman navy have on the coasts and islands of the western Mediterranean, we can see that it was quite vulnerable. The Romans had not been able to fight the Punic navy off the African coast at the beginning of the war, and consequently they could not prevent the Carthaginians from operating in these waters. The Romans had improved their situation by recovering Syracuse, but they had still not been able to defeat the Punic navy.

### 3. THE YEARS 211-207, THE TURNING POINT

After the capture of Syracuse the Romans intensified their attacks in Africa. In 210, the Romans went to pillage the coast of Africa. The fleet with fifty ships, led by M. Valerius, made an unexpected landing at Utica. He ravaged the territory widely, capturing many people with all kinds of booty and returned to Lilybaeum in Sicily. He questioned the captives and learned that soldiers were being hired everywhere in Africa to be sent to Spain and that a very large fleet was being made ready for the purpose of recovering Sicily<sup>56</sup>. Apparently the Romans were able to sail without being stopped, as Livy does not tell anything about the Carthaginian navy at this point. Hasdrubal got more soldiers in Spain, but the Carthaginian naval attack on Sicily never took place. We do not know why.

Still, in 210, the Carthaginians attacked Sardinia with a fleet of forty ships. First they laid waste the region of Olbia; after the Roman praetor P. Manlius Vulso appeared there with the army, the Carthaginian fleet sailed to the other side of the island and ravaged the territory of Carales. The fleet returned to Africa with much booty<sup>57</sup>.

#### 3.1. *Nova Carthago and Tarentum*

The year 209 was very important for the Romans, as they were able to take both Nova Carthago and Tarentum, and that greatly helped their situation. Both the Roman navy and army attacked Nova Carthago. After the city was captured, there was a dispute about who should get the *corona muralis*, that is, who had first got over the city wall; finally it was decided to give it both to a soldier in the army and to a sailor in the navy. The *praefectus classis* C. Laelius was given a *corona aurea* and 30 bulls<sup>58</sup>.

In the same year the Romans recovered Tarentum. The Carthaginian fleet was not there since it had been sent over to Corcyra, where Philip was making preparations to attack the Aetolians<sup>59</sup>. He was waiting for the

<sup>56</sup> Liv. XXVII 5.8-13.

<sup>57</sup> Liv. XXVII 6.13-14.

<sup>58</sup> Pol. X 11-19; Liv. XXVI 43-49. Rewards: Liv. XXVI 48.5-14. Livy gives a list of the captured goods, among other things there were catapults and other weapons, gold and silver and grain; in the harbour the Romans captured 63 cargo ships, some with their cargoes containing grain, arms, linen, spartum and other materials needed for ship building. Liv. XXVI 47.

<sup>59</sup> Liv. XXVII 15-16.

Carthaginian fleet to arrive along with the ships that he had got from the Achaean league and those coming from Bithynia from king Prusias, so that he could attack the Romans in a naval battle<sup>60</sup>. However, after this, there is nothing in our sources about this Carthaginian fleet. The Bithynian fleet did not show up either. We do not know what happened. The Carthaginian fleet left Tarentum, and that enabled the Romans to take it back. Why did the Carthaginians send this fleet away to Greece? Had they the same problem as the Romans, lack of sailors, perhaps? The problem is likely to be in our sources, as we get very sporadic information again.

In 208, the Romans responded to the previous attack in Sardinia by relocating ships. P. Scipio was ordered to send over to Sardinia fifty of the eighty ships, which he had either brought with him from Italy or captured at Nova Carthago, for the defence of Sardinia. This was done, because there was a report stating that at Carthage there were great naval preparations that year, and that with two hundred ships the Carthaginians would cover the whole coast of Italy, and also of Sicily and Sardinia. The number of Roman ships in Sicily was increased to one hundred and the *praetor urbanus* was given the task of preparing the thirty old war ships which were in Ostia and of manning twenty new ships with crews, so that he might defend the coast near Rome<sup>61</sup>. The total number of the Roman fleet in Italian waters was thus 100 in Sicily, 50 in Sardinia and 50 in Italy. They could have confronted the Punic navy with equal numbers<sup>62</sup>.

So we are here getting very close to the numbers of the First Punic War. Why did the Roman naval activity increase at this time? The Romans were already winning in Spain and they had taken back Tarentum and Syracuse. The war with Macedon had started, but in that war the Romans never sent a large fleet. So, what is the reason for equipping so many new ships? Was it just a rumour, or was there actually a new Punic fleet and, in that case, were the Romans able to do something to prevent the Carthaginians from using this fleet?<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Liv. XXVII 15.7, 30.16.

<sup>61</sup> Liv. XXVII 22.

<sup>62</sup> J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 127.

<sup>63</sup> Is the number 200 credible in Livy's text? When he tells about the contract made between Philip and Hannibal he states, that Philip was supposed to come and ravage the coast of Italy with a fleet of 200 ships. Liv. XXIII 33.10. That text has not got much credibility, and so we must ask how reliable this number for the Carthaginian navy is.

### 3.2. *Sea battles off the African coast in 208 and 207*

The Carthaginian attack never took place, but there were two big sea battles off the African coast in 208 and 207. According to Livy, in 208, M. Valerius crossed over from Sicily to Africa with one hundred ships. He landed near Clupea and ravaged the country widely, meeting hardly any resistance. Suddenly came the report that a Punic navy was approaching, and the foragers were brought back to ships. The Punic fleet had eighty-three ships. There followed a battle not far from Clupea. Livy does not give any details. He just states that the Romans were successful and that after capturing eighteen ships and putting the rest to flight, they returned to Lilybaeum with lots of booty from land and the ships<sup>64</sup>.

This was the biggest sea battle in the Second Punic War. Unfortunately, Livy does not give any details. What losses the Romans had, he does not tell us either. So far, the Romans had been able to land on Africa and ravage the area without being stopped by the Carthaginian navy. Now the Carthaginians had their navy waiting for the Romans. Why had the Carthaginian navy not interfered in the earlier Roman attacks on Africa? We do not know.

According to Livy, the Roman fleet ravaged the African coast again in the following year. The proconsul M. Valerius Laevinus was leading the fleet that sailed from Sicily and laid waste the territory of Utica and Carthage. When the Roman fleet was returning to Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet with seventy warships met them. Again, Livy does not give any details, but only states that seventeen Carthaginian ships were captured, four sunk at sea and the rest of the fleet routed and put to flight. The Romans, *Romanus terra marique victor*, returned to Lilybaeum with much booty. Livy adds that thereafter, since the enemy ships had been expelled from the sea, great supplies of grain were brought to Rome<sup>65</sup>.

Livy does not say how many ships there were in the Roman fleet, nor does he tell anything about the possible losses of the Roman navy. There is no way of knowing what actually happened in this battle, but it is interesting that the Roman ships were loaded with booty and still capable of beating the Carthaginians who had only come to fight the Romans. The Carthaginians had probably made their ships as light as possible to make

<sup>64</sup> Liv. XXVII 29.7-8.

<sup>65</sup> Liv. XXVIII 3.5-7.

then rapid and swift. This reminds one of the situation in the First Punic War. For instance, in the battle off Ecnomus in 256, the Roman ships were loaded with all kinds of equipment which was going to be used in Africa; the Carthaginian ships were prepared for this battle only, but still they were not able to stop the Romans<sup>66</sup>.

The big question is what were the Romans actually doing there. When we read Livy, we get the idea that the Roman motive for going to Africa was to pillage the coastal area. But we have also learned how the Romans took captives and by interrogating them got information about enemy's plans. I would see this as follows: The Roman fleet went there with the purpose of fighting the Punic fleet. They had not been able to do it at the beginning of the war, as they apparently had planned, with the consequence that the Punic fleets had been able to challenge the Romans both in Sicily and in Sardinia and on the Italian coast as well. The Romans wanted to put a stop to this. This was the time when they were able to do it, as they had gained control over Sicily and Tarentum. It was also essential to do it at the time when there apparently was some intelligence about new Punic ships being prepared. Thus, this would be the turning point in the war at sea. The Romans were able to defeat the Punic navy that for eleven years had caused problems, and they could now go back to their original plan.

In 207, Hasdrubal was defeated at the Metaurus. He had finally left Spain and arrived in Italy, taking the same route Hannibal had used. He arrived about ten years later than planned. In Hannibal's original plan the idea was that Hasdrubal would cross the Alps soon after he himself did. Since his arrival in Italy was badly delayed, one might think that by this time there could be another way of transporting Hasdrubal and his army to Italy. However, this was not the case. The route from Spain to Italy was still closed, the Carthaginians had lost much time and also the control of the Spanish coast, which they still had had when Hannibal left for Italy. The Romans, on the other hand, could use their navy; they could inform the army in Italy and they even transported troops from Spain and Sicily by sea<sup>67</sup>.

<sup>66</sup> There are many similarities in Livy's stories in 208 and 207 and so it could be possible that they are duplicates of the same event. This is evidently not the case, as Thiel points out that without these losses it is difficult to understand why the Carthaginian navy did not try to stop Scipio from crossing to Africa. J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 131, 135; J. BRISCOE, *CAH*<sup>2</sup> VIII, Cambridge 1989, p. 67.

<sup>67</sup> Liv. XXVII 5.11-12, 38.6-12.

The route between Spain and Italy is actually the only area where the Punic navy had not made an attempt to break the Roman control over the coast and landing places; this is because the Romans had at the beginning of the war crushed the Carthaginian fleet in Spain and thereafter conquered the coast so that the Carthaginian navy lost the possibility of operating on this coast; consequently, it could not disturb the Roman shipments.

#### 4. THE CLOSING YEARS

After the Metaurus, Hannibal withdrew to Bruttium. The game was over, both on land and at sea. Hasdrubal was defeated in northern Italy and so was the Punic navy in Africa. In these years, however, there still is some information about the action of the Carthaginian navy and how the Romans responded to it. In 206, Livy reports a sea battle in Spain when the Romans were trying to take the city of Gades with the help from deserters from the city. A small Roman fleet; seven triremes and one quinquereme, led by C. Laelius met an equally small Carthaginian fleet<sup>68</sup>. Livy's description of the battle is not very clear; it seems that the navies had much difficulty in fighting the weather and the tide. Adherbal escaped to Africa, and Laelius, the victor, returned to Carteia<sup>69</sup>.

This battle was by no means an important one; it could not have changed the result of the war in any way, nor even affect the situation in Spain. Here Livy still tries to give some details, which he failed to do with the battles off the African coast.

##### 4.1. *Mago sails to Italy*

This is not the last time we hear of the Punic fleet in Spain. According to Livy, Mago received orders from the Carthaginian senate to take the fleet he had in Gades over to Italy. There he was supposed to hire Gauls and Ligurians to join Hannibal. For this purpose money was sent from Carthage. As Mago was sailing along the coast of Spain, he tried to attack the city of Nova Carthago, landing the soldiers on the shore by night, but

<sup>68</sup> One quinquereme and 8 triremes.

<sup>69</sup> Liv. XXVIII 23.6-8, 30.4-12.

with no success<sup>70</sup>. In this story Livy does not mention the Roman navy, so we do not know whether it was present or not. Perhaps it was not there as the Punic fleet ventured to sail that close to the coast. Livy does not tell anything about the Punic fleet either.

Mago sailed to the Balearic Islands where he spent the winter. The Roman navy was not there to stop him. In 205 he sailed from the smaller of the Balearic Islands to Italy. He had with him about 30 warships and many transport ships carrying infantry and cavalry. He took Genua, since, according to Livy, there were no forces guarding the coast, and beached on the Ligurian coast hoping to cause rebellion. He kept ten warships and sent the rest of them to Carthage to protect the coast<sup>71</sup>. The Carthaginians sent envoys to Philip to persuade him to cross over into Sicily or Italy. Men were also sent to the commanders in Italy to inform them that they should keep Scipio in Italy. Mago was sent twenty-five warships, infantry, horsemen, elephants and money to hire auxiliaries, so that he could move on closer to Rome and join forces with Hannibal<sup>72</sup>. So out of the three brothers only Mago was able to sail from Spain to Italy and that was only because the Romans at that point had already taken a large part of their ships back to Rome.

In 205, the Carthaginians tried to send help to Hannibal in Italy. The fleet was, however, captured off Sardinia by Cn. Octavius, who was in command of the province<sup>73</sup>.

#### 4.2. *Scipio sails to Africa*

Publius Cornelius Scipio was made consul and sailed to Sicily in 205. He had 7000 soldiers and 30 warships. He had not gained consent to hold

<sup>70</sup> The Carthaginians attacked the same part of city wall where the Romans had breached it. The Romans, however, opened the gate and rushed out, and in the following confusion the Carthaginians escaped to their ships. Liv. XXIII 36.

<sup>71</sup> Liv. XXVIII 46.7-10.

<sup>72</sup> Liv. XXIX 4.

<sup>73</sup> There are two versions of the story, of which Appian's is the more credible. According to him, the Carthaginians sent 100 merchant ships laden with supplies, soldiers, and money, but as they had not sufficient force of rowers they were blown by the wind to Sardinia where praetor attacked them with his warships, sank twenty and captured sixty of them. The remainder escaped to Carthage. App., *Hann.* 8.54. Livy refers to his sources saying that according to Coelius, the ships were laden with grain and provisions sent to Hannibal and according to Valerius, that the ships were captured while carrying Etruscan booty and captive Ligurians and Montani to Carthage. Liv. XXVIII 46.14.



a levy, but he had obtained permission to take volunteers and to receive what the allies contributed to ship building. Livy gives a long list of cities involved and what each one of them provided. It is evident that this was not a voluntary gesture from the Etruscan cities but a punishment for rebelling<sup>74</sup>. There are many stories in our sources about how tired the inhabitants of Etruria and Umbria and in the colonies were with the war and how they started to complain and refused to follow orders any more. After Hasdrubal and Mago had arrived in Italy, the Etruscans in particular took the Carthaginian side<sup>75</sup>.

In 204, after a year of preparations in Sicily, Scipio sailed to Africa with 40 warships and 400 cargo ships. He landed at Promunturium Pulchri, and the Punic navy did nothing to stop him<sup>76</sup>. Scipio wintered near Utica and laid siege to it. He was receiving help sent from Sardinia, Spain and Sicily, getting grain, clothes and arms and all kinds of supplies. At this point Livy states that the Punic fleet had been launched and was ready and equipped to intercept the supplies<sup>77</sup>. However, this did not happen. According to our sources, the Carthaginian navy did not function at all during the winter. It is possible that the Carthaginians lacked of sailors, as we know that about the same time the Carthaginians bought 5000 slaves to serve as sailors in the navy<sup>78</sup>.

Still, the Romans knew to expect something, as they decided to defend the coast of Sicily with 40 ships, to prevent any fleet crossing over from Africa. Another 40 ships were assigned to protect the coast of Sardinia. The Romans also continued to guard the Italian coast. In all, the Romans had 160 warships in use in that year<sup>79</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 147.

<sup>75</sup> The Roman senate sent dictator Marcus Livius Salinator to sort out the situation, to see which Etruscan cities had helped Hasdrubal. According to Livy, almost all the Etruria had taken the Punic side and there followed several trials. Liv. XXVII 9, 24, 38.1-7; XXVIII 10.1-5; XXIX 15, 36.10-12; XXX 26.12. The ships were evidently new, there is no reason to doubt Livy in this point. Thiel thinks that they were old, and that the Etruscans were only forced to pay for the repair of them. Accordingly, Thiel also rejects the story about drying out the newly built ships that had been hurriedly built in fresh timber. If the Romans wanted to punish the Etruscans, then there is no reason to save in costs, and the fact that the Romans had just taken back large number of their ships since there was no use for them any more, does not count either. See Liv. XXIX 1.14. J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 145-148.

<sup>76</sup> Liv. XXIX 27.6-13.

<sup>77</sup> Liv. XXX 3.2-4.

<sup>78</sup> App., *Lib.* 9; J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 160-161.

<sup>79</sup> Liv. XXX 2.1-5.

The Punic navy did not accomplish much during the rest of the war. In 203, the Carthaginian navy attacked the Romans in Utica, towing away about sixty Roman transport ships to Carthage. The Roman ships were unprepared for a naval action, since they were used for siege operations<sup>80</sup>.

Even before the battle at Utica the Carthaginians had ordered Hannibal to return to Africa<sup>81</sup>. Mago's troops returned from the Ligurian coast, where envoys from Carthage had arrived to bring the orders to cross over to Africa. On the way Mago died and a considerable number of Carthaginian ships, being scattered on the open sea, were captured by the Roman fleet off Sardinia<sup>82</sup>.

Peace negotiations were started in 203. However, Hannibal's return persuaded the Carthaginians to break the truce and start the war again. According to Livy, during the armistice, Gn. Octavius crossed over from Sicily with two hundred transports and 30 warships. When he was approaching the African coast, a southwesterly wind damaged and scattered the ships, and most of the transport ships were carried to the island of Aegimurus, about 30 miles from Carthage. This could all be seen from Carthage, and Hasdrubal was sent to Aegimurus to collect the ships, which were towed to Carthage<sup>83</sup>. The Romans protested and Scipio sent legates to Carthage. On their way back to the Roman camp the Roman ships first were escorted out, but then attacked by Carthaginian warships<sup>84</sup>.

The war was ended with a new peace agreement after Zama in 202. In this treaty the number of Punic warships was reduced to ten

<sup>80</sup> Both Livy and Polybius state how Scipio, to rescue his ships, anchored them in line and placed around them the transport ships. He held the transport ships together by placing masts and yards crosswise from ship to ship. In addition he laid down planks above to make gangway the whole length of the ships. Beneath these bridges he left openings where scouting vessels could dash out against the enemy. Pol. XIV 10; Liv. XXX 10.

<sup>81</sup> There are two stories about how he got back. According to Livy, he had been foreboding this and had previously put ships in readiness and he could leave soon. According to Appian however, the Carthaginians sent an admiral with ships to hasten his coming. The Carthaginians also sent an embassy to Rome. Hannibal built a fleet, for which Italy supplied abundant timber. Liv. XXX 20.5-6, 25.11-12; App., *Lib.* 31; *Hann.* 58. Appian's story seems to have more credibility, since it took Hannibal about half a year to evacuate from Italy. J.H. THIEL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 170-171.

<sup>82</sup> Liv. XXX 19.1-6.

<sup>83</sup> Liv. XXX 24.5-12. Before this, one hundred transports convoyed with 20 war ships were sent by praetor Publius Lentulus from Sardinia. They crossed to Africa safe from enemy and storms.

<sup>84</sup> The Roman quinquereme was attacked by three Carthaginian triremes. Pol. XV 1-2; Liv. XXX 25.1-8 speaks of three Punic quadriremes. Diod. XXVII 11-12; App., *Lib.* 34.

triremes<sup>85</sup>. The Punic ships were taken to the sea and burned. Livy refers to some historians, who report that there were 500 ships of different types<sup>86</sup>.

#### CONCLUSION

The Romans had control over most of the coasts and landing places at the beginning of the war, thus preventing the Carthaginians from using their fleets. Hannibal's strategy responded to this situation: he crossed the Alps, for which the Romans were not prepared. However, Hannibal's attack on Italy not only changed the war on land but also at sea. The Roman plan was to attack Spain and Africa. In Spain, one of the first things the Romans did was to engage the Punic fleet. As a result of this, the Carthaginians lost their position on the coast and the Romans were able to take control of the area. In Africa, on the other hand, the Romans were not able to do this, as the consul was called back. He had with him 160 quinqueremes, with which he could have fought the Punic fleet. However, this did not happen, and so, in the following years, Punic fleets were able to challenge the Romans in Sicily, Sardinia and off the Italian coast. So the Romans had to defend and to take back areas which according to their plans should have been secured already. Thus, Hannibal's attack meant that both on land and at sea the Romans were forced to fight in areas where they had not intended to fight. The situation at sea was very different from the First Punic War, where the Romans had the initiative and a plan, and the Punic navy, more or less, only tried to stop them. It also interesting to notice that the fleet numbers in this war were about the same as in the First Punic War.

Had the war ended with the battle of Cannae, then the Romans had lost despite the fact that they controlled most of the coasts at the beginning of the war. It would not have mattered that the Carthaginians were not able to establish a sea route to Italy. The Carthaginians consequently intensified their naval efforts after Cannae. In the following years, Punic fleets challenged Roman control of coasts and landing places in all areas except for the route between Italy and Spain. This was because the Punic fleet in Spain had been defeated at the beginning of the war.

<sup>85</sup> Pol. XV 18. See App., *Lib.* 59.

<sup>86</sup> Liv. XXX 43.12. Probably meaning Valerius Antias, who usually exaggerates. Or it might be that also transport ships were included in the number.

The Carthaginians had a clear plan in their warfare at sea. E.g., in 215, when Hannibal had sent Mago to give a report, the Carthaginian senate responded by sending three fleets with reinforcements. The Carthaginians, however, suffered setbacks and only the help intended for Hannibal in Italy, led by Bomilkar, got through. Mago's fleet, intended to help Hannibal as well, was directed to Spain instead, and the fleet that was supposed to help to take Sardinia was blown off course to the Balearic Islands. Had the Carthaginians been able to take Sardinia, they would have been able to open a route from Africa to Italy. In Sicily, they tried to take Lilybaeum and Syracuse at the same time. Whenever there was a gap in Roman defence, they Carthaginians would strike.

Had the Punic navy been defeated it would not have been able to challenge the Romans in Sicily, Sardinia and off the Italian coast. This could also be an explanation as to why there were several small sea battles in this war but very few big ones. The Punic navy was divided into smaller fleets, all causing problems to the Romans. It was only towards the end of the war, after taking back Syracuse and Tarentum, that the Romans went to Africa to fight the Punic navy in two of the biggest sea battles of the whole war in 208 and 207. This can be seen as the turning point in war at sea, as in the following years the Punic fleet was not able to stop the Romans from landing in Africa, or from making regular shipments from Sicily, Sardinia and Spain. Now the Romans were able to wage the war the way as they had apparently planned it. They had no difficulty in establishing a sea route between Africa and Sicily, and likewise their whole campaign in Spain was based on regular shipments. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were not able to do this when Hannibal was in Italy. So, after all, the Romans were able to keep and to take back their positions. If Hannibal had been able to open a regular sea route and start shipments to Italy he could have put the Romans in a situation where they would have been forced to surrender.

There are many problems with sources in this war, although it is the best documented of the Punic Wars. We do not have much information about the navies at the beginning of the war. We do not know, e.g., what the Barcids did to renew the navy after the First Punic War. One of the most important things that made the Romans concerned about the growth of Carthaginian power in Spain was the foundation of Nova Carthago. Polybius was aware of how convenient it was for the operations in Spain as well as in Africa. Defeating the Punic navy in Spain at the beginning of the war was extremely important, considering all the future operations

in the area. Still, Polybius does not say anything about the Punic navy when he discusses the outbreak of the war, although the Romans must have learnt about it when they did their inspections between the wars. In 218, the Romans sent a significant navy to Lilybaeum too, evidently with the purpose of fighting the Punic navy off the African coast. We do not know how large a navy the Carthaginians had in Africa at the beginning of the war, but we can just follow how separate fleets operated in the islands and off the Roman coast.

So, our sources do not tell much about the navies at the time when the war broke out. Still, the earliest events in the war show that the Carthaginians had a navy both in Spain and in Africa and that the Romans were prepared to fight them. So, after all, there was a Punic navy operating again, and the Romans must have noticed it and it must have been one of the reasons for the new war.

We lack information about the key points in the war at sea. The Ebro battle in 217 was decisive for the question as to who was going to master the coast of Spain and thus the whole area. From Livy and Polybius we get the idea that it was not a real fight, that the Carthaginians just quickly retreated to the shore; but from Sosylus we see that it was a fierce battle, which is quite understandable, given how important the outcome would be. Another problem concerns Syracuse. The Punic fleet was able to sail in and out for years and the Romans were unable to stop it. At the crucial moment Bomilcar left, and our sources fail to explain why. When we think about his reputation as an admiral, it should be remembered that it was he who succeeded in 215 in helping Hannibal. It is evident that there was traffic between Carthage and Syracuse and the south coast of Italy in the years when Hannibal controlled this area. So Bomilcar's move to Tarentum must have been a part of this traffic, but unfortunately we do not know more. Perhaps the most important gap in our knowledge is on what happened off the African coast in 208 and 207, where the two largest naval battles of this war took place. Livy gives no details of the battles, and he tells the story as if the Romans only went to raid the coast and then happened to face the Punic navy. Still, defeating the Punic fleet was the prerequisite of the Roman scheme to invade Africa, and also the point where the Romans could go back to their original plan which had been interrupted when Hannibal attacked Italy.

We do not know what happened in Malta in 218, how the Punic garrison surrendered. There is no information about the Roman fleet that defeated the Carthaginian fleet at Lilybaeum in the same year. In 215, off

Sardinia, the Romans won in a battle, which Livy describes as *levique certamine* and gives no details. When the Romans took Nova Carthago, we can see from the rewards that the navy did something important, however, we do not know what. The Punic fleet that was sent from the Gulf of Tarentum to Corcyra just seems to disappear in there. In 206, when Mago attacked Nova Carthago, there is no information about the Roman navy — we do not even know if it was there — and there are no details about the Punic fleet either. We do not know why the Punic navy did not defend the African coast before the years 208 and 207. Our sources are also silent about the state of Punic navy after that. It did not do much work after 207, but we do not know what the problems were.

There is not enough information about Rome's allied fleets, those of Massilia and Syracuse, either. Massilian ships played a crucial role in the battle of Ebro, and Syracuse, on the other hand, saved the situation for the Romans at the beginning of the war, defending Roman interests at a time when a proper Roman fleet had not yet arrived in Sicily. There are also huge gaps in our information about the Roman navy: e.g., it has been shown to be impossible to count the exact ship numbers, based on the information we have from Polybius and Livy<sup>87</sup>. The gaps in our knowledge about the Punic navy are even greater. We simply do not have enough information about any of the navies involved in this war. Livy and Polybius do not give the information we would like to have, since neither of them was really interested in war at sea. Polybius knew about warfare on land, but had no experience on warfare at sea. Livy, on the other hand, did not have any experience of warfare at all; he just took the information from previous texts. Despite all the lacunae, it is still possible, as I hope to have shown, to reconstruct the story of war at sea in the Second Punic War and to demonstrate that in this war the navies had as important role as in the First Punic War.

<sup>87</sup> There is not much information about new Roman ships being built, thus, we cannot follow the development of the Roman navy from the First Punic War.

## APPENDIX I

### ROMAN GRAIN SHIPMENTS

Finally, we must discuss the Roman grain shipments. The Romans transported grain for the army from Italy to Spain and from Sicily and Sardinia to Italy. At the end of the war, grain was transported from Sicily, Sardinia and Spain to Africa. How was this arranged and what was the meaning of these shipments?

According to Appian, the senate was influenced among other things by food shortage, when it instructed the consuls for 216 to finish the war as quickly as possible<sup>88</sup>. Grain deliveries from Sicily started in 216, when a fleet arrived from Hiero at Ostia<sup>89</sup>. The shipment included 300,000 measures of wheat and 200,000 of barley. The Syracusans also promised to transport as much more as was needed to any port named<sup>90</sup>.

Livy makes the story look like a donation that the Romans did not actually need. However, at this point the Romans desperately needed all the grain they could get. Moreover, in 216, the senate received letters from the praetors of Sicily, T. Otacilius, and Sardinia, A. Cornelius Mammula, who both complained that neither pay or grain was being furnished to the soldiers and the crews at the proper time, and that they had no means of doing so. The senate replied by saying that there was nothing on hand to send, and ordered the praetors to provide for their own fleets and armies. Otacilius sent legates to Hiero and received what money was needed and grain for six months. According to Livy, in Sardinia the allied states made generous contributions to Cornelius<sup>91</sup>.

However, the war diminished food production in Sicily and Sardinia as well. Livy states that before the war, Sicily and Sardinia had paid taxes in kind, but were hardly feeding the armies that garrisoned them<sup>92</sup>. The generous contributions about which Livy speaks in Sardinia look suspect; as, according to Livy, one of the reasons why people were rebelling in 215 was that the Sardinians had in the previous year been ruled with harshness and greed and were burdened by

<sup>88</sup> App., *Hann.* 17.

<sup>89</sup> Hiero gave grain to the Romans at least twice in the inter-war period 240-219. In 237 he appeared in Rome in person with 200,000 modii of wheat. In 220, during the Celtic War, he sent grain for the Roman armies, for which the Romans paid after the war.

<sup>90</sup> According to Livy, Hiero had heard about the death of Flaminius and the destruction of his army and he had sent the things which good and loyal allies were accustomed to contribute towards the expenses of the war, and he begged the senate to accept it. The transport also included a statue of victory, in gold, weighing 220 pounds. Hiero also sent some bowmen and slingers. The Romans also got the advice to invade Africa, for then Hannibal would have a war on his hand at home and Carthage would be less free to send him reinforcements. Liv. XXII 37.

<sup>91</sup> Liv. XXIII 21.1-6.

<sup>92</sup> Liv. XXIII 48.7.



a heavy tribute and an unfair requisition of grain<sup>93</sup>. Still, more grain was needed and after Manlius had defeated the rebels, he punished the cities by taking tribute and grain in proportion to the resources of each or its guilt<sup>94</sup>. Further grain shipments from Sicily took place in 215 when 200,000 modii of wheat and 100,000 modii of barley were sent by Hiero<sup>95</sup>.

In 212, during the siege of Capua, Livy states that grain was stored for the army at Puteoli and in another garrison at the mouth of river Volturnus. One part of the grain had been sent from Sardinia and one part bought in Etruria and stored previously in Ostia<sup>96</sup>.

Appian records a food crisis in Rome in 211. Polybius refers to a serious shortage, not precisely dated but belonging to the same time. The Romans sent envoys to Ptolemy asking for grain as there was a very serious shortage in Rome. Polybius states that no help from abroad had been forthcoming, since all over the world except in Egypt there were wars in progress and hostile forces in the field<sup>97</sup>. What is the meaning of this embassy? Erdkamp states that an incidental shipment of corn is quite possible, but is of no importance. A structural supply would be another matter, and of that there are no signs<sup>98</sup>. I would see this basically as a sign of political support, in an extremely difficult situation in 211, when the Romans were just taking back Syracuse, and Tarentum and the south coast of Italy were still under Punic rule, and, moreover, the First Macedonian War had just started. It is clear that this did not solve the problems of famine in Italy.

In 210, after taking Agrigentum, Livy states that the consul made the Sicilians lay down their arms and turn their attention to tilling the soil, so that the island might not only produce food enough for the inhabitants, but might relieve the grain market of the city of Rome and of Italy, as it had often done on many occasions<sup>99</sup>.

So, Rome suffered from food shortage even before Cannae, and the troops stationed in Spain, Sardinia and Sicily were complaining about the same

<sup>93</sup> Liv. XXIII 32.9.

<sup>94</sup> From Carales he sailed back to Rome with the tribute and the grain. Liv. XXIII 41.6-7.

<sup>95</sup> Liv. XXIII 38.13.

<sup>96</sup> Liv. XXV 20.2-3.

<sup>97</sup> App., *Hann.* 17; Pol. IX 11a. Polybius also states that the price of grain had become very high. A Sicilian medimnus cost fifteen drachmae. That is 45 times as high as that in the Po valley in normal times. F.W. WALBANK, *op. cit.* (n. 5), vol. II, Oxford 1967, p. 138. See Liv. XXVII 4, about how the Romans were seeking support from King Syphax and other princes in Africa and how they also sent an embassy to Egypt. Livy only tells about the gifts the Romans brought to the monarchs in Egypt, not about the grain. According to Walbank, the identification between Livy's embassy and the one in Polybius cannot be established. F.W. WALBANK, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>98</sup> P. ERDKAMP, *Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars 264-30 B.C.*, Amsterdam 1998, p. 167.

<sup>99</sup> Liv. XXVI 40.13-16. See Liv. XXVII 5.1-6, 8.19, about how cultivation was started again in Sicily.

problem. For Spain, private contractors were called to help and for Sicily and Sardinia the senate ordered the *propraetors* to provide for their own armies and fleets. After Cannae, the situation just deteriorated as Capua defected and Syracuse joined the Carthaginians in 215. In the same year a Sardinian rebellion erupted.

Traditionally grain shipments have been seen as the thing that saved the Romans, that enabled them to continue their war against Hannibal for so many years. Erdkamp argues, however, that this was not the case. To put it simply, he states that the islands, especially Sicily, did not have much to send. In the years 216-215, when help was mostly needed, Sicily and Sardinia were hardly capable of providing for the legions and allies stationed there. Hiero provided supplementary provisions for the Roman troops on the island, and sent two shipments of corn to Italy in 216 and 215. As Erdkamp calculates, these would add up in total to about the food required by one legion during two years. Shipments from Hiero ended with his death in 215. After this, warfare in the island made agriculture difficult. During many years only Sardinia was able to supply corn on a regular basis to Italy. At least during the years following the battle of Cannae, the Roman armies in Italy were largely dependent on resources of the peninsula<sup>100</sup>.

Many questions are open. Should we assume that there were more shipments than those we know of or that these shipments were something exceptional and that is why Livy mentions them? What was the situation at sea? Was it generally possible for the Romans to make shipments?

The Romans were no doubt transporting grain on the coastal route of Italy from one magazine to another, and the coast guard was securing this traffic. But was it sufficient? Hardly, as we know that the Carthaginians were able to stop some traffic, e.g. the fleet going from Cosa to Spain in 217. In 215, when the Macedonian ambassadors were caught, the Romans stopped the (Roman) ships transporting them, since they could not be sure whether these were enemy ships or their own<sup>101</sup>. This shows that not only Roman ships were sailing along the coast, but that there must have been some Carthaginian traffic going on as well. We can assume that in the area controlled by the Carthaginians the communication between cities was made not only by land but also by sea. The ambassadors got through to Italy and Hannibal too was able to send messengers; so, the Italian coast was not under Roman control and not safe for large-scale grain shipments.

<sup>100</sup> P. ERDKAMP, *op. cit.* (n. 98), p. 166-168. Between the battles of Trasimene and Cannae, Hiero gave 300,000 modii of wheat, by Polybius' figures for rations and size of legions enough to feed about 2,5 Roman legions for 6 months. After Cannae, he fed the whole army of Sicily for 6 months. There were however, 13-14 legions in service in 216. P. GARNSEY, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*, Cambridge 1988, p. 185.

<sup>101</sup> Liv. XXIII 38.1-4.

We must also take into account how insecure the situation was especially in Sicily.

There are two texts about the situation. Polybius writes about the famine in 211, how no help had been coming from abroad, since all over the world except in Egypt there were wars in progress and hostile forces in the field<sup>102</sup>. I do not want to push this too far, but we could say that he is referring to the situation at sea, which was very difficult, and so be saying that the shipments were not arriving.

Livy states in 207, that after the battle off the African coast, since the enemy ships had been expelled from the sea, great supplies of grain were brought to Rome<sup>103</sup>. We could take that Livy not only means that the Punic fleet was beaten off the African coast, but that this victory, together with the victory in the previous year, meant that the Punic fleets could no longer threaten the Roman shipments. We know that these Roman victories had a paralysing effect on the Punic fleet off the African coast, since the Carthaginians were not able prevent the Romans from landing to Africa nor to stop the regular shipments to the Roman army in there.

So to put all this together; at the beginning of the war very few things went according to the Roman plans, as Hannibal's attack made not only Italy but Sicily and Sardinia as well into a war zone. This caused problems for agriculture, and at the same time, the sea between these areas was not safe either. So the turning point in the war at sea in 207 could be a turning point for the grain shipments as well. By that time the Romans had taken Sicily back, and the area controlled by the Carthaginians in Italy was getting smaller, so it was possible to start producing grain again, but as long as the Punic navy was still operating, it would not have been safe to transport it. Accordingly, the operations against the Punic navy in 208 and 207 had several reasons and consequences. They very much cleared the sea from further Punic attempts to attack Sicily and Sardinia, they made it possible for the Romans to land in Africa, and they made the sea safer for the Roman shipments.

<sup>102</sup> Pol. IX 11a.

<sup>103</sup> Liv. XXVIII 3.5-7.

## APPENDIX II

### CARTHAGINIAN AND ROMAN FLEETS IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR<sup>104</sup>

	CARTHAGE	ROME
218	Italian coast: 20 quinqueremes Sicily: 35 quinqueremes Spain: 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, 5 triremes	to Sicily: 160 quinqueremes to Spain: 60 quinqueremes, unknown how many actually arrived
217	Spain: 40 ships Sardinia and the coast of Italy: 70 ships	Spain: 35 ships Italy: 120 quinqueremes; the same fleet sailed to Corsica and Sardinia
216	fleet from Carthage to Spain, number of ships unknown	25 ships added to the fleet of 50 in Lilybaeum
215	Sardinia: 60 warships transport to Locri, incl. 4000 cavalry, 40 elephants, but number of ships unknown to Spain: 60 warships Sicily: two fleets, number of ships unknown	Roman fleet from Sicily to Sardinia: number of ships unknown 25 ships to guard the Italian coast around Rome 25 ships to guard the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum + 25 ships for the same purpose
214		100 new ships built, 30 sent to Sicily, where 100 ships already blockaded Syracuse
213	to Heraclea Minoa: reinforcements, number of ships unknown to Syracuse: 55 warships	to Panormus: 30 quinqueremes
212	from Syracuse to Carthage 35 ships  from Carthage to Syracuse 100 ships	
211	a fleet from Syracuse to Carthage, number of ships unknown from Carthage to Syracuse 130 warships	from Lilybaeum to Utica, 80 quinqueremes

<sup>104</sup> N.B. As stated in the text, several gaps remain in our knowledge about the fleets. These figures can only give a rough estimate of the fleet numbers.

- |     |  |  |
|-----|--|--|
| 210 | to Sardinia: 40 ships  | from Lilybaeum to Utica:<br>50 warships  |
| 209 | fleet to Corcyra, number of<br>ships unknown   | at Nova Carthago: number of ships<br>unknown   |
| 208 | rumour about 200 warships  | to Sardinia: 50 warships<br>from Spain<br>in Sicily: 100 warships<br>on Italian coast near Rome:<br>50 warships  |
|     | off the African coast 83 ships   | from Sicily to Africa a fleet of<br>100 warships<br>(the Sicilian fleet)   |
| 207 | off the African coast 70 warships  | a fleet from Sicily to Africa,<br>number of ships unknown  |
| 206 | in Spain: 1 quinquereme,<br>8 triremes<br>in Spain: a fleet, number<br>unknown   | in Spain: 1 quinquereme, 7 triremes  |
| 205 | from Spain to Italy: 30 warships,<br>of which 10 were kept in Italy,<br>20 on to Carthage<br>from Carthage to Italy: 25 warships<br>to Italy, 100 merchant ships<br>(no warships), ended up in<br>Sardinia | in Sardinia: warships, number<br>unknown<br>from Italy to Sicily 30 warships   |
| 204 |  | from Lilybaeum to Africa<br>40 warships<br>supplies from Sardinia, Spain and<br>Sicily, type of ships unknown<br>40 warships to defend the coast of<br>Sicily, 40 in Sardinia<br>a fleet off the Italian coast |
| 203 | in Utica: a fleet attacking the<br>Roman fleet in harbour,<br>number of ships unknown  |  |
|     | a fleet off the African coast,<br>55 ships, type unknown   | supplies from Sardinia to Africa:<br>20 warships<br>supplies from Sicily to Africa:<br>30 warships   |



## THE *IMPERIUM* OF CN. CALPURNIUS PISO\*

The First Catilinarian Conspiracy has long been the object of scholarly endeavour thanks both to the unreliability of our sources and the ingenuity of scholars in remedying this lacuna. Although valuable studies have served to weed out some of the more extravagant fabrications<sup>1</sup> an accurate understanding of the events remains elusive. Several important aspects of the alleged conspiracy have not been adequately explained and it is my intention to consider the appointment of the conspirator Cn. Calpurnius Piso as *Quaestor ProPraetore* and governor of the province of Hispania Citerior. It is my contention that Piso has been the victim of posthumous denigration and that his appointment need not be viewed either in the context of the 'conspiracy' of 66/65 BC or the anti-Pompeian politics of the mid to late 60s BC.

A lengthy excursus on the events of the years 66-65 BC would be superfluous, although a brief outline of the background may help us to view Piso's position in its proper context.

In the course of the electoral shenanigans of the summer of 66 BC, the *consules designati* P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla were found guilty of electoral bribery, fresh elections were held in the autumn and their accusers L. Manlius Torquatus and L. Aurelius Cotta were returned victorious (Asc. 75; Dio Cass. XXXVI 44.3). The summer also saw the return to Rome of the governor of Africa, L. Sergius Catilina, to face accusations of maladministration (Asc. 85). Seeking to escape prosecution Catiline offered himself for election, only to have his candidacy rejected by the presiding consul, L. Volcatius Tullus<sup>2</sup>. The reasons for

\* Journal sigla in the notes are those of *L'Année Philologique*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. R. SEAGER, *The First Catilinarian Conspiracy*, *Historia* 13 (1964), p. 338-347; E.S. GRUEN, *Notes on the 'First Catilinarian Conspiracy'*, *CPh* 64 (1969), p. 20-24. Previous studies have focused almost exclusively on Piso's relationship to the events of the so-called 'First Catilinarian Conspiracy', neglecting his role in Spain. A notable exception to this is the study by L. AMELA VALVERDE, *El asesinato de Cn. Calpurnio Pisón*, *Gerión* 20 (2002), p. 255-279; however, Amela Valverde persists in placing Piso's appointment in the context of Crassus' anti-Pompeian stance. I feel, therefore, that now would be an appropriate time to reconsider the evidence for Piso's appointment and to place his command in the context of the Spanish provinces in the period prior to Pompey's appointment in 55 BC.

<sup>2</sup> Sallust, *Cat.* 18.2, is clear that Catiline was a candidate only at the second consular elections, cf. G. SUMNER, *The Consular Elections of 66 B.C.*, *Phoenix* 19 (1965),



Volcatius' decision have been disputed: it is clear that Catiline was not charged with *repetundae* until the following year and the mere threat of prosecution did not provide grounds for the quashing of his candidacy<sup>3</sup>. One need not posit a political motivation for a decision that evidently entailed some legal consideration (Asc. 89) and may have been directed towards securing a re-run of the earlier elections<sup>4</sup>. According to Cicero the disgruntled Catiline then joined with a young aristocrat, Cn. Calpurnius Piso, in a plot to murder the consuls and massacre the Senate (Asc. 92; Cic., *Mur.* 81). That Autronius and Sulla were party to the plot seems likely (Sall., *Cat.* 18; Cic., *Sull.* 10; Dio Cass. XXXVI 44.3) and their intention was evidently to murder the consuls on the first of January 65 BC (Sall., *Cat.* 18)<sup>5</sup>.

As has long been recognised, the events surrounding the conspiracy are hopelessly unclear and I have little to add to the wealth of scholarly analyses though we should be wary of placing too much emphasis on the context of Crassus' rivalry towards Pompey<sup>6</sup>. Rather I wish to turn our attention to a confused and overlooked footnote to the 'Conspiracy', namely

p. 226-231; J.T. RAMSEY, *Cicero, pro Sulla 68 and Catiline's Candidacy in 66 B.C.*, *HSPH* 86 (1982), p. 121-131. This view has recently been doubted, cf. F.X. RYAN, *The Consular Candidacy of Catiline in 66*, *MH* 52 (1995), p. 45-48.

<sup>3</sup> E.G. HARDY, *The Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: a Re-Study of the Evidence*, *JRS* 7 (1917), p. 157-158, has shown that Sallust (*Cat.* 18.2) is incorrect in attributing Catiline's rejection to his impending trial for extortion. E.S. GRUEN, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 24, contends that Volcatius' decision was a political one reflected in his Pompeian background and Catiline's association with senators hostile to Pompey: Cn. Calpurnius Piso and Q. Lutatius Catulus. On Volcatius' Pompeian sympathies, cf. Cic., *Fam.* I 1.3, I 2.1-2, I 4.1. Hardy's explanation is coloured by the contention that Catiline was the tool of Crassus and Caesar, a connection that has been thrown into doubt by R. SEAGER, *art. cit.* (n. 1), who stresses Catiline's Pompeian connections.

<sup>4</sup> G. SUMNER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 229, points to the election of Curio to the tribunate in 51 BC as evidence that no legal grounds existed for the rejection of Catiline's candidacy. By rejecting Catiline, Volcatius was ensuring the election of the 'Pompeian' candidates: Torquatus and Cotta. For the view that Autronius and Sulla were Crassus' men, cf. L.R. TAYLOR, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*, Berkeley 1949, p. 224 n. 23. This connection cannot now be maintained: E.S. GRUEN, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> The association of the conspiracy referred to by Asconius with that of Sallust on January 1 is uncertain as Asconius implies that it took place a year before the delivery of Cicero's *In Toga Candida* at the consular elections in the summer of 64 BC. Cic., *Sull.* 6, includes L. Vargunteius amongst the conspirators. Vargunteius was one of the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BC, cf. Sall., *Cat.* 17.3, 28.1, 47.3. That he had connections with Crassus may be confirmed by the appearance of a Vargunteius on the staff of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BC (Plut., *Crass.* 28.1-2; Oros. VI 13.3).

<sup>6</sup> Suet., *Iul.* 9, records an anti-Caesarian tradition that implicates Crassus and Caesar in the conspiracy and is echoed by Asconius (83) as being derived from Cicero's

the dispatch of Catiline's associate, Cn. Calpurnius Piso to the governorship of Hispania Citerior.

According to Sallust (*Cat.* 18.5) the intention of the conspirators was to send Piso to Spain following the assassination of the consuls on January the first. Suetonius (*Iul.* 9) associates Piso with Caesar in a plot to raise rebellions in Spain and Cisalpine Gaul. That Piso was sent to Spain is confirmed by epigraphic evidence that records his appointment as 'Quaestor pro pr. ex s. c. provinciam Hispaniam Citeriorem' (*ILS* 875), however, it is only in Sallust that we find it associated with the conspiracy. Suetonius implies that it was distinct from the plot to murder the consuls formulated by Crassus, Caesar, Autronius and Sulla; so too Asconius (92) who affirms that Piso was 'in Hispaniam missus a senatu' and not at the behest of the conspirators<sup>7</sup>.

As it was, the conspiracy of January the first came to nothing<sup>8</sup>. Piso, however, was sent to Spain to take up his governorship. That Piso should be rewarded for his part in the conspiracy by the grant of ProPraetorian

posthumous *De consiliis suis*, cf. P.A. BRUNT, *Three Passages from Asconius*, *CR* 7 (1957), p. 193-195. The earlier view that Catiline acted as agent for Crassus and Caesar against Pompeian interests is found in E.T. SALMON, *Catiline, Crassus and Caesar*, *AJPh* 56 (1935), p. 302-316; E.G. HARDY, *art. cit.* (n. 3). A more moderate version is found in A.M. WARD, *Cicero's Fight against Crassus and Caesar in 65 and 63 B.C.*, *Historia* 21 (1972), p. 244-258, who although adducing their electoral support for Catiline does not associate them with the Conspiracy. On the earlier literature, cf. H. FRISCH, *The First Catilinarian Conspiracy: a Study in Historical Conjecture*, *C&M* 9 (1948), p. 10-36. This view has been substantially refuted and now receives little currency: cf. E.S. GRUEN, *art. cit.* (n. 1); R. SYME, *Sallust*, Berkeley 1964, p. 88-102; C.E. STEVENS, *The 'Plotting' of B.C. 66/65*, *Latomus* 22 (1963), p. 412-427. R. SEAGER, *art. cit.* (n. 1), has shown connections between Catiline and Pompey and there seems little need to allude to Pompeian and anti-Pompeian agendas in an affair that better evidences the complexities of political alliances and the political rivalries of the *nobiles*. Crassus' ties to the Senatorial aristocracy have been shown by E.J. PARRISH, *Crassus' New Friends and Pompey's Return*, *Phoenix* 27 (1973), p. 357-380.

<sup>7</sup> Dio's account (XXXVI 44.3) of Piso's appointment follows that of Suetonius and dissociates it from the earlier conspiracy.

<sup>8</sup> Asconius' identification of Catiline and Piso with the *magni homines* Cicero said were breaking up the trial of Manilius (66) serves only to add to the confusion. The claim that the alleged conspiracy of 66/65 BC was, in fact, associated with the political context of the trial of Manilius has been taken up by a variety of scholars, cf. E.J. PHILLIPS, *Cicero and the Prosecution of C. Manilius*, *Latomus* 29 (1970), p. 595-607; A.M. WARD, *Politics in the Trials of Manilius and Cornelius*, *TAPhA* 101 (1970), p. 545-556; E.J. PHILLIPS, *Asconius' Magni Homines*, *RhM* 116 (1973), p. 352-357; E.S. GRUEN, *art. cit.* (n. 1); R. SEAGER, *art. cit.* (n. 1) p. 344-345. That Catiline was acting in relation to the trial of Manilius would explain his appearance in the forum on the 29th of December (Cic., *Cat.* 1.15) as well as Sallust's statement that the plan to murder the consuls was to be re-staged on February 5, 65 BC (*Cat.* 18.6).

*imperium* was due to the influence of Crassus: according to Sallust (19.1-2) he was sent ‘adnitante Crasso, quod eum infestum inimicum Cn. Pompeio cognoverat’. Piso had attracted Crassus’ attention as an out-spoken opponent of Pompey, and here I agree with Gruen’s association of the conspirator with the Cn. Piso, who, Valerius Maximus (6.2-4) records, attempted to prosecute Manilius Crispus and finding his target to be protected by Pompey threatened Pompey: ‘praedes rei publicae te, si postulatus fueris, civile bellum non excitaturum, et iam de tuo prius quam de Manili capite in consilium iudices mittam’ — ‘Give your assurance to the republic that if you are prosecuted you will not incite civil war and I will have your head on a capital charge before I get Manilius.’<sup>9</sup> Crassus, therefore, saw in Piso a valuable tool in undermining the influence of Pompey and that by arranging his dispatch to Spain, he would create a counter to Pompey’s power in the East (Sall., *Cat.* 19.2) — a notion that found credence in rumours that Piso’s eventual murder was at the hands of Pompeian agents in the Peninsula (Asc. 92; Sall., *Cat.* 19.3-5).

This easy hypothesis, however, presents us with problems. Why should the Senate have acquiesced in the granting of *imperium* to a mere Quaestor who but a few weeks before had planned a bloody purge of its members? The reason given by Sallust (*Cat.* 19.2) that the Senate was motivated by fear of Piso’s tempestuous personality is inadequate; what little we know of Piso’s career prior to the events of the 66/65 BC is unexceptional and high-profile prosecutions were the hallmark of ambitious young politicians on the threshold of their career. Scholars, therefore, have chosen to emphasise Crassus’ influence in securing Piso’s dispatch<sup>10</sup>. Crassus was undoubtedly an influential figure in the senate (Plut., *Crass.*

<sup>9</sup> On the identification of Piso, cf. E.S. GRUEN, *Pompey and the Pisones*, CSCA 1 (1968), p. 159-161.

<sup>10</sup> On the relationship of Crassus and Piso, cf. Asc. 83; cf. E.S. HARDY, *art. cit.* (n. 3), p. 164; C.E. STEVENS, *art. cit.* (n. 6), p. 416-417; L. AMELA VALVERDE, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 269-271. A.M. WARD, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic*, Columbia 1977, p. 140, 150-151, argues that the *mali cives* alluded to by Cicero (Asc. 93) are Crassus and Caesar. H. Frisch, *art. cit.* (n. 6), rejects Crassus’ involvement in the conspiracy of 66/65 BC but associates Piso’s appointment with Crassus’ proposal to annex Egypt and the agrarian legislation of Servilius Rullus, as moves to undermine the position of Pompey. Both Crassus and Caesar were personally acquainted with the Peninsula: Caesar served as Quaestor under Antistius Vetus in 68 BC, and Crassus sought refuge in Spain from Marius and Cinna in 85-84 BC (Plut., *Crass.* 4) before raising an armed force of 2,500 men from amongst his families’ *clientes* and offering his services to Metellus Pius and Sulla (Plut., *Crass.* 6.1-2). Personal acquaintance, however, does not support their use of Piso for similar strategic purposes, *contra* E.T. SALMON, *art. cit.* (n. 6) p. 305.

7) and Parrish has shown that he fostered ties with the senatorial aristocracy with both sons marrying into the illustrious Caecilii Metelli<sup>11</sup>. As Censor in 65 BC, Crassus' position in the senate was paramount and he was able to marshal his considerable influence to secure the appointment of Piso. One should beware, however, of assuming too much of Crassus' stature: his tenure of the censorship was beggared with disagreement, his proposals for the annexation of Egypt (Cic., *Leg. Agr.* 2.44; Suet., *Iul.* 11; Plut., *Crass.* 13.1-2) and the enfranchisement of the Transpadanes (Dio Cass. XXXVII 9.3; Cic., *Balb.* 50) being successfully thwarted by his colleague Q. Lutatius Catulus, and they eventually abdicated without completing a *lustrum* (Dio Cass. XXXVII 9.3; Plut., *Crass.* 13.1-2). Motivation for Piso's appointment cannot, therefore, be realistically attributed to Crassus alone and must have found support across a wider senatorial spectrum, if indeed undue influence was needed.

A second problem lies in what Piso was actually expected to do during his time in Spain. Conventional wisdom cites Badian<sup>12</sup> in support of Sallust (*Cat.* 19.2) for the strong ties that existed between the provincials and the family of the Calpurnii Pisones, and their ability to undermine the influence of Pompey in the Peninsula. The earliest member of the family to see service in the Peninsula was C. Calpurnius Piso, the consul of 180 BC. As praetor in Hispania Ulterior between 186-185 BC he co-operated with the governor of Citerior, L. Quinctius Crispinus, in a campaign into Baeturia and Carpetania that yielded mixed results but culminated in a victory near Toledo (Livy XXXIX 30.1) that earned them both a triumph (Livy XXXIX 42.2-4)<sup>13</sup>. Through the second century BC the family established what Earl has termed an *ancestral connection* with the Peninsula<sup>14</sup>; however, this connection would prove to be an ill-omened one: L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, praetor in Ulterior in 154 BC, was heavily defeated by the Lusitani (App., *Iber.* 83; Livy, *Per.* 47) and Q. Calpurnius Piso's campaigns in the Numantine war may have inspired Livy's rebuke that the war had dragged on thanks to the incompetence of Rome's generals (*Per.* 56)<sup>15</sup>. The governorship of L. Calpurnius Piso

<sup>11</sup> E.J. PARRISH, *art. cit.* (n. 6), p. 359-360.

<sup>12</sup> E. BADIEN, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)*, Oxford 1958, p. 312.

<sup>13</sup> For the Calpurnii Pisones during the second century BC, cf. D.C. EARL, *Calpurnii Pisones in the Second Century B.C.*, *Athenaeum* 38 (1960), p. 283-298.

<sup>14</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 290-291.

<sup>15</sup> App., *Iber.* 83.362, states that Piso did not attack Numantia but rather turned against Pallantia, *contra* Livy, *Per.* 26.

Frugi (*pr.* 113 or 112 BC) that Cicero cites as an example of probity, ended in disaster with the governor's death in battle (Cic., *Verr.* II 4.56), and from that point no further member of the *gens* would serve in the Peninsula until the arrival of Cn. Piso fifty-seven years later.

Through service in the Peninsula the Republican governors created ties of *clientela* with the native aristocracy — manifest in the granting of citizenship<sup>16</sup>. The appearance of Roman *nomina* thus relates to the activities of the particular *gentes* in the Peninsula<sup>17</sup>. A marked concentration of Calpurnii in the communities of Turdetania and the upper Guadalquivir no doubt reflects the family's service in Hispania Ulterior. Taken over the Peninsula as a whole, however, the Calpurnii do not fare well in comparison with other Republican *nomina*, accounting for only 1.19% of the total inscriptions in comparison to 2.34% of Pompeii, 2.41% Caecilii, 2.92% Licinii and 3.69% Fabii, the 6.04% Cornelii reflecting the hegemony established by the Cornelii Scipiones in the Peninsula prior to 197 BC<sup>18</sup>. The poor showing of the Calpurnii, together with their mixed record, preponderance in Ulterior rather than Citerior and absence from the Peninsula for more than half a century prior to the arrival of Cn. Piso, must, I believe, throw into question assumptions about the ability of an obscure member of the *gens* to marshal his *clientela* on a scale to rival that of Pompey.

The preponderance of Pompeian influence is testified by Sallust's account of Piso's murder at the hands of Pompeian veterans (*Cat.* 19.5). Pompeian connections with Spain are evidenced by the inscription recording the grant of citizenship to Spanish cavalymen in the service of the consul, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, in 89 BC (*CIL* I 709)<sup>19</sup>. These ties were

<sup>16</sup> On the creation of provincial *clientelae*, cf. E. BADIAN, *op. cit.* (n. 12), p. 252-284. The appearance of Roman *nomina* not only reflects Roman favour, but also native attempts to attract the same, cf. R.C. KNAPP, *The Origins of Provincial Prosopography in the West*, *AncSoc* 9 (1978), p. 188-190.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. R.C. KNAPP, *art. cit.*; S.L. DYSON, *The Distribution of Roman Republican Family Names in the Iberian Peninsula*, *AncSoc* 11/12 (1980-1981), p. 257-299. Unfortunately, few inscriptions can be dated to the Republican period, making the application of epigraphic evidence for the distribution of *nomina* during the period pre-49 BC suspect, cf. P.A. BRUNT, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, Oxford 1971, p. 205.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. R.C. KNAPP, *art. cit.*, chart II.

<sup>19</sup> On the Pompeian *clientela* in Spain, cf. L. AMELA VALVERDE, *El desarrollo de la clientela pompeyana en Hispania*, *SHHA* 7 (1989), p. 105-117; B.J. LOWE, *Sextus Pompeius and Spain: 46-44 B.C.*, in A. POWELL – K. WELCH (eds.), *Sextus Pompey in History and Literature*, London 2002, p. 65-102; cf. also M. SALINAS DE FRIAS, *La función del hospitium y la clientela en la conquista y romanización de la Celtiberia*, in *SHHA* 1 (1983), p. 21-41. On the argument that the siting of the battle of Ilerda in 49 BC was intended to

strengthened and expanded during Pompey's service in Spain during the Sertorian War (77-72 BC) and further enhanced by the actions of his *legati* under the *lex Gabinia* (Cic., *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 35; Flor. I 41.9) and the governorship of L. Afranius in Citerior<sup>20</sup>.

During his governorship of Hispania Ulterior in 61 BC, Caesar sought to establish a *clientela* amongst the native communities: alleviating financial difficulties through the cancellation of debts, revoking the reparations imposed by Metellus Pius during the Sertorian war and fostering ties with the native aristocracy, most famously the elder L. Cornelius Balbus from Gades<sup>21</sup>. The conclusion that Caesar possessed an extensive *clientela* in Ulterior comparable to that of Pompey in Citerior, however, is misplaced: we hear of no Iberian partisans of Caesar in the Ilerda campaign (Caes., *BCiv.* I 39.2) and it was only after victory there opened the Peninsula to the threat of Caesarian reprisals that we see a widespread defection amongst the native communities<sup>22</sup>. The shallowness of Caesar's support is borne out by the revolt that broke out against the governor, Q. Cassius Longinus, in the summer of 48 BC and the loyalty of all the communities of the Guadalquivir except Ulia to the sons of Pompey in 46 BC<sup>23</sup>. Despite a scatter of well-publicised defections, 3,000 Roman and Spanish *equites* served in the Pompeian army at Munda (*BHisp.* 31), and the Peninsula would stay loyal to Sextus Pompey until his death (App. V 13.556). In view of Caesar's inability to break the loyalty of the Spanish provinces to Pompey, what could Piso have been expected to achieve?

If, as I have suggested, Piso's appointment has no place either in the plans of Crassus, or in an effort to undermine Pompey's *clientela* in the Spanish provinces, what are we left with of Piso's command? As Balsdon long ago suggested<sup>24</sup> the appointment may have been a regular one

exploit Pompeian support in the vicinity, cf. L. AMELA VALVERDE, *art. cit.*, p. 108; EAD., *La Turma Salluitana y su relación con la clientela pompeyana*, *Veleia* 17 (2000), p. 85.

<sup>20</sup> L. AMELA VALVERDE, *SHHA* 7 (1989), p. 114; cf. Ch.F. KONRAD, *Afranius Imperator*, in *HAnt* 8 (1978), p. 67-76.

<sup>21</sup> App., *BCiv.* II 8.26-27; Plut., *Caes.* 12; Caes., *BCiv.* II 18.5-6.

<sup>22</sup> The defection of Ulterior to Caesar was no doubt facilitated by the unpopularity of Varro's confiscation of 18 million sesterces, 20,000 pounds of silver and 120,000 pecks of wheat from the provincials (Caes., *BCiv.* II 18), including the treasury of the temple of Hercules in Gades that Caesar adroitly returned (*BCiv.* II 21).

<sup>23</sup> On the relationship of the communities of the Guadalquivir valley to Caesar, cf. J. MARTINEZ MERA, *Las ciudades hispanas ante la Guerra Civil*, in *ETF(hist)* 11 (1998), p. 307-333.

<sup>24</sup> J.P.V.D. BALSDON, *Roman History 65-50 B.C.: Five Problems*, *JRS* 52 (1962), p. 134-135

and by the Imperial period the granting of ProPraetorian *imperium* was standard practice for Quaestors serving in the provinces<sup>25</sup>. The bestowal of *imperium* upon *privati* first appears during the Second Punic War<sup>26</sup> and becomes increasingly common during the later Republic — one thinks immediately of the succession of *imperia* held by Pompey from 82 BC<sup>27</sup>. A Quaestor could receive *imperium* either by delegation from a provincial governor or by grant of the Senate. Seager has suggested that there was a shortage of Praetorian governors in the mid 60s necessitating the regular appointment of Quaestors to provincial commands<sup>28</sup>.

*Imperium* was conferred upon a Quaestor on the occasion of the death of a governor: in 119 BC the Quaestor M. Annius governed Macedonia *ProPraetore* following the death of the Praetor Sex. Pompeius<sup>29</sup>. The Quaestor C. Cassius Longinus governed Syria following the death of Crassus in 53 BC until the arrival of M. Bibulus in 51 (App., *Syr.* 51, *BCiv.* V 10; Cic., *Fam.* XV 14; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 119-122, *BJ* I 180-182). P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was Quaestor under Trebonius in Asia, fleeing to Macedonia when his superior was murdered by Dolabella and returning to recover his province as *ProQuaestore ProPraetore* in 43 BC (Cic., *Fam.* XII 14-15).

An absent governor could delegate *imperium* to a Quaestor: when Marius departed for Numidia in 105 BC he left his Quaestor Sulla in charge of Africa as *Quaestor ProPraetore* (Sall., *Jug.* 103). Upon his return to Pontus in 63 BC Pompey left M. Aemilius Scaurus in charge of Syria and Judaea as *ProQuaestore ProPraetore* (*IGRP* III 1102; *ILS* 8775; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 79, *BJ* I 157; App., *Syr.* 51, *BCiv.* V 10). Following the departure of Q. Minucius Thermus in 50 BC, the Quaestor L. Antonius governed the province of Asia (Cic., *Fam.* 2.18). When Cicero departed Cilicia in 50 BC he left his Quaestor, C. Coelius Caldus, in charge of the province (*Att.* VI 6; *Fam.* II 15). In 48 BC, Caesar's Quaestor Q. Cornificius was dispatched to govern Illyricum as *ProPraetore* (*BAlex.* 42.2) before going on to govern Syria (Cic., *Fam.* XII 19)<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> A.H.J. GREENIDGE, *The Title 'Quaestor Pro Praetore'*, *CR* 9 (1895), p. 258.

<sup>26</sup> ProPraetorian *imperium* was conferred on *privati* in 295 BC but the four men in question had each held the Consulship, cf. W.F. JASHEMSKI, *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Propraetorian Imperium to 27 B.C.*, Chicago 1950, p. 100.

<sup>27</sup> E.S. GRUEN, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley 1995, p. 534-543, emphasises the traditional character of *privati cum imperio*.

<sup>28</sup> *Art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 346.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. W.F. JASHEMSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 58.

<sup>30</sup> It is unclear whether M. Terentius Varro Lucullus governed Cisalpine Gaul in 82 BC as a *Legatus ProPraetore* (Plut., *Sulla* 27.7) or as a *Quaestor ProPraetore* (Plut., *Luc.* 37.1).



In addition to provincial appointments the Senate could also bestow *imperium* upon a Quaestor: in 74 BC P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus was appointed *Quaestor ProPraetore* to oversee the constitution of Cyrenaica as a province (Sall., *H.* II 43)<sup>31</sup> and in 58 BC the younger Cato undertook the annexation of Cyprus as *ProQuaestore ProPraetore* (Vell. Pat. II 45.4; Auct., *Vir. Ill.* 80.2; Livy, *Per.* 104). Cicero tells us that the Quaestor T. Antistius was appointed by lot to govern Macedonia in 49 BC (*Fam.* XII 29), presumably *ProPraetore*.

Piso's receipt of *imperium* was not, therefore, exceptional and need not be dependent upon the plotting of 66/65 BC for its justification. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the Spanish *fasti* for the 60s is poor and it is impossible to say how Piso's appointment relates to the situation in Spain at that time. However, I would suggest that his command may be explained by the unsettled nature and internecine warfare that beset the Peninsula. Sánchez-Corriendo<sup>32</sup> has suggested that the transhumant pastoralism practised by the Lusitani ensured annual warfare along the frontier of the province — Varro even goes so far as to advise against cultivating land because of the incessant raids of Lusitani (*Rust.* I 16.2). We have already referred to the death of L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi in 112 BC, and the record of *triumphatores* produced by the Spanish provinces in the first century BC indicates that the Peninsula remained unsettled. In addition to the incidence of triumphs, Cicero records disturbances near Gades during the governorship of Sex. Quintilius Varus (*Fam.* X 32.2). In 56 BC the governor of Citerior, Metellus Nepos, was defeated by the Vaccae near Clunia in the Ebro valley (Dio Cass. XXXIX 54.1-2). In 48 BC, Q. Cassius Longinus campaigned against the Lusitani (*BAlex.* 48). That violence was common is shown by the frequent references to fortified towns in the *Bellum Hispaniense* (31)<sup>33</sup> and the elder Pliny talks of the so-called *turres hannibalis* (*HN* II 181; XXV 165) that served as watch-towers and fortifications that are symptomatic

<sup>31</sup> Sallust does not specify Lentulus' rank although it seems reasonable to assume that he was granted *imperium* in view of the unsettled character of Cyrene at that time, cf. E. Badian, *M. Porcius Cato and the Annexation and Early Administration of Cyprus*, *JRS* 55 (1965), p. 119. For the suggestion that the governorship of Cyrene was normally conferred on a *Quaestor ProPraetore* cf. W.F. JASHEMSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 83.

<sup>32</sup> J. SANCHEZ-CORRIENDO, *Bandidos lusitanos o pastores trashumantes? Apuntes para el estudio de la trashumancia en Hispania*, *HAnt* 21 (1997), p. 69-92.

<sup>33</sup> An inscription from Hasta Regia records the reconstruction of walls and gates in the later first century BC (*CIL* II 5405).

of banditry<sup>34</sup>. The increase in banditry as provincials fled into the mountains to escape the oppressive character of Roman rule is a recurrent theme. Suetonius records that at the time of Caesar's proconsulship the province was infested with bandits (*Iul.* 18) and his campaigns against the Lusitani earned him a triumph (Plut., *Caes.* 12). In 43 BC Asinius Pollio complained to Cicero that bandits operating in the *Saltus Castulonensis* were interrupting communications with Rome (Cic., *Fam.* X 31.1). As late as the reign of Augustus a reward of 1,000,000 sesterces was offered for the apprehension of the bandit Corocotta (Dio Cass. LVI 43.3).

If we dissociate the appointment of Piso from the conspiracy of 66/65 BC, how then are we to explain his eventual fate? Although the view that Piso's murder was at the hands of Pompeian *clientes* has found widespread acceptance<sup>35</sup>, the three sources that recount Piso's fate are less conclusive. According to Asconius (92) the murder was committed by *clientes* of Pompey, although we are not told that the murder was carried out on the orders of Pompey — merely that it was not against his wishes: 'Ibi quidem dum iniurias provincialibus facit, occisus erat, ut quidem credebant, a Cn. Pompeii clientibus Pompeio non invito'. Sallust (*Cat.* 19.3-5) is studiously noncommittal outlining two possibilities: that Piso was killed because of his 'imperia iniusta, superba, crudelia', or that he was killed by agents of Pompey. Dio merely records that provincials murdered Piso angered at his maladministration (XXXVI 44.5).

The prospect of an unpopular governor being murdered by disgruntled Spaniards is not implausible. Perhaps the closest parallel to Piso is to be found in the career of Q. Cassius Longinus. Cassius had served as Pompey's Quaestor in Spain in 52 BC when his unpopularity led to a conspiracy amongst the provincials that left him wounded (*BAlex.* 50.1). Having attained the tribunate in 49 BC, Cassius was appointed governor of

<sup>34</sup> A. GARCIA Y BELLIDO, *Bandas y guerillas en las luchas con Roma, Hispania* 5 (1945), p. 547-604. Unrest during the reign of Augustus may have caused the construction of fortifications in the Ebro valley, cf. M.M. MEDRANO – M.A. DIAZ, *Indices y evidencias de conflictos y cambios políticos en el Convento jurídico Cesaraugustano durante la dinastía Julio-Claudia*, *Kalathos* 6 (1986), p. 161-187; M. ALMAGRO-GORBEA – A. LORRIO, *Segobriga III: La Muralla Norte y la Puerta Principal (Arqueología Conquense)*, 9, Cuenca 1989, p. 202, on the evidence from Segobriga. On banditry, cf. K. HOPWOOD, *Bandits, Elites and Rural Order*, in A. WALLACE-HADRILL (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London 1989, p. 171-187; *Bandits between Grandees and the State: the Structure of Order in Roman Rough Cilicia*, in K. HOPWOOD (ed.), *Organised Crime in Antiquity*, London 1989 p. 177-206.

<sup>35</sup> L. AMELA VALVERDE, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 271.

Hispania Ulterior in 48 where his behaviour surpassed that of his previous term and culminated in a second unsuccessful assassination attempt (*BAlex.* 52). The provincials only gained respite when Cassius drowned at sea fleeing the arrival of his successor (*BAlex.* 64). In AD 25 the Governor of Tarraconensis, L. Calpurnius Piso, was murdered by conspirators from Tiermes (Tac. IV 45.3). The Spaniards do not seem to have been unwilling to dispose of an unpopular governor and the accusations of injustice, arrogance and cruelty accord well with what we know of Piso's personality.

Sadly, the paucity of our knowledge of the Spanish provinces prior to the arrival of Caesar in 61 BC, makes it impossible for us to make any firm conclusions about Piso's role in the province. In view of the well known difficulties concerning the events of 66/65 BC and the questions that I have raised concerning the validity of traditional views of Piso's governorship, I would like to conclude that Piso's appointment as 'Quaestor pro pr. ex s. c. provinciam Hispaniam Citeriorem' need not be viewed in the context of the sinister goings-on of Catiline and Crassus, and may have arisen through the death of the incumbent governor in the internecine fighting that beset the provinces at that time. His receipt of ProPraetorian *imperium* was not in itself exceptional and his eventual murder is an indication of the perils of provincial maladministration and of the turbulent state of the Spanish provinces, not of Piso's role in the so-called 'First Catilinarian Conspiracy.'

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## ATTACKING THE WORLD WITH FIVE COHORTS: CAESAR IN JANUARY 49

On 7 January 49 (by unadjusted chronology) the senate passed its 'last decree' against the rebellious pro-consul C. Julius Caesar, declaring him an outlaw. Four nights later he crossed the Rubicon *with one legion*<sup>1</sup>. The towns of Italy fell like dominoes to him. On 17 January Pompey left Rome. By 15 February, now joined by two more legions<sup>2</sup>, Caesar blockaded Corfinium, the only town to resist, which fell on 21 February. By 23 February Pompey was at Brindisium, fleeing the entire peninsula; his evacuation was complete by 17 March: «a shameful and disastrous flight» (Cic., *Att.* VIII 1.3). Within six weeks Italy was Caesar's.

There have been few more audacious military gambles in history, and few where one side with so few resources at hand has caught the other seemingly so totally unprepared.

Ever since 52 Pompey's disaffection from Caesar was patent<sup>3</sup>: there can be no coincidence that two of the former's laws totally undermined all of Caesar's best laid plans. Whatever the terminal date of Caesar's Gallic command (two five-year grants from 59), of far greater importance is Caesar's obsession with a seamless transition from his provinces to a second consulship. Everyone knew his ruthlessness: it was memories of 59 which made his enemies determined to allow him no second chance. How, then, can we explain what happened? To ask the question more pointedly, exactly what did Caesar's enemies think that he would do in January 49?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The reference to 5 cohorts is supposedly Livy, quoted by Orosius VI 15 — but Caesar had a legion (10 cohorts) and 300 cavalry. Though apparently an exaggeration, the quotation shows the impression Caesar's action made.

<sup>2</sup> The XIIth joined him at Cingulum (*BC* I 15), the VIIIth at Corfinium, together with 22 cohorts raised in Gaul and 300 Noric cavalry (I 18).

<sup>3</sup> Pace E. GRUEN, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley 1974.

<sup>4</sup> It is striking how many histories and biographies have no comment: Lawrence ECHARD, *Roman History*, London 1695; Jules MICHELET, *Histoire romaine: République*, Paris 1833; John BUCHAN, *Caesar*, London 1932; Max CARY, *History of Rome*, London 1938; J. VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée le Grand*, Brussels 1954.

## WAR WAS INEVITABLE

Many historians who have considered the outbreak of the war have stressed above all else that it was inevitable. Nathaniel Hooke, writing between the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite uprisings, was the first to stress, in 1738, that Caesar had prepared his army to be in readiness to support him as early as 51; that that was inevitable was shown by Cic., *Fam.* VIII 1.14 (Dec. 50), and Caesar's ultimatum of 1 January 49 that he would invade Italy. Pompey also had a strategy: simply to obstruct Caesar's access to Rome until he could be overwhelmed by the Spanish legions<sup>5</sup>.

Much the same line was followed by Adam Ferguson, one time chaplain to the Black Watch. By 50, although Gaul was «in a state of profound tranquillity» — Caesar was under the same illusion — he was «as if preparing for a dangerous and important war». Although it had been claimed that Caesar's legions were not reliable, Pompey thought war inevitable (Cic., *Att.* VII 8.4, Dec. 50). If Caesar made any move into Italy, Pompey's Spanish army would *probably* invade Gaul, while Pompey 'received' him in Italy because the other nine of Caesar's legions could not move before spring and were needed anyway to blockade the Pyrenees (against Pompey). The war was therefore to be fought in the provinces of Gaul and Spain<sup>6</sup>.

In the nineteenth century, the great schoolmaster Thomas Arnold argued in 1849 that Pompey had at first been lulled into false security, sure that Caesar would not make war on his own country. That illusion was shattered by Hirtius' visit of 6-7 December (Cic., *Att.* VII 4: he came from Caesar but did not visit Pompey) and Antony's speech of 21 December (VII 8.5 with talk of *terror armorum*). «From that time he looked forward to a war as inevitable». His assets, moreover, assured him of an easy victory. In the event, however, Pompey was taken by surprise, thinking that he had two or three months to organise to restrain Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, while the Spanish armies crossed the Alps and caught him in the rear<sup>7</sup>.

Perhaps the most infamous idolator of Caesar, Theodor Mommsen, depicted Caesar as fighting for his political life against overwhelming

<sup>5</sup> N. HOOKE, *Roman History from the Building of the City to the Ruin of the Commonwealth*, 3 vols, London 1738, book 10, chap. 1.

<sup>6</sup> A. FERGUSON, *History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic*, 3 vols, London 1783, II, p.357-379.

<sup>7</sup> T. ARNOLD, *History of the Later Roman Commonwealth*, 2 vols, London 1849, I, p. 404-428.

odds. War was inevitable and also planned long in advance: Caesar's anxiety to be consul again in 48 was so that he could conduct a war «far more suitably and more advantageously than if he now as proconsul of Gaul gave the order to march against the senate and its general». By summer 51, however, events had overtaken the master: «He could not avoid perceiving now at any rate, if not earlier, that he would not be spared the necessity of drawing the sword against his fellow-citizens». He had only to wait until the XIIIth reached Ravenna. The resources of his enemies were, however, overwhelming: exclusive control of the seas, all the provinces except the Gauls, all client states, the aristocracy and capitalists in Italy, and legions: two in Italy and seven in Spain. Rarely has there been a more cold-blooded analysis of the coming cataclysm<sup>8</sup>.

A little later (1865) appeared a biography of Caesar for which Mommsen had refused to act as research assistant, by none other than Napoleon III. His main message is that there was no hope of settlement: and indeed that Pompey wanted war and Caesar had ended his offer of conciliation brought by Curio with menaces (App. II 32). Pompey had ten legions; could Caesar oppose him with one? This biography must also be credited with a vital insight: that the rumours of Caesar's intended march on Rome in December 50 were concocted to counter the vote of the senate for joint disarmament.<sup>9</sup>

Giulio Giannelli, professor at Florence, noted in 1962 both the inevitability of war and Caesar's ultimata of 27 December–1 January, declaring that he would defend himself. The same emphasis was laid by Francesco de Martino of Naples: Caesar declared in his despatch of 27 December that he would move against an illegal *dominatio* — and this was considered a declaration of war (App. II 32)<sup>10</sup>.

That war was inevitable is the main thrust of Robin Seager's biography of Pompey (1979). After his illness in the summer of 50 Pompey faced «the thought of civil war with equanimity», even an invasion of Italy by Caesar «with his highly trained army of veterans». There were rumours of troop movements in the north as early as October 50 (Cic., *Att.* VI 9.5), by early December Pompey thought war was certain (VII 4.2), and at the beginning of January Caesar was threatening (Plut., *Caes.*

<sup>8</sup> T. MOMMSEN, *History of Rome* (1853-1856), 5 vols, London 1895, V, p. 175, 182, 187, 202.

<sup>9</sup> NAPOLÉON, *Histoire de Jules César*, 3 vols, Paris 1865, II, p. 500, 503, 506, 509f, 493.

<sup>10</sup> G. GIANNELLI, *Trattato di storia romana*, Rome 1962, p. 429f; F. DE MARTINO, *Storia della costituzione romana*, 5 vols, Naples 1966, IV, p. 183f.

30, App. II 32). If both sides were so sure of war, how do we explain the sequel? We are told on the one hand, that by January 49 Pompey probably did not see war as inevitable or desirable: that view was held rather by the «hard core of the Optimates». Most importantly, «it was Caesar who upset the calculations of both Pompeius and the Optimates by invading Italy not only with such speed, but also so early in the year»<sup>11</sup>.

Much the same line was taken by the biography of Caesar three years later, by Christian Meier of Munich. He noted that as early as 51 the consul Sulpicius Rufus repeatedly recalled the civil wars of the 80s and assumed that Caesar would use armed force. By April 50 it was clear that Caesar would defend the tribunes' rights (Cic., *Fam.* VIII 11): he had «an army in readiness to punish any violation of the hallowed rights of the tribunes». By mid 50 Curio was talking of war (VIII 14) and by December Pompey is quoted as saying that war was inevitable (*Att.* VII 4.2). The final assurance was Caesar's threats on 1 January. No one, however, knew what Caesar would do. (It is important to note that according to Meier Caesar's command ended in 50, and that it was a concession of Pompey to extend it to November<sup>12</sup>.)

#### POMPEY DISARMED

If the war was inevitable, and recognised as such by all sides, the events of the first weeks of conflict become even harder to fathom. The most obvious — although paradoxical — answer is that Pompey was inadequately prepared.

The earliest modern biographer known to me (excluding lives by authors such as Petrarch) was the Belgian polymath Hubert Goltz (1563). He, significantly, has nothing about the unreliability of Caesar's legions. Realising that everyone was against him, Caesar began raising men and money. Pompey, on the other hand, was «negligent and lazy», content with hostile speeches. At the end of 50 Curio came to Ravenna, urging Caesar to march on Rome, but the latter replied with offers of compromise, «preferring to try all offers of peace», although they ended with a threat. Another agent, Antony, also uttered threats (1 January). After the

<sup>11</sup> R. SEAGER, *Pompey, a Political Biography*, Oxford 1979, p. 156f.

<sup>12</sup> C. MEIER, *Caesar* (1982), trans. London 1995, p. 331f.



SCU Caesar was informed of «the most unjust» decrees of the senate and was provided with «the most just causes of civil war»<sup>13</sup>.

Scipio Dupleix, Historiographer of France, in his history of the Republic (1638), asserted that after the deaths of Julia and Crassus, Pompey and Caesar plotted against each other. Caesar was determined on force; Pompey reacted, but too late, gulled by the idea that Caesar's troops were disloyal. In this connection, Dupleix noted something overlooked by everyone else: Caesar had led his troops in person for years, while Pompey had not even seen his! On Caesar's ultimatum of 1 January 49, which was a declaration of war, Pompey had only two legions and his lieutenant Domitius only 4,000 men<sup>14</sup>.

Although his views seem harder to classify, those of Rev. Samuel Clarke, pastor at St Bennet Finck, London, perhaps fit best here. In his biography of Caesar (1665) he noted Pompey's being deceived over the loyalty of Caesar's troops: he «could not believe that Caesar would thrust himself into so great danger or that he would be able to raise sufficient force to resist him». It seems, however, that Pompey was not totally unprepared, merely insufficiently: «For though Pompey had authority from the consuls and senate to leavy (*sic*) soldiers, to call home legions and to send Captains for the defence of those Cities in Italy by which Caesar should pass, yet all this was not sufficient to resist his fury and the power that he brought with him»<sup>15</sup>.

The Capuchin Rene Vertot in his *Roman Revolutions* (1719) stressed two matters: the madness of Appius on the unreliability of Caesar's legions, so that Pompey believed that they would even come over to him in the event of war, and — a somewhat different tack — that the senate believed that Pompey would have a powerful army before Caesar could gather his scattered troops and cross the Alps<sup>16</sup>.

Jean-Baptiste Crevier, continuer of Rollin's history and professor of rhetoric at Beauvais, was the first to stress the extraordinary effect on Pompey of the popular reaction to his illness in summer 50: «une espèce d'éblouissement de joie et de confiance» that, combined with the false

<sup>13</sup> H. GOLTZ, *C. Julius Caesar*, Bruges 1563, p. 41f. The biography takes up most of the volume and is paginated separately.

<sup>14</sup> S. DUPLEIX, *Histoire romaine depuis la fondation de la République*, 2 vols, Paris 1638, II, p. 626f.

<sup>15</sup> S. CLARKE, *Life and Death of Julius Caesar*, London 1665, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> R. VERTOT, *Histoire des révolutions arrivées dans le cours de la République romaine* (1719), 4th ed., 2 vols, Amsterdam 1739, II, p. 368-375.

reports about the loyalty of Caesar's troops, had a fatal effect. Pompey had more troops, Crevier was the first again to stress, than Caesar in January 49, but heroised on all sides, he lost his head. This picture of Pompey is in strongest contrast to the characterisation of Caesar: he was in very serious trouble after treating the senate in 59 with utter contempt, liable to many charges, never willing to surrender any office, and with no desire for peace!<sup>17</sup>

The anonymous French author of the *Life of Augustus Caesar*, translated into English in 1748 and prefaced by a *Short and clear view of the first triumvirate*, which is actually a biography of Caesar from 63, stated that «Cicero himself allows that Pompey had taken no precautions»<sup>18</sup>.

Oliver Goldsmith in his Roman history written for the booksellers (1769) adopted the same view, but with an individual slant. Pompey was deceived about the state of Caesar's army; then, after the boast about stamping his foot, «he did not prepare for his defence, lest he should be obliged to acknowledge himself in danger»<sup>19</sup>. This must rank as the most damning condemnation of Pompey's vanity ever made: to refuse to prepare for a crisis which you can foresee will overwhelm you.

It seems that the Rev. Charles Hereford also subscribed in his Roman history of 1792 to the view that Pompey was disarmed, if we are to take his words literally. Pompey «reposed in security on the fame of his former achievements», boosted by the reaction to his illness and reports on Caesar's army. Yet he considered the war inevitable and was «averse to any accommodation». His strategy was that the Spanish legions should invade Gaul while he himself would oppose Caesar in Italy. In the last analysis he «relied on *his own name* and the *authority of the senate*; he had trusted to the advanced season of the year, which approached the middle winter; and to the slender force of his rival, in appearance ill-suited to such a vast enterprise» (my italics)<sup>20</sup>. Name and authority are not, however, legions.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Pierre Levesque, professor at the Collège de France, stated bluntly that Pompey's vanity «could not calculate the danger he provoked» and that he «did not deign to make any preparations. He thought that, to defeat Caesar, only harangues and

<sup>17</sup> J.-B. CREVIER, *Histoire romaine*, 16 vols, Amsterdam 1740, XIII, p. 266-300.

<sup>18</sup> Anon., *Life of Augustus Caesar*, Eng. trans. 2 vols, London 1746, I, p. 63.

<sup>19</sup> O. GOLDSMITH, *Roman History*, 2 vols, London 1769, I, p. 437-440.

<sup>20</sup> C. HEREFORD, *History of Rome*, 3 vols, London 1792, II, p. 322, 326, 333.

decrees were necessary». Caesar's offers of surrender of some province(s) were not, however, sincere — as Levesque detected; Caesar knew that such offers would not be taken seriously. Having stated that Pompey made no preparations, Levesque was the first to go so far as to suggest that Pompey was actually promoting a crisis in order to be appointed to deal with it, in short, plotting a civil war in order to be given the command. He is said to have had 32,000 men, but this is not explained. The seven Spanish legions and the two 'Parthian' would be about 45,000<sup>21</sup>.

In his lectures in Berlin Barthold Georg Niebuhr laid most stress on the rumours that Caesar's army was unreliable, but this was somewhat undercut by his assertion — strange for an historian who prided himself on his special insights — that the same army was indispensable for the security of Gaul, meaning that Caesar could not afford to bring his army into Italy. All this relies on students' notes, but it seems that Niebuhr seriously misunderstood the situation by labelling Caesar's second consulship «an empty honour»!<sup>22</sup>

George Long, professor of Greek then Latin at UCL, also seems to fit this school, but his comments on attitudes are few. On 1 January 49 Pompey filled Rome with troops, and on the 7th boasted of his seven legions in Spain and two in Italy and stated that Caesar's were unreliable<sup>23</sup>. It is unfortunate also that Caesar's biographer James Froude (1907) gave no more clue to what he thought was in the minds of Pompey and Caesar than that the former believed that the latter's army was unreliable. He saw that the crux was the second consulship, and noted that only one of Caesar's officers proved false<sup>24</sup>.

William Heitland, Fellow of St John's Cambridge, asserted that by December 50 war was «pretty certain» (Cic., *Att.* VII 4) and noted the rumour in the same month that Caesar was marching on Rome, which allowed Marcellus to declare war on him — and yet «Pompey had not provided himself with an army ready to take the field at once»<sup>25</sup>.

Herbert Havell, an Englishman who taught at Halle, in 1914 stressed appropriately that Caesar was «sincerely anxious to maintain peace», but at the end of 50 moved to Ravenna, «on the frontiers of Italy». Pompey,

<sup>21</sup> P. LEVESQUE, *Histoire critique de la République romaine*, 3 vols, Paris 1807, III, p. 199, 204, 208-209, 211.

<sup>22</sup> B. NIEBUHR, *Lectures on the History of Rome*, 3rd ed., London 1870, p. 609-611.

<sup>23</sup> G. LONG, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, 5 vols, London 1864-1874, V, p. 3, 6.

<sup>24</sup> J. FROUDE, *Caesar*, London 1907, p. 376f.

<sup>25</sup> W. HEITLAND, *Roman Republic*, 3 vols, Oxford 1909, III, p. 268-270, 277.

however, «with his usual apathy had neglected to assemble a force for the defence of Italy»<sup>26</sup>.

Jérôme Carcopino, who was a few years later to win infamy as Vichy Minister of Education, stated simply in 1935 that Pompey was not seriously prepared and taken by surprise by the suddenness of Caesar's attack. Probably *from the end of January* he decided to retreat to the East to draw Caesar after him and allow the Spanish legions to occupy Italy. He also dated Caesar's summoning of legions VIII and XII to Italy to early December, following Marcellus' conferring of power on Pompey<sup>27</sup>.

In Ronald Syme's masterwork published in September 1939 he pointed out that war was inevitable from autumn 50. «Caesar strove to avert any resort to open war» but Pompey was determined to destroy him. Ultimately, however, «a rash and factious minority prevailed», Pompey was «ensnared», and thus made «inadequate preparation for war»<sup>28</sup>.

An American historian writing towards the end of the Vietnam War, Erich Gruen of Berkeley, noted that Caesar had made it clear in April 50 that he would defend the tribunes (Cic., *Fam.* VIII 11.3), but by mid year war was only a possibility or something about which there was talk (VIII 14.2-4, *Att.* VII 1.3). The mass of the senators did not want to be drawn into a conflict «that might provoke military intervention», but «the Pompeians needed civil war to preserve their pre-eminence. Caesar may not have wanted it, but he was prepared for it». The war, in short, was a mistake, caused by Curio, the Marcelli and Catonians. Pompey was caught out<sup>29</sup>.

Most recently Peter Wiseman analysed the outbreak of war in the new *Cambridge Ancient History* (1994). He quotes Caelius and Cicero forecasting war in August 50 (Cic., *Fam.* VIII 14.4, *Att.* VII 1.2) and even Pompey's favouring of it (*Att.* VII 4.2, 8.4, 9.3) and does not omit Caesar's threats to avenge his country's wrongs on 1 January. Despite all that, «It was therefore (*sic*) a devastating shock when the news came in that Caesar was marching south with the Thirteenth legion» — but surely his contemporaries could recall as well as Wiseman does Caesar's decisive action against Vercingetorix three years earlier<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> H. HAVELL, *Republican Rome*, London 1914, p. 512-513.

<sup>27</sup> J. CARCOPINO, *Histoire romaine*, Paris 1935, 3rd ed. 1943, p. 865, 852.

<sup>28</sup> R. SYME, *The Roman Revolution*, Oxford 1939, p. 42, 44, 45, 47, 49.

<sup>29</sup> E. GRUEN, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley 1974, p. 482f.

<sup>30</sup> *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IX (1994), p. 417f.

The majority of historians, therefore, while accepting that war was inevitable, with Caesar's character well known to every one of his contemporaries, have Pompey failing to make adequate preparations, lulled into false security by any number of fantasies, or ridden roughshod over by extremists who both wanted to use him for their own purposes and at the same time did not seem to realise that without preparations they would ensure not their power but their own destruction. There have, therefore, been historians who proposed a more radical solution in defence of Pompey's competence and historical coherence.

#### POMPEY PREPARED — OR PREPARING

This is a rare category of opinion, given the facts. Ernest Sihler, professor of Latin in New York, in his useful *Annals of Caesar* (1911) noted only that Pompey began conscription late in 50, and that Caesar's letter of 1 January 49 (App. II 32) was an ultimatum. It should be noted that Sihler alone revealed that Caesar's second consulship by itself would have been of little use to him, since by Pompey's law of 52 there had to ensue a five years' gap before a provincial command — but that was a law which Pompey himself broke<sup>31</sup>. That law could also presumably have been as easily repealed by Caesar as consul II as his laws were pushed through in 59.

The first serious presentation of this school of thought, however, was by Eduard Meyer in his classic *Caesars Monarchie*, published in Germany in 1918. Pompey «had prepared for every eventuality». What were these eventualities? Two legions were in Apulia, either to guard the Adriatic coastal roads (an attack would presumably come from that side) or ready to go East if Italy could not be held. Meyer asserted that Pompey's preparation for the latter course is demonstrated by his strategy in January 49: it included the evacuation of Rome. Pressure was to be applied to Caesar from Spain and Greece. Certainly in January Italy was being assigned to various legates (Cic., *Fam.* XVI 11.3), the provinces had been assigned (Caes., *BC* I 6), and money was being raised from the *municipia* (Caes., App. II 34). Pompey's real feelings are perhaps best indicated in Meyer's account by the stress on the unreliability of Caesar's legions, the idea that if Caesar really was crossing the Alps in December with ten

<sup>31</sup> E. SIHLER, *Annals of Caesar*, New York 1911, p. 188, 190, 170.

legions the two at Capua could be sent against him, and the statement that Pompey also had ten legions — seven in Spain<sup>32</sup>. The only problem with Meyer's notes on Pompey's preparations in January is that they have all been wrenched out of context and date in fact to after the crossing of the Rubicon!

Apparently to the same school belongs Thomas Rice Holmes, one-time schoolmaster, whose *Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire* appeared in 1923. He began by stressing that the war was seen as coming early in 51 by Sulpicius Rufus, consul that year (Cic., *Fam.* IV 3.1). Caesar, on the other hand, by his winter arrangements 50/49, «proves that he did not intend to adopt an attitude of menace and that he hoped for peace»: four legions were at Matisco (Macon) and four in the territory of the Belgae, 700 miles from the Italian frontier. Caesar's attitude was also shown by his sending of Balbus to Scipio «to effect a compromise» on 7 December (*Att.* VII 4.2), while Pompey was recruiting. Looking back, Holmes emphasised, Cicero thought that it was Pompey who had wanted the war (*Fam.* IX 6.2: June 46: Pompey was rather unafraid; XVI 12.2: 27 Jan. 49: that was the *boni*)<sup>33</sup>.

Frank Ezra Adcock wrote the authoritative account in the *Cambridge Ancient History* (vol. IX, 1932). As far as one can detect the thread, the vital points seem to be that he believed that Caesar's command expired on the Ides of November 50, that Pompey was appointed commander in Italy on 2 December and that he had indeed prepared in case Caesar should strike. There is one great insight tucked away and easily overlooked: Caesar must have ordered the 8th and 12th legions to join him in Italy (Caes., *BC* I 8) by 18 December. This completely undercuts all assertions about *Caesar's* unpreparedness<sup>34</sup>. As for the letters of 18-22 January 49 cited (Cic., *Att.* VII 10, 11.3-4, 12.4) they give no indication whatsoever that Pompey's flight was all pre-planned — quite the opposite!

The most important contribution to this category was made by Kurt von Fritz, refugee in the United States from Nazism, in 1942. He argued that Pompey all along realised that Italy would have to be evacuated, but that this policy was too unpopular to be revealed, and so it backfired.

<sup>32</sup> E. MEYER, *Caesars Monarchie*, Berlin 1918, p. 277, 268, 289, 270, 289.

<sup>33</sup> T.R. HOLMES, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire*, 3 vols, Oxford 1923, II, p. 239-240.

<sup>34</sup> *CAH* IX (1932), p. 634, 635, 639, 636.

For what it is worth, in all his tergiversations, Cicero claimed that Pompey had planned the evacuation from the beginning (*Att.* VIII 11.2), even two years earlier (IX 10.6)! In the prelude to the war, Pompey's confidence was dominant: the well-known story of the foot waiting to be stamped (Plut., *Pomp.* 61, App. II 37, Dio XLI 7.3). In the first week following the news of Caesar's advance, however, the evacuation was immediately mentioned, e.g. 17 January (*Att.* IX 10.2). Then by the 28th he was saying that in a few days everyone could return to Rome (VII 16.2).

Cicero complained that he had never been told of such a plan (VIII 11D.6) but he had (IX 10.2)! One person who obviously did *not* know was Domitius Ahenobarbus — unless he could read «the interests of the Republic» (VIII 12C.3) as Pompey's code for evacuation! That same despatch mentioned only the two consuls going to Sicily, but on 15 February Pompey told one of them to go there while all other troops were to cross the Adriatic (VIII 12A.3). The consuls had been in south-western Italy since 17 January (*ibid.*); they were then summoned to Apulia, leaving a garrison in Capua, a month later (VIII 6.2), before being summoned to Brundisium (VIII 11C, 11D.4). The evacuation was only then made clear to them. Pompey had kept his leading friends in the dark, because they wanted to defend Italy. In that connection it is to be stressed that Domitius was, contrary to most views, strategically competent, as shown by Caesar's need to take Corfinium.

Ultimately, however, it must be asked what precisely is von Fritz's proof that Pompey «*at no time* [my italics] had any intention of resisting Caesar in Italy». The answer is essentially his total lack of involvement in the defence of Italy, his tarrying around Rome and in Campania, his failure to recruit actively, even his obstruction of the levy, and his lies about the 'Parthian' legions. Between 26 January and 4 February he 'discovered' that they were unreliable. This is incredible, given that he had seen them in December when the war was impending. He lied: they fought loyally at Pharsalos (Caes., *BC* III 94.5).

When the plan was finally revealed, it roused a storm of indignation. «Pompey's own boasting, his display of unlimited confidence and pretence of easy superiority» had totally gulled his associates. Pompey was also furious that he had not been given the supreme command.

Von Fritz attempted to put this strategy into a psychological context. Pompey was the man of crises, the indispensable 'fixer' since the 80s; he always, of course, had to have helpers, but strictly subordinate. This was the greatest crisis of them all, and he wished to use it to establish his



permanent supremacy. He had to defeat Caesar — but not too easily: hence the desperate flight and then the hoped-for perilous but final victory. This insight into Pompey's mind had already been adumbrated by Levesque in 1806<sup>35</sup>.

There is in this brilliant reconstruction a fatal flaw. The evidence can be equally well — for many, better — explained as showing Pompey (as in 62) completely misjudging the situation: full of confidence, irresponsibly negligent, but then taken totally off guard by Caesar's attack, vacillating between confidence and despair in January-February, but finally left with *no other option* than to abandon Italy, and naturally hesitant to reveal his inability to retain it, when by any reasonable calculation it should have been easy. There is no shred of evidence that the evacuation of Italy entered Pompey's head until Caesar's spectacular advance. Von Fritz indeed undermined his own case by drawing attention to the fact that as late as 26 December Pompey thought that Caesar would be content to retain his provinces for another year (Cic., *Att.* VII 8.4)!

Roberto Paribeni, one of the leading archaeologists of the Fascist era, in his history of the age of Caesar and Augustus (1950) asserted that Pompey was ready for war by 50, and the senate was preparing arms as witnessed by the two legions for Parthia being kept at Capua. He understood that after the senate's vote for dual disarmament, Marcellus spread the rumour of Caesar being ready to invade. Pompey in his interview with Cicero on 10 December 50 was most anxious that the latter should not propose any acceptable compromise. Caesar himself had by December called two more legions to Italy (the point already made by Adcock and Carcopino). Pompey began the war with only two legions, however, contrary to his usual caution, misled by Labienus. In the midst of all this one is amazed to read that «fratricidal war was indispensable for Caesar's safety and that of the state» and that only a single leader «unhampered by outdated customs» could save it. The indoctrination of many years could obviously not be shaken off in a moment<sup>36</sup>.

More recent biographers of Pompey have followed the same line. John Leach (1978) stressed the turning-point constituted by Pompey's illness in summer 50, making him confident to the point of arrogance. He believes that Pompey was making preparations by late summer-early autumn for a possible conflict, given the recession of the Parthian threat.

<sup>35</sup> K. VON FRITZ, *Pompey's Policy before and after the Outbreak of the Civil War*, *TAPA* 73 (1942), p. 145-180.

<sup>36</sup> R. PARIBENI, *L'età di Cesare e di Augusto*, Bologna 1950, p. 137-142.

Leach subscribes to von Fritz's theory that Pompey realised before the end of 50 that if Caesar invaded Italy it had to be abandoned, and then Caesar could be trapped between Spain and the East. The Catonians, on the other hand, wanted to hold northern Italy: so invasion was considered. At the same time Pompey «probably did not anticipate the immediate invasion by Caesar»<sup>37</sup>.

The most extensive biography of Pompey is by Peter Greenhulgh in two volumes; it is the second (1981) which deals with this question. His natural predecessor is von Fritz, but the impressionistic system of documentation is disastrous. It must be stated at the outset that Greenhulgh believes Caesar's command expired on 1 March 50. He quotes at length Plutarch on Pompey's illness, without taking up the biographer's judgement. Pompey gave Caesar a last chance by offering joint disarmament in summer (App. II 28). «Pompey still believed that Caesar would back down if treated with sufficient firmness», but if war came, it was one which Pompey «was entirely confident of winning». He could not levy troops, however, until commissioned by Marcellus. Then began his «active preparations», and Pompey looked forward to turning the political battle into a military one «which he could lead from the front». The SCU was the ultimatum which he desired. The fact that Cicero so completely misunderstood Pompey's strategy is the proof of the latter's skill: «its success (*sic*) depended on its being disguised as long as possible». One moment Greenhulgh writes of Pompey's «belief that Caesar's troops would not follow him», the next that he did not take that seriously. As for the legions in Italy «two were of doubtful loyalty» — but von Fritz had already shattered that myth — «and one had not seen action».

Then comes the leap of faith: «Pompey had hoped that Caesar would have waited to concentrate his legions from beyond the Alps, but he was hardly surprised (*sic*) that Caesar was invading at once». That is contradicted by every shred of evidence which we have. Furthermore, Pompey's whole strategy was useless when he was not granted the supreme command. It would seem not genius but the most selfish irresponsibility to leave Italy bereft of defence in order to satisfy his own vanity.

All, however, was not lost. Despite Caesar's *fulgor* «it would be fatal to march south through Umbria only to find a government force speeding northward through Etruria, along the via Cassia». Greenhulgh is hoist on his own petard: Caesar could have been blocked! Presumably all contemporaries could see as much.

<sup>37</sup> J. LEACH, *Pompey the Great*, London 1978, p. 165f.

Perhaps the removal of the senate from Rome was the master stroke, preventing the legalisation of Caesar's coup. There is no sign that he was in the least impeded — to the contrary.

Once again we must ask what is the evidence for Pompey's master strategy? That the two legions must have been transferred from Capua to Apulia at the end of 50 for Pompey to find them there in January 49 (Cic., *Att.* VII 12.2; Caes., *BC* I 14). If that is so, how could his strategy not be evident to everyone until February — with disastrous exceptions such as Domitius, of course. The most desperate of all Greenhault's arguments is the second proof: all the money left in the treasury, to disguise Pompey's true strategy!<sup>38</sup>

#### CAESAR COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT INVADE ITALY

One of the earliest proponents of this view was another of the earliest biographers of Caesar, Stefano Schiappalaria (1587): «ne pensarono mai gli avversarii suoi, ch' ei si dovesse porre con si deboli forze a si difficile impresa». Pompey, besides, believed those troops unreliable; he had ten legions, and was set to raise another 130,000 men<sup>39</sup>.

The same view was propounded by Samuel Broé (Citri de la Gnette), the French historian who as early as 1681 wrote a specialist monograph on the Triumvirates. Caesar's advance was quite unforeseen. Pompey's belief in the disaffection of Caesar's troops did not make Pompey unprepared, but rather made him abandon all thought of compromise, and Cato promised to make Caesar accountable. When Pompey was armed by Marcellus, everyone took up arms in Rome<sup>40</sup>.

The two French Jesuits François Catrou and Pierre Julien Rouillé noted Caesar's organisational skills in using Cisalpine Gaul to give him a presence in Italy. The fundamental matter, however, was that the senate could not believe that Caesar would move and so they prepared as if dealing with a Catiline<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> P. GREENHAULT, *Pompey the Republican Prince*, London 1981, pp.114-160.

<sup>39</sup> S. SCHIAPPALARIA, *Vita di C. Giulio Cesare*, Antwerp 1578, p. 192, 199. Stefano Schiappalaria, born at Vezzano, was a soldier and writer, baron of the court of Charles V, of whom he wrote eulogies, as well as translator of Vergil for Plantin.

<sup>40</sup> S. BROÉ, *Histoire du Premier Triumvirat*, Paris 1681, p. 102, 108, 114.

<sup>41</sup> F. CATROU – P. ROUILLÉ, *Histoire romaine*, 20 vols, Paris 1725-1737, XVI, p. 513-519.

It seems quite a time before another historian adopted this approach, and that somewhat contradictorily. Charles Merivale, Dean of Ely, had the individual idea that Pompey had facilitated Caesar's election to a second consulship «in order to withdraw him from his Gallic legions», and he stressed the constant attempts by his enemies to have him recalled. That did not happen, so Marcellus appointed Pompey commander in Italy. Caesar promised «to come in person to Rome, to avenge his own and his country's injuries». Then comes the sudden switch: «neither the government nor their chief had expected so bold a movement» as the crossing of the Rubicon<sup>42</sup>.

Perhaps the classic biographer of Caesar in the twentieth century, Matthias Gelzer, who was professor at Frankfurt when it appeared (1949), suggested that for civil war to be averted, either Pompey or Caesar would have to go to Parthia! Gelzer seemed unaware that Napoleon III a century earlier had seen through Marcellus' trumped up rumours, but Caesar would not dare invade Italy, so it was thought. In Gelzer's view his opponents thought that he would canvass for the consulship as a *privatus* (citing Cic., *Att.* VII 9 and Vell. II 49.4). That is not, in fact, what Cicero was talking about: candidature in person was one of *five* possibilities<sup>43</sup>.

Michael Grant in his biography (1969) similarly noted only that «the senate» (*sic*) calculated that no reinforcements could reach him for a fortnight, and they expected him to wait for these<sup>44</sup>.

One of the most important discussions of this whole question is Kurt Raaflaub's *Dignitatis contentio* (1974). Caesar avoided all threats and sent his legions to winter quarters, keeping only one legion in Cisalpine Gaul, even continuing to send peace offers (Cic., *Att.* VII 4.2). In sum, there were «many indications» that Caesar was not «in the least» thinking of attack. Pompey, on the other hand, was overcome by the demonstrations during and after his illness (Cic., *Att.* VIII 16.1, IX 5.3; Vell. II 48.2; Plut., *Pomp.* 57; Dio XLI 6.3) and rumours of disaffection in Gaul (Caes., *BC* I 6.2; Plut., *Pomp.* 57.3; App. II 30), although one must ask whether he believed them (the sources certainly imply that he did). Pompey believed that his preparations would induce Caesar to desist (*Att.* VII 8.4) and that there was plenty of time (Caes., *BC* I 6., App. II 34). To the contrary, the levies were too late (Cic., *Fam.* XVI 11.3); one contrasts the realism of Curio and Cicero about the coming war (*Fam.* VIII 14.3, *Att.* VII 3.5, 7.6).

<sup>42</sup> C. MERIVALE, *History of Rome* (1875), London 1911, p. 334, 337-340, 344.

<sup>43</sup> M. GELZER, *Caesar*, trans. Needham, Oxford 1968, p. 177, 182, 196, 190.

<sup>44</sup> M. GRANT, *Julius Caesar*, London 1969, p. 157.

Raaflaub settles one important question: there was no doubt about Caesar's strength and preparedness (*Att.* VII 3.5, 6.2, 7.6, all from December 50) — and that included Pompey.

Ultimately, however, far more important than Pompey's influence were the calculations of the Optimates. They were sure that Caesar would not invade, were convinced that a second consulship of his would be a disaster, but also believed that they could force him to surrender!<sup>45</sup>

#### CAESAR WAS CAUGHT OUT

Perhaps the most individual of all interpretations is that of an early English biographer of Caesar, William Warde Fowler of Lincoln College (1891). By late 51 «the political current was... setting strongly towards civil war» and Caesar was being «driven to desperate action»: he was «politically almost defenceless but with an apparently irresistible army». Pompey, on the other hand, was «master of Italy», for the senate had allowed him to raise an army. Then comes the bolt from the blue: «Caesar had made no preparations for such a contingency as a declaration of war»<sup>46</sup>. Rarely has anyone so unprepared for an examination passed with such flying colours, especially if Pompey was «master of Italy».

To this same school apparently belongs one of the most original and underestimated historians of the Republic, Guglielmo Ferrero, later to be professor of modern history in Geneva and a refugee from Fascism. He stressed Caesar's attempts at reconciliation, handing over the two legions for the Parthian war and instructing Curio to abandon his opposition to Pompey (*Cic., Fam.* VIII 14.2). «So far was he from believing in the possibility of a civil war that he only brought to Italy a single legion to garrison the Cisalpine province», and it was believed that he would not risk an uprising in Gaul by withdrawing further legions. It was Pompey who precipitated the war by taking command at Luceria in December 50 (*Att.* VII 5.4). At the end of December Curio urged Caesar to march on Italy but he declined; he did, however, call the 8th and 12th legions. «The common opinion was that he would never dare to leave Gaul behind him and break into Italy, but would prefer to remain on the defensive in the valley of the Po»<sup>47</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> K. RAAFLAUB, *Dignitatis contentio*, Munich 1974, p. 35f.

<sup>46</sup> W.W. FOWLER, *Julius Caesar*, London 1891, p. 253, 258.

<sup>47</sup> G. FERRERO, *Greatness and Decline of Rome* (1902-1907), 5 vols, London 1909, II, p. 199-220.

Here it seems should also be placed Alfred Heuss, professor in many German universities from 1938, who in his *Roman history* (1960) emphasised that Caesar considered peace better than war for himself, hence his endless offers of compromise. Although in Heuss' view, the aristocracy by its decisiveness and ability controlled politics and was able to target Caesar's most vulnerable points, his conciliatory position finally forced his enemies to abandon constitutional law and have Marcellus invest Pompey<sup>48</sup>.

#### NEITHER SIDE WAS WELL PREPARED

Frank Burr Marsh, who taught at Texas, wrote in the aftermath of the First World War (1927). His basic statement is that neither side was prepared. Pompey had «misjudged the whole situation» in believing Caesar's army was disloyal, that he could not leave Gaul undefended, that he could be crushed between Spain and Italy, and that the Italians were not on his side. That is somewhat undercut by the statement that by December 50 Pompey was «fully committed to the side of war» (Cic., *Att.* VII 8) and that he had considered the possibility of Caesar's capturing Rome and had prepared for it! (VII 9.2: no, that was Cicero.) Caesar's lack of preparation is taken to be obvious.

Marsh used those same arguments a little later in his *Roman history* (1935). The major addition was the straightout assertion that Pompey was taken by surprise, although he must have foreseen that Caesar might have a large enough army in Cisalpine Gaul to invade Italy (sic): who else would have thought one legion sufficient? Marsh himself immediately before stated that Pompey believed that Caesar would have to wait for his legions to cross the Alps<sup>49</sup>.

#### THE SOURCES

Confronted with this array of contradictory views based on very selective use of sources, it is time to conduct a more systematic investigation of them on which to base the best possible reconstruction.

<sup>48</sup> A. HEUSS, *Römische Geschichte*, Braunschweig 1960, 4th ed. 1976, p. 204f.

<sup>49</sup> F. MARSH, *The Founding of the Roman Empire*, Oxford 1927, p. 141; *The Roman World*, London 1935, p. 229-231.

The only source which may be thought to give an account without hindsight is Cicero. As early as July 51 he reported that he knew from Pompey that he was «prepared for any eventuality» (*Fam.* II 8.2). In April 50 Pompey was moving that Caesar leave Gaul on 13 November. Caelius Rufus was already sure that Caesar would defend the tribunician veto if Curio were «suppressed»; otherwise he would stay in his province «as long as he liked» (*Fam.* VIII 11). By early August Curio was talking of war in the violent public dispute between Pompey and Caesar over the latter's right to stand for the consulship *in absentia*; he could not see peace lasting another year (*Fam.* VIII 14.2). At the beginning of October, since Caesar was insistent on not giving up his army, Pompey was said to be thinking of leaving Rome (*Att.* VI 8.2). Atticus told Cicero that Caesar was taking four legions to Placentia (on the Trebia in Cisalpine Gaul), 15 October (VI 9.5). (It seems, as Shackleton-Bailey suggested, that Caesar had rather ordered his legions to assemble for review at Nemetocenna, now Arras, in Gallia Belgica<sup>50</sup>.) From Athens in the same month Cicero foresaw the «greatest struggle» (*tanta dimicatio, summa contentio*), the «arbitration of war» (*castris res geretur*), but before that the attempt to prevent Caesar's candidature *in absentia* and also to make him relinquish his army (VII 1.2-4). On 7 December Pompey left for Campania for recruiting (VII 5.4). By 9 December Cicero was speaking more hopefully of the possibility of a peaceful settlement (*concordia*) as an alternative to the victory of the *boni* (VII 3.2), although he characterised Caesar as a man «who fears nothing and is ready for anything» (*audacissimo paratissimoque*). Everyone was «moving heaven and earth» to avoid war (VII 3.5). On 10 December Pompey told Cicero that war was *certain*, but the latter believed that if Caesar were given a second consulship, he would not risk everything (VII 4.2-3). Nine days later Cicero declared that the alternatives were a fight (*depugnandum*) or allowing Caesar's candidature (VII 7.6). On 25 December Cicero again met Pompey who revealed that *there was not even a desire for pacification. Preparations against Caesar were proceeding energetically* according to Pompey, and Caesar was expected to forego the consulship and retain his army and province. Were Caesar to «go mad», Pompey was contemptuous of him and confident of the opposing forces, but a speech of Antony on 21 December had contained *threats of armed force* (VII 8.4-5). Two

<sup>50</sup> D. SHACKLETON-BAILEY, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, 6 vols, Cambridge 1965-1967, III, p. 277.



days later Cicero set out the logical possibilities to Atticus: Caesar's candidature *in absentia*, candidature in person, elections without Caesar, Caesar's resort to tribunician veto, and finally *Caesar's resort to arms*. It was the fifth and last possibility on which he then expatiated: war at once or at the elections, or on the pretext of rejection of his candidature or threats to the tribunes. Cicero could not understand why Caesar did not relinquish his command and become consul! He revealed, however, that it was the idea of Caesar as consul again which some found terrifying. He concluded by seemingly quoting Caesar: «You must fight if you do not give me what I want» (VII 9.2-5).

On 12 January Cicero informed Tiro that the tribunes had joined Caesar after the passing of the SCU. He was ready to strike and Pompey was finally afraid of him and making preparations, dividing Italy into commands (*Fam.* XVI 11). On the very night previous Caesar had, of course, crossed the Rubicon. At the end of January Cicero described Pompey as hopeless, «in utter panic and confusion», relying on the two Parthian legions (*Att.* VII 13.1-2). And Caesar was offering variations on his previous terms: Pompey was to go to Spain, Caesar to hand over Gaul and come to Rome to stand for consul. Gaul, Cicero stated, was disaffected while Spain was held by six legions (*Fam.* XVI 12). Pompey wrote to Cicero that in «two days» he would have a strong army and planned a springboard back to Rome in Picenum. It is revealed that it was none other than Labienus who was assuring him now of the weakness of Caesar's legions (*Att.* VII 16.2)!

By the beginning of February all was lost: useless consuls, no recruitment, no volunteers, and as for Pompey «no courage, no plan, no forces, no energy» (VII 21.1).

From the surviving letters of Cicero and various correspondents we obtain a number of very clear impressions of people's thoughts in the year leading up to the outbreak of war. Caesar would use constitutional pretexts. War was generally regarded as inevitable, although many worked hard to avoid it. Caesar was fearless and prepared. Pompey was recruiting by December and confident. The remaining accounts may be treated shortly in historical order.

Hirtius' continuation of the *Gallic Wars* (book VIII) offers a variety of notes. There were no operations in Gaul in 50, because Caesar wanted the war finished before he left the province (VIII 48). Early in 50 he went to Italy to campaign for Antony's augurship and also for his own consulship (obviously for 48). Then he returned to Nemetocenna to review the

legions. In the middle of the year the Parthian legions were requested. Then Caesar saw to winter quarters: three legions with him in Belgica, three with the Aedui (VIII 54).

As for Caesar himself, early in January 49 he recorded Marcellus' statement that armies needed to be enrolled before the senate could vote freely (BC I 2). Following the SCU Pompey claimed to have ten legions ready, while Caesar's troops would neither defend nor follow him (I 6), but the levy was still to be held in Italy.

Velleius adds little. The first sparks of civil war were kindled not long after Milo's trial (April 52). Curio was most responsible. Pompey accepted Caesar's «very fair terms», but agreement was blocked by the tribune. This is contradicted in the next chapter by saying that Pompey rejected the terms (II 48-9).

Suetonius' biography of Caesar seems to add nothing to the present investigation, but Plutarch is a major source. In his life of Pompey he emphasised his illness at Naples in mid 50 and the way the tremendous outpouring of affection in Italy was said to be a major cause of the war, producing arrogance and unlimited confidence and neglect of preparations. Then comes the story of the reported unreliability of Caesar's legions, peddled by Appius (57). Following Curio's motion of joint disarmament (58) Marcellus announced ten legions crossing the Alps and commissioned Pompey (59; much less detail in *Caes.* 29-33).

Appian asserted that Caesar's term in Gaul was expiring by 50 (II 27). Those sent by Pompey to Caesar to bring back the Parthian legions reported that Caesar's troops were exhausted and ready to change sides; these men were either ignorant or bribed, but they tricked Pompey into making no preparations (30). In early December Marcellus armed Pompey to march against Caesar and he began conscription (31). Curio came to Caesar at Ravenna, urging him to march, but Caesar negotiated; in a letter taken to Rome on 1 January 49, however, he threatened to «come quickly» to avenge himself. This was regarded as a declaration of war. War was declared, but the senate thought Caesar's forces were too small to rush from Gaul; Pompey was to raise 130,000 Italians (34), but Favonius jeered at his earlier assurance about stamping his foot (37). In sum, Pompey began preparations late; Caesar's bellicosity is clear, but his threats were not taken seriously.

Finally Dio. Caesar's term was «about to expire» in 50, and the wars in Gaul were complete (XL 44, 59); compare, in 51 Marcellus moved to recall him, but his colleague Sulpicius resisted because Caesar was «in the middle of his term» (59). By 50, however, Caesar was determined to

stay in office and was collecting soldiers, money and arms (60). «Near the end of the year» Marcellus invested Pompey to protect Rome with two legions (64). Caesar crossed the Rubicon (XLI 4), but Pompey had not yet prepared adequate forces and saw that his own supporters did not want war. He sent peace envoys and the senate was conciliatory (5). He then went to Campania, but Greece was known as his true destination (7); compare, he decided to leave when Corfinium was besieged (10). He could not go to Spain because Caesar held Gaul! In sum, Caesar was well prepared, Pompey not. Corfinium was the turning point.

#### CONCLUSION

Many moderns from the early eighteenth century have stressed that the civil war seemed inevitable. That was one thing of which contemporaries were certain: as early as 51 (Cic., *Fam.* IV 3.1), by April 50 when it became clear that Caesar would defend the tribunes' rights (VIII 11.3) and by December 50 Pompey was convinced (*Att.* VII 4.2, 8.4, 9.3); most telling of all were Antony's speech of 21 December (VII 8.5) and Caesar's ultimatum 1 January 49 (App. I 32).

What, then, are we to make of Caesar's peace efforts (stressed by Ferrero, Havell, Rice Holmes, Syme and Raaflaub)? Crevier (1738) and Levesque (1806) had already denounced him as having no desire for peace. The rumours of his advance as early as December 50 were convincingly explained by Napoleon III (1865) as concocted by Marcellus. It was Rice Holmes who also stressed Caesar's sending his troops into winter quarters, but it was Adcock (1932), followed by Carcopino and Paribeni, who revealed the vital point that for two more legions to meet Caesar as early as February 49 they must have been summoned to Italy in December 50.

The question is whether anyone at the time took Caesar's peace offers seriously. Proposing joint disarmament may have won an overwhelming vote of support in the senate (370-20), but such an outcome was hardly likely. Those who knew Caesar would hardly have been able to imagine him reduced to one province and one legion! The purpose of those offers was yet another propaganda coup for Caesar: he could pose as the man of moderation, compromise and peace.

Moderns have equally stated that Pompey wanted war (Napoleon, Rice Holmes, Paribeni); he had been preparing since 51 (Hooke) and began conscription in late 50 (Sihler, Marsh).

Who, then, caused the war? Definite statements by moderns are not common, but Pompey has sometimes been indicted, in his desire to be the saviour of Rome (Levesque 1806), and by his taking command in December 50 (Ferrero). More recent analysis has more commonly blamed the Optimates, beginning with the classic judgement of Syme (followed by Raaflaub, Gruen and Millar).

Since war was inevitable and both sides were determined on it, it is extraordinary that the vast majority of moderns have seen Pompey tricked into inaction or being incompetent (Goltz 1563, Dupleix 1638, Clarke 1665, Vertot 1719, Crevier 1738, Goldsmith 1769, Hereford 1792, Levesque 1806, Niebuhr in the early nineteenth century, Long 1864, Froude 1907, Heitland 1909, Howell 1914, Carcopino 1935, Syme 1939, Raaflaub 1974). What exactly gulled him? There is one major matter which is constantly referred to: the statement that Caesar's troops were unreliable. This must rank as one of the most amazing successes in the history of misleading wartime propaganda. It is also something which no one thinks about.

The story is found only in late sources, Appian and more especially Plutarch. Appian smelled a rat: the source of the report was either ignorant or bribed. It is only Plutarch who identifies this source: Appius, who brought back the Parthian legions. This is, in fact, Appius Claudius, consul 34, nephew of the consul 54. He was certainly a Caesarian by 38; otherwise we know only of his political flexibility<sup>51</sup>. There is only one possible explanation: that he spread this story under Caesar's influence — for no one who had been to Gaul could for a second have doubted the legions' attitude to Caesar, but to his fanatical enemies in Rome any cock and bull story confirmed their wildest prejudices. The paradox is that, *in total contradiction*, be it noted, the two Parthian legions were claimed to be devoted to Caesar! Von Fritz destroyed that myth and proved that Pompey in this case knew better.

<sup>51</sup> Virtually nothing is known of him between 50 and 38 save that he may have been at Pharsalos. *RE* III, col. 2853, no.298 (Münzer). We must also confront the apparent agreement of Labienus. Syme was inclined to take this seriously: Labienus had «a low estimate of Caesar's military strength». The evidence is, however, slight: Labienus, who joined Pompey only on the outbreak of war, in any case, «did not doubt the weakness of Caesar's forces» (*non dubitantem de imbellicitate Caesaris copiarum*, Cic., *Att.* VII 16.2, 38 Jan. 49). The perhaps more famous reference (Caes., *BC* III 87) is, in fact, an ironic prelude to the battle of Pharsalos. Within half a dozen chapters the Pompeians are routed by these inferior troops. And Syme himself explained it all: He had fallen out with Pompey and had «an overweening sense of his own merits and importance» (R. SYME, *The Alliance of Labienus*, *JRS* 28, 1938, p. 113-125, see p. 114, 115).

The second influence on Pompey was first noted by Crevier (1738) and has been emphasised by more recent biographers of Pompey (Leach, Seager, and also Raaflaub): the tremendous false confidence Pompey felt in the responses to his recovery from illness in mid 50, which Plutarch had stressed.

Thirdly, Pompey's unpreparedness cannot, of course, be considered apart from Caesar's ability to strike. Pompey could only be so slack if he thought that Caesar could not or would not invade. Many must have thought that Caesar could not remove legions from Gaul for security reasons (Niebuhr, Ferrero). If it was a matter of time, how long did Caesar have to wait, given the season? Until spring (Ferguson 1783), two-three months (Arnold 1849), a fortnight (Grant 1969). Perhaps this calculation would have given Pompey time to organise the resistance. What hardly anyone notices, however, is what every schoolboy used to know, that the Roman calendar was seriously awry, so that the date was not early January but late November. This was certainly not mid winter as most seem to assume and Hereford actually stated, nor «early in the year» (Seager)<sup>52</sup>.

Before summarising the central question of strategies, we must be sure about resources: what were the respective strengths of each side? Dupleix (1638) stated that Pompey had only two legions, and Domitius only 4,000 men. Mommsen, to the contrary, not surprisingly, in order to heighten Caesar's victory, exaggerated Pompey's overwhelming superiority: control of all the seas, of all provinces except the Gauls, of all the eastern client states, and backed by nine legions (7 in Spain, 2 in Italy). Meyer stated simply that both Pompey and Caesar had ten legions. It was, however, the stunning insight of Dupleix (1638) alone that even if the forces were theoretically equal, Caesar had led his legions in person for a decade, Pompey had never even seen his!

If the two Parthian legions were all that Pompey had at the end of 50 in Italy, he set about a vigorous recruitment campaign, as can be demonstrated by the following figures. By mid January Pompey and the consuls were at Capua and his forces were as follows (Caes., *BC* I 12): five cohorts at Iguvium under Thermus, an unspecified force at Auximum under Varus; levies at Capua (I 15) then produced ten cohorts at Asculum under Spinther, six cohorts at Camerinum under Hirrus, twenty cohorts at Corfinium under Ahenobarbus, and seven cohorts at Sulmo

<sup>52</sup> Prof. Beryl Rawson kindly assures me that the north Adriatic towns early in winter are fiercely cold.

under Lucretius (I 18). These forces were all posted down the eastern side of Italy. That was because, as Meyer alone indicated, that was where an advance by Caesar, if it were to eventuate, might be expected. There were also six cohorts at Alba with Manlius and three at Terracina with Rutilius Lupus (I 24). These constitute more than 54 cohorts, along with the Parthian legions (moved from Capua to Apulia in December 50), a total of more than *seven* legions! Well might Warde Fowler claim that Pompey was master of Italy — had he had the will.

Pompey is sometimes thought to have had a strategy: to hold Caesar up in Italy and then to defeat him with the Spanish legions (Hooke 1738, Ferguson 1783, and Hereford 1792) — an interesting trio of 18th century English historians. The crucial question is whether Caesar could have been blocked in Italy. The only modern to have considered this question seems to have been Greenhough, who admitted the possibility. Most historians, of course, consider the question of Pompey's strategy after Caesar's invasion, in other words *post eventum*, when it was clear to Pompey that Italy was lost: he was to draw Caesar to the East and have the Spanish legions occupy Italy (Carcopino 1935) or to crush him between Spain and Italy (Marsh 1927).

Spain and the great Pompeian army there obviously loom large in moderns' calculations. What is the reality? Caesar came to Spain, supposed nodal point of Pompey's strategy, in June 49, with astounding calmness, having failed, it must be admitted, to pin Pompey down in Italy. «In a campaign of forty days the best army controlled by the enemy had been put out of action»<sup>53</sup>. These legions had not made a move. If Spain was one of the jaws of a pincer, it was remarkably toothless.

As we have seen, however, there are those who wish to go much further and claim that Pompey was prepared for Caesar's boldness all along, and ready with an equally bold, indeed even higher risk strategy. This was first floated by Meyer (1918): Pompey was to go East and catch Caesar between Spain and Greece, but it was von Fritz in 1942 who most forcefully argued the case that Pompey was prepared all along to abandon Italy. Many other historians apparently in this category, however, have not revealed Pompey's strategy: he was simply ready for all emergencies (Rice Holmes 1923), ready by 50 with two legions at Capua (Paribeni 1950), realising by the end of 50 that Italy had to be abandoned (Leach

<sup>53</sup> M. GELZER, *Caesar*, p. 217: see *Caes.*, *BC* I 37-87, App., *BC* II 42-43.

1978), or simply making active preparations from December 50 (Greenhaugh 1981).

There are two matters vital to evaluating whether Pompey always planned to evacuate Italy, especially leaving Rome to Caesar. First, the treasury, mentioned only by Greenhaugh. Pompey left all the state funds in Rome to fall into Caesar's hands, but Greenhaugh was so desperate as to claim that this was all part of the brilliance of Pompey's planning!

More fundamental, however, for its more serious repercussions, is the other proof for Greenhaugh of that strategy, the removal of 'the senate' from Rome. Caesar would thus be left without a body to legalise his seizure of the capital. Once again, let reality intervene. Caesar first visited Rome for a few days in early April 49 (Caes., *BC* I 32-33). Many senators remained, but as neutrals outside the city. There were only two consulars present in the senate but it was legally summoned. Caesar then returned for eleven days in December (Caes., *BC*. III 1-2): he was now «lawful dictator»<sup>54</sup>. It was, in fact, the Pompeians who were in trouble by being removed from Rome by 48 (Dio XLI 43). The matter is anything but trivial. Note the struggle over the location of the senate during the Cinnan government and Sulla's absence, and the same controversy in the vital year of Actium<sup>55</sup>.

Would it be too wicked to suggest that the attempt to claim that Pompey all along planned quite rationally to abandon Italy is not only obviously in accordance with his own estimate of himself as always the master strategist since his twenties, but also to conceal one of the shabbiest actions in his military career, the betrayal of Ahenobarbus?

#### CAESAR'S OPTIONS

Recalling the famous observations of England's leading philosopher of history, Robin Collingwood, we must try to put ourselves in Caesar's place and enumerate the possible courses of action for him by December 50–January 49 (unadjusted chronology: in reality October–November 50). The closest we come to this in the contemporary sources is Cic., *Att.* VII 9. The only modern known to me to have considered any such options is the

<sup>54</sup> M. GELZER, *Caesar*, p. 204f.

<sup>55</sup> E. BADIAN, *Waiting for Sulla*, *JRS* 52 (1962), p. 47-61; R.T. RIDLEY, *The Emperor's Retrospect*, Leuven 2003, p. 150f.



thoughtful Guglielmo Ferrero: Caesar might remain on the defensive in northern Italy. There are really only four possibilities:

1. Stay in Cisalpine Gaul — but that would not be very useful.
2. Retreat to Transalpine Gaul, to the safety of his legions, and wait for his enemies to find him, but that was neither brave nor advancing the problem any nearer a solution.
3. Invade Spain, to deal with the legions on which Pompey obviously placed such great reliance — but that would also be avoiding the central issue and leaving his enemies in control of Italy and the capital. Perhaps it would also be wasting time on a problem which could wait.
4. Invade Italy: this was the vital nerve centre, the possession of which conferred legitimacy and gave access to treasures, and which, being the boldest step, was likely to succeed by sheer surprise. This does admittedly involve a paradox: it was the move which was surely most attractive to Caesar, if we know anything about his personality; his contemporaries must surely have been able to make the same calculation!

There are other theoretical possibilities, namely crossing to Africa or attempting to move to the East, but in truth at this point they had no purpose and were probably in practice impossible.

In sum, most people could see the war coming. Pompey and Caesar were equally determined to defend their supremacy. Pompey believed that his power was overwhelming. He had in fact put more than sufficient troops into place in Italy (7 legions) to protect it from invasion. He also thought that he had plenty of time (months) to prepare for a spring campaign. Caesar could not — many thought — risk denuding Gaul of troops even then. How could Pompey or his Optimate backers have thought for a second that Caesar would move on Rome at the beginning of winter with one legion and that the Italian garrisons would fall like a pack of cards to him? Perhaps in a nightmare they may have imagined it — but history is full of nightmares which have come true.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> May I take this opportunity of recording my gratitude to valued colleagues in Leuven who invited me to give this paper at a seminar there in 2002.

## CHILDREN AND ACCIDENTS IN ROMAN ANTIQUITY\*

Ag, sy het nie gesterwe,  
Maar sy was somar dood

### 1. INTRODUCTION

«She did not die, she was just dead». With these brief and sober words, the South African poet Totius (J.D. du Toit, 1877-1953) lamented the loss of his little daughter Wilhelmina. Not only her young age, but also the cruel turn of fate and the abruptness of her death are deeply mourned. On New Year's Eve, whilst trying to close a window, she was struck dead by lightning<sup>1</sup>.

About AD 350 we find the Roman poet Ausonius lamenting the loss of his grandson Pastor:

- (1) Tu quoque maturos, puer immature, dolores  
interrupisti luctus acerbus avi,  
Pastor, care nepos, spes cuius certa fuisses  
(...)
- (5) Nomen, quod casus dederat (quia fistula primum  
pastorale melos concinuit genito),  
sero intellectum vitae brevis argumentum:  
spiritus adflatis quod fugit e calamis.  
Occidis emissae percussus pondere testae,
- (10) abiecit tecto quam manus artificis.  
Non fuit artificis manus haec: manus illa cruenti  
Certa fuit fati suppositura reum.

You also, lad of unripe years, have broken this sequence of laments for riper age, Pastor, my beloved grandson, filling with bitter grief your grandfather, whose sure hope you would have been (...). Your name, which chance had given you (because just when you were born a pipe sounded some pastoral air), too late was understood to be a symbol of

\* I owe many thanks to prof. Toon Van Houdt (Leuven) for valuable suggestions, and to Hugo Coomans and Ingrid Sperber, who corrected my English text. References to the apocrypha were kindly supplied by prof. Rita Beyers (Antwerpen). Prof. Willy Clarysse (Leuven) helped me for the papyrological side of the topic.

<sup>1</sup> T.T. CLOETE, *Vyftig gedigte van Totius*, Cape Town 1980, p. 28 (the poem is titled *Passieblome*). Compare vv. 3-4: «geen siekte en geen lijding, geen uur van voorbereiding» ('no illness, no suffering, no time to say goodbye').

your short life: because the breath soon passes from the pipes on which a shepherd blows. You perished stricken down by the weight of a cast tile, thrown from the roof by a workman's hand. No workman's hand was that: that hand of bloody Fate should surely have borne the blame.

(Ausonius, *Parentalia* 11, v. 1-3, 5-12;  
Loeb-translation by H.G.Evelyn White).

Children and accidents may seem a somewhat bizarre subject. Yet records of deaths caused by accident have turned out to be valuable sources for historical research. For medieval England, coroners' inquests are a unique source of information on the daily life of peasants, villagers and middle to lower classes in towns. When a person died violently or suddenly, by homicide, suicide or misadventure (accidental death), people were obliged by law to summon a county coroner to come and view the body. By their immediacy and freshness, recorded in the language of the jurors and witnesses soon after the case, these inquests read like vignettes of medieval life<sup>2</sup>. On the basis of about 4000 coroners' rolls and inquests concerning suspect deaths in medieval England, Barbara Hanawalt has been able to link certain types of accidents to specific ages of children. For instance, the rise of fatalities connected with field work among boys aged eight to twelve suggests that they began to take part in 'dangerous' outside labour at that age, whereas girls were kept in the vicinity of the parental home for safer tasks for a few more years. Sex differentiation already appears from age two to three: considerably more girls were involved in accidents playing with pots or cauldrons, whereas more boys met death in accidents outside the house. In addition, the author discovered patterns and practices in the rearing of young children (e.g. toddlers taking interest in the work of their parents), a field left unexplored by earlier historians of childhood like Ph. Ariès<sup>3</sup>. Other studies of medieval historians on the theme of children and accidents confirm Hanawalt's inquiries and shed light on risky places for little ones (reports were found concerning babies being suffocated in the nurse's bed or burned as they lay swaddled beside the hearth)<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> B.A. HANAWALT, *Childrearing among the Lower Classes of Late Medieval England*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8.1 (1977), p. 1-22, at p. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> B.A. HANAWALT, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 11-13 for tables concerning age and sex distribution, and p. 14-19 for different stages of childhood and typical accidents (with reference to E. ERIKSON's work on child development: *Childhood and Society*, London 1965, and *Identity, Youth and Crisis*, New York 1968).

<sup>4</sup> Medieval hagiographic sources are rich in records of accidents: R. FINUCANE, *The Rescue of the Innocents: Endangered Children in Medieval Miracles*, New York 1997;

## 2. AIM AND PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE

The excellent work carried out by medievalists has served mainly as a source of inspiration for this study. Unlike medievalists, ancient historians will never be able to draw up either a typology of age-related accidents for children or a survey of perilous places for young ones, simply because the number of attested cases from antiquity is insufficient for statistical conclusions which could point to certain tendencies concerning patterns in the rearing of young children, child labour or risky places for little ones. We never hear of a Roman swaddled baby being burned by the fire in the hearth, although we may imagine that such events did happen<sup>5</sup>.

We know, however, of inquiry measures taken in Roman Egypt in the case of suspect deaths which are similar to a coroners' inquest. A formal report to the *strategos* was needed, explaining how the body was found. The *strategos* appointed a public physician and an assistant. The official inspection of the corpse by the physician and his assistant was followed by the authorization of the assistant to proceed with the burial. Finally a medical report confirmed by the authority of both physician and assistant, certifying the facts of the case, was handed over to the authorities<sup>6</sup>.

E.C. GORDON, *Accidents among Medieval Children as seen from the Miracles of Six English Saints and Martyrs*, *Medical History* 35.2 (1991), p. 145-163; D. LETT, *Les lieux périlleux de l'enfance d'après quelques récits de miracles des XIIe-XIIIe siècles*, *Médiévales* 34 (1998), p. 113-125; P.-A. SIGAL, *Les accidents de la petite enfance à la fin du Moyen Âge d'après les récits de miracles*, in R. FOSSIER (ed.), *La petite enfance dans l'Europe médiévale et moderne, Actes des XVI<sup>e</sup> journées internationales d'histoire de l'Abbaye de Flaran, septembre 1994*, Toulouse 1997, p. 59-76. Recent work on medieval children still acknowledges Hanawalt's conclusions about links between age and specific types of accidents and kinds of labour: N. ORME, *Medieval Children*, New Haven-London 2001, p. 98-100.

<sup>5</sup> Early Christian hagiographical literature might yield new evidence. Compare the apocryph about Jesus' childhood (see n. 26). The eight-year-old Jesus heals his brother Jacob who was bitten by a snake: *Paidika tou Kuriou* 16 (the so called Childhood Gospel according to Thomas). See C. TISCHENDORF, *Evangelia Apocrypha adhibitis plurimis codicibus graecis et latinis maximam partem nunc primum consultis atque ineditorum copia insignibus*, Leipzig 1876, p. 110, 154-155, 178; S. VOICU, in F. BOVON – P. GEOLTRAIN – S.J. VOICU, *Apocrypha. Écrits apocryphes chrétiens*, Paris 1997, p. 203. For another accident concerning professional activities (a boy hurts his foot while carving wood but is healed by Jesus): *Evangelium Thomae Latinum* 8. See C. TISCHENDORF, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

<sup>6</sup> The procedure is explained by A.I. SPARKS, *A Report of Accidental Death*, *BASP* 8 (1971), p. 7-10. See also O. NANETTI, *Ricerche sui medici e sulla medicina nei papiri, Aegyptus* 21 (1941), p. 301-314, and M.H. MARGANNE-MELARD, *La médecine dans l'Égypte romaine: les sources et les méthodes*, in *ANRW II* 37.3 (1996), p. 2709-2740.

Despite these limitations imposed by the sources, I hope to tackle some new issues:

- (1) In this paper a first attempt will be made to offer a comprehensive collection of known accidents from Roman antiquity in which children were involved. Evidence will be drawn mainly from inscriptions, although papyrological and literary sources will be included in the discussion. Although this study is not the only one to deal with accidental death, it is to my knowledge the first to focus exclusively on children<sup>7</sup>. The collection I am about to present here will bring to light several new cases which have not been noted before.
- (2) On what I would call the factual level, I will shed some light on professional and other activities which formed part of Roman children's daily life.
- (3) The nature of our evidence will allow us to move to another level, to the discourse dealing with ancient preoccupations and anxieties — an aspect that calls for a specific approach which differs from the analysis in the Hanawalt study of administrative reports. Thus the analysis of funerary epigrams on deaths caused by accident will lead to a better understanding of the ancient perception of risk. Ancient dream-books and astrological treatises will be included in the discussion.
- (4) Finally an analysis of the role of children in the 'field of anxiety' which is constituted by sudden fatalities will add to our knowledge about ancient concepts of childhood. In my view, ancient society did not expect the death of a child in an accident to be a major concern to its parents. This rather bold conclusion will be explained by the demographic conditions of antiquity under which the death of a child was experienced not so much as premature, but rather as untimely. Of course, people knew that children ought not to die before their parents, but they were used to seeing such events happening in their own families or in their neighbourhoods, more than once in their lives<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> See already: H.-J. DREXHAGE, *Unfälle im römischen Ägypten, Anagenesis* 4 (1986), p. 17-24, and G. NACHTERGAEL, *Un aspect de l'environnement en Egypte gréco-romaine: les dangers de la circulation, Ludus Magistralis* 21 (1988), p. 19-54 (both concerned with papyrological sources and not specifically with children); A. GUNNELLA, *Morti improvise e violente nelle iscrizioni latine*, in F. HINARD – M-F. LAMBERT (eds.), *La mort au quotidien dans le monde romain. Actes du colloque organisé par l'université de Paris IV (Paris-Sorbonne 7-9 octobre 1993)*, Paris 1995, p. 9-22 (epigraphical material). R. LATTIMORE, *Themes in Greek and Roman Epitaphs*, Baltimore 1942, p. 144-145, also provides epigraphical examples of accidental death.

<sup>8</sup> This point is made clear in a lucid essay, which has been of crucial value for the argument of this article, by K. BRADLEY, *Images of Childhood. The Evidence of Plutarch*,

## 3. ACCIDENTS OCCURRING IN PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES OR EDUCATION

In this table, I have listed all sources which could point to some kind of labour or professional activity carried out by minors<sup>9</sup>.

Reference	Place of origin	Age	Cause of Death
1. <i>AP</i> 7, 632 = Vérilhac 89	(author: Diodorus)	2 y.	fall from a ladder
2. Vérilhac 93 = Peek 1625	Kamiroi	3 y.	buried by a bunch of stakes
3. Vérilhac 61 = Peek 874	Smyrna	11 y.	fall from a tree
4. <i>CLE</i> 1198	Lugdunum	14 y.	javelin in a gymnasium
5. Vérilhac 95 = Peek 1155	Arkesine	16 y.	javelin in a gymnasium
6. <i>AP</i> 7, 303 = Vérilhac 98	(author: Antipater of Sidon)	infant (ἔτι ζῶοντα γάλακτι)	sea
7. <i>CIL</i> III 8910	Salonae	1 y.	sea
8. Vérilhac 97 = Peek 741	Amorgus	5 y.	sea
9. Peek 1985 = <i>IG</i> III <sup>2</sup> 12315	Piraeus	8 y.	sea
10. <i>CLE</i> 826 = <i>CIL</i> III 1899	Salonae	11 y.	sea
11. Vérilhac 96 = Peek 1562	Sinope	15 y.	sea
12. Peek 1129	Erythrae	ἀρτίχρους	sea
13. <i>P. Oxy.</i> L 3555	Oxyrhynchus	θεραπαινίδιον	wounded by an ass
14. <i>P. Tebt.</i> III 1 7, col. 8, l. 17-28.	Berenikis Thes- mophorou (Fayoum)	παιδάριον	aggression with a stick
15. <i>AE</i> 1922, 48	Solentia (Dalmatia)	<i>aetatis primo ... flore</i>	struck by a horn of a cow

in S.B. POMEROY (ed.), *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and a Consolation to his Wife. English Translation, Commentary, Interpretative Essays and Bibliography*, New York–Oxford 1999, p. 183-196, esp. 183-184.

<sup>9</sup> Note the following abbreviations: *CLE* = F. BÜCHELER, *Carmina Latina Epigraphica*. Vol. I-III, Leipzig 1896-1926; Peek = W. PEEK, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, I. *Grab-Epigrammen*, Berlin 1955; Vérilhac = A-M. VÉRILHAC, *Paides Aoroi. Poésie funéraire*, Athenes 1978-1982.

Admittedly, the analytic character of most texts makes it difficult to conclude with certainty that professional activities were involved in the accident. It is not clear why the slave Korax (νηπιάρχου δμῶς, no. 1), only two years old, was standing on a ladder from which he fell and fractured his neck. We know for sure that Korax was a slave. Dionysus (no. 3), eleven years old and a child of many qualities, fell from a tree. Unfortunately we do not know whether his fall was connected with some kind of labour or simply with play. Plutus, son of Plutus and Antiochis (no. 2), was extremely young to be working as a vintager. The inscription provides us with an example of very young children involved in agricultural activities: at the age of three, the boy was buried under a bunch of stakes (?) while helping his parents to load a cart. Juridical texts exhibit other examples of accidents caused by the awkward loading of carts<sup>10</sup>. Another clear example of early agricultural activities is provided by no. 15 (see also n. 16). A young boy was struck while he was giving feed to the cows (v. 3-4: *perit percussus cornu, bubus dum pabula ponit*). He was already dead when his mother ran into the field to rescue him — in bitter grief the poor woman remarks that she now lost a son after the death of two little daughters.

Fatal accidents could also occur during sporting activities at the gymnasium<sup>11</sup>. The young Diotimus (no. 5) was hit by a javelin thrown by a «murderous hand». The severe injury, caused by the weapon piercing his side to the bone, is described in an emphatic way (v. 9-11), as is the deep grief caused by the boy's death (v. 16-19). The inscription also mentions how the wrongdoer disappeared in the «bottomless depths of the sea». It is possible that he committed suicide or was thrown into the water by an angry crowd. In the case of fourteen-year-old Myrra (no. 4), whose neck was transfixed by a javelin, the innocence of the perpetrator is explicitly stated (v. 8: *non inimica manus*).

The accidents confront us with ancient anxieties and worries. Fear of water and the sea certainly belongs in this area, the theme of shipwreck being frequent in Hellenistic epigrams and funerary inscriptions as well as

<sup>10</sup> Dig. IX 2.7.2 and 2.52.2. The exact meaning of the Greek word οἰνοθρόν which appears in the inscription is not clear.

<sup>11</sup> Legal texts often mention such fatalities: Dig. IX 2.7.4 and 2.9.4-2.9.10. See A. WACKE, *Incidenti nello sport e nel gioco in diritto romano e moderno*, Index 19 (1991), p. 359-378, and D. GOUREVITCH, *Il giovani pazienti de Galeno. Per una patocenosi dell'impero romano*, Bari 2001, p. 62-64, about youngsters, accidents and sports.



in Latin epigraphic poetry<sup>12</sup>. The baby crawling around the deck and being blown into the water by a sudden wind (no. 6) looks like a typical product of the somewhat morbid imagination that is displayed more than once in Greek epigrams. Closer to reality is inscription no. 8: an unfortunate mother said farewell to her five-year-old son Epanodus as he left on a sea voyage — apparently unattended by his mother. Neither the boy nor the father returned. Since pleasure trips were most unusual in antiquity, we may suspect a context of merchants travelling for professional reasons<sup>13</sup>.

Two papyrological sources merit further comment. No. 13 is both an accusation and a request for help written by an elderly widow, Thermouthion, and addressed to the *strategos* of Oxyrhynchus. Thermouthion lived with a little house-born slave, Peina (Greek for ‘pearl’), whom she had brought up as her own daughter. She hoped the child would offer her support and comfort in her old age<sup>14</sup>. On her way to a music lesson in town, the girl was knocked down by a donkey belonging to a man named Polydeuces<sup>15</sup>. The *paedagogus* brought her back home: her hand was crushed, she had bruises all over her body and had lost her ability to speak. Her injuries seemed impossible to heal. As the girl was not expected to survive, Thermouthion claimed she too had lost her future. Possibly things are presented in an overly negative way (a well-known procedure in complaints and requests for compensation), but the crucial and vital role of the little girl in the life of the lonely widow is clear. Another complaint is found in no. 14. On August 27 of the year 183 a father sent out his son Pnephros with three cows. A fight broke out when the latter encountered a certain Ptolemaios, who immediately became violent. He forcibly took the stick from the boy, and with the same stick drove the cattle into a canal, where one cow was devoured by a crocodile. In this case the accident concerns an animal, but the text also informs us that a boy could be entrusted with the care of cattle (a situation also mentioned by agricultural writers<sup>16</sup>) and reveals the brutality to which children could be subjected in a harsh agricultural world.

<sup>12</sup> E. GALLETIER, *Étude sur la poésie funéraire romaine d’après les inscriptions*, Paris 1922, p. 112, and A. GUNNELLA, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 20 n. 104, for many bibliographical references.

<sup>13</sup> Compare Galenus, *De sanitate tuenda* 1.8 (6.37–38 Kühn) about toddlers (aged three or four) on a ship.

<sup>14</sup> I. 7-9: ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι τοῦ ἡλικίας γενόμενον ἔχειν με γηροβοσκόν, γυναῖκα ἀβοήθητον οὖσαν καὶ μόνην.

<sup>15</sup> See *Dig.* IX 2.8 and 2.27.34 about accidents with animals.

<sup>16</sup> Varro, *RR* II 10.1.3 (*Ad maiores pecudes aetate superiores, ad minores etiam pueros... Itaque in saltibus licet videre iuventutem, et eam fere armatam, cum in fundis*

Literary sources provide further evidence. Two young boys who were cleaning the arena were killed when guards lost control over a lion which was normally tame and obedient (Martial, *Ep.* II 75). The link between children (presumably slaves valuable for their labour) and accidents is also confirmed in the Hippocratic treatise on *Epidemics* (5th century BC)<sup>17</sup>.

#### 4. OTHER ACCIDENTS

Fatalities which cannot be connected with professional activities or education are listed below. They offer us an insight into the daily life of children.

Reference	Place of origin	Age	Cause of Death
1. V�rilhac 88 = Peek 241 = TAM II 369	Xanthus	2 y.	fire
2. CLE 2119	Narbone	2 x 6 y.	fire
3. CLE 2126	Roma	15 y.	fire
4. V�rilhac 92 = Peek 1248	Rhodus	14 y.	falling stone

*non modo pueri sed etiam puellae pascant*). See also Columella, *RR* VI, pr. and *RR* VII 1. In both passages by Columella we may assume that children are meant, although Columella does not mention them explicitly: A. GONZALES, *A pueritia rusticis operibus educandus. Le travail des enfants   la campagne chez les agronomes latins*, in M.M. MYRO – J.M. CASILLAS – J. ALVAR – D. PLACIDO (eds.), *Las edades de la dependencia*, Madrid 2000, p. 239-254, esp. 247-248.

<sup>17</sup> A rough analysis of this treatise yields a total of 21 patients who are fairly certain to have been children by a strict definition (terminology is ambiguous since *pais* often refers to slaves and pediatric age-specific terms do not exist) in comparison with 40 patients with pregnancy-related problems and a total of 131 female patients. Some accidents involve children: a παιδίον gored by a boar (*Ep.* 5.39); a παῖς struck on the head with an ostrakon by another παῖς (4.11); a παῖς/ groom kicked by a horse (5.16); a κόρη fallen from a cliff (5.55); two παῖδες injured in falls (4.4 and 5.65); a κόρη poisoned by a mushroom (7.102); a twelve-year-old παιδίσκη hit on the head by a door (5.28). These cases suggest that doctors were more often involved in the care of older, pubescent children than of infants. Nancy Demand suggests that most of the patients were slaves, valuable for their role as workers in the adult world: «the focus of the Hippocratic doctor is clearly on those with, or approaching, adult status: working children and *parthenoi*» (p. 146) — one is tempted to compare with poor Thermouthion who lost her slave. See N. DEMAND, *Birth, Death, and Motherhood in Classical Greece*, Baltimore–London 1994, p. 141-147, for the Hippocratic evidence.

Reference	Place of origin	Age	Cause of Death
5. <i>CLE</i> 1060 = CIL III 2083	Salonae	11 y. (?)	falling tile
6. <i>TAM</i> 4, 1, 134	Nicomedia	5 y. and 4 y.	earthquake
7. Vérilhac 90	Amasia	7 y.	earthquake
8. Vérilhac 91 = Peek 1988 = <i>IG</i> XII 8, 92	Imbros	παῖς	collapsing house
9. Vérilhac 83 = Peek 738	Hermupolis Magna	7 y.	scorpion bite
10. Vérilhac 94 = Peek 1994 a	Parion	6 y.	horse
11. L. Robert in <i>Hellenica</i> X (1955), p. 280- 281 = Le Bas- Waddington 1745	Cavučköy	12 y (?)	horse
12. <i>CLE</i> 155 = CIL VI 22804	Roma	9 y.	run over
13. <i>CLE</i> 457 = CIL XI 4311	Interamna	9 y.	run over by a cart
14. <i>CLE</i> 1059	Ostia	<i>parvolus dum ludit</i>	run over by a cart
15. Vérilhac 100 = <i>AP</i> VII 170	(author: Posidippus or Callimachus)	3 y.	fall into a well
16. Vérilhac 101 = Peek 1159	Notion	3 y.	fall into a well
17. <i>P. Oxy.</i> III 475	Oxyrhynchus	8 y.	fall out of a window
18. <i>P. Oxy.</i> I 52	Oxyrhynchus	? (ἢ παῖς)	fall out of a house
19. <i>CLE</i> 1157 = CIL V 2417	Ferrarum	<i>parva... ossa</i>	fall into a pit
20. <i>P. Mich.</i> 230	Talei	?	fall from father's shoulder
21. <i>CIL</i> XI 7376 = <i>CLE</i> 1901	Volsini	puella	fall from a height
22. Peek 1350	Ilion	ἀρτιφυής	fall (after being pushed)
23. <i>AE</i> 1982, 984	Tipasa	<i>primis rapto annis</i>	fall from a height
24. <i>CLE</i> 842 = CIL VI 17876	Roma	1 y. (?)	drowning in a river

Reference	Place of origin	Age	Cause of Death
25. Peek 952 = <i>IG XIV 2067</i>	Roma	2 y.	drowning in a river
26. <i>AE</i> 1988, 117	Roma	7 y. 22 d.	fire <sup>18</sup>
27. <i>CIL</i> VI 29195	Roma	9 y.	drowning in a river
28. <i>CIL</i> III 3224	Emona	10 y.	drowning in a river
29. <i>CLE</i> 1643 = <i>CIL</i> IX 6318	Teatum Marrucinorum	3 y. 6 m.	drowning in a swimming pool
30. <i>CIL</i> VI 16740	Roma	8 y.	drowning in a swimming pool
31. <i>CLE</i> 1159 = <i>CIL</i> VI 29436	Roma	13 y.	suffocated by a crowd <sup>19</sup>
32. <i>CLE</i> 502 = <i>CIL</i> VI 14578	Roma	12 y.	suffocated by a crowd <sup>20</sup>
33. Peek in <i>EA</i> 2 (1983), p. 84; Merkelbach in <i>EA</i> 3 (1984), p. 38.	Smyrna	3 y.	choked on a grape or intoxicated by an overdose of wine <sup>21</sup>
34. Kaygusuz in <i>EA</i> 4 (1984), p. 72.	Kimistene	ἡίθεος	poisonous drink

This series provides some vivid and touching stories, illustrating conditions of life in antiquity. Unstable and shaky houses in crowded areas caused various accidents. People were killed by collapsing buildings or falling tiles, not to mention fires in wooden constructions or

<sup>18</sup> Possibly a high temperature is meant. See *AE*: «incredibili subitanea vi ignis = *crise d'erysipèle*».

<sup>19</sup> The event took place during the *Agon Capitolinus*: see E. COURTNEY, *Musa Lapidaria. A Selection of Latin Verse Inscriptions*, Atlanta 1995, p. 396 (referring to Herodian I 9.2).

<sup>20</sup> During the feast of 1 January: see E. COURTNEY, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

<sup>21</sup> *HPOINH* in l. 4 is read by Peek as ἡ ρ' οἰνῇ and could point to an overdose of wine. Merkelbach accepts the same reading but translates it as 'grape', claiming that the child choked. See Suetonius, *Claud.* 27, for a boy throwing up a pear and suffocating when trying to catch it in his mouth. Merkelbach sticks to his reading in his latest edition of the inscription: R. MERKELBACH – J. STAUBER, *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten I*, Leipzig–Stuttgart 1998, 05/01/58, referring to *Vita Sophoclis* 14 (the tragic poet dying of the same cause).

earthquake damage, especially in buildings which lacked safety and stability due to the greed of speculative builders<sup>22</sup>. Parents in antiquity were aware of the dangers wells held for their little ones: protective measures were taken to keep them away from such dangerous places<sup>23</sup>. Fatalities in swimming pools and rivers seem to have been frequent at all times, as well as the phenomenon of crowded streets and dangerous traffic<sup>24</sup>.

In a sober and touching way the texts call our attention to the tragic aspects of the human condition (the abnormality of a younger person dying before an older one) and the irony of fate.

Cleophon returned from a long journey. The same night his house collapsed. The only survivor, he alone lived on to mourn. All of a sudden he had lost his wife and his child, whom he had longed for during his absence (no. 8). A relief from ancient Nicomedia shows an adult in simple clothing standing between two apparently well-to-do children, protecting them with his arms. The inscription tells us that the slave-*paedagogus* Hermes was found together with his pupils in the heaps of rubble left by a massive earthquake. From the position of the bodies, it was clear that he had tried to protect the boys by embracing them. The grateful father had them buried together and explicitly honours his courageous slave with an inscription and a relief (no. 6). Equally tragic are the harsh contrast between innocent play and the unexpected death of a young boy in Ostia (no. 14) and the case of the nine-year-old who was probably run over when hurrying towards his elder brother (*nimum properans ad fratrem Philostercum suum*) (no. 12). Inscription no. 16 depicts the despair of a family noticing the absence of their little boy. Running into the garden, they hear the splash of his falling into the well. Although his uncle jumped into the well to rescue him, all help came too late for the unfortunate toddler<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Literary references to dangerous living conditions in ancient towns are collected in L. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, Leipzig 1922<sup>10</sup>, vol. I, p. 23-27.

<sup>23</sup> A. GUNNELLA, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 18 n. 80, for archaeological evidence of wells being barred. For a literary example of a child falling into a well: Marcus Diaconus, *Vita Porphyri Gazae* 80-83 (ed. Grégoire-Kugener).

<sup>24</sup> One may think of Theocritus, *Id.* XV 51-59 (two women nearly ran over by a horse in a crowded street; they are happy that their little child was not with them) or Suetonius, *Nero* 5 (Nero's father deliberately crushing a little boy with his span of horses in a little village near the Via Appia).

<sup>25</sup> B.A. HANAWALT, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 20-21, for adults risking their lives to save children in danger.

No. 20 is a complaint to the *strategos* by a man called Paponotos in the year 48. During a police inquiry after a theft of twelve beams from his house, five stolen beams were found in the home of a certain Patynion. In the scuffle which followed the discovery, a little boy, whom Paponotos was carrying on his shoulder, fell and suffered severe injury. In the Oxyrynchite village of Seneptha (AD 182), a slave boy Epaphroditus, aged eight, was leaning out of a window to have a better look at the castanet-dancers performing at the local festival. The fall from the window resulted in the boy's death<sup>26</sup>. The death of a young slave boy was reported to the *strategos* and was the subject of an official inquiry (no. 17).

It is possible that some other epigraphical or papyrological cases of death caused by accident have been overlooked. Inscriptions mention several persons dying on the same day. This suggests an accident<sup>27</sup>. The same goes for a set of inscriptions attesting to the sudden death of several persons in a village, possibly due to the collapse of a public building<sup>28</sup>.

## 5. ACCIDENTS AND OTHER CAUSES OF DEATH IN INSCRIPTIONS

Funerals in antiquity were much more of a public affair than they are nowadays. Funerary inscriptions, public documents *par excellence*, provided their readers with numerous details on the family, career, relations, social status, and age of the deceased, as well as expressions of grief, conceptions of afterlife or legal clauses about the funerary monument. However, they are usually reticent about the cause of death, except for those deaths which are explicitly regarded as violating the rules of the cosmos (*malae mortes*): murder, violence, magic or supernatural powers,

<sup>26</sup> A boy fell from a roof and died but was resurrected by the young Jesus, foreshadowing the resurrection of Lazarus. The story occurs in the Childhood Gospel according to Thomas (late 3rd or 4th century). See C. TISCHENDORF, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 149-150 (version A) and p. 161 (version B) for the Greek text; p. 102-103 and p. 173-174 for the Latin text. Also S. VOICU, *art. cit.* (n. 5), p. 201 (§9).

<sup>27</sup> CLE 840 (5 y. and 4 y.); CLE 1440 (mother and a six-year-old old daughter); CIL VI 17633 (sisters, aged 6 and 4); CIL VI 17361 (*puer* and *verna* aged 3 and 14); CIL VI 10493 (twin sisters aged 12 who died on the same day). See also AE 1987, 683, l. 2-3 ([*stirps mea quod misero funere rapta*] *mihi est*, | [*strage repentina puerilis c*] *oncidit ae[tas]*). M.E. LE BLANT, *Des sentiments d'affection exprimés dans quelques inscriptions antiques*, *Memoires de l'Institut de France* 36 (1898), p. 225-233, for a survey of inscriptions of persons dying on the same day.

<sup>28</sup> J. BINGEN, *Une nouvelle stèle de la «série Kappa» de Térénothis*, CE 71 (1996), p. 331-334.

failure in surgery<sup>29</sup>, accidents or mothers dying in childbirth<sup>30</sup>. Recent studies have focused on what is called (with a modern term) *mortes singulares* in the epigraphical evidence from the western part of the Roman Empire: death in military operations, or due to crime, disease, accident, suicide, and other exceptional conditions (dying on one's birthday, dying far away from home, etc). In these studies *mors singularis* is used as a broad category containing all exceptional causes of death specified in funeral inscriptions, and thus including cases of *malae mortes*. The tedious task of collecting the considerable amount of evidence has been carried out by some Spanish scholars<sup>31</sup>. Freeborn people, mostly from heavily Romanized regions, seem most often to mention exceptional death. Not surprisingly, those who lived an 'adventurous' life, like soldiers or merchants, are best represented in this group. More *mortes singulares* are attested for men than for women, whereas more women are recorded as having died of illness. Among the cases attesting a *mors singularis*, however, children below the age of fifteen are rather poorly represented (10%). Of course these numbers do not reflect statistic realities, but refer to ancient preoccupations or anxieties (or their absence; in this case, they show which kind of people found it worth mentioning their 'exceptional' death on a stone). Therefore, these numbers seem to imply that, contrary to our times, young children who died in accidents were not a major concern to the ancients. This rather bold conclusion needs to be tested against other evidence for ancient worries and anxieties.

## 6. ACCIDENTS IN ANCIENT DREAM-BOOKS AND HOROSCOPES

The *Oneirocriticon* («Interpretation of Dreams») by Artemidorus of Daldis is a remarkable document, displaying a cross-section of society which is hardly ever revealed in other ancient literary sources and

<sup>29</sup> E.g. CIL VI 37337 (*alumnus quem medici secarunt et occiderunt*) and 30112 (*seminis iacui, medici male membra secarunt corpori*); A. GUNNELLA, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 17.

<sup>30</sup> A. GUNNELLA, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 9-11.

<sup>31</sup> H. GALLEGO FRANCO – M.R. GARCIA MARTINEZ – F.J. GARCIA DE CASTRO, «*Mortes singulares*»: *un estudio social en relacion a la evidencia epigrafica en el occidente romano*, *Historia Antiqua* 22 (1998), p. 361-370 (for description and catalogue of attested cases of death); H. GALLEGO FRANCO – M.R. GARCIA MARTINEZ – F.J. GARCIA DE CASTRO, «*Mortes singulares*»: *testimonios epigraficos en el Occidente romano*, in A. ALONSO AVILA – S.C. ORTIZ DE ZARATE – T. GARABIOT GOMEZ – E. SOLOVERA SAN JUAN (eds.), *Homenaje al profesor Montenegro. Estudios de historia antigua*, Valladolid 1999, p. 473-486 (distribution of social status and age of the attested cases).



introducing every conceivable social type: men and women, masters and slaves, rich and poor, but also specific professionals, such as beekeepers, beggars, tax-collectors, criminals, soldiers, doctors, etc. In this vast collection, Artemidorus interprets the dreams of 'ordinary people' from all over the Mediterranean. As such they are a record of social attitudes widely shared and understood in the Antonine period<sup>32</sup>. Children figure predominantly in the *Oneirocriticon*. People are concerned about their fragility and fear an untimely death, since they are treasured as an insurance for old age. Furthermore they tend to regard childhood as a distinct stage in life.

Deaths of young children were part of everyday reality and are well represented in the *Oneirocriticon*. Many children died before their parents (*On.* 1.13). One woman bore seven children but lost them all while they were still in swaddling clothes (*On.* 5.73). Those dreaming of giving birth to a fish could expect the baby to be mute, said Artemidorus' predecessors, but for Artemidorus the dream meant either giving birth to a stillborn baby, or to a child who would only live for a short time (*On.* 2.18)<sup>33</sup>. For deaths caused by accident the evidence is extremely meagre. A father lost his son when the boy fell into a river and drowned (*On.* 5.22). Another father lost two sons who were murdered by bandits — a *mors singularis* but hardly an accident (*On.* 5.84).

A similar absence of children's accidents is displayed by the *Anthologiarum libri* by the astrologer Vettius Valens. This collection of ancient horoscopes devotes an entire chapter to *biaiothanatoi*: poisoning, decapitation, drowning, suicide (II 2, p. 129-131 ed. Kroll). Though children figure quite often in other horoscopes (there are a number of horoscopes of children who never reached adulthood, undoubtedly a major concern of clients ordering horoscopes, and many also asked if a child would live), not a single child is referred to in the chapter about violent death. In fact, only one horoscope mentions an accident happening to a child. It is an account about an unfortunate boy born AD 158. He suffered dangerous convulsions at the age of seven and eighth months, eruptions and eczema, especially at the age of 26 months, fell into an animal snare and suffered injuries, and finally died, 32 months old, after more convulsions<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> K. BRADLEY, *Children and Dreams*, in S. DIXON (ed.), *Childhood, Class and Kin in the Roman World*, London–New York 2001, p. 43-51.

<sup>33</sup> K. BRADLEY, *art. cit.* (n. 32), p. 47-48, for children's deaths in the *Oneirocriticon*.

<sup>34</sup> This horoscope is translated with commentary by: O. NEUGEBAUER – H.B. VAN HOESSEN, *Greek Horoscopes*, Philadelphia 1959, p. 271.31–272.25. See also T. BARTON, *Ancient Astrology*, London–New York 1994, p. 166-172, about violent death in horoscopes.

## 7. ANCIENT PREOCCUPATION WITH ACCIDENTS?

Whereas the theme of infants' and children's death in accidents does not seem to be frequent in literary and epigraphical sources, the unusual and abrupt manner of death fascinated the ancients just as it fascinates us now. «Only the man who is mindful of the fragility of human existence has a fair opinion on human life» says Pliny the Elder (*Nat. Hist.* VII 44), a sentence which is illustrated by the story of the death of Anacreon, who choked on a grape, or the unfortunate death of Fabius, to whom a swallow of milk proved fatal. Strange ways of dying seem to have held a particular appeal for the poets of the *Greek Anthology*. The seventh and the ninth books exhibit numerous examples of bizarre ways of death. An eagle was pierced by an arrow, fell on the hunter and cut his throat with the point of the arrow (*AP* IX 223). A fisherman fell from his boat and drowned. The next day he was found on the beach with his hands eaten off. It was concluded that smart fish had eaten the part that used to destroy them (*AP* VII 204)<sup>35</sup>. Of course, such epigrams were never published on stone. They served as *epideictic* pieces of art, exaggerating (and ridiculing?) the interest in special circumstances of death which are found in funeral inscriptions. Again, children are rarely mentioned in such epigrams (I have included nos. 1 and 6 in my first list, since they could point to professional activities, and no. 15 in my second list, since an exact age is mentioned)<sup>36</sup>.

In *AP* VII 542 a mother laments the loss of her son who fell through the ice while skating. He was beheaded by the sharp edge of the ice he had broken (similar case in *AL* 709 Riese)<sup>37</sup>. The mother cremated the

<sup>35</sup> R. LATTIMORE, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 145, for a complete list of epigrams in *AP* books VII and IX.

<sup>36</sup> The terminology is often vague. Possible (and remarkable!) cases involving children: *AP* VII 631 (shipwreck involving a *παῖς*); *AP* IX 56 (decapitated after falling through the ice, a similar case as in VII 204); 67 (a *κούρος* crushed by the tomb of his evil step-mother); 158 (three girls [*παῖδες*] play dice in order to find out who would die first; the one indicated by the dice refuses to believe it, but unexpectedly falls from a roof); 243 (a *παῖς* escaped from a burning house but was struck by lightning and died); 262 (a mother lost six children, three to illness and three to the sea); 267 (youngster falling from a ship into the sea); 278 (*παῖς* saw his father's coffin in a stream and jumped to save the coffin but drowned); 292 (shipwreck involving a *παῖς*); 390 (a mother throws her fourth baby, *βρέφος*, into the fire, since her efforts to educate the three older ones ended with those children dying in the same way); 407 (thirsty *βρέφος* drowning in the sea, where he had hoped to drink more than he could receive from his mother's breast).

<sup>37</sup> See Achilles Tatius V 7.8-9 for a reverse case: corpse found, head gone. I owe this reference to Thomas Opsomer (Louvain).

head, the only part which was left. In deep grief she utters the following words: «My poor child. Part of you has been consumed by fire, part by the merciless water». An inscription from Smyrna, now in Leiden, is somewhat similar in pathetic description (no. 3 in my first list): an eleven-year-old boy falls from a tree, breaking his skull and spattering his own father with his blood.

## 8. CONCLUSION

I return to the poems by Totius and Ausonius in the introduction. Separated by a distance of more than 1500 years, they share the poet's bewilderment at their sudden loss, at the abrupt and absurd end to the lives of their beloved children. The unusual character of death incites and explains the grief which is undoubtedly shared by the reader. From this point of view, which I would call the factual and individual level, one may say that things have not changed: individuals in the past were as deeply grieved by the loss of their children as people are nowadays<sup>38</sup>. Both ancients and moderns are puzzled by unexpected and unusual death. In a different way, the studies of Hanawalt and other medieval historians (which focus on the same factual and individual level) lead to the same conclusion. They demonstrate how suspicious deaths of children were scrupulously investigated by medieval authorities and never treated with indifference.

At the discourse level, we were confronted with philosophical remarks about the fragility of human life (and the possibility of fatalities breaking of this life) as well as with a literary tradition in epigrams which points to fascination for unusual and strange ways of dying. The theme of violent death also turned out to be an issue of concern in astrological writings. Deaths of children figure predominantly in Artemidorus' dream-book. It seems therefore all the more remarkable that children's accidental death never developed into a major issue of anxiety. Misadventures of children are hardly mentioned in dream-books or horoscopes, and are but a minority in inscriptional evidence or in the epigrams of the *Anthology*.

At this point, one should keep in mind the demographic conditions of the ancient world. In a society which was plagued by sudden and violent

<sup>38</sup> M. GOLDEN, *Did the Ancients Care when their Children Died?*, *G&R* 35 (1988), p. 152-163, remains a fundamental study of this topic.

outbreaks of epidemic diseases as tuberculosis, typhus, dysentery and malaria, in times when people were confronted with infant mortality rates of 30% during the first year of life, and half of all newborn children dying before the age of ten<sup>39</sup>, childhood accidents simply could not create a focus of anxiety as they do now. An accident was just one of many disasters which could alter the life of the young (think of the unfortunate boy in Vettius Valens' horoscope who was afflicted by extremely bad health; his fall into an animal snare was just one event in his short and miserable life). It is therefore quite normal that sources which reveal ancient worries and anxieties (funerary inscriptions, dream-books and horoscopes) are rather reticent about the subject. People simply had other sorrows.

Nowadays, the first confrontation with death usually occurs in youth when the grandparents die. In mid-life, one loses one's parents. When people die they are surrounded by their children and grandchildren. A disturbance of the normal order, by accident, illness or crime, is experienced as a tragic event, tragic by its abnormality. Forced by demographic conditions, Roman society considered matters from another angle. Child death in antiquity was an everyday reality and although the theme of *mors immatura* was widespread in epithaphs (people knew that children ought not to die before their parents), the loss of a child was not so much premature as it would be called today, but simply untimely<sup>40</sup>.

At this point, one may suspect a paradox or even contradiction in my central argument. How can one reconcile the assertion about ancient people coping with the omnipresent possibility of childhood death with the bewilderment which arises explicitly in inscriptions emphasizing the cruel irony of fate or the contrast between innocent play and sudden death (nos. 12 and 14 in my second list)? I believe that the contradiction is only apparent. I consider ancient reticence about children's accidental death as a socially approved and distinctive response to the news of death — a response which was in no way a barrier to individual expressions of genuine grief. Bradley has made the same point for ancient consolatory literature<sup>41</sup>.

Society taught people how to cope with harsh everyday reality. Funerary inscriptions, dream-books or horoscopes are hardly what one would

<sup>39</sup> W. SCHEIDEL, *Death on the Nile. Disease and the Demography of Roman Egypt*, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2001, for a recent approach of Roman demography with special focus on diseases.

<sup>40</sup> K. BRADLEY, *art. cit.* (n. 8), p. 183–184.

<sup>41</sup> K. BRADLEY, *art. cit.* (n. 8), p. 195–196.

call private or intimate documents, but belong to the area of interaction between personal feelings and social expectations. People voiced their grief in a sociologically acceptable way, they asked dream-interpreters or astrologers the kinds of questions which were fashionable and acceptable.

Once again, I recur to the Bradley thesis: to recognize the combination of the intellectual and the tender is to recognize how before the ubiquity of child death parents in antiquity responded in ways that made sense to themselves<sup>42</sup>. Marked by a reticence about causes of death and a seeming restraint upon expressing love and tenderness, Roman inscriptions resorted to conventional means to express care for deceased young ones: use of epithets, exact indication of age, etc<sup>43</sup>. However, the call for serenity and resolution is sometimes broken by utterances of grief mentioning unusual causes of death, in the same way as in *Consolationes* cool parental reactions are intermingled with touches of tenderness leaving no doubt about the reality of grief and loss. Whether it was by social convention that mostly middle-class people gave utterance to this grief by mentioning fatalities is an intriguing problem, which remains difficult to resolve<sup>44</sup>.

#### ADDENDUM

Among the newly discovered epigrams by Posidippus (VIII 31-34) there is another example of a fictitious epitaph for the young (v. 2 παρθένη) Kalliope who fell from a high roof during a nighttime festival. See *Posidippo di Pella, Epigrammi* (P. Mil. Vogl. VIII 309). Edizione a cura di G. Bastianini e Cl. Galazzi con la collaborazione di C. Austin, Milan 2001, p. 67.

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<sup>42</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 195.

<sup>43</sup> M. KING, *Commemorations of Infants on Roman Funerary Inscriptions*, in G.J. OLIVER (ed.), *The Epigraphy of Death. Studies in the History and Society of Greece and Rome*, Liverpool 2000, p. 117-154.

<sup>44</sup> A. GUNNELLA, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 22. Most inscriptions are from middle-class people.

APOLLO AND THE EMPERORS (I)  
THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE FOR THE IMPERIAL CULT  
AT SAGALASSOS\*

INTRODUCTION

Sagalassos in Pisidia (SW Turkey), like many other cities of the Roman East, flourished in the peace of the imperial period<sup>1</sup>, and similarly expressed her gratitude and loyalty to the empire and its leaders who had brought about this peace and prosperity, through the celebration of an imperial cult.

With the death of the Galatian client king Amyntas in 25 BC, Sagalassos found itself, together with the rest of Pisidia, incorporated into the newly established Roman province of Galatia. In order to organise the region and subdue it once and for all, Augustus devised a grand scheme involving the settlement of troops and veterans, and the opening up of the area through major infra-structural works<sup>2</sup>. Together with the political submission and development of the region, the cult of the emperor, the ideological pillar of the incorporation into the empire, found its way into Pisidia.

The imperial cult arose after the battle of Actium in 31 BC, when the Rome of Octavian strengthened or extended her authority over the areas that had previously been controlled by Mark Antony or his vassals, including the Greek cities. Under the reign of a single overlord, the cities needed to represent this new foreign power to themselves. They did so by reverting to and adapting a means that the *poleis* had devised during

\* Thanks are due to to prof. H. Hauben and prof. J. Poblome for their useful comments. Miss Nerina De Silva has improved the written English.

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Abbreviations are listed at the end of the article.

<sup>1</sup> For a general overview of Sagalassian history under Roman rule see M. WAELEKENS, *Romanization in the East. A Case Study: Sagalassos and Pisidia (SW Turkey)*, *MDAI(I)* 52 (2002), p. 311-368.

<sup>2</sup> S. MITCHELL, *Anatolia. Land, Men and Gods in Asia Minor*, I. *The Celts and the Impact of Roman Rule*, Oxford 1993, p. 70-79.

<sup>3</sup> C. HABICHT, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*, München 1970<sup>2</sup>; S.R.F. PRICE, *Rituals and Power: the Roman Imperial cult in Asia Minor*, Cambridge 1984, p. 23-40; P. ZANKER, *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder*, München 1987, p. 294-295.

the Hellenistic period, the ruler cult<sup>3</sup>. The latter was moulded on the cult of the gods, the one model that was available to them for the representation of a power on whom the city was dependent and which was external<sup>4</sup>. Thus the emperors received all the cultic honours the gods did, classified by the Greeks as *isothēoi timai*, namely sanctuaries, effigies, celebrations and priests.

It is the aim of the present article to give an overview of all manifestations of the imperial cult at Sagalassos, set within the framework of Pisidia. Its evolution through time, with special attention to the way it was introduced into the religious life of the city, will be sketched in the following issue of this journal.

## 1. THE CULTIC HONOURS REPRESENTED IN MARBLE AND BRONZE

### 1.1. *Imperial cult buildings at Sagalassos*

Two milestones, one originating from Sagalassos and dedicated to the emperor Constantine and his sons<sup>5</sup>, the other from her territory and dating to the reign of Diocletian<sup>6</sup>, refer to the city as being twice *neokoros* or 'temple-warden'.

The word *neokoros* originally referred to a temple official who was responsible for the security and cleanliness of the temple, the storage of votive objects and for financial affairs related to the cult<sup>7</sup>. At some point during the 1st century AD certain cities began to call themselves *neokoros* in relation to a traditional deity, and from the end of that century onwards, the title was applied informally to a city in connection with the imperial

<sup>4</sup> See S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 29-30.

<sup>5</sup> The milestone was recorded on the Lower Agora of the city (H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *Roman Inscriptions from the Fifth Campaign at Sagalassos*, in M. WAELEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos IV. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1994 and 1995* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 9), Leuven 1997, p. 310 no. 6). While the original text dedicated in honour of the emperor Constantine and his three sons by the holy, brilliant and notable city of Sagalassos, twice *neokoros*, first of Pisidia, friend and ally of the Romans, can be dated between 25 December 333 and 25 May 337, the stone was later re-used in honour of the emperors Constantius II and Constans I, dated ca. AD 340-350.

<sup>6</sup> This stone was recorded at Çeltikçi some 12 km south of the ancient city (D.H. FRENCH, *Roman Roads and Milestones of Asia Minor*, II. *An Interim Catalogue of Milestones* [*British Archaeological Reports. International Series*, 392.2], Oxford 1988, p. 104 no. 273).

<sup>7</sup> For a general overview of its use see S.J. FRIESEN, *Twice Neokoros. Ephesus, Asia and the Cult of the Flavian Imperial Family* (*Religions in the Graeco-Roman World*, 116), Leiden 1993, p. 50-53.






Fig. 1 – City-plan of Sagalassos.



cult<sup>8</sup>. However, it was only in the reign of Hadrian that the term was taken up more widely and became a regular civic title indicating the possession of a temple dedicated to the provincial imperial cult, at which a supra-local festival was celebrated<sup>9</sup>. The imperial cult which was sponsored by the whole province has to be distinguished from the civic cults of the emperor organised by the individual cities. While the latter were a strictly local initiative, permission for the establishment of the former had to be sought in Rome. The final decision lay in the hands of the Senate, but the emperor's approval was crucial<sup>10</sup>.

The presence of such a provincial cult enhanced a city's development in many ways<sup>11</sup>. It obviously enriched the religious life of a city, but it also created new offices for wealthy citizens to demonstrate their commitment to the city's well-being. Furthermore, it brought these individuals and the city in closer contact with the Senate and the emperor. Finally, it improved the city's economy through a temple-building program partially funded by outside — i.e. provincial — sources and through associated periodic festivals, which attracted people from far beyond the city's territory<sup>12</sup>. Consequently, the provincial cult was an occasion for intense competition between the cities of the province, and the *neokoros*-title, indicating that a city had been successful in this selection process, was vaunted widely. In fact, it developed into the primary means by which the larger cities asserted their status in relation to one another.

Major cities were selected often twice (or more) as 'temple warden' of the emperors, so that they might have more than one imperial temple that was granted provincial status and associated with the celebration of provincial festivals. Although Sagalassos is said to have had two, she was greatly surpassed within the province of Lycia-Pamphylia by the cities of Perge and Side, which had four and six such neocorates, respectively<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> According to Friesen the term *neokoros* was not used as a city title related to the imperial cult until the establishment of the cult of the *Theoi Sebastoi* in Ephesos during the reign of Domitian (*op. cit.* [n. 7], p. 50). This event constituted the starting point for the proliferation of such city titles in the 2nd century AD (*op. cit.*, p. 57).

<sup>9</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 64-65 and n. 47.

<sup>10</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 66-67.

<sup>11</sup> See S.J. FRIESEN, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> On the importance of such festivals in the ancient economy see L. DE LIGT, *Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire. Economic and Social Aspects of Periodic Trade in a Pre-Industrial Society* (Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 11), Leiden 1993.

<sup>13</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 272; for Side see J. NOLLÉ, *Side im Altertum. Geschichte und Zeugnisse*, I. *Geographie-Geschichte-Testimonia. Griechische und lateinische Inschriften* (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 43), Bonn 1993, p. 124.




Fig. 2 – Temple of Apollo Klarios: elevation.

Two major sanctuaries dedicated to the imperial cult, and therefore possible candidates for the two temples associated with the *neokoros*-titles, have been noted at Sagalassos.

*The temple of Apollo Klarios* — The remains of this temple are situated on the hill to the west of the Lower Agora (Fig. 1.16)<sup>14</sup>. The monument, an Ionic peripteral temple of 6 by 11 unfluted columns, measuring 13.50 x 24.75 m and opening to the east, originally stood on a stepped *krepidoma* (Fig. 2). The temple was surrounded by a *temenos* wall in the Doric order, with large Ionic windows and gates on the eastern and western sides.

The history of the monument has been the subject of much debate. The remains of this sanctuary indicate that it was altered several times during its existence. At present it is difficult to attribute the preserved elements to any particular phase, because the blocks are essentially plain and

<sup>14</sup> For a more detailed description of the monument see L. VANDEPUT, *The Architectural Decoration in Roman Asia Minor. Sagalassos: a Case Study* (Studies in Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology, 1), Turnhout 1997, p. 50-57 and 198-202.

undecorated. The only useful features are the Ionic capitals and an inscription that records restorations to the temple<sup>15</sup>. Several scholars have dated the temple to around AD 100 but M. Waelkens and L. Vandeput attributed the original lay-out of the sanctuary, consisting of the Ionic *peripteros* and the *temenos* wall, to the reign of Augustus, on the strength of the architectural decoration<sup>16</sup>.

A major reorganisation of the temple could be dated to the reign of Trajan<sup>17</sup>. The reconstruction is referred to in the building inscription cut on the architrave blocks, which mentions a certain Proculus as governor. The latter has to be identified as C. Aquillius Proculus, governor of the *provincia Asia* in AD 103/104. At this time a new *peristasis* was built and new marble veneer was applied to the originally Augustan cella walls, most probably after the building had suffered extensive damage during one of the earthquakes of the second half of the 1st century AD<sup>18</sup>. The plain Ionic entablature of the reconstruction seems to confirm such a date, as it was characteristic at Sagalassos for the transition from the 1st to the 2nd century AD<sup>18a</sup>.

At some point during the second half of the 5th–first half of the 6th century AD the sanctuary was finally transformed into a tripartite church with a transept inserted near the eastern end of the basilica<sup>19</sup>.

The building inscription also mentions the dedication of the restored temple to Apollo Klarios, the divine emperors and the *patris* by Titus Flavius Collega, his wife Flavia Longilla and his family, paid out of his own resources and the 10,000 *denarii* from the time of his office as high priest of the imperial cult. Considering that Apollo was already venerated at

<sup>15</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *Städte Pamphyliens und Pisidiens*, II. *Pisidien*, Wien 1892, p. 226 no. 200; *IGR* III 342.

<sup>16</sup> M. WAEKENS, *Sagalassos. History and Archaeology*, in M. WAEKENS (ed.), *Sagalassos I. First General Report on the Survey (1986-1989) and Excavations (1990-1991)* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 5), Leuven 1993, p. 45; L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 50-57.

<sup>17</sup> See H. DEVIJVER – M. WAEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 5), p. 295; L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 55-57.

<sup>18</sup> For an overview of the earthquakes that struck Sagalassos see M. WAEKENS – M. SINTUBIN – Ph. MUCHEZ – E. PAULISSEN, *Archaeological, Geomorphological and Geological Evidence for a Major Earthquake at Sagalassos (SW Turkey) around the Middle of the Seventh Century AD*, in W.G. MCGUIRE – D.R. GRIFFITHS – P. HANCOCK – I.S. STEWART (eds.), *The Archaeology of Geological Catastrophes* (*The Geological Society of London. Special Publications*, 171), London 2000, p. 377-378.

<sup>18a</sup> See M. WAEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 344.

<sup>19</sup> See M. WAEKENS – P. TALLOEN, *art. Sagalassos*, in P.C. FINNEY (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Early Christian Art and Archaeology*, Grand Rapids (Mich.) (forthcoming).

Sagalassos in the Hellenistic period<sup>20</sup> and that the temple is of Augustan origin, and since the imperial cult, as we shall see, was only introduced during the Flavian dynasty, the inscription implies a rededication of the sanctuary of Apollo Klarios to house both his cult and that of the emperors<sup>21</sup>. This may have occurred at the inauguration of the restored temple, although it seems more likely that it happened some time earlier (cf. *infra*).

At first sight, this rededication of the temple to house the imperial cult may have brought the city its first title of *neokoros* or 'temple warden'<sup>22</sup>.

*The temple of Antoninus Pius* — The ruinous site on one of the most commanding terraces of the southern part of the city, immediately to the north of Alexander's Hill, is the location of a second sanctuary for the imperial cult (Fig. 1.18)<sup>23</sup>. It consisted of an east-west oriented rectangular courtyard of ca. 68.8 by 46.0 m surrounded on all four sides by a 7.74 m-wide Ionic portico and accessible through the main entrance, which was situated at the western side, directly opposite the southern city gate (Fig. 3). In the axis of the courtyard stood, on top of a low stepped *krepidoma*, a large Corinthian *peripteros* of 6 by 11 fluted columns, measuring 26.80 by 13.80 m, with an entrance facing west (Fig. 4). Many small honorific monuments decorated the temple courtyard in antiquity. Among them were statues for emperors, priests of the imperial cult and victors in games (cf. *infra*).

According to the building inscription recorded by Lanckoronksi, the temple was dedicated by the city of Sagalassos to the emperor Antoninus Pius, the *sumpans oikos* and the *theoi patrioi*<sup>24</sup>. Yet, on the basis of the architectural ornamentation of the sanctuary, Waelkens and Vandeput have dated the beginning of construction to the second half of the reign

<sup>20</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *Sagalassos. Religious Life in a Pisidian Town during the Hellenistic and Early Imperial Period*, in C. BONNET – A. MOTTE (eds.), *Les syncrétismes religieux dans le monde méditerranéen antique. Actes du Colloque International en l'honneur de Franz Cumont à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire de sa mort, Rome, 25-27 septembre 1997* (Institut Historique Belge de Rome. Études de Philologie, d'Archéologie et d'Histoire Anciennes, 36), Bruxelles–Rome 1999, p. 207.

<sup>21</sup> A similar process seems to have occurred at Selge, where among the ruins of the Hellenistic temple of Zeus Kesbelios an architrave block bearing a dedication to the *theoi Sebastoi* and the living emperor Claudius or Nero was found, which suggests that this sanctuary too was at some moment in time rededicated in order to house the imperial cult (see J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *Die Inschriften von Selge* (*Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*, 37), Bonn 1991, p. 80 no. 11).

<sup>22</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 346. This will be further discussed in the second part of this article in *AncSoc* 2005.

<sup>23</sup> For a more elaborate description of the sanctuary see L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 64-82 and 203-205.

<sup>24</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 224 no. 188; *IGR* III 348.






Fig. 4 – Temple of divus Hadrianus and Antoninus Pius: elevation.

of the emperor Hadrian<sup>25</sup>. This has most recently been confirmed by the discovery of the missing onset of the inscription dedicating it to *divus Hadrianus* as well as to Antoninus Pius, and also by test soundings inside

<sup>25</sup> M. WAELENS, *art. cit.* (n. 16), p. 46, and L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 75-77. Elsewhere in Pisidia there are also attestations of temples dedicated to Hadrian: at Selge a podium temple was consecrated to both Hadrian and his adoptive son L. Aelius Caesar (see A. MACHATSCHKE – M. SCHWARZ, *Bauforschungen in Selge* [Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Denkschriften, 152], Wien 1981, p. 94-96; J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* [n. 21], p. 78 no. 8), while in Termessos the propylon of a temple for Artemis outside the city walls was erected to the emperor (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 62, 120-121). At Kremna beside the basilica and the adjacent forum built by L. Fabricius Longus (S. MITCHELL, *Kremna in Pisidia. An Ancient City in Peace and in War*, London 1995, p. 56-69; G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *The Inscriptions of Central Pisidia: including Texts from Kremna, Ariassos, Keraia, Hyia, Panemoteichos, the Sanctuary of Apollo of the Perminoundeis, Sia, Kocaaliler and the Döğeme Boğazı* [Inscripfen griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 57], Bonn 2000, p. 13 no. 4), also a large prostyle temple in Corinthian order may have been dedicated to him (see S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.*, p. 97-102).



the portico which placed the start of construction in the early 2nd century. The building was, however, not completed until the reign of his successor, to whom the temple was eventually dedicated<sup>26</sup>.

Several inscriptions testify that the temple at Sagalassos remained the sanctuary for the cult of the subsequent emperors, as their statues were added to the imperial sanctuary when they came to power, or removed as a consequence of a *damnatio memoriae* (cf. *infra*).

The test soundings and the present position of the various building blocks indicate that the sanctuary was abandoned and dismantled during the first half of the 5th century. At that time, the steps of the surrounding portico were surmounted by walls. The position of these walls and the fact that they incorporate building elements of the former portico allow them to be ascribed to a first phase of encroachment within the sanctuary. Furthermore, several frieze blocks of the temple were re-used in the eastern part of Basilica E1, a church that was erected in the former stadium during the late 5th or early 6th century AD (Fig. 1.19).

Located on a promontory, the sanctuary dominated the view of the city from the valley below and was visible for miles around to every traveller approaching the city. Moreover, its location near the city gate at the beginning of the colonnaded street — the north-south axis of the city (Fig. 1.17) — ensured that the sanctuary was noticed by everybody passing through it, stressing its importance within the urban framework, in which it served as a focal point. Yet, it may have had more than a local importance, as seems to be suggested by the sheer size of the shrine — the largest in Pisidia proper — possibly even serving the provincial imperial cult, which would have given the city the title of *neokoros*. This would explain why the title of ‘first city of Pisidia, friend and ally of the Romans’ appears for the first time in the building inscription of the temple<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> M. WAELEKENS *et al.*, *The 2003 Excavation and Restoration Season at Sagalassos*, in XXVI. *Kazı Sonuçları Toplantısı, 24-28 Mayıs 2004, Konya* (forthcoming). The *sumpans oikos* mentioned in the dedicatory inscription most probably refers to the imperial house. Such a dedication to the ‘entire household’ also appears in an imperial context at the Hadrianic basilica of Kremna (see G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 13 no. 4). Whether the dedication to the *patrioi theoi* implied the explicit presence of Zeus as claimed by Mitchell (*op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 82) remains unclear.

<sup>27</sup> The latter part of the title, namely ‘friend and ally of the Romans’, was granted by the emperors, especially by the Severi, to numerous cities in the East and embodied the notion of a loyal city which sent recruits, provisions and equipment to the Roman armies along the eastern borders. It was quickly perceived as a standard of value to determine a city’s position within its province (see J. NOLLÉ, «*Colonia und Socia der Römer*». *Ein neuer Vorschlag zur Auflösung der Buchstaben «SR» auf den Münzen von Antiocheia bei*



The temples of the imperial cult formed only a part of the range of civic architecture honouring the emperor.

### 1.2. *Other architectural manifestations of imperial worship*

Other public monuments which were the object of a dedication to the emperors at Sagalassos comprised two arched gateways decorated with weaponry friezes, which embellished both south corners of the Upper Agora (Fig. 1.4), slightly oblique to the side of the agora<sup>28</sup>. The one in the southwest corner measured 5.60 by 0.90 m. It consisted of a single arched gateway flanked by two rectangular piers supporting an archivolt which was decorated with small *cornucopiae*. Projecting pilasters at either side of the archivolt supported an entablature, composed of an architrave, a weaponry frieze with greaves and a Macedonian shield, and a cornice. The arched gateway could be attributed to Claudius, at the time of his second consulship in AD 42-43 (Fig. 5)<sup>29</sup>. The dedicatory inscription, however, was clearly not the original one, but replaced an erased dedication that must have been intended for Caligula, who was murdered in AD 41. The scantily preserved second arch in the southeast corner was almost identical in shape and decoration to the one at the southwest corner. Here the weaponry frieze contained a.o. a cuirass, a Macedonian shield and a helmet. In view of the close similarity of both arches it may also have been intended for Claudius. As the fragmentary text refers to the third consulship of an emperor, it would then have to be placed in AD 43-44<sup>30</sup>.

*Pisidien*, in H.H. SCHMITT – C. SCHUBERT – K. BRODERSEN – U. HUTTNER [eds.], *Rom und der griechische Osten. Festschrift für Hatto H. Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag*, Stuttgart 1995, p. 360-363). The fact that Sagalassos already held the title by the reign of Antoninus Pius again stresses her importance in the region. The title is also attested for Selge around the middle of the 3rd century AD (J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* [n. 21], p. 80 no. 12).

<sup>28</sup> S. MITCHELL – M. WAELEKENS, *Sagalassus and Cremna*, AS 37 (1987), p. 38; S. MITCHELL – M. WAELEKENS, *Ariassus and Sagalassus*, AS 38 (1988), p. 63-64; M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 16), p. 46; L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 22.

<sup>29</sup> IGR III 344.

<sup>30</sup> Horsley and Mitchell believe the erection of the triumphal arch in honour of Claudius to be part of a series of dedications to that emperor throughout Pisidia (at Baris: SEG XIX 761; at Kremna: G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 11 no. 1; at Olbasa: N.P. MILNER, *An Epigraphical Survey in the Kibyra-Olbasa Region conducted by A.S. Hall* [British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, Monograph 24], Hertford 1998, p. 38 no. 95 and p. 66 no. 145.5; at Seleukeia Sidera: J.R.R. STERRETT, *The Wolfe Expedition to Asia Minor* [Papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, 3], Boston 1888, p. 334 no. 466) which may have to be seen in the light of the creation of the new province




Fig. 5 – Arch of Claudius on the Upper Agora: elevation.

The stadium of Sagalassos, situated in the western part of the city (Fig. 1.19), may have been built under the rule of the last member of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, Nero<sup>31</sup>. The stadium functioned as the venue for

of Lycia-Pamphylia in AD 43, including most of Pisidia (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 12).

<sup>31</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342.

athletic competitions that formed part of Greek religious festivals, but was also regularly the site of Roman spectacles (cf. *infra*). The badly preserve construction consisted of benches on top of a podium surrounding a running track broadly 145 m long and 25 m wide. Since it was already there before the reign of Trajan, to whom a monument was dedicated in front of the stadium (cf. *infra*), and as athletic games, which were undoubtedly held in the stadium, are recorded from the second half of the 1st century AD onwards, the reign of Nero is a likely period for its construction<sup>32</sup>. Moreover, a dedication to Nero by Tiberius Claudius Dareios and his sons, honouring him as the 'neos Helios', was found on a door lintel among the ruins of Basilica E1 built within the stadium<sup>33</sup>. According to Devijver and Waelkens, Dareios was probably a new citizen of Nero<sup>34</sup> and the dedication would then have been a token of appreciation and loyalty to the emperor. This was also manifested in the construction of another monument dedicated to the emperor since, according to a recently discovered inscription, the same individual and his sons were also involved in the dedication to Nero and the *divus* Claudius, of a large limestone structure, possibly a gateway, in the northwestern part of the city<sup>35</sup>.

One of the sons of Tiberius Claudius Dareios, Tiberius Claudius Kallikles, also expressed his gratitude and loyalty by dedicating a monument to the *Theoi Sebastoi*, the *theoi patrioi* and the *demos*, remains of which have again been found in the northwestern part of the city<sup>36</sup>. The object of the dedication is not clear, but considering its location it seems not unlikely that the latter construction was related to the previous monument and that, like his father before him, he might have erected it in honour of Claudius and Nero.

Another imperial memorial was erected as a prostyle structure with an apsidal cella that possibly housed a statue, built directly to the west of the stadium (Fig. 1.19)<sup>37</sup>. It consisted of a small square socle on which stood

<sup>32</sup> See also M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342.

<sup>33</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 230 no. 221; *IGR* III 345. He was honoured in the same manner at nearby Prostanna (*SEG* XVIII 566).

<sup>34</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *Local Elite, Equestrians and Senators: A Social History of Roman Sagalassos*, *AncSoc* 27 (1996), p. 109; M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342.

<sup>35</sup> M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342.

<sup>36</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 228 no. 205; *IGR* III 343; H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 109.

<sup>37</sup> L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 23.

a semi-circular *naikos* with protruding wings. In front of the wings, ending in pilasters, stood a column. The simple entablature was composed of an architrave-frieze carrying an inscription and a cornice. It was dedicated to the emperor Trajan by Claudia Severa and her brothers, Tiberius Claudius Aquila and Tiberius Claudius Pius between AD 102 and 116<sup>38</sup>. Claudia Severa, a member of the prominent family of the *Tiberii Claudii*, was the wife of Titus Flavius Neon, the first priest of the imperial cult (cf. *infra*). The location of the honorific monument in the urban periphery, facing the stadium, confirms that the latter was older than the reign of Trajan.

In the series of imperial constructions, the completion of the peristyle temple dedicated to the *divus Hadrianus* and the living emperor Antoninus Pius was followed by the inauguration of the bath complex situated to the east of the Lower Agora (Fig. 1.12)<sup>39</sup>. The building, stretching out over some 80 by 60 m, originally stood three stories high. The ground floor consisted of several rooms covered by massive brick vaults resting on ashlar and mortared rubble walls. These rooms were interconnected by vaulted corridors. On top of these rooms, there was an intermediate floor level formed by the ca. 1.50 m high *hypocausta* of the *caldaria* and *tepidaria* of the building. The *hypocausta* were composed of brick pillars supporting a suspended brick floor covered by marble slabs. The top floor of the bath building consisted of a *caldarium* and *tepidarium* in the west part and the *frigidarium* in the east part of the building, divided by a central hall (Fig. 6). The rooms on the top floor of the baths were again covered by brick vaults, resting on massive mortared rubble and brick walls faced by an ashlar façade. The interior walls are riddled with small clamp holes pointing to the once lavish marble decoration of the building.

Characteristic of many bath complexes in Asia Minor, the spacious and lavishly ornamented rectangular central hall (roughly 25 by 18.65 m),

<sup>38</sup> See K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 230 no. 222; H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 4), p. 112, and H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 5), p. 303.

<sup>39</sup> M. WAELEKENS – S. MITCHELL – E. OWENS, *Sagalassos 1989*, AS 40 (1990), p. 193-196; M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 16), p. 47; M. WAELEKENS *et al.*, *The 1994 and 1995 Excavation Seasons at Sagalassos*, in M. WAELEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos IV. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1994 and 1995* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 9), Leuven 1997, p. 199-205; M. WAELEKENS *et al.*, *The 1996 and 1997 Excavations and Restoration Activities at Sagalassos*, in M. WAELEKENS – L. LOOTS (eds.), *Sagalassos V. Report on the Excavation Campaigns of 1996 and 1997* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 11B), Leuven 2000, p. 336-362.




Fig 6 – Plan of the Roman Baths.

also known as the ‘Kaisersaal’ (imperial hall) or ‘Marmorsaal’ (marble hall), was often associated with the imperial cult. This was also the case at Sagalassos as is indicated by the dedicatory inscription carved on its marble veneering<sup>40</sup>. This inscription places the inauguration of the bath complex, of which the construction had begun during the reign of Hadrian, in the spring of AD 165, during the joint reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus to whom it was dedicated, together with the ancestral deities, by the city of Sagalassos. This central hall of the bath complex is traditionally a place for imperial worship. It is a ‘Hall of Honour’ for the ruling and the past deified emperors and the imperial family<sup>41</sup>. It was only fitting that, alongside the official temples dedicated to the imperial cult, a place in the baths, the social centre of the city, would be set aside with the same intent. This central hall appears to have lost its function between the end of the 4th and the early 6th century when it was converted into a second *caldarium*<sup>42</sup>.

Another secular construction at Sagalassos that can be related to the imperial cult is the *macellum*, a market building for fine foodstuffs such as fish, meat, fruit and vegetables. This building, situated immediately to the southeast of the Upper Agora and orientated to the north (Fig. 1.14), was dedicated to the emperor Marcus Aurelius and the city by a high priest of the emperors, Publius Aelius Akulas<sup>43</sup>. This Roman type of building, which spread throughout Asia Minor in the 2nd century AD, is also related to the imperial cult elsewhere<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 350.

<sup>41</sup> See F.K. YEGÜL, *Baths and Bathing in Classical Antiquity*, New York 1992, p. 422. Similarly, elsewhere in Pisidia the bath-gymnasium complexes at Adada (see J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 304 no. 426), Takina (W.M. RAMSAY, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia: being an Essay of the Local History Phrygia from the Earliest Times to the Turkish Conquest*, I, Oxford 1895, p. 329 no. 138) and possibly also at Termessos (see TAM III 21) were dedicated to the emperors. Such an imperial dedication has equally been conjectured for the baths at Kremna (see S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 157).

<sup>42</sup> M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 350.

<sup>43</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 228 no. 210; IGR III 351. The inscription was amended by H. DEVIJVER (*art. cit.* [n. 34], p. 115). At Kremna, a temple was dedicated to *divus* Verus, Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus (S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 108-110; G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 43 no. 12). The *macellum* at Perge was also constructed at this time (S. ŞAHİN, *Die Inschriften von Perge [Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 54]*, Bonn 1999, p. 211).

<sup>44</sup> C. DE RUYT, *Macellum. Marché alimentaire des Romains (Publications d'histoire de l'art et d'archéologie de l'Université catholique de Louvain, 35)*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1983, p. 264. Elsewhere in Asia Minor, at Apollonia on the Rhyndakos, a priest of the

The *macellum*, which has not yet been excavated, consisted of a square courtyard with a *tholos* in the centre, surrounded by porticoes onto which square-shaped shops opened<sup>45</sup>. As the exterior walls have not yet been discovered, it is not possible to determine its exact dimensions, but the sides of the building must have measured about 40 to 45 m and the sides of the central square about 23 m. The *tholos* with a diameter of 7.30 m consisted of a *krepidoma* with three steps, bearing a superstructure of eight columns. This round building may have housed a fountain or perhaps a statue of the emperor to whom the edifice was dedicated<sup>46</sup>.

The dedicatory inscription, which was cut on the architrave blocks of all four of the interior porticoes, records the 13.000 *denarii* paid by Akulas for the construction of the market building. This sum of money probably constitutes the *summa honoraria* which Akulas had promised the city in exchange for his high priesthood (cf. *infra*)<sup>47</sup>. As newly enfranchised *civis Romanus* he not only assumed the financial burden of high priest of the imperial cult, but his loyalty to the *domus imperatoria* was given extra emphasis by the inauguration of the *macellum* in honour of an imperial victory, according to Devijver probably Marcus Aurelius' defeat of the Parthians in AD 166<sup>48</sup>, although the absence of co-emperor Lucius Verus in the dedicatory inscription makes that unlikely. Thus the secular *macellum* took on a religious and an imperial dimension.

A large gateway with an aediculated façade, erected at a major street crossing to the north of the Roman baths and dated to the first quarter of the 3rd century AD<sup>49</sup>, may have been dedicated to a member of the Severan dynasty. This has been argued on the basis of a parallel at Kremna, where a link with the Severan victory over Parthia has been

emperors is also known to have funded the construction of a *macellum* (see C. DE RUYT, *op. cit.*, p. 37) and at Larisa a *macellum* was dedicated to Hadrian (*ibid.*, p. 97).

<sup>45</sup> For a more detailed description of the building see K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 135 and 159-160, and C. DE RUYT, *op. cit.* (n. 44), p. 188-190.

<sup>46</sup> See C. DE RUYT, *op. cit.* (n. 44), p. 295 and 324.

<sup>47</sup> The *macellum* was considered a very prestigious gift, which was normally financed by members of the local elite seeking the highest offices (see C. DE RUYT, *op. cit.* [n. 44], p. 353).

<sup>48</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 117. At Kremna, the emperor and his son Commodus, probably together with another deity, may have received a temple (see G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 43 no. 12).

<sup>49</sup> For a more elaborate description of the scanty remains see M. WAELEKENS – S. MITCHELL, *Sagalassus 1987*, in VI. *Araştırma Sonuçları Toplantısı Ankara 23-27 Mayıs 1988*, Ankara, p. 207-208.



suggested for the construction of the monumental propylon at that Roman colony<sup>50</sup>.

The same is perhaps true for the reconstructed *nymphaeum* on the northern side of the city's Lower Agora at the same time<sup>51</sup>. This vista of the square yielded beside other fragmentary statues, two images of the winged goddess of victory, Nike (Fig. 7), that are contemporary with the second construction phase of the building and are therefore most probably part of its decorative program<sup>52</sup>. This may then suggest that the fountain was equally dedicated to the Severan family on the occasion of their victory over Parthia.

A final public honour for the emperors took the shape of a dynastic monument to the rulers of the later Roman empire, usurping an early imperial honorific monument at the southern end of the Upper Agora (Fig. 8)<sup>53</sup>. This building consisted of a square curved canopy roof supported by four columns on top of pedestals, and once housed a statue which according to Waelkens might well have represented the emperor Augustus<sup>54</sup>. Yet, the close similarity of the monument with a structure depicted on a civic coin minted during the reign of Claudius II Gothicus

<sup>50</sup> M. WAEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 356. For the propylon dedicated to the Severan family at Kremna see L. VANDEPUT – M. BÜYÜKKOLANCI, *Das grosse Bogentor in Kremna in Pisidien*, *MDAI(I)* 49 (1999), p. 244-247. A tripylon is also known to have been dedicated to Septimius Severus and Caracalla at Lycian Balbura (see *IGR* III 469), and an arch was constructed in honour of the Parthian victory at Side (J. NOLLÉ, *op. cit.* [n. 13], p. 83).

<sup>51</sup> A *nymphaeum* was equally dedicated to the Severan imperial family at Perge between AD 195 and 204 (see S. ŞAHİN, *op. cit.* [n. 43], nos. 195-196).

<sup>52</sup> The first, 1.50 m high statue from the second niche of the *nymphaeum* represents the goddess wearing a wreath on her head and a *chiton* of which she holds the lower part with both hands, thus exposing her bare feet (inventory number SA2000LA/147) (M. WAEKENS, *The 2000 Excavation and Restoration Season at Sagalassos*, in *XXIII. Kazi Sonuçları Toplantısı*, 28 Mayıs-1 Haziran 2001, Ankara 2002, p. 19). The second, headless statue is 0.86 m high and shows Nike standing, wearing a *chiton* which leaves her left shoulder and breast exposed, with a *guirlande* hanging from her right shoulder across her upper body towards her left hip, which she is holding with her left hand (inventory number SA2001LA/56) (M. WAEKENS *et al.*, *The 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 Excavation Seasons at Sagalassos*, in M. WAEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos VI. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*), Leuven (forthcoming). The statues of Hera Ephesia and Tyche found at the *nymphaeum* could not be linked to the building and may have been brought from elsewhere in the city.

<sup>53</sup> M. WAEKENS – D. PAUWELS – J. VAN DEN BERGH, *The 1993 Excavations on the Upper and Lower Agora*, in M. WAEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos III. Report on the Fourth Excavation Campaign of 1993* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 7), Leuven 1995, p. 24; L. VANDEPUT, *op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 43-45.

<sup>54</sup> See M. WAEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 334.



Fig 7 – Marble statue of the goddess Nike from the Severan *nymphaeum* on the Lower Agora (inventory no. SA2000LA/147).



Fig 8 – The canopy monument on the Upper Agora.

(AD 268-270) and housing an effigy of the goddess of Fortune, suggests a *Tychaion* (Fig. 9)<sup>55</sup>. Later on, it was re-dedicated to an empress, most probably Constantia<sup>56</sup>. She was the daughter of Constantius II (AD 337-361) and the wife of emperor Gratianus (AD 367-383), who together with his co-ruler over the West, Valentinian II (AD 375-392)<sup>57</sup>, was honoured on the front pedestals of the monument. Beside the obvious link with

<sup>55</sup> *IW* no. 3889; *SNG* Paris no. 1852; *SNG* von Aulock no. 8629. This identification seems to be corroborated by the fact that a monument of the same kind housing a statue of Tyche and featuring on the coins of Side was found on the agora of that Pamphylian city (see J. NOLLÉ, *Side. Zur Geschichte einer kleinasiatischen Stadt in der römischen Kaiserzeit im Spiegel ihrer Münzen*, *AW* 21, 1990, p. 253). A similar *tholos* erected on the Tiberian platea at Pisidian Antioch has also been tentatively linked with a shrine of Fortuna (see S. MITCHELL – M. WAEKENS, *Pisidian Antioch. The Site and its Monuments*, London 1998, p. 156).

<sup>56</sup> See H. DEVIJVER – M. WAEKENS, *Roman Inscriptions from the Upper Agora at Sagalassos*, in M. WAEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos III. Report on the Fourth Excavation Campaign of 1993* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 7), Leuven 1995, p. 119.

<sup>57</sup> This emperor is identified as Valentinian I by J. NOLLÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 328 n. 142.



Fig 9 – Bronze city coin from the reign of Claudius II Gothicus depicting the goddess Tyche within a tetrastyle structure (SNG von Aulock no. 8629)

Constantia, the secondary presence of the western rulers Gratianus and Valentinian II could also be due to the establishment of a monument honouring the so-called ‘Trinity’ comprising the three rulers of the empire, namely Gratianus, Valentinian II and Valens (375-378) or Theodosius (379-383), as was most probably the case at Side and on Crete<sup>58</sup>. Afterwards, the main inscription was re-cut to honour Flavia Eudoxia, the wife of the emperor Arcadius (AD 395-408)<sup>59</sup>.

<sup>58</sup> Side: J. NOLLÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 328 no. 51; Crete: *Inscr. Cret.* IV 285. On the ‘Trinity’ see J. NOLLÉ, *op. cit.*, p. 328-329.

<sup>59</sup> See H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 56), p. 118-119 no. 4-6.

### 1.3. *Imperial representations*

In addition to the temples and other buildings dedicated to the imperial cult, the image of the emperor was current in daily life at Sagalassos in two different manifestations, namely as statues and on coins.

*Statues* — Of the imperial statues that were actually erected throughout the city, only one definite remnant has thus far been recorded, namely a fragment of an imperial effigy found on the Lower Agora<sup>60</sup>. Their inscribed bases, on the other hand, have been recovered. They have been found mainly around the imperial sanctuaries, on public squares and along the colonnaded streets. These statues will all have been consecrated by local priests of the imperial cult and city officials, a ceremony accompanied by a distribution of gifts to the attending council members and other citizens, which was paid for by the dedicator, whether it was the city, one of its institutions, or one of its citizens<sup>61</sup>.

The veneration of the imperial image was a feature adopted from Greek religion: by honouring the image of a distant ruler, people made amends for what they could not do in his presence<sup>62</sup>. On holy days the imperial statues, like those of deities, were wreathed and anointed with oil, and incense was burnt before them to ensure the well-being of the ruler<sup>62a</sup>.

Although several monuments dedicated to members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty have been recorded throughout the city (cf. *supra*), no honorific statues erected to them have so far been found in Sagalassos<sup>63</sup>. The first attested emperor to be honoured in this manner is Vespasian, whose statue was erected on the Upper Agora by Tiberius Claudius Piso

<sup>60</sup> A lower right naked leg of a marble statue (0.45 m high and 0.27 m wide) representing a male figure standing in front of a trophy found in the western portico on the Lower Agora (inventory no. SA99LA/148) can be identified as a fragment of an imperial representation.

<sup>61</sup> T. PEKARY, *Das römische Kaiserbildnis in Staat, Kult und Gesellschaft dargestellt anhand der Schriftquellen (Das römische Herrscherbild. Abt. 3.5)*, Berlin 1985, p. 110.

<sup>62</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 200-201.

<sup>62a</sup> In some cities the bringing of sacrifices before statues of the emperors was a special office, namely that of the *prothytes* as established in the Pisidian cities of Adada and Pednelissos (L. ROBERT, *Opera minora selecta. Épigraphie et antiquités grecques*, II, Amsterdam 1969, p. 839-840).

<sup>63</sup> Elsewhere in Pisidia, the emperor Augustus is honoured at Termessos by the people as *euergetes* and saviour (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 203 no. 60; TAM III 36), while at Apollonia statues were erected to Augustus, Livia, Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus within the imperial sanctuary (MAMA IV 143), as well as three equestrian statues of Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus (MAMA IV 142), and an effigy for Claudius or Nero (MAMA IV 144).



and Tiberius Claudius Varus, following the stipulations of their father's (Tiberius Claudius Ilagoas) will<sup>64</sup>. The latter, probably the eldest son of Tiberius Claudius Dareios and brother of Tiberius Claudius Kallikles<sup>65</sup>, was also involved in the dedication of buildings to Claudius and Nero (cf. *supra*). With this statue to Vespasian he attested the family's loyalty to the imperial house under the new dynasty. His son Piso also appeared among the high priests of the imperial cult (cf. *infra*). Except for Vespasian, the other members of the Flavian dynasty are conspicuously absent at Sagalassos, or in the whole of Pisidia for that matter<sup>66</sup>.

The next recorded statue, to the emperor Trajan and again known through its base, was erected by the *boule* and *demos* on the main north-south street, the so-called Colonnaded Street in the lower part of the city (Fig. 1.17)<sup>67</sup>.

His adoptive son Hadrian had a statue put up to him by Attalos, son of Neon and grandson of Antiochos<sup>68</sup>. The 1.22 m high and 0.66 m wide limestone base of the statue was found in the northeast part of the Upper Agora. According to Devijver, the father of the dedicator, Neon, son of Antiochos, may have been the brother of Publius Aelius Akulas who received Roman citizenship from Hadrian and financed the construction of the *macellum* in honour of Marcus Aurelius (cf. *supra*)<sup>69</sup>.

A statue put up by the *boule* to Marcus Aurelius as *caesar* during the reign of his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, was erected within the

<sup>64</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 132. Imperial statues were often erected in accordance with someone's will (see T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* [n. 61], p. 11).

<sup>65</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342-343.

<sup>66</sup> Only at Termessos are a priest of Domitian and a priestess of Domitia recorded (*TAM* III 83-84).

<sup>67</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 226 no. 199; *IGR* III 346. The emperor also received a statue at Apollonia (*MAMA* IV 146), at nearby Kremna (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 12 no. 3), at Ilyas (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 423 no. 620), at Olbasa (N.P. MILNER, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 63 no. 138), and at Pednelissos (*SEG* II 729).

<sup>68</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 230 no. 215; *IGR* III 347. Elsewhere in Pisidia, statues for Hadrian are recorded at Lysinia (G.E. BEAN, *Notes and Inscriptions from Pisidia*, I, AS 9, 1959, p. 79 no. 22), Pednelissos (*SEG* II 718), which is also known to have sent an embassy to the emperor during his stay at Perge (S. ŞAHİN, *op. cit.* [n. 43], p. 147 no. 111), at Pogla (W.M. RAMSAY, *Antiquities of Southern Phrygia and the Border Lands*, *AJA* 4, 1888, p. 13 no. 12), at Selge (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 235 no. 256), and at Tymbriada (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 280 no. 399), while at Termessos no less than six dedications to the emperor were recorded, four of which as Olympios (*TAM* III 10, 37-40 and *SEG* XLI 1264).

<sup>69</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 117.

sanctuary of the imperial cult dedicated to the emperor<sup>70</sup>. Marcus Aurelius was also honoured as emperor together with his co-ruler Lucius Verus at Yazıköy on the territory of the city, by the *polis* of Sagalassos at the same time as the inauguration of the Roman baths (cf. *supra*). This monument, which took the form of a votive milestone, was undoubtedly erected along the *Via Sebaste*, which crossed Sagalassian territory<sup>71</sup>.

The son and successor of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor Commodus, also received a statue from the city of Sagalassos which was erected within the imperial *temenos*<sup>72</sup>.

Even after the end of the Antonine dynasty, the sanctuary dedicated to the divine Hadrian and Antoninus Pius continued to be used, as Septimius Severus was honoured by the city of Sagalassos with a statue, erected within the *temenos*<sup>73</sup>. This was the last imperial dedication recorded within the walls of the sanctuary. A votive milestone in honour of the whole Severan family was again placed along the ‘imperial highway’ at

<sup>70</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 225 no. 190; *IGR* III 349.

<sup>71</sup> W.M. RAMSAY, *op. cit.* (n. 41), p. 336 no. 166; *IGR* III 332; M. CHRISTOL – T. DREW-BEAR – M. ÖZSAIT, *Trois milliaires d’Asie Mineure, Anatolia Antiqua* 2 (1993), p. 164-169. For a detailed description of the course of the *Via Sebaste* in the vicinity of Sagalassos see M. WAELEKENS *et al.*, *The 1996 and 1997 Surveys in the Territory of Sagalassos*, in M. WAELEKENS – L. LOOTS (eds.), *Sagalassos V. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1996 and 1997 (Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae, 10)*, Leuven 2000, p. 175-176. Both emperors were given statues at Verbe (A.M. WOODWARD – H.A. ORMEROD, *A Journey in South-western Asia Minor, BSA* 16, 1909-1910, p. 119 no. 13). Ariassos also must have had a statue group erected for the co-rulers of which only that of Verus is preserved (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 114 no. 109). The latter was also honoured with an effigy at the imperial sanctuary of Kormasa (G.E. BEAN, *art. cit.* [n. 68], p. 110 no. 80), while at Lysinia (*ibid.*, p. 79 no. 23) Marcus Aurelius was given a statue.

<sup>72</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 225 no. 191; *IGR* III 350. Similar dedications are registered at Ilyas (W.M. RAMSAY, *op. cit.* [n. 41], p. 332 no. 145), at Selge (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 235 no. 255) and at Termessos (*TAM* III 41-42).

<sup>73</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 224 no. 189; *IGR* III 352. Elsewhere in Pisidia statue bases for Septimius Severus, whether or not accompanied by members of his family, are known at Anabura (*MAMA* VIII 372), Ariassos (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 120 no. 112), Ilyas (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 417 no. 613), Konana (J.R.R. STERRETT, *ibid.*, p. 339 no. 473), Melli (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 155 no. 150), Ormele (J.R.R. STERRETT, *An Epigraphical Journey in Asia Minor [Papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, 2]*, Boston 1888, p. 109 no. 76), Panemoteichos (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 112 no. 106), Sia (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *ibid.*, p. 147 no. 139), Takina (A.H. SMITH, *Notes on a Tour in Asia Minor, JHS* 8, 1887, p. 231 no. 12), and Termessos (*TAM* III 43). At Kormasa, Iulia Domna received a statue (N.P. MILNER, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 71 no. 156), and Geta at Sia (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 149 no. 142).



Yarıköy<sup>74</sup>, while at Sandal Asar — ancient Sandalion — in the territory of Sagalassos a limestone pedestal, carrying an honorific inscription to the emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla, to *caesar* Geta, and to the empress Julia Domna, was put up, possibly by an unidentified priest of the imperial cult<sup>75</sup>.

Severus' son Caracalla was honoured twice in this manner by the city. Once still during the co-reign with his father (AD 198-211) when his statue was erected along the street to the west of the sanctuary of Apollo Klarios<sup>76</sup>. A statue base put up to him as sole emperor was found on the Upper Agora and dated to AD 212<sup>77</sup>.

A first interruption in this series of imperial dedications, that is, the absence of the effigy of the emperor Elagabalus, may have been due to the claim to the throne put forward by L. Gellius Maximus, a citizen of Sagalassos who was commander of one the eastern legions, *legio IV Scythica* stationed at Zeugma on the Euphrates. His rebellion of AD 219 was crushed and Gellius himself put to death<sup>78</sup>.

The last members of the Severan dynasty known to have been honoured with a statue were the emperor Severus Alexander and his mother Iulia Mamaea; it was presented by the priest of the imperial cult, Aurelius Meidianus Attalianus (cf. *infra*)<sup>79</sup>. The double base carrying these statues was found along the Colonnaded Street.

<sup>74</sup> A.H. SMITH, *art. cit.* (n. 73), p. 259 no. 48; *IGR* III 333. This also occurred on the territory of Apollonia (*MAMA* IV 148).

<sup>75</sup> M. WAELKENS *et al.*, *The 1994 and 1995 Surveys on the Territory of Sagalassos*, in M. WAELKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos IV. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1994 and 1995* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 9), Leuven 1997, p. 30.

<sup>76</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 227 no. 203; *IGR* III 353. Numerous inscriptions on statue bases honouring Caracalla have been recorded throughout Pisidia: at Apollonia (*MAMA* IV 147), at Ariassos (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 115 no. 110), at Baris (*SEG* XIX 760), at Kolbasa (W.M. RAMSAY, *art. cit.* [n. 68], p. 271 no. 2; B. LEVICK, *Some Coins and Inscriptions of Colonia Comama*, *NC* 7, 1967, p. 33 n. 3), at Konana (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 339 no. 474), at Kormasa (G.E. BEAN, *art. cit.* [n. 68], p. 110 no. 79), at Melli (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 155-157 no. 151-154), at Olbasa (N.P. MILNER, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 64 no. 143), at Pogla (together with Iulia Domna: V. BERARD, *Inscriptions d'Asie Mineure*, *BCH* 16, 1892, p. 423 no. 49), at Sia (V. BERARD, *ibid.*, p. 435 no. 66), at the ancient city near Çaykenari (*SEG* VI 616), and at Termessos (*TAM* III 44 and 894).

<sup>77</sup> H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 56), p. 115 no. 1; *SEG* XLIV 1761.

<sup>78</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 150.

<sup>79</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 226 no. 196; *IGR* III 354. The emperor also received a statue at Baris (H. WALDMANN, *Neue Inschriften aus Pisidien*, *ZPE* 44, 1981, p. 101 no. 10), and at Ariassos (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 118 no. 111) where he was even honoured with a triumphal arch (see *ibid.*, p. 118-122 and no. 114).

A period of almost thirty years followed without any notable sign of public imperial veneration, at Sagalassos and elsewhere in Pisidia<sup>80</sup>. Then a monument on the Colonnaded Street was dedicated to the emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina<sup>81</sup>.

In the territory of Sagalassos, again along the *Via Sebaste*, a milestone was dedicated to Gallienus' successor, the emperor Claudius II Gothicus<sup>82</sup>. Milestones commemorating road works remained an important medium to express the city's status and to honour the ruling imperial house. Several examples dedicated by the city to members of the Tetrarchy have been recorded in the territory, as well as others honouring the Constantine dynasty<sup>83</sup>.

Constantius II was given two statues erected by the *metropolis* of Sagalassos on two identical limestone statue bases placed on the Upper Agora. They were dated between AD 346 and 361<sup>84</sup>.

A small limestone base dedicated to Julianus was found in the village of Ağlasun, situated in the valley below the ancient site<sup>85</sup>. This is one of

<sup>80</sup> Only at Ariassos has a dedication to Gordian III been recorded (G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 122 no. 115).

<sup>81</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 226 no. 198; *IGR* III 355. Gallienus and Salonina were conspicuous for their philhellenism and frequently honoured in the Greek East (see C.P. JONES, *Some New Inscriptions from Bubon, MDAI(1)* 27-28, 1977-1978, p. 293). A honorific milestone was dedicated to Gallienus and his father Valerianus at Kremna (see G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 46 no. 14), and dedications to his wife Salonina were recorded at Verbe (A.M. WOODWARD – H.A. ORMEROD, *art. cit.* [n. 71], p. 119 no. 12) and possibly at Selge (G.E. BEAN, *Inscriptions from Selge, Anadolu Araştırmaları* 2.1-2, 1965, p. 56 no. 1), although this is rejected by Nollé and Schindler (*op. cit.* [n. 21], p. 79 no. 10), while the emperor himself received a statue in the *sebasteion* et Sia (V. BERARD, *art. cit.* [n. 76], p. 435 no. 68).

<sup>82</sup> D.H. FRENCH, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 113 no. 299.

<sup>83</sup> Milestones dedicated to the Tetrarchy have been noted at Ağlasun (D.H. FRENCH, *op. cit.* [n. 6], p. 101 no. 264), at Çeltikçi (*ibid.*, p. 104 no. 273) and at Düğür (A.H. SMITH, *art. cit.* [n. 73], p. 230 no. 1; D.H. FRENCH, *op. cit.* [n. 6], p. 105 nos. 275-276); a re-used milestone dedicated to the Constantini was recorded at Ağlasun (D.H. FRENCH, *op. cit.* [n. 6], p. 101 no. 264). Also elsewhere in Pisidia, namely at Apollonia (*MAMA* IV 233), at Hadrianopolis (A.S. HALL, *R.E.C.A.M. Notes and Studies no. 9. The Milyadeis and their Territory*, *AS* 36, 1986, p. 140-142 nos. 2-3), at İlyas (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 30], p. 419 no. 617), at Olbasa (G.E. BEAN, *art. cit.* [n. 68], p. 102 no. 61), and at Termessos (*TAM* III 942-944), both groups were honoured in similar fashion. Constantine was even honoured by the people of Termessos as the 'all-seeing' Helios (*TAM* III no. 45), and at Malos he received a statue (*SEG* XXXV no. 1405).

<sup>84</sup> Both were 1.80 m high, 0.85 m wide and 0.36 m thick (see H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* [n. 58], p. 116-117 nos. 2-3). Constantius II received two statues at Termessos: one as emperor (*TAM* III 13), and one as *caesar* (*TAM* III 46).

<sup>85</sup> H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 56), p. 119 no. 8.

the few known dedications to the last pagan emperor, who reigned from AD 361 to 363.

The last imperial statue to be erected in the city was put up for the emperor Zeno the Isaurian (AD 474-491)<sup>86</sup>. Its statue base was recorded near the eastern city-gate.

Most of these statues would have been present in the city for long periods of time, as it was the custom to restore them if they were damaged by catastrophes or age<sup>87</sup>. Yet this was not the only way in which the imperial image became known to the citizens of Sagalassos. It was also displayed in a completely different fashion — by means of civic bronze issues.

*Coins* — On civic coinage issued under the empire, the effigy of the reigning emperor or a member of his family was depicted on the obverse as a way of honouring the ruling dynasty<sup>88</sup>. A special kind of homage awarded by the civic authorities was the representation of the emperor with divine epithets and/or attributes, or as an eponymous magistrate.

The first of these special honours was conferred upon Hadrian who was revered on four coin types as Olympios<sup>89</sup>. They refer to the special relation between the emperor and Zeus Olympios, with whom he became identified, and which manifested itself in the completion of the Olympieion at Athens. Caracalla received a special civic issue depicting the emperor wearing a lion-skin over his head and proclaiming him as the Roman Herakles (*Hēraklēs Rōmaios*)<sup>90</sup> who would free the empire from its enemies. Later emperors and empresses were often represented with

<sup>86</sup> K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 228 no. 208.

<sup>87</sup> See T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* (n. 61), p. 31 and 35.

<sup>88</sup> See K.W. HARL, *Civic Coins and Civic Politics in the Roman East, AD 180-275*, London 1987, p. 38-51.

<sup>89</sup> The civic bronze issues depicting Hadrian Olympios have four different types on the reverse, namely the Dioskouroi: *IW* no. 3833, *SNG* Paris no. 1763; the mother goddess Kybele: S. SCHEERS, *Coins found in 1996 and 1997*, in M. WAELKENS – L. LOOTS (eds.), *Sagalassos V. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1996 and 1997* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 10), Leuven 2000, no. 17; the hero Lakedaimon: *IW* no. 3832, *SNG* Paris no. 1764-1765; and the lunar deity Mên: *BMC* no. 12.

<sup>90</sup> *BMC* p. 243 no. 18. In Amblada, both Caracalla and Geta were honoured as the new Ares (*neos Ares*) and represented in body-armour holding a trident (Caracalla: *SNG* von Aulock no. 4904; *SNG* Paris no. 1037; Geta: von Aulock Pisidien I no. 141-142). The colony of Kremna even issued a whole series of coins featuring the Severan imperial family (Julia Domna as Leto holding the children Caracalla and Geta: von Aulock Pisidien II no. 1167; the busts of Geta, Severus and Caracalla above an eagle with spread wings: von Aulock Pisidien II nos. 1189-1190; Caracalla and Geta confronted and extending hands: von Aulock Pisidien II no. 1188).

the attributes of the solar and lunar deity, respectively, on the civic bronze issues. Gordianus III (AD 238-244), for instance, was depicted wearing a radiate crown on two types of civic issues<sup>91</sup>, while his wife, the empress Tranquillina, was represented with a moon-crescent behind her shoulders on two types of Sagalassian coins<sup>92</sup>. During the reign of Traianus Decius (AD 249-251), the empress Etruscilla equally had a crescent depicted behind her shoulders<sup>93</sup>. These attributes were also present on the effigies of the wife of Gallienus (AD 253-268), the empress Salonina, and of their son, the co-emperor Saloninus<sup>94</sup>.

The grant of an eponymous magistrate to an emperor occurred at Sagalassos, as W. Weiser established, during the joint reign of Philippus I and II (AD 247-249), when the junior emperor was awarded the title of *demiourgos*<sup>95</sup>. On coins that were issued during his period in office

<sup>91</sup> The first type features on the reverse the lunar god Mên standing to the left, with a crescent behind his shoulders, wearing a Phrygian cap, a *chlamys*, and a short *chiton*, holding a *phiale* in his right hand, while his left hand rests on a scepter (SNG von Aulock nos. 5184-5187; *IW* no. 3864; SNG Paris no. 1816). The reverse of the second bronze issue depicts a female figure advancing to the right, wearing a *chiton* and a *himation*, while holding a vessel-like object on her head with her right hand (SNG von Aulock no. 5184).

<sup>92</sup> The first civic bronze shows a female figure standing facing, holding an infant on her left arm (*IW* no. 3865; SNG Paris no. 1818; SNG von Aulock no. 5185), while the second displays an altar decorated with garlands and with a pine-cone on top, surmounted by a star within crescent (SNG von Aulock no. 5186).

<sup>93</sup> The reverses of the types minted under Etruscilla feature either a bust of Mên to the right, wearing a Phrygian cap, with a crescent behind his shoulders (*IW* no. 3870; SNG Paris no. 1824), the hero Lakedaimon standing to the left, wearing a helmet and a cuirass, and holding Nike on his hand (*IW* no. 3871; SNG Paris no. 1823), a bust of Helios to the left, radiate and draped (SNG von Aulock no. 5193), or two arched shrines, each containing a circular altar, adorned with a crescent and surmounted by a star, with a tall column between them (SNG von Aulock no. 5194; SNG Paris no. 1822).

<sup>94</sup> The civic issues representing the empress Salonina depict several scenes on the reverse: Sarapis standing to the left, wearing a *kalathos*, raising his right hand and holding a sceptre in his left hand (*KM* no. 22); Nike advancing to the right, holding a trophy (*IW* no. 3866; SNG Paris no. 1842); Tyche standing to the left, holding a *cornucopiae* and a rudder (*IW* no. 3880; SNG Paris no. 1846); two joint hands (*IW* no. 3881; SNG Paris no. 1847); two joint hands above a wreath between two palm-branches (SNG Paris no. 1844); three columns on tall bases supporting an architrave with two small arched shrines between them, each containing an altar adorned with a garland and a crescent surmounted by a star (SNG Paris no. 1845); an eagle standing facing, looking to the left with half-spread wings, holding a wreath in his beak (SNG von Aulock no. 5201; SNG Paris no. 1843). The examples of co-emperor Saloninus feature either a pine-cone surmounted by a crescent (*KM* no. 25), or Hephaistos seated to the right, wearing a cap, wielding a hammer in his right hand and holding a round shield with his left on his knees (*KM* no. 26).

<sup>95</sup> W. WEISER, *Philippus iunior als Ehrenburgermeister von Sagalassos und Prostanna*, SNR 64 (1985), p. 91-97; for the coin type see SNG Copenhagen no. 209. This was also

Philippus II is represented wearing a diadem that was characteristic for that magistrate. The representation of an emperor as an eponymous magistrate implied the assignment of the office although this of course did not entail the actual presence of the emperor in the city; his office was held by a substitute. It usually did mean that the emperor financed all duties of the magistrate, but at Sagalassos he also funded the issue of the coins on which his magistracy was proclaimed, as can be gathered from the exceptional genitive form of the emperor's title<sup>96</sup>. There is clear evidence from elsewhere that the holding of honorary local offices by emperors or their associates was the occasion for them to make specific benefactions to the city, just like it would have been if a wealthy local citizen held an important magistracy<sup>97</sup>.

## 2. IMPERIAL CELEBRATIONS

The rule of Rome at Sagalassos was made omnipresent within the city in the marble and bronze of buildings, statues and coins, but it was really incorporated into the daily life of the community through public celebrations in honour of the imperial house. All this took place in a 'holy-day' atmosphere, with the high priest of the imperial cult presiding. It was at these imperial festivities and in their rituals that the vague and elusive ideas concerning the emperor were acted out and made real. The bust or statue of the emperor dominated the celebration of his cult. The effigies of the emperor and his predecessors could be seen at games as well as in sacred processions. To quote S. Price: «Here the conceptual systems of temple, image and sacrifice had their living embodiment»<sup>98</sup>.

the case at Prostanna, some 40 km NE of Sagalassos (see *art. cit.*; for the coin type see von Aulock Pisidien II nos. 1823-1828). In the early Julio-Claudian period several members of the family of the ruling dynasty and of the Roman military elite were elected to honorary magistracies in the colony of Pisidian Antioch (see S. MITCHELL – M. WAELENS, *op. cit.* [n. 55], p. 10). At Tarsus, the emperors Commodus and Caracalla assumed the post of *demiourgos* (see S. MITCHELL, *Festivals, Games, and Civic Life in Roman Asia Minor*, JRS 80, 1990, p. 192).

<sup>96</sup> W. WEISER, *art. cit.* (n. 95), p. 95. Together with Prostanna, Sagalassos is the only city where such a genitive form, and the implied funding of the coinage, is recorded. For the *demiourgos* as the leading civic magistrate at Sagalassos see L. ROBERT, *A travers l'Asie Mineure. Poètes et prosateurs, monnaies grecques, voyageurs et géographie* (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 239), Paris 1980, p. 250.

<sup>97</sup> See D. KIENAST, *Augustus. Prinzeps und Monarch*, Darmstadt 1982, p. 344-345.

<sup>98</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 102.

Imperial celebrations were organised both on an irregular and regular basis. The accession of a new emperor or the receipt of good news about the emperor in the course of his reign were met with public rejoicing, but there was also a regular cycle of celebrations, such as public feasts for the celebration of the emperor's birthday, as are attested at Termessos<sup>99</sup>. Yet, the most important way in which the emperor was brought into the life of the community was by adapting a traditional festival in honour of the chief local deity, or by staging events that belonged exclusively to the imperial sphere, namely gladiatorial fights and animal hunts. Both kinds of imperial celebrations were held at Sagalassos.

### 2.1. *Religious festivals*

The traditional religious festivals or *panegyreis* celebrated in honour of a deity included athletic and/or musical games, processions in which images of the god would be carried through the city, public sacrifices of animals, and feasts consisting of banquets, markets and performances<sup>100</sup>. At Sagalassos, this kind of festivals is known only from inscriptions on the bases of statues given to the victors of the different contests of the associated games<sup>101</sup>. Other elements of the festival have not been recorded although they undoubtedly were part of the event.

The emperor was often brought into close relationship with the traditional gods of the city, in joint dedications or in assimilation with them, but particularly in the festivals, the most popular aspect of any given cult, which often had an imperial title added to them, for example Sebasteia, Kaisareia, as a way of introducing the cult of the emperor into civic life<sup>102</sup>. This was the case at the other major centres of Pisidia, Termessos and Selge, in the

<sup>99</sup> TAM III 5 which most probably records the establishment of a birthday celebration for the emperor Septimius Severus.

<sup>100</sup> One of the best documented examples of such a festival in southwest Anatolia is recorded at Lycian Oinoanda (see M. WÖRRLE, *Stadt und Fest im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien. Studien zu einer agonistischen Stiftung aus Oinoanda* [Vestigia. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, 39], München 1988).

<sup>101</sup> These smaller local prize-games or *agones thematikoi* — to be distinguished from the more important and prestigious sacred games or *agones hieroi* which offered a crown instead of prize money — were very popular in Asia Minor, especially during the 3rd century AD when they offered a rival claim on funds and an alternative route to individual and civic prestige (see S. MITCHELL, *art. cit.* [n. 95], p. 189-190).

<sup>102</sup> See S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 103.

*Agon Sebasteios Solymeios* and the *Agon Kaisareios Kesbelios*, named after Zeus Solymeus and after Zeus Kesbelios, respectively<sup>103</sup>. These double titles represent joint cults that demonstrated piety to both god and emperor.

So far, no such civic games that were part of a festival explicitly dedicated to the imperial cult have been recorded at Sagalassos. Several elements, however, suggest that the prominent Klareian games, based on the local cult of Apollo Klarios, were also held in honour of the emperors<sup>104</sup>. Firstly, they were founded by Tiberius Claudius Piso, son of Tiberius Claudius Ilagoas and member of a family that was deeply involved in imperial veneration (cf. *supra*)<sup>105</sup>. Furthermore, Piso was a high priest of the imperial cult, and not a priest of Apollo<sup>106</sup>. Moreover, of the other two known *agonothetes* of these games, only one served as priest of Apollo, while the other was again a high priest of the imperial cult (cf. *infra*)<sup>107</sup>. The fact that these games were dedicated to the deity whose sanctuary also housed the emperors (cf. *supra*), equally suggests that they might also have been dedicated to the divine emperors. This, combined with the fact that statue bases for victors in these games were also erected within the imperial sanctuary<sup>108</sup>, strongly argues for the presence of an imperial element in the festival<sup>109</sup>.

Devijver suggested that the first Klareian games took place on the occasion of the consecration of the restored Apollo Klarios temple in

<sup>103</sup> Termessos: *TAM* III 161 and 164; Selge: J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 115 no. 55. Agonistic inscriptions related to a festival which was dedicated to both a traditional deity and the emperors have also been found in Verbe in southwestern Pisidia: the *Agon Severeios Alexandreios Herakleios Eusebeios Eutycheios* in honour of Severus Alexander and Herakles (see A.M. WOODWARD – A.H. ORMEROD, *art. cit.* [n. 71], p. 120 no. 15).

<sup>104</sup> See also M. WAELKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 347. An *agon Klareios* related to the cult of Apollo is also known from Isinda in southwestern Pisidia (A.M. WOODWARD – H.A. ORMEROD, *art. cit.* [n. 71], p. 113 no. 4).

<sup>105</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 125 and 133-135. Also see K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 230 no. 217 and *IGR* III 361.

<sup>106</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 133 no. 3.

<sup>107</sup> *Agonothetes* Gbaimos was a priest of Apollo (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 227 no. 201), while the other, Publius Aelius Quintus Claudius Philippianus Varus, was imperial high priest (*ibid.*, p. 225 no. 195; *IGR* III 360). According to Devijver the latter can be identified with Claudius Philippianus Varus (*ibid.*, p. 227 no. 202; see H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* [n. 34], p. 118).

<sup>108</sup> See K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 225 no. 194.

<sup>109</sup> In this way they have a parallel in the Ephesian Olympics, begun as a festival for Domitian and revived under Hadrian as a result of his connection with Zeus Olympios (see S.J. FRIESEN, *op. cit.* [n. 7], p. 117-119).



AD 103/104<sup>110</sup>. However, an earlier date seems certain since one of the victors in the wrestling contest of the Klareian games held under the presidency of Piso, namely Attalos, son of Neon, grandson of Demetrios, was the father of Titus Flavius Neon who received Roman citizenship under Vespasian (cf. *infra*)<sup>111</sup>. The inscription on the statue base for Attalos does not mention Piso's career as an equestrian officer (cf. *infra*), which may suggest that he already held the office of *agonothete* before the beginning of his military career. The exact occasion of the establishment of the Klareian games is not clear, but considering the chronological implications of Attalos' participation and the long list of honorific monuments dedicated by Piso's ancestors to the emperors (cf. *supra*), the foundation of the games may well be Piso's contribution to the loyalty displayed by his family to the imperial house of the *Iulii-Claudii*.

The Klareian games are the oldest ones known at Sagalassos and are mentioned in inscriptions from the second half of the 1st century until the 3rd century AD. From the middle imperial period onwards, and especially during the 3rd century, new games were established, some of which were linked with the older Klareia in the sense that they were held together<sup>112</sup>. These *agones* are prize-games which we denote as private because they were privately funded and took their names from the benefactors who instituted them, without any explicit relation to an official cult. Such institutions by members of prominent families arose during the Hellenistic period<sup>113</sup>, but became widespread during the middle imperial period as a

<sup>110</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 114.

<sup>111</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 345. For the inscription see K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 230 no. 217; H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 56), p. 119 no. 7.

<sup>112</sup> The oldest of these private games were the Vareia which, according to Devijver, were founded by Tiberius Claudius Varus, the brother of Tiberius Claudius Piso (H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* [n. 34], p. 127). Known *agonothetai* are Publius Aelius Quintus Claudius Philippianus Varus (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* [n. 15], p. 225 no. 195) and Gbaimos (*ibid.*, p. 227 no. 201). The Rhodoneia, dated in the first half of the 3rd century AD, were organised and financed by Quinta Aurelia Drakainiane Rhododiane Rhodonis, while her husband Quintus Aurelius Diomedianus Alexandros served as *agonothete* for life (see H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.*, p. 120-121; K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 225 no. 193). Gbaimos also served as *agonothetes* of the Rhodoneia, as well as of the Vareia and the Klareia (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 225 no. 194). Finally, the Callippianeia were founded in accordance with the last will of the Roman senator and priest of Dionysos M. Ulpus Callippianus after whom they were named; the only known president of the games was Quintus Aurelius Diomedianus Alexandros (K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 225 no. 193a).

<sup>113</sup> See A. CHANIOTIS, *Sich selbst feiern? Städtische Feste des Hellenismus im Spannungsfeld von Religion und Politik*, in M. WÖRLE – P. ZANKER (eds.), *Stadt und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus*, München 1995, p. 151.

way for leading members of the citizen body to contribute to the development of their *patriis*. Many of them were funerary games, founded on the occasion of the demise of a close relative.

The probable connection with the emperor and with one of the main sanctuaries of the city establishes the Klareia as the major games at Sagalassos. The mix of local cult practice and loyalty to the emperors became one of the most important characteristics of the *agones* of the imperial period<sup>114</sup>, at the same time satisfying both civic pride and economic needs. The *agones* in fact represented a crucial commercial opportunity since they attracted large numbers of visitors. The need for a means of exchange on these occasions may even explain some of the massive minting of local bronze coins by the Pisidian and other cities during the 3rd century AD<sup>115</sup>.

The presidency of the games or *agonothesia* was a liturgy of Hellenistic tradition. As the funds of the *polis* were often insufficient for the organisation of these *agones*, the local elite shouldered the financial burden. Most of the contests of the traditional and imperial festivals, and obviously all of the private games, were financed from foundations — gifts or bequests invested, usually in land, to provide the necessary income — set up by private individuals and administered by the city<sup>116</sup>. These benefactors were generally appointed as *agonothetai*, the officials who were chosen from the members of the city council and charged with the organization of the games<sup>117</sup>, often for life or even in perpetuity, e.g. Tiberius Claudius Piso, who established the Klareian games at Sagalassos<sup>118</sup>. Since the funding of the prizes and shows was at least partly secured by the founder, *in casu* Tiberius Claudius Piso who as perpetual *agonothetes*

<sup>114</sup> See F.K. YEGÜL, *Memory, Metaphor, and Meaning in the Cities of Asia Minor*, in E. FENTRESS (ed.), *Romanization and the City. Creation, Transformation and Failures. Proceedings of a Conference held at the American Academy in Rome to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Excavations at Cosa, 14-16 May 1998 (Journal of Roman Archaeology. Supplementary Series, 38)*, Portsmouth (RI) 2000, p. 151.

<sup>115</sup> See S. MITCHELL, *art. cit.* (n. 95), p. 193.

<sup>116</sup> See S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 62. Our understanding of such foundations has been increased by the publication of the documents from Oinoanda, which set out the arrangements made by a local benefactor, C. Iulius Demosthenes, for a new pentateric agonistic festival (see M. WÖRRLE, *op. cit.* [n. 101]).

<sup>117</sup> Concerning the election of the *agonothetes* see S. MITCHELL, *art. cit.* (n. 95), p. 188.

<sup>118</sup> At Termessos, Hermaios, son of Hermolaos, who donated a sum of money for the organisation of the *agon Sebasteios Solymeios* was also appointed *agonothetes* (TAM III 161).

not only provided funds for the organisation of these games, but also for effigies and statues *in perpetuo* of the victors in the wrestling competition<sup>119</sup>, most of the later agonothete's burden was in theory organisational, not financial. Yet, in practice much expenditure could still be expected in the preparation of the games, and the cities gradually became more dependent on these benefactors for the funding of the games<sup>120</sup>.

Such institutions were a means for wealthy citizens to achieve social recognition and to perpetuate their memory. The donors would have been assured of continuing prestige by the inclusion of their descendants in the procession at the festival and constant mention of their name in the honorific inscriptions on statue bases erected for the victors of the different contests which served more their glorification than that of the victor.

Known *agonothetai* include, besides the founder of the games, Tiberius Claudius Piso, Publius Aelius Quintus Claudius Philippianus Varus and a certain Gbaimos who was priest of Apollo for life<sup>121</sup>. In view of the link with the imperial cult, it might also have been these games that were presided over by the *Titi Flavii*, Titus Flavius Neon and his grandson Titus Flavius Severianus Neon, who were mentioned in inscriptions as *agonothetes* for life and for eternity, respectively<sup>122</sup>. Yet, it cannot be ruled out that we are dealing here with a new agonistic festival dedicated solely to the cult of the *Sebastoi*, either to mark the accession of new emperors or their victories, or simply to provide the cult with an essential ingredient.

From the inscriptions it is clear that the Klareian games basically consisted of martial contests such as the *pankration*, wrestling (πάλη) and pugilistic competitions (πυγμή), which were organised for both adults and youths<sup>123</sup>. None of the inscriptions related to the games refer to them

<sup>119</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 134. At Pogla, Aurelius Archelaianus Alexandros, the founder and perpetual agonothete of the *agon Serapeios Alexandreios*, was responsible for financing the statues, prizes and honours (*SEG XIX 836*).

<sup>120</sup> See S. MITCHELL, *art. cit.* (n. 95), p. 188, and C. ROUECHÉ, *Performers and Partisans at Aphrodisias in the Roman and Late Roman Periods. A Study based on Inscriptions from the Current Excavations at Aphrodisias in Caria* (*Journal of Roman Studies. Monographs*, 6), London 1993, p. 8.

<sup>121</sup> See n. 107.

<sup>122</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *The Inscriptions of the Neon-Library of Roman Sagalassos*, in M. WAELEKENS – J. POBLOME (eds.), *Sagalassos II. Report on the Third Campaign of 1992* (*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 6), Leuven 1993, p. 107 no. 2.1 and no. 2.3.

<sup>123</sup> For the *pankration* see K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 225 no. 194; for the wrestling (πάλη) and the boxing competitions (πυγμή) see *ibid.*, p. 227 no. 202 and p. 230

as pentateric, which may indicate that we are dealing here with an annual festival.

Although the Klareian games appear to have been connected with the imperial cult, they have to be distinguished from the exclusively imperial games or *Sebasteia* held within the framework of the provincial imperial cult or other local imperial festivals<sup>124</sup>. These have thus far not been recorded at Sagalassos, but the *neokoros*-title suggests that they may have existed.

These imperial festivals, like other rituals of the imperial cult in the cities of the Eastern Roman empire, were strongly Greek, but some of the peripheral elements of the cult were indeed of Roman origin.

## 2.2. *Gladiatorial games and wild beast fights*

Gladiatorial games (*munera gladiatoria*) and animal fights (*venationes*) were in origin Roman institutions, introduced as part of lavish aristocratic funerals. In the later republic they were commonly sponsored by office holders (or those seeking public office), thus acquiring a central position in Roman public life. Eventually, the organisation of a gladiatorial show became a *munus*, an obligation on would-be magistrates, and it was in this form that it was exported to the provinces. As has since long been demonstrated by L. Robert, the 'civilized' Greek world did embrace the blood sports of the Romans<sup>125</sup>. In Asia Minor the vast majority of gladiatorial inscriptions are linked with the imperial cult. High priests of the provincial cult of the emperors sponsored competitions as part of their official duties, while their local counterparts were equally responsible for mounting gladiatorial fights, as they are known to have maintained troupes (*familiae*) of gladiators and wild-beast fighters<sup>126</sup>. From this we may deduce that such fights were put on mainly if not exclusively in connection with the imperial cult<sup>127</sup>.

no. 217. The participation of both adults and youths is attested by inscriptions nos. 195 and 202 published *ibid.*, p. 225 and 227.

<sup>124</sup> Such exclusively imperial festivals have been recorded at Apollonia (*agones hiera Kaisares*; see *MAMA* IV 152 and 154), Olbasa (*agon (Severios) Augusteios Kapetoleios pentaeterikos poleitikos*; see J. JÜTHNER, *Die Augusteia in Olbasa*, *WS* 24, 1902, p. 53-59 nos. 1-4) and at Pogle (*agones Sebasteia*; see *CIG* III 4367g).

<sup>125</sup> See L. ROBERT, *Les gladiateurs dans l'Orient grec*, Paris 1940.

<sup>126</sup> See L. ROBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 125), p. 240, 267-275. In Adada Bianor, son of Antiochos, presbyter and archpriest of the emperors, as well as gymnasiarch, was honoured on the agora by the 'family', undoubtedly an association of gladiators (J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 42], p. 303 no. 425; *IGR* III 372).

<sup>127</sup> L. ROBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 125), p. 267-275; S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 88-89.

This was also the case at Sagalassos where Publius Aelius Quintus Claudius Philippianus Varus, a high priest of the emperor, and *agonothetes dia biou* of the *agones Klareia* and the private *agones Vareia* (cf. *supra*), organised over a period of four entire days *venationes* and *munera gladiatoria*, in which ‘sharp weapons’ were used, which meant a fight to the death. Each day five pairs of gladiators took part in fights with an iron hunting spear<sup>128</sup>. Another such event was given by a certain Tertullus whose sepulchral epigram mentions the gladiatorial shows and *venationes* he organized wherein *bestiarii* fought against bears, panthers and lions<sup>129</sup>. The execution of these *munera* or *venationes* apparently exceeded the guidelines prescribed by Roman authorities for duration, number of participants, nature of the fight and/or number and type of animals, since Tertullus obtained imperial consent for the organization of his spectacles as was required for exceptional instances<sup>130</sup>.

Similar fights elsewhere in Pisidia are known to have been organised by the high priests of the imperial cult at Selge, Pednelissos and Adada<sup>131</sup>, while civic coins of Kremna also commemorate the imperial consent for the organisation of exceptional gladiatorial exhibitions<sup>132</sup>.

Roman-style amphitheatres were rarely built in the Greek world. Greeks generally preferred to use their own stadia, or sometimes theatres, for gladiatorial games, wild-beast shows and executions<sup>133</sup>. For this purpose, small arenas could be built into the orchestras of theatres, while the curved ends of the stadia could be converted into oval ‘amphitheatres’ for gladiatorial games, of which the oblong shape made them a natural venue for large-scale wild-beast shows<sup>134</sup>. That this was also the case at

<sup>128</sup> According to Waelkens, the organisation of these games may be related to the inauguration of the new theatre at Sagalassos (M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* [n. 1], p. 354).

<sup>129</sup> *IGR* III 362.

<sup>130</sup> See J. NOLLÉ, *Kaiserliche Privilegien für Gladiatorenmunera und Tierhetzen. Unbekannte und ungedeutete Zeugnisse auf städtischen Münzen des griechischen Ostens*, *JNG* 42-43 (1992-1993), p. 69-70, and L. ROBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 125), p. 274 sqq.

<sup>131</sup> Selge: J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 95 no. 20a; K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 233 no. 247a); besides gladiatorial fights and animal hunts, the Selgian priest who officiated in the second quarter of the 3rd century AD also organised distributions of money and theatrical performances. Pednelissos: L. ROBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 125), p. 316-318; Adada: see n. 127.

<sup>132</sup> See J. NOLLÉ, *art. cit.* (n. 130), p. 54-57 and p. 69, who identified the object depicted on coins minted during the reign of Aurelianus (*SNG* Paris no. 1525) as gladiator shields.

<sup>133</sup> See K. WELCH, *Greek Stadia and Roman Spectacles: Asia, Athens, and the Tomb of Herodes Atticus*, *JRA* 11 (1998), p. 121.

<sup>134</sup> The transformation of a stadium into an amphitheatre was normally done by means of wooden barriers; the practice of building stone amphitheatres into the curved ends of

Sagalassos can not only be deduced from the high podium of the stadium (cf. *supra*), separating the track from the seats<sup>135</sup>, but also from the epigram of Tertullus that mentions gladiatorial fights and animal hunts «*en stadiois*»<sup>136</sup>. The arrangement of an arena in the local theatre is corroborated by its relief decoration depicting animal fights<sup>137</sup>.

### 3. PRIESTS OF THE IMPERIAL CULT

The loyalty displayed by citizens towards the emperor and the *domus imperatoria* in the erection of buildings and statues, and in the organisation of festivals culminated in their appointment to the priesthood of the imperial cult. Its importance within civic religion at Sagalassos is illustrated by its title, namely *archiereus* or high priest, indicating that it stood at the head of all civic priesthoods. In spite of the high profile of the imperial cult, few of its priests are recorded, although it has to be said that in general hardly any inscriptions relating to priests have survived<sup>138</sup>.

The first priesthood of the imperial cult at Sagalassos, that of Titus Flavius Neon, dates to the reign of the Flavians. The man in question was the first *civis romanus* of the family. His father Attalos was a native with a strictly Greek name and therefore not a Roman citizen. The new citizen assumed the *praenomen*, *nomen gentilicium* and *tribus* of the Flavian emperors<sup>139</sup>. His relationship and loyalty towards the emperor — presumably Vespasian — and the *domus imperatoria* are revealed in two ways. He was mentioned as the «first high priest» of the imperial cult at Sagalassos and he is called a «friend of the emperor»<sup>140</sup>. Moreover,

stadia only began in late antiquity, when athletic competitions had already declined (see K. WELCH, *art. cit.* [n. 133], p. 122).

<sup>135</sup> The podia are excessively high for athletic displays and their height can best be explained as a protective measure against the possibility of animals jumping into the audience (see K. WELCH, *art. cit.* [n. 133], p. 123).

<sup>136</sup> See n. 129.

<sup>137</sup> D. DE BERNARDI- FERRERO, *Teatri classici in Asia Minore*, III. *Città di Pisidia, Licia e Caria*, Roma 1969, p. 54-56.

<sup>138</sup> Besides the imperial priests only a priest of Apollo (see n. 107), a priestess of Demeter and Kore (M. WAELKENS *et al.*, *art. cit.* [n. 39], p. 147), and a priest of Dionysos (see n. 112) have thus far been recorded within the city.

<sup>139</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 122), p. 109.

<sup>140</sup> See H. DEVIJVER – M. WAELKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 5), p. 293-296 no. 1.1: a honorific inscription on a statue base (1.19 m high, 0.87 m wide and 0.51 m thick) put up to the imperial high priest by the *geraioi*.

throughout his life, he presided over *agones*, which may have been dedicated to the imperial cult (cf. *supra*) as he is the one who introduced that cult. His financial burden as *agonothetes* and as high priest of the imperial cult would have been considerable and attests to his *euergesia* towards the city. It was as a tribute to him that his grandson Titus Flavius Severianus Neon founded the library of Sagalassos in the early 2nd century<sup>141</sup>.

Tiberius Claudius Piso, son of Tiberius Claudius Ilagoas and the founder and *agonothetes in perpetuum* of the Klareian games (cf. *supra*), was also *archiereus* and a Roman equestrian officer as attested by an honorific inscription found on the Lower Agora<sup>142</sup>. Devijver places him in the same generation as Titus Flavius Neon<sup>143</sup> but, as the latter was the first priest of the local imperial cult, Piso must have held office after him. The Roman knight undoubtedly held his imperial priesthood only after he had served as *praefectus fabrum* and held the classical *tres militiae* as *praefectus cohortis III Bracaraugustanorum*, *tribunus legionis IV Scythicae* and *praefectus alae VII Phrygum* under the Flavian dynasty<sup>144</sup>. As he is also known to have put up a statue to the emperor Vespasian on behalf of his father (cf. *supra*) on which his military career is not mentioned, this could put his imperial priesthood, after his military career of ca. 10-12 years, sometime during the reign of Domitian. Piso thus showed his loyalty to the emperor in two contexts, both within the *polis*, where he erected a statue for the emperor, organised the imperial cult, and

<sup>141</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 122), p. 107 no. 2.3 on the podium of the back wall of the library building. This building was wrongly identified as a *Sebasteion* by J. Russell (J. RUSSELL, *Sagalassos in Pisidia*, *JRA* 10, 1997, p. 541-542), although a (bronze?) statue of the emperor may have been placed in the central niche of the library (see M. WAELEKENS – H. KÖKTEN ERSOY – K. SEVERSON – F. MARTENS – Ş. SENER, *The Sagalassos Neon Library and its Conservation*, in M. WAELEKENS – L. LOOTS (eds.), *Sagalassos V. Report on the Survey and Excavation Campaigns of 1996 and 1997* [*Acta Archaeologica Lovaniensia. Monographiae*, 10], Leuven 2000, p. 420), as such buildings are known to have housed imperial images (see T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* [n. 61], p. 47).

<sup>142</sup> The inscription was carved on a limestone statue base, found on the Lower Agora (H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* [n. 34], p. 133 no. 3). It is remarkable that although the inscription was erected to honour the victorious athlete, apparently a victor in the wrestling contest of the Klareian games for the second time — the first time also during the high priesthood and *agonothesia* of Piso (see H. DEVIJVER, *ibid.*, p. 133 no. 4) — it only devotes two lines to him. This concise homage to the athlete is no more than a pretext to enlarge upon the career and benefactions of Tiberius Claudius Piso.

<sup>143</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 153.

<sup>144</sup> For a detailed discussion of this military career see H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 134-135.



founded a festival with imperial links, and in the empire where he served the emperor through military commands.

According to its building inscription, Titus Flavius Collega, together with his wife Flavia Longilla, his mother and his brother Titus Flavius Varus Dareios, and perhaps other family members whom can not be identified due to the fragmentary state of the text, financed the restoration and decoration of the temple of Apollo Klarios and the *Theoi Sebastoi* (cf. *supra*). The former was the high priest of the imperial cult at the time of the reconstruction and inauguration of the temple, assigned by the Devijver to the reign of Trajan on the basis of the office of governor Proculus (cf. *supra*). Collega paid for it from his own resources, which included 10,000 *denarii* from the time of his priesthood; this most probably refers to the *summa honoraria* that he deposited in the treasury upon his election as high priest, a sum that could be used when needed.

The priest who was in office during the inauguration of the temple of the *divus* Hadrianus and Antoninus Pius is not known. Yet, a fragmentary text on a column plinth mentioning an *archierasamenos* suggests, according to Lanckoronski, that a second dedicatory inscription was cut on the plinths of the east side of the building, commemorating the dedication of the columns by the high priest of the imperial cult<sup>145</sup>.

Publius Aelius Akulas, son of Antiochos, grandson of Neon, and great-grandson of Rhodon, was the high priest of the emperors who constructed the *macellum* to the southeast of the Upper Agora and dedicated it to Marcus Aurelius (cf. *supra*). The 13,000 *denarii* he contributed to the construction of the market was most probably again the *summa honoraria* for his appointment to the imperial priesthood. This man was also the first husband of Publia Aelia Ulpiana Noe who remarried Titus Flavius Severianus Neon, the library builder, and who may have funded the construction of the nymphaeum at the northern end of the Upper Agora<sup>146</sup>.

The high priest of the imperial cult, Publius Aelius Quintus Claudius Philippianus Varus, was not only *agonothetes dia biou* of the *agones*

<sup>145</sup> See K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 224 no. 188\*. Cities are known to have invited individuals to contribute to the cost of building imperial temples: At the ancient city near Ilyas on the west shore of Lake Burdur a couple dedicated half of the *peristasis* to Zeus Soter and the *Theoi Sebastoi* (see G.E. BEAN, *art. cit.* [n. 68], p. 81 no. 25). The gift of columns by priests is also registered at Aphrodisias (see MAMA VIII 450).

<sup>146</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 116, and M. WAELKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 353.

*Klareia* and the *agones Vareia*, but also organised animal hunts and gladiator fights, which undoubtedly should be seen within the framework of his imperial priesthood (cf. *supra*). He was honoured with a statue by the association of wool-dyers, erected within the sanctuary of the imperial cult<sup>147</sup>. Contrary to the other known imperial priests at Sagalassos, and in the whole of Pisidia for that matter, Varus is the priest of a single emperor<sup>148</sup>. For the emperor to have been the object of a separate cult, he must have been of the utmost importance to the city, which immediately suggests such emperors as Augustus and Hadrian. Given the importance of the first emperor for the region and for Sagalassos in particular<sup>149</sup>, the foundation of a separate cult dedicated to him seems plausible<sup>150</sup>. However, since Titus Flavius Neon is clearly stated to have been the first priest of the imperial cult at Sagalassos, any cult of Augustus must have been founded afterwards<sup>151</sup>. Another possibility may be that the inscription deals with Varus as the high priest of the living emperor, contrary to his function as the *archiereus* of both the living emperor *and* the consecrated *divi Augusti*<sup>152</sup>. The elaborate nomenclature of the priest at first seems to suggest a date after the *Constitutio Antoniniana* (AD 211), at a time when the members of the elite used their names to distinguish themselves from the new Roman citizens<sup>153</sup>. Devijver, however, claims that the priest can almost certainly be identified with the agonothete of the Klareian games, Claudius Philippianus Varus<sup>154</sup>, and that his name was

<sup>147</sup> See n. 107.

<sup>148</sup> Exceptions to this are found at Termessos, where priests of Augustus (*TAM* III 684), Domitian (*TAM* III 83a) and Hadrian (*TAM* III 15) are attested, and at Tymbriada (D. KAYA – S. MITCHELL, *The Sanctuary of the God Eurymedon at Timbriada in Pisidia*, *AS* 35, 1985, p. 51 no. 1).

<sup>149</sup> See M. WAELEKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 321-340.

<sup>150</sup> This was also suggested by S. PRICE, *Gods and the Emperors. The Greek Language of the Roman Imperial Cult*, *JHS* 104 (1984), p. 85 n. 50.

<sup>151</sup> Augustus is known to have received much posthumous worship (see T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* [n. 61], p. 31-32). A cult of *divus Augustus* established after the latter's death is also attested at Termessos by the imperial priesthood of Hoples III, dated to the second half of the 1st century AD (*TAM* III 684), and that of Marcus Aurelius Platonianus Otanês dated to ca. AD 235 (*TAM* III 108-110).

<sup>152</sup> For a similar case at Athens see A.J.S. SPAWFORTH, *The Early Reception of the Imperial Cult in Athens: Problems and Ambiguities*, in M.C. HOFF – S.I. ROTROFF (eds.), *The Romanization of Athens. Proceedings of an International Conference held at Lincoln, Nebraska (April 1996)*, Oxford 1997, p. 190.

<sup>153</sup> See S. MITCHELL, *Greek Epigraphy and Social Change. A Study of the Romanization of South-West Asia Minor in the Third Century A.D.*, in *Atti del XI Congresso Internazionale di Epigrafia Greca e Latina, Roma, 18-24 settembre 1997*, Rome 1999, p. 432.

<sup>154</sup> See K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 227 no. 202.

due to his adoption by a certain Publius Aelius Quintus; this would then place him in the 2nd century AD<sup>155</sup>.

Titus Aelius Aurelianus Tudeus was honoured by *boule* and *demos* as high priest of the emperors with a statue which was paid for by his brother Titus Aelius Valerianus Demarchios<sup>156</sup>. The inscription on the octagonal statue base found west of the temple of Apollo Klarios was dated by Devijver to the late 2nd century AD<sup>157</sup>.

The last recorded high priest of the emperors at Sagalassos was Aurelius Meidianus Attalianus, who dedicated a statue to the emperor Severus Alexander, his mother Iulia Mamaea and the entire *domus imperatoria* (cf. *supra*).

With one exception, all imperial priests at Sagalassos were called *archiereus* 'of the emperors', indicating that they not only served the cult of the living emperor but also that of his ancestors or predecessors. Furthermore, despite the fact that Sagalassos obviously housed two provincial imperial cults (cf. *supra*), none of the titles of the recorded priests explicitly refer to a provincial high priesthood.

Although not attested at Sagalassos, the high priest of the imperial cult could have a high priestess, generally his wife, as consort, who then possibly took care of the cult of the female members of the Imperial House<sup>158</sup>.

As known from other cities, the priesthood of the imperial cult was a public office that had to conform to electoral laws and included formal processes<sup>159</sup>. To win the office of the imperial priesthood, candidates,

<sup>155</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 118.

<sup>156</sup> R. PARIBENI – P. ROMANELLI, *Studi e ricerche archeologiche nell'Anatolia Meridionale*, *Monumenti Antichi* 23 (1914), p. 260 no. 172.

<sup>157</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 119.

<sup>158</sup> For priestesses of the imperial cult in Pisidia see *IGR* III 364, 375 and 377(Adada); A.H. SMITH, *art. cit.* (n. 73), p. 256 no. 41(Pogla); J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 84 no. 15, p. 88 no. 16, and p. 95 no. 20b (Selge); *TAM* III 55b, 78, 83, 85, 97-99, 285 and 827 (Termessos). Previously, it was widely held that female incumbents of the imperial high priesthood held the title not in their own right but as wives of those high priests who happened to be married (D. MAGIE, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*, Princeton 1950, II, p. 1608; R. MACMULLEN, *Woman in Public in the Roman Empire*, *Historia* 29, 1980, p. 214). Recent research, however, has established that the concept of honorary priesthoods is incongruent with the practices of Greek cults (S.J. FRIESEN, *op. cit.* [n. 7], p. 81-84). This seems to be confirmed by the priesthood of Publia Plancia Aurelia Magniana Motoxaris at Selge, who appears to have held the office on her own (see J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* [n. 21], p. 84 no. 15 and p. 88 no. 16).

<sup>159</sup> A detailed account of these procedures is given in the publication of a letter to the city of Ariassos, commemorating the foundation by a high priest of the imperial cult,

like the holders of the magistracies, were expected to pay specified amounts or *summa honoraria* to the city upon entry to their office. This does not constitute the sum which the priest was going to spend while in office, but an ‘inauguration fee’, on top of which the expenses related to the office would come. These amounts could vary between one city and another, broadly reflecting the wealth of the community<sup>160</sup>. These could be direct cash payments to the city, but were often devoted to monuments erected by the office-holder for the adornment of the *polis*. At Sagalassos, it is known to have taken the form of buildings, whether religious, such as the partial modification of the temple of Apollo Klarios and the emperors by the imperial high priest Titus Flavius Collega, or civic, such as the construction of the *macellum* by Publius Aelius Akulas (cf. supra). It could, however, also take the shape of an imperial statue<sup>161</sup>, as may well have been the case with Aurelius Meidianus Attalianus, the priest who erected a statue of Severus Alexander and Iulia Mamaea (cf. supra), or a provision of certain commodities, as at Ariassos in southern Pisidia where the nominee provided oil for the gymnasium<sup>162</sup>.

There are no clear indications concerning their period in office, but the fact that the priesthood is not mentioned as *dia biou*, contrary to the others at Sagalassos such as the priesthood of Dionysos<sup>163</sup>, it is most likely to have been for a quite limited period of time. This is also the case elsewhere in Pisidia, for example at Ariassos where Diotimos is known to have held it for three years, while in Termessos the number of imperial priesthoods held by Laertes, son of Nannamos, namely six, indicates an annual term in office<sup>164</sup>. In view of the high expenses the office entailed this is not surprising.

Among their duties as high priests of the emperors was the organisation of imperial festivals, which included processions of the imperial image, public banquets and games (cf. supra). In addition, there was the

Dioiteimos son of Samos (see V. BERARD, *art. cit.* [n. 76], p. 427 no. 58 and G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* [n. 25], p. 124 no. 117).

<sup>160</sup> R. DUNCAN-JONES, *The Economy of the Roman Empire. Quantitative Studies*, London 1982<sup>2</sup>, p. 84.

<sup>161</sup> See T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* (n. 61), p. 122.

<sup>162</sup> See n. 159.

<sup>163</sup> See K. LANCKORONSKI, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 229 no. 212.

<sup>164</sup> Ariassos: G. HORSLEY – S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* (n. 25), p. 124 no. 117; Termessos: *IGR* III 445.

organisation of and presidency over other categories of contests, such as the gladiator fights and animal hunts (cf. *supra*), which were exclusively linked to the imperial cult. The latter belonged to the most expensive gifts in the field of public entertainment, as they resulted in the deaths of well-trained fighters and exotic animals. Central to both types of celebrations were the sacrifices that the high priests made on behalf of the emperors. Their purpose was to secure the health and a long rule for the *Sebastoi*<sup>165</sup>. Yet, high priests of the imperial cult also demonstrated their loyalty to the imperial house in ways other than cultic ones. This has been demonstrated for Sagalassos on the basis of the military career of Tiberius Claudius Piso (cf. *supra*). Elsewhere in Pisidia, Hoples, son of Obrimotes, and imperial high priest at Termessos, for instance, is recorded as having commanded auxiliary troops sent by the city to help the emperor Marcus Aurelius in his northern wars<sup>166</sup>, while at Pogla a third century priest named Aurelius Arteimianus Dilitrianus accompanied four deliveries of grain to the Roman army as part of the *sacra annona*<sup>167</sup>.

The *archiereus* who organised and above all financed the cult of the emperor and the attendant festivities, thus provided the most lavish displays of civic or communal generosity. Consequently, the office was reserved for the most prosperous of the local elite. The imperial cult was one of the major contexts in which the competitive spirit of those elites was worked out. Rivalry between successive holders of the post, as well as their intrinsic wealth, was certainly a potent factor in maintaining the level of donations<sup>168</sup>. The increasing expenditure within the frame of the priesthood resulted in an accumulation of the office. Some individuals held the imperial priesthood several times (cf. *supra*). Closer examination identifies them as members of the civic elite and even of only a few families who dominated the local scene and held the imperial priesthood<sup>169</sup>.

<sup>165</sup> S. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 211.

<sup>166</sup> TAM III 106; see also J. NOLLÉ, *art. cit.* (n. 27), p. 365-366, and S. MITCHELL, *art. cit.* (n. 153), p. 427.

<sup>167</sup> V. BERARD, *art. cit.* (n. 76), p. 422; IGR III 407.

<sup>168</sup> See S. MITCHELL, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 112.

<sup>169</sup> Elsewhere in Pisidia, at Adada, Antiochos, son of Bianor, was high priest of the imperial cult, like his father before him (see J.R.R. STERRETT, *op. cit.* [n. 33], p. 290 nos. 411-412, while Iaie, daughter of Antiochos and Anna held the priesthood in imitation of her parents (J.R.R. STERRETT, *ibid.*, p. 285 nos. 404-405). Together with his priesthood of Zeus, Neoptolemos held the high priesthood of the imperial cult at Kotenna, like his brother Stanamoas before him, and his son Setas afterwards (G.E. BEAN – T.B. MITFORD, *Jour-*

As demonstrated above, the family of the *Tiberii Claudii* played a major role in honouring the members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty at Sagalassos and would continue to do so under the Flavians. The *Titi Flavii*, on the other hand, were responsible for the introduction of the imperial cult through the person of Titus Flavius Neon, while his wife Claudia Severa, a family member of the *Tiberii Claudii*, built the monument for the emperor Trajan. Ulpiana Noe, the wife of their grandson, Titus Flavius Severianus Neon, was previously married to the founder of the macellum, Publius Aelius Akulas. The latter was himself a relative of Attalos, the man who erected a statue to the emperor Hadrian (cf. *supra*)<sup>170</sup>.

What led these people to make those dedications and to take the huge expenses entailed by the imperial priesthood upon themselves? We are undoubtedly looking here at a combination of motives: a certain moral obligation and sense of loyalty, and in some cases even gratitude<sup>171</sup>. One motive, however, stands out: social recognition, both on a communal as on an imperial level.

Before the advent of Rome the main source of financing for building and public offices was the municipal treasury. With the treasury being emptied by Rome the cities had to find a new source for funding public construction and offices<sup>172</sup>, something that was found in the tradition of liturgies in which the affluent citizens had to offer expenses towards the relief of the *polis*. Their compensation for these financial efforts was the social recognition that they received from their fellow citizens, who honoured them with statues and honorific inscriptions. What they finally accumulated, however, is

*neys in Rough Cilicia 1964-1968* [Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Denkschriften, 102], Wien 1970, p. 30 no. 12). Publia Plancia Aurelia Magniana Motoxaris held the imperial priesthood at Selge, which was afterwards assumed by her younger brother, Publius Plancius Magnianus Aelianus Arrius Perikles, together with his wife Aurelia Volussia Quirinia Atossa (J. NOLLÉ – F. SCHINDLER, *op. cit.* [n. 21], p. 84 no. 15 and 95 no. 20). At Poglă such a 'hereditary link' was also present as both Arteimas and his son Aurelius Arteimianus Dilitrianus Arteimas were priest of the imperial cult (V. BERARD, *art. cit.* [n. 76], p. 422), while Attes, son of Hermaios, is even stated to have belonged to a family of imperial high priests (*ibid.*, p. 423 no. 52) confirming that this priesthood was *de facto* the domain of one or a few families.

<sup>170</sup> For a more elaborate discussion of the relationships of the local elite at Sagalassos see H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34).

<sup>171</sup> T. PEKARY, *op. cit.* (n. 61), p. 153.

<sup>172</sup> Roman domination had at but eradicated the city's revenue, leaving only indirect taxes and the leasing of public land to create income (see M. SARTRE, *L'Orient romain. Provinces et sociétés provinciales en Méditerranée orientale d'Auguste aux Sévères* (31 avant J.C. — 235 après J.C.), Paris 1991, p. 134-138).

symbolic capital, the most durable form of wealth, in the form of «obligation, gratitude, prestige, personal loyalty»<sup>173</sup>. It was this asset on which their position of social and political prominence within the community relied<sup>174</sup>.

This system was now, under the encouragement of the Roman administration that operated through the cities and their elites, put into use on an unprecedented scale. The priesthood of the imperial cult quickly became the public liturgy. The *euergesia* of assuming the priesthood was not only an expression of loyalty to one's own community, but also to the emperor himself, which brought the priest in contact with the imperial representatives. Rome contributed to the success by rewarding the elite with social promotion on the imperial level, in the form of Roman citizenship and knighthood, and admittance to imperial offices, both civil and military. This is clearly illustrated by Titus Flavius Neon, the first imperial priest, who became a Roman citizen under Vespasianus, and by Tiberius Claudius Dareios, a new citizen of Nero who dedicated two structures to the emperors (cf. *supra*)<sup>175</sup>. The grandson of the latter, Tiberius Claudius Piso, an imperial high priest and the founder of the Klareian games, became the first Roman knight of Sagalassos<sup>176</sup>. The enormous financial input required by the priesthood was thus compensated by the great social prestige that the high priest enjoyed.

Priesthoods of the cult were prestigious posts and rapidly became an identifiable stage in a pattern of social mobility that could take an energetic family from Roman citizen to senatorial status in a mere three generations<sup>177</sup>.

The local aristocracy used the imperial cult as a means to climb the imperial social ladder and the emperor was the realizer of the Roman social order for the loyal local meritocracy<sup>178</sup>. The dedications of buildings and the foundation of games within the framework of the imperial cult, and especially the imperial priesthood itself offered the members of

<sup>173</sup> R.L. GORDON, *From Republic to Principate*, in M. BEARD – J. NORTH (eds.), *Pagan Priests. Religion and Power in the Ancient World*, London 1990, p. 194.

<sup>174</sup> See O. VAN NIJF, *The Civic World of Professional Associations in the Roman East (Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 17)*, Amsterdam 1997, p. 127-128.

<sup>175</sup> On the activity of the first Roman citizens at Sagalassos see M. WAELKENS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 342-344.

<sup>176</sup> See H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 132-135.

<sup>177</sup> See M. BEARD – J. NORTH – S. PRICE, *Religions of Rome, I. A History*, Cambridge 1998, p. 358-359.

<sup>178</sup> H. DEVIJVER, *art. cit.* (n. 34), p. 152.



the civic elite a platform towards the imperial officials, to draw attention to themselves and promote their own careers. Their generosity was quite largely responsible for making the imperial cult possible.

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ABBREVIATIONS (journal sigla are those of *l'Année Philologique*):

- BE*: L. ROBERT, *Bulletin Epigraphique*, I-X, Paris 1972-1987.  
*BMC*: G.F. HILL, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia* (A Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the British Museum, 19), London 1897.  
*CIL*: T. MOMMSEN (ed.), *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, III. *Inscriptiones Asiae, provinciarum Europae Graecarum, Illyrici Latinae*, Berlin 1873-1902.  
*CIG*: A. BOECKH – J.C. FRANZ – E. CURTIUS (eds.), *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (*Subsidia epigraphica: Quellen und Abhandlungen zur griechischen Epigraphik*), reprint Hildesheim 1977.  
*IGR*: R. CAGNAT, *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*, III, Paris 1906.  
*IW*: E. BABELON, *Inventaire sommaire de la Collection Waddington*, Paris 1898.  
*KM*: F. IMHOOF-BLUMER, *Kleinasiatische Münzen* (*Sonderschriften des Oesterreichischen Archäologischen Instituts*, 1), Wien 1901-1902.  
*MAMA*: *Monumenta Asiae Minoris antiqua*, I-X, 1928-1993.  
*SEG*: *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, I-XLIX, Amsterdam 1923-1999.  
*SNG* Kopenhagen: N. BREITENSTEIN, *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum*, II. *The Royal Collections of Coins and Medals Danish National Museum*, 32. *Pisidia*, Copenhagen 1956.  
*SNG* Paris: P. LEVANTE – P. WEISS (eds.), *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. France*, 3. *Cabinet des Médailles. Pamphylie, Pisidie, Lycaonie, Galatie*, Zurich 1994.  
*SNG* von Aulock: H. VON AULOCK, *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum*, III 1. *Sammlung von Aulock*, 12. *Pisidien Lykaonien Isaurien*, Berlin 1964.  
*TAM* III: R. HEBERDEY, *Tituli Asiae Minoris collecti et editi auspiciis Academiae Litterarum Vindobonensis*, III. *Tituli Pisidiae*, 1. *Tituli Termessi et agri Termessensis*, Wien 1941.  
von Aulock Pisidien I: H. VON AULOCK, *Münze und Städte Pisidiens*, I (*Istanbuler Mitteilungen*, Beiheft 19), Tübingen 1977.  
von Aulock Pisidien II: H. VON AULOCK, *Münze und Städte Pisidiens*, II (*Istanbuler Mitteilungen*, Beiheft 22), Tübingen 1979.

## THE PHILOSOPHER SENECA ON SUICIDE\*

Suicide features prominently in Seneca's philosophical writings<sup>1</sup>, especially in his *Epistulae ad Lucilium*<sup>2</sup>. These Seneca wrote after he withdrew, in the year 62, more than 60 years old, gradually and insofar as possible, from the circle of *amici* of the emperor Nero and shortly before the latter would force him to take his own life, in April 65. *Epist.* 70 is devoted entirely to the theme of suicide and has sometimes been titled *De morte ultro appetenda*<sup>3</sup>. In his book on stoicism John Rist, with some exaggeration, calls it «virtually a paean to suicide»<sup>4</sup>. No other Stoic before Seneca devoted comparable attention to the problem of self-killing<sup>5</sup>. What is more, of all Greek and Roman philosophers Seneca was the one who concerned himself most intensively with this

\* I wish to thank my colleagues Jan Opsomer (Cologne), Geert Roskam and Toon Van Houdt (both Leuven) for reading through an earlier draft of this paper and for their many useful comments.

Editions used: *L. Annaei Senecae Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*. Recognovit et adnotatione critica instruxit L.D. REYNOLDS, 2 vol., Oxonii 1965, and *L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum libri duodecim*. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L.D. REYNOLDS, Oxonii 1977.

<sup>1</sup> A survey of the relevant passages in Seneca (including his tragedies) is provided by Nicole TADIC-GILLOTEAUX, *Sénèque face au suicide*, AC 32 (1963), p. 541-551. Cf. also Yolande GRISÉ, *Le suicide dans la Rome antique*, Paris-Montréal 1982, and of course Anna Lydia MOTTO, *Seneca Sourcebook: Guide to the Thought of Lucius Annaeus Seneca* (...), Amsterdam 1970, s.v. 'Suicide'.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Miriam GRIFFIN, *Seneca. A Philosopher in Politics*, Oxford 1976 (1992<sup>2</sup>), p. 372, and D. ELSÄSSER, «*Omnia ferenda sunt?*» *Seneca und das Problem des Selbstmordes*, in: *Schola Anatolica. Freundesgabe für H. Steinthal*, Tübingen 1989, p. 97-120 (here 105).

<sup>3</sup> See Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.*, p. 206

<sup>4</sup> J.M. RIST, *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969, p. 247. Elsässer explicitly agrees (*art. cit.*, p. 112). Cf. P. VEYNE, *Seneca. The Life of a Stoic*, New York-London 2003 [the original French edition dates from 1993], p. 113, who speaks of «the veritable delight» with which Seneca wrote *epist.* 70 (he wrongly says no. 71).

<sup>5</sup> J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 233, says (exaggeratively): «in the writings of one Roman Stoic in particular suicide seems to be almost the principal concern of the philosopher». M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.*, p. 368, remarks correctly: «(...) to judge from what remains, suicide figures more prominently and more passionately in his works than in those of other Stoic philosophers»; see also p. 372. Most recently Pierluigi DONINI, in: *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. K. ALGRA et. al.), Cambridge 1999, p. 735, wrote: «the glorification of suicide as the supreme and perhaps only act of freedom on man's part is a peculiarity of Seneca, which has no parallel in the previous tradition».

question<sup>6</sup>. Some have even spoken of an obsession<sup>7</sup> and have called him «the pre-eminent philosopher of suicide»<sup>8</sup>.

Due to grave problems of health (see also below) the young Seneca at one time himself contemplated taking his own life, but because of his elderly father he refrained from the deed (*epist.* 78.1-2). His eventual suicide in 65 on Nero's orders is well known thanks to Tacitus' *Annals*. But it must be remembered that this was a case of choosing suicide above execution, not of death above life<sup>9</sup>. Seneca's oldest surviving philosophical work, the *Consolatio ad Marciam*, offers consolation to the daughter of Aulus Cremutius Cordus, a prominent Roman who committed suicide under Tiberius by starving himself. And be it noted that Seneca's principal model was Cato of Utica, who took his own life at the end of the Republic! Seneca's suicide refers to those of Socrates and Cato; Seneca himself inspired Thræsea Pætus.

In the first part of this paper I will, for the sake of a proper understanding of Seneca's specific statements on suicide, briefly survey on the one hand his stoic views in general and his views on death in particular, and on the other the opinions on suicide of relevant predecessors. Thereafter we will deal with the most significant texts of Seneca concerning suicide, focusing on the relevant passages from the *Epistulae ad Lucilium*<sup>10</sup>. In systematizing Seneca's viewpoint (in itself of course a useful activity) these texts have in the past been excessively split up. In part II we will overlook the main *quaestiones* in modern research. Finally, in part III I will take a position in each of the important points of discussion, whereby I wish to avoid exaggeration or minimization or distortion. In particular I react to Dieter Elsässer who

<sup>6</sup> See Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.*, p. 206: «De tous les philosophes anciens, Sénèque est celui qui s'est intéressé le plus à la question du suicide». Cf. J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 245-246. Cf. also D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 104: «Hat das Problem des Selbstmordes bisher in keiner philosophischen Lehre eine zentrale Stellung eingenommen, so rückt es bei Seneca in den Mittelpunkt seiner Betrachtungen».

<sup>7</sup> J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 246; cf. M.J. SEIDLER, *Kant and the Stoics on Suicide*, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44 (1983), p. 429-453 (here 434).

<sup>8</sup> Thus A.J.L. VAN HOOFF, *From Autothanasia to Suicide. Self-Killing in Classical Antiquity*, London-New York 1990, p. 190.

<sup>9</sup> Compare for the formulation M. GRIFFIN, *Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide*, *G&R* 33 (1986), p. 64-77 and 192-202 (here 69).

<sup>10</sup> I have left the tragedies aside in this study of Seneca's philosophical views on suicide. It is not necessary to examine them in order to determine his philosophical position. Moreover, what Tadic-Gilloteaux and Grisé have noted about suicide in the tragedies makes it clear they have nothing extra to offer.

argues that there is a contradiction between the Stoic sage's claiming of the right to commit suicide and the idea that precisely he manages to bear all.

# I

To correctly interpret and judge Seneca's statements on suicide one must keep in mind the whole of his Stoic vision as well as a number of his observations on life and death. I list the items that are indispensable to our problem.

Reality, which is totally corporeal, presents for the Stoa and Seneca two facets: passive matter on the one hand, and on the other active reason or *Logos* that shapes everything and is also called god. Human reason is a part of the divine *Logos*. This *Logos* is in fact an immanent god, and Seneca sometimes labels human reason as god in us.

To achieve happiness man must live in harmony with nature characterized by reason and in accordance with his own human nature also characterized by reason; in other words, man must live according to reason. Reasonableness is (pos.) virtue (*virtus*), (neg.) to be free from disturbing passions (*ἀπάθεια*). Only then is man for his happiness not dependent on what is outside him, prosperity and adversity, and can he achieve the independence so desired (*αὐτάρκεια*). All that is not of itself good or bad is indifferent (*indifferentia*). Indifferent things are divided into preferred and unpreferred (*commoda* and *incommoda*). They have some importance for the life of the Stoic but his happiness does not depend on them.

The road to complete reasonableness is difficult and comprises a series of spiritual exercises through which man on his way to wisdom, the *proficiens*, can at a certain moment attain *virtus*. Only the sage, the model that is only exceptionally realized — Seneca's examples are Socrates and Cato — lives in total harmony with the *Logos*. Central to the meditation exercises of the *proficiens* is to inure oneself against setbacks, in particular against the fear of death.

With a view to happiness Seneca considers it supremely important to free oneself and his fellow man from the fear of death. He thinks it is not good to attach oneself too much to life or to excessively hate it; to lessen the fear of death he minimizes the value of life *an sich*. He also posits that one should not allow the present to become diluted by being too much occupied by the uncertain future.

As for the question whether there is something after death, Seneca appears uncertain and makes divergent statements. A hereafter cannot in his opinion be philosophically proved, but he does admit, in the wake of wise predecessors, to dream of a nice afterlife. He also finds that the thought of a hereafter elevates the human spirit. This uncertainty about a possible afterlife is in Seneca's eyes not that important, for like his Stoic predecessors he is wholly a *Diesseitsmensch*.

Let us now briefly overlook the positions taken by Seneca's relevant predecessors on the issue of suicide<sup>11</sup>.

For Plato suicide had to be an exception. The *locus classicus*<sup>12</sup> is a passage from the *Phaedo*, viz. 62BC: man is property of the gods and may take his own life only when the gods put him under compelling circumstances: thus Socrates considered his death sentence to be such a peremptory circumstance (ἀνάγκη). Apart from this passage, Plato also refers to self-killing in *leg.* 873CD and *rep.* 407D-408B. In these texts Plato deals with the circumstances where suicide, which as a rule is out of the question, is permitted: death sentence, inescapable doom (e.g. an incurable disease), unbearable shame. For the cynics, who put much emphasis on individual freedom, suicide is permitted in all cases where a reasonable life has become impossible (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius VI 24 with the well-known 'the logos or the noose'). In the Stoic view life and death are indifferent things; it is allowed to depart from life on reasonable grounds (α εὐλογος ἐξαγωγή). According to the biographical tradition the elder Zeno, after breaking a finger or toe in a fall, took his own life, exclaiming «why do you call me, I'm on my way»; and there is a similar story about Cleanthes (see Diog. Laert. VII 28 and 176; *SVF* I 288 and 474). It is assumed that Zeno took the incident for a divine sign. For Panaetius the individual *persona* plays a crucial role (Cicero, *off.* I 112). In the spirit of Plato and on the basis of Posidonius Cicero too (*Tusc.* I 74) accepts suicide only in the event of a divine hint; note the formulation (on which more below):

Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis deus iniussu hinc nos suo demigrare;  
cum vero causam iustam deus ipse dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni,

<sup>11</sup> See J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 233ff., M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 70-75, and D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 98-103, who offer clear and more ample overviews. For Aristotle see J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 236 and M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.*, p. 71 (for the Epicureans see p. 72).

<sup>12</sup> M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.*, p. 70.

... vir sapiens ... tamquam a magistratu aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a deo evocatus atque emissus exierit<sup>13</sup>.

The Stoics also specified the circumstances in which self-killing was permissible (see e.g. *SVF* III 757 and 768; Diog. Laert. VII 130<sup>14</sup>): mainly cases of giving one's life for one's country or friends, to avoid shameful actions under a tyrant, to escape severe illness or intolerable pain, or extreme poverty. Neither the cynics nor the Stoics, two philosophical schools for which suicide was more than exceptionally permitted, devote much attention to self-killing<sup>15</sup>; nor do we find in the earlier Stoa Seneca's explicit link between liberty and suicide. Later, Epictetus speaks explicitly of a divine sign (σημαίνω) (Arrian, *Epictetus* I 9.16, I 29.29 [with reference to Socrates] and III 26.29)<sup>16</sup>.

Seneca is convinced that man is entitled to decide about his own death (see e.g. *epist.* 51.9, 65.22 and 91.21 *Non sumus in ullius potestate, cum mors in nostra potestate sit*). But it is clear that he is not advocating a faint-hearted flight from life. To flee into death (*ad mortem confugere*) is just as reprehensible as fleeing from death (*mortem ... fugere*) (*epist.* 98.16). What he is defending is the right to break off or avoid a worthless life through death. In other words, the right to kill oneself on reasonable grounds.

Already in §10 of *epist.* 12 (the last letter of book I, dealing with the prudent use of our lifetime) we are told, in the framework of the brief postscript (*mercedula*) Seneca presents to Lucilius and other readers, that nothing compels us to live contrary to our own will (*necessitate vivere*): «On all sides lie many short and simple paths to freedom» (*ad libertatem viae*)<sup>17</sup>. And Seneca adds: *Agamus deo gratias ...*

After dealing with the suicide of Cato in *epist.* 24.6-8 (a letter on the theme of fear [*metus* / *sollicitudo*], esp. fear of death), Seneca takes in

<sup>13</sup> See D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 103.

<sup>14</sup> See also Cicero, *off.* III 60-61.

<sup>15</sup> It is significant that suicide is not found in the index of B. INWOOD (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, Cambridge 2003.

<sup>16</sup> See J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 250-252 and Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 218-221.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *De ira* III 15.4: «In whatever direction you may turn your eyes, there lies the means to end your woes. See you that precipice? Down that is the way to liberty. See you that sea, that river, that well? There sits liberty — at the bottom. See you that tree, stunted, blighted, and barren? Yet from its branches hangs liberty. See you that throat of yours, your gullet, your heart? They are ways of escape from servitude. Are the ways of egress I show you too toilsome, do they require too much courage and strength? Do you ask what is the highway to liberty? Any vein in your body!» (trans. J.W. Basore [Loeb]).

§22-26, again in a postscript to the letter proper, some utterances by Epicurus as the basis of a few considerations on suicide. Seneca wants to fortify Lucilius with regard to life and death — he wants to bring Lucilius to *securitas* — and posits that we should not love life too much, but neither should we hate it too much. Even if one comes to the conclusion that suicide is the proper action (*etiam cum ratio suadet finire se*), one may not proceed in a rash and reckless manner. The sage does not flee from life, but steps out of it (*Vir fortis ac sapiens non fugere debet e vita sed exire*)<sup>18</sup>. We can be satiated (*satietas*) and nauseated (*vitae fastidium, nausea*) with living, but suicide on grounds of *libido moriendi* is for Seneca not allowed.

In *epist.* 58.32-36 Seneca claims not to scorn old age. But he then offers the question whether one should simply await the end or rather organize it personally. Old age, thus Seneca, can be appreciated if the body is not feeble, the senses still function and one's conscience is free of guilt (§33). However, if the body has become useless, the soul may *free itself* (§34-35) and should preferably do so in good time (§34):

At si inutile ministeriis corpus est, quidni oporteat educere animum laborantem? Et fortasse paulo ante quam debet faciendum est, ne cum fieri debebit facere non possis.

But if the body is useless for service, why should one not free the struggling soul? Perhaps one ought to do this a little before the debt is due, lest, when it falls due, he may be unable to perform the act<sup>19</sup>.

This latter thought returns in *epist.* 70.5 (see below). But the continuation of *epist.* 58 also merits citation here:

(35) ... Non relinquam senectutem, si me totum mihi reservabit, totum autem ab illa parte meliore; at si coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti. (36) Morbum morte non fugiam, dumtaxat sanabilem nec officientem animo. Non adferam mihi manus propter dolorem: sic mori vinci est. Hunc tamen si sciero perpetuo mihi esse patiendum, exhibo, non propter ipsum, sed quia impedimento mihi futurus est ad omne propter quod vivitur; inbecillus est et ignavus qui propter dolorem moritur, stultus qui doloris causa vivit.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *exire* in *prov.* 2.10 and in *epist.* 30.2 and 98.16.

<sup>19</sup> English translations of the letters are those of Richard M. Gummere in the Loeb edition of Seneca's *Epistulae ad Lucilium*.



(35) It is this: that I shall not abandon old age, if old age preserves me intact for myself, and intact as regards the better part of myself; but if old age begins to shatter my mind, and to pull its various faculties to pieces, if it leaves me, not life, but only the breath of life, I shall rush out of a house that is crumbling and tottering. (36) I shall not avoid illness by seeking death, as long as the illness is curable and does not impede my soul. I shall not lay violent hands upon myself just because I am in pain; for death under such circumstances is defeat. But if I find out that the pain must always be endured, I shall depart, not because of the pain, but because it will be a hindrance to me as regards all my reasons for living. He who dies just because he is in pain is a weakling, a coward; but he who lives merely to brave out this pain, is a fool.

The final sentence can be compared with *epist.* 98.16 (see below).

*Epist.* 70, the first of book VIII, is, as already noted, devoted entirely to the question of self-killing. In brief, the main thoughts are as follows: Death, says Seneca in §3, is a harbour; some will sight it sooner, others later. Not life *an sich* is something good, but living well is. The sage will live as long as he must, not as long as he can (§4). It is not a matter of quantity, but of quality (§5). *It is permitted to free oneself from this life, and not only in cases of extreme distress* (§5). What matters is not whether one dies sooner or later, but whether one dies well or badly; and part of dying well is avoiding the risk of a bad life (§6). One must not want to live at all costs (§6-7)<sup>20</sup>. However, one may not seek death out of a fear of death (§8-9 with Socrates, among others, as example). In §11 Seneca admits that it is not easy to pronounce in general on how to act when death is imposed from without, wait or anticipate. The choice depends on many factors. But it is certain that one must be able to leave as reason sees fit (§12).

Seneca then points out that according to some philosophers we are not masters of our own lives and that suicide is in their eyes impious (§14). *This, he counters, places an unacceptable restraint on human liberty*. It is of crucial importance to man that the exit from life is available without restriction. Indeed, that is how nature has arranged it<sup>21</sup>.

Man, Seneca continues, has the right not to suffer the cruelty of disease or cruelty inflicted by his fellow man: «This is the one reason why we cannot complain of life: it keeps no one against his will» (§15).

<sup>20</sup> Compare Seneca's reproach of Maecenas who had said in one of his poems that he wanted to live for as long as possible (*epist.* 101.10-15).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *De ira* III 15.4 cited above n. 17; further e.g. Pliny, *nat.* VII 190 and M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 193.

We are not confronted with every possible ordeal, but each one of us has to face death; consequently, it is necessary to prepare for death through well-considered exercise and training (§18). Compare *epist.* 4, where it is argued that we must arm ourselves against (fear of) death with considerations of divergent nature.

In §19ff. Seneca cites several examples of simple people who opted unflinchingly for suicide and always found the necessary means thereto; the same must *a fortiori* be possible for someone who has been prepared through philosophy. Compare again *epist.* 4, where it is said that it is not difficult to accept death when we see how some depart from life for futile reasons.

The examples he adduces of simple folk resolutely opting for suicide which form the basis of his *a fortiori* reasoning range from horrifying to bizarre. To cite just one:

Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners; nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment (70.23).

In *epist.* 77.15 the link death — liberty also comes up<sup>22</sup>. The letter (in particular 5-10) deals with the suicide of Marcellinus. Already in §3 Seneca drops the remark that, if necessary, one may end one's life prematurely:

Vita non est imperfecta si honesta est; ubicumque desines, si bene desines, tota est. Saepe autem et fortiter desinendum est et non ex maximis causis; nam nec eae maximae sunt quae nos tenent.

But life is not incomplete if it is honourable. At whatever point you leave off living, provided you leave off nobly, your life is a whole. Often, however, one must leave off bravely, and our reasons therefore need not be momentous; for neither are the reasons momentous which hold us here (§4).

Marcellinus, still comparatively young, suffered from a disease which, though not hopeless, was bound to be long drawn-out, and consulted a number of friends as to what action he was to take (§5). A Stoic emphasized the insignificance of life in itself and the fact that in life the same things always recur:

<sup>22</sup> See A.D. LEEMAN, *Das Todeserlebnis im Denken Senecas*, *Gymnasium* 78 (1971), p. 322-333 (here 331).

Do not torment yourself, my dear Marcellinus, as if the question which you are weighing were a matter of importance. It is not an important matter to live; all your slaves live, and so do all animals; but it is important to die honourably, sensibly, bravely. Reflect how long you have been doing the same thing: food, sleep, lust, — this is one's daily round. The desire to die may be felt, not only by the sensible man or the brave or unhappy man, but even by the man who is merely surfeited (§6) (cf. also §16 and *epist.* 24.25-6).

The Stoic adds (§7) that to prevent someone from taking his own life is as bad as killing him.

Although this meditation is in my opinion not adequately attuned to Marcellinus' situation, the Stoic involved was able to persuade him: for three days Marcellinus did not eat, then took to a bath filled with hot water and passed gently away.

§§11ff. contain a variety of considerations aimed at diminishing the resistance to death, such as: «Your goal will be the goal of all things» (§12) and «There is no life that is not short» (§20), and also: Life is like a play: what counts is not how long it lasts, but how good the performance was. Here again, in particular in §16, Seneca posits that life, over time, becomes boring; it does not mean that much (§17-18).

This is an argument which in the *consolatio* is used to console: to show that dying is not awful, the value of human life is minimized. (With *ipsa impellente philosophia* Seneca in *epist.* 24.26 concedes that philosophy itself, by minimizing the value of life, is partly to blame for the displeasure that life causes in some!)<sup>23</sup>

As in letters 4 and 70 the exemplary conduct adduced here (§§14-15) is again that of someone simple, viz. a young Spartan enslaved, and not the example of someone great; that suicide would *a fortiori* be easier for someone trained in philosophy is not said in as many words, but it is implied<sup>24</sup>. In the example of this young slave Seneca points out «how close by freedom is» (§15).

Letter 104.1ff. (esp. 3) reveals a special facet of Seneca's uncommonly high morality. In his eyes man himself can dispose of his own life and can, if need be, put an end to it. But on the other hand he posits:

<sup>23</sup> On which see J. BLÄNSDORF, *L'interprétation psychologique de l'autarkeia stoïcienne chez Sénèque*, in: R. CHEVALLIER – R. POIGNAULT (eds), *Présence de Sénèque*, Paris 1991, p. 81-96.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. 24.9; cf. further 36.12 and 77.15.

Indulgendum est enim honestis adfectibus; et interdum, etiam si premunt causae, spiritus in honorem suorum vel cum tormento revocandus et in ipso ore retinendus est, cum bono viro vivendum sit non quamdiu iuvat sed quamdiu oportet: ille qui non uxorem, non amicum tanti putat ut diutius in vita commoretur, qui perseverabit mori, delicatus est. Hoc quoque imperet sibi animus, ubi utilitas suorum exigit, nec tantum si vult mori, sed si coepit, intermittat et se suis commodet.

For one must indulge genuine emotions; sometimes, even in spite of weighty reasons, the breath of life must be called back and kept at our very lips even at the price of great suffering, for the sake of those whom we hold dear; because the good man should not live as long as it pleases him, but as long as he ought. He who does not value his wife, or his friend, highly enough to linger longer in life — he who obstinately persists in dying — is a voluptuary<sup>25</sup>.

Compare «as long as he ought» to 70.4 already cited! Cf. also Seneca's own conduct discussed above<sup>26</sup>.

## II

Let us now briefly survey the basic lines of recent research on Seneca's view of suicide, which has received attention both in more general works on suicide in Antiquity or on Stoicism as well as in the framework of specific studies of Seneca. We will deal first with the central points of the discussion as well as some problems that hinder the study.

Seneca's stand on suicide is in my opinion very clear: self-killing is permitted on rational grounds, indeed the possibility to take one's own life is the cornerstone of human liberty.

Two general questions dominate the debate. Firstly: Is Seneca in this matter faithful to the Stoic tradition? Secondly: Is the Stoic c.q. Seneca's view of suicide consistent with the basic tenets of Stoicism?

In the treatment of these broad questions a number of specific problems emerge. A first problem is formed by the fact that the viewpoint of the older Stoa is known only from fragments and from later

<sup>25</sup> Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 209, also sets this passage in some relief; she further adduces, rightly, *epist.* 98.15-16.

<sup>26</sup> *Interdum* to my mind does not imply that one sometimes need not take one's loved ones into account, but rather that sometimes the circumstances can be such as to prevent one from committing suicide because of the loved ones. See also below.

summaries (e.g. those of Cicero and Diogenes Laertius); this situation makes it impossible to define the viewpoint of the older Stoa with precision and absolute certainty. Later summaries could conceivably contain elements from later stages of Stoicism<sup>27</sup>. For that matter, it cannot be ruled out that the older Stoa was not in complete agreement on the question of suicide<sup>28</sup>.

Miriam Griffin rightly emphasizes — and this is a second problem — that Seneca does not offer a systematic exposition of the Stoic doctrine, but incites his addressees and readers to a certain attitude on the basis of the Stoic approach; his pronouncements are strongly determined by the specific context in which they are uttered<sup>29</sup>. Still, it must be pointed out that in *epist.* 70 Seneca does dwell formally on suicide<sup>30</sup>.

For Seneca the right to take one's own life is a *conditio sine qua non* for human liberty. But here one must take into account — and this is a third problem — that *libertas* has various connotations in Seneca<sup>31</sup>. In particular the metaphorical labelling of suicide as a *via libertatis* (*prov.* 2.10) requires closer examination.

Fourthly, I would also like to point out that some uncertainties arise because Seneca does not always explicitly indicate that it is the sage he is talking about; most of what he writes is meant for *proficientes*, readers on route to wisdom. He also refers continually to 'the' people in general<sup>32</sup>.

In connection with the problems that arise it must finally be noted that, in order to fully explain and judge what Seneca says about suicide, his views on life and death in general must be kept in mind<sup>33</sup>.

In Seneca's eyes, according to John Rist, who in his book on Stoicism (1969) examined the Stoics' views on suicide, Zeno's viewpoint went further than stated above (self-killing was permitted as soon as there were compelling circumstances). Indeed, in *epist.* 104.21 we read: *alter*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. A.J.L. VAN HOOFF, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 189.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 242; Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 180; D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 102. Nor was the Stoa unanimous on the fate of the soul after a person's death.

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 375.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 105.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 105 and 112; compare M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 438.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 109.

<sup>33</sup> For Seneca's views on death A.D. LEEMAN's 1971 paper is still a good point of departure (*art. cit.* [n. 22]). See further R. HOVEN, *Stoïcisme et stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà*, Paris 1971.

(Socrates) *te docebit mori si necesse erit, alter (Zeno) antequam necesse erit*. Rist notes thereby that for Zeno (i.e. in Seneca's interpretation) suicide was «an arbitrary act of decision... unconnected with external pressures or signs»<sup>34</sup>. This remark, as Miriam Griffin rightly observes<sup>35</sup>, is surely an exaggeration. Rist further posits that Seneca himself, by no longer speaking of a divine sign<sup>36</sup> and by very strongly emphasizing human liberty (*epist.* 70.14), radically altered the traditional viewpoint of his school. For Seneca, says Rist, suicide is «a free act, perhaps ... the supremely free act» and «peculiarly ennobling»<sup>37</sup>; he also speaks of «the exaggerated cult of suicide»<sup>38</sup>.

Miriam Griffin, whose important work on Seneca was published in 1976, examines in the first paragraph of the chapter «Mors diu meditata» whether the path Seneca took to his death was consistent with his teaching c.q. the orthodox Stoic tradition<sup>39</sup>; in a second paragraph she goes further into the question whether or not Seneca deviates on some points from the Stoic tradition. In her opinion Zeno, as understood by Seneca, only slightly expanded the position of Plato<sup>40</sup>. In addition, she holds that Seneca's own viewpoint is essentially the same as that of his Stoic predecessors. She minimizes the importance of Seneca's silence on the matter of the divine sign. She does concede that Seneca puts greater emphasis on human liberty<sup>41</sup>, and believes he did so because suicide was unacceptable to some Stoics<sup>42</sup>. Seneca, thus Griffin, does not champion suicide but rather a philosophical approach to death and fear thereof. He is certainly no «apostle of suicide»<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 247.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 373. In interpreting *epist.* 104.21 she adduces the passages *epist.* 58.34 en *epist.* 70.5.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 246-247.

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 247 and p. 249; compare also the summary of Rist's position by M. GRIFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 383.

<sup>38</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

<sup>39</sup> First and foremost, Griffin wants to examine the relationship between Seneca's suicide and his philosophical views on self-killing; in connection with his views on suicide, she de facto brings the Stoic tradition into the picture: «In comparing Seneca's behaviour with his doctrine, it will be economical to proceed via an examination of orthodox Stoic doctrine concerning suicide, so far as it can be reconstructed» (*op. cit.*, p. 372).

<sup>40</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 374.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> The basis for this assumption is her interpretation of *epist.* 70.14, a passage that will be discussed below.

<sup>43</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 384.

In her book on suicide among the Romans (1982) Yolande Gris   does not comment on the Rist–Griffin debate. What she presents is a systematic overview of Seneca’s views, under four headings: one must check whether suicide is expedient; suicide for emotional or passionate reasons is prohibited; it is not so much a matter of taking one’s life as of freedom; man has a ‘*ius mortis*’. She puts the texts of Seneca themselves clearly under the reader’s eyes, but juxtaposes his tragedies and his philosophical works without further ado<sup>44</sup>. In her opinion Seneca, to be sure, emphasizes man’s freedom in this matter, but he explicitly (in *epist.* 70 and *prov.* 6.7–9) calls this liberty a gift of divine nature, so that the disregard of the divine sign is not really significant (cf. Griffin)<sup>45</sup>. Finally, she expressly posits that for her Seneca’s pronouncements on suicide form a coherent whole<sup>46</sup>.

Like Rist, Dieter Els  sser (1989) believes that Seneca’s view is a clear departure from the Stoic tradition<sup>47</sup>. Els  sser too holds that for Seneca suicide is «the supremely free act»<sup>48</sup>. His study, for that matter, is entirely focused on the second of the general problems listed above: in his eyes there is beyond any doubt a contradiction among a number of Seneca’s positions. On the one hand Seneca assumes that the sage in the development of his *virtus* is wholly independent of external circumstances; the sage endures events with astonishing *patientia* (note the words «omnia ferenda sunt» in the title of the article<sup>49</sup>). Virtue is a matter of one’s inner attitude over which the outside world would have no hold. On the other hand Seneca posits that it is of crucial importance for human freedom that man can kill himself if he finds that the development of his *virtus* is endangered. Seneca, according to Els  sser, is aware of the problem (see *epist.* 71.12) but offers no solution (*ibid.* 13–15). In Els  sser’s argumentation the suicide of Cato Uticensis is central<sup>50</sup>. The author explicitly states that he wants to receive reactions to his verdict on Seneca’s position<sup>51</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Compare in this respect N. TADIC-GILLOTEAUX: she too studies both Seneca’s philosophical pronouncements and the relevant passages in his tragedies. But at least she keeps them separate. She states that no contradictions or incoherence could be found in Seneca’s   uvre. For her, too, Seneca was no «ap  tre du suicide» (*art. cit.* [n. 1], p. 551).

<sup>45</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>46</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>47</sup> *Art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 112–113.

<sup>48</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>49</sup> See *epist.* 71.11 and *art. cit.*, n. 26.

<sup>50</sup> Compare on this point M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9) (not mentioned by Els  sser).

<sup>51</sup> See *art. cit.*, p. 118.



In his recent book on Seneca Paul Veyne explicitly agrees with Rist on Seneca's relation with the Stoic tradition<sup>52</sup>. Like Elsässer (whose contribution, however, he does not seem to know) he believes that Seneca's philosophical viewpoints are contradictory<sup>53</sup>.

### III

For the question whether suicide is permitted without a divine hint the obvious point of departure is *epist.* 70.14, where Seneca writes:

Invenies etiam professos sapientiam qui vim adferendam vitae suae negent et nefas iudicent ipsum interemptorem sui fieri: expectandum esse exitum quem natura decrevit. Hoc qui dicit non videt se libertatis viam cludere: nihil melius aeterna lex fecit quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus multos.

You can find men who profess wisdom and maintain<sup>54</sup> that one should not offer violence to one's own life, and hold it accursed for a man to be the means of his own destruction; we should wait, say they, for the end decreed by nature. But one who says this does not see that he is shutting off the path to freedom. The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits.

Griffin holds that Seneca here has certain Stoics in mind<sup>55</sup>. But I wonder whether Seneca, in the framework of such a delicate discussion, would

<sup>52</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 113: «As J.M. Rist has well said, for Seneca, suicide is the [free (WE)] act par excellence. It is almost the simplest way to achieve wisdom, at once final and instantaneous. ... Die as a sage, because living as one may only be a utopian dream»; and further: «Such an extreme attitude is typical of our author. Stoic orthodoxy did not go this far». But p. 84-85 contradict this.

<sup>53</sup> M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9), deals with the contribution of philosophy in the cult of self-killing in the first century AD. Her view is that it was not philosophy that caused this cult. She proves this position in two steps: (1) In the eyes of the Greek and Roman philosophical writers who accept or defend suicide, quite a few conditions must be fulfilled before one can proceed to the act itself. (2) In the previous centuries already many instances of self-killing were accepted. A crucial role was played by the celebrated suicide of Cato at the end of the Republic. The conclusion is that philosophy played a part in the styling and the prestige of a deed that had gained an aura of fashion after Cato's suicide. M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), examines (further pursuing the research of his doctorate of 1981) Kant's attitude towards the Stoic position on self-killing. Among the Stoics, Seneca occupies for Kant a prominent place, but in the first part of Seidler's paper Seneca is not really treated separately.

<sup>54</sup> The Loeb translation has been slightly altered here as *etiam* was undoubtedly interpreted wrongly.

<sup>55</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 375. This would be «an additional argument invented to counter some Stoics».

refer in such general terms to colleagues of the Stoic school<sup>56</sup>. Usually, and in my view rightly so, it is assumed that Seneca is referring to philosophers like Pythagoras and Plato<sup>57</sup>, who were known to hold that man was a divine possession and that only the gods could decide on the end of life.

With regard to suicide Seneca emphasizes in 70.14, but elsewhere as well, human liberty. Furthermore, nowhere does he state that a divine hint is needed before one is allowed to take one's own life<sup>58</sup>. Rist therefore speaks of a fundamental difference with the Stoic tradition.

Griffin, however, draws attention to some utterances that would seem to imply the notion of a divine hint<sup>59</sup>: viz. *epist.* 14.2 *cum exiget ratio*; *epist.* 24.24 *cum ratio suadet finire* (cf. *vit. beat.* 20.5 *Quandoque aut natura spiritum repetet aut ratio dimittet*,...); 26.10 *quando res exiget*; *epist.* 69.6 *si ita res suadebit*; 98.16 *non si suadebit res exibat?*; 117.21 *cum visum erit*; see also 65.22. But these pronouncements refer to the fact that suicide is only allowed when the circumstances demand it, in other words, on rational grounds, i.e. when reason deems it the obvious solution<sup>60</sup>. If Seneca had wished to speak of a divine sign, he could have done so in clearer, more explicit terms; he knew the tradition and yet he does not refer to the divine hint as such. I think he did so deliberately<sup>61</sup>.

I take it that for Seneca no specific hint is necessary because the *sapiens* and the *proficiens*, being armed with (divine) *ratio*, are perfectly capable of assessing the situation correctly. This, in my opinion, is not a break with the Stoic tradition, but rather its logical consequence<sup>62</sup>.

One must not forget that the god of the Stoa is a different god from Plato's. Where Plato in connection with suicide had a divine sign in mind, the Stoics employed varying terms: Epictetus would speak explicitly of a divine hint; Cicero, who took a Platonic-Stoic position, says in this

<sup>56</sup> He could have referred explicitly to his Stoic colleagues with *quidam ex nostris* (cf. *De ira* II 19.3; *epist.* 67.5, 87.26, 89.8; *nat.* II 15.1).

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. A.D. LEEMAN, *art. cit.* (n. 22), p. 329; Y. GRISÉ *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 216. Cf. also H.-P. BÜTLER – H.J. SCHWEIZER, *Seneca im Unterricht*, Heidelberg 1974, p. 39.

<sup>58</sup> M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 432 n. 13, is wrong on this point.

<sup>59</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 2), 374-375; cf. p. 381.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 246 and D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 113-114. See on this problem also M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 72, and M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 432-433.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. correctly D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.*, p. 72. See further D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 103, and M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.*, p. 432 with n. 13.

connection (*Tusc.* I 74; see above): *Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis deus iniussu hinc nos suo demigrare*, thereby speaking, like Seneca in *epist.* 41, of a god within us. Seneca himself, in the passages cited by Griffin, talks of a judgement of the *ratio* which judiciously interprets the *res*. And that, as already noted, is not unlogical: for the human *ratio* is a part of the divine *Ratio*<sup>63</sup>.

70.14 is in no way a revolt against a divine power or against nature. The freedom to take one's own life is in Seneca's eyes a divine gift: see *epist.* 12 above and also, e.g., *prov.* 6.7-9 where god himself points out that man has been given many possible ways to exit from life<sup>64</sup>. Like his Stoic predecessors Seneca undoubtedly wants to act in accordance with the divine will. But he is also convinced that the sage's reason can correctly assess the circumstances.

Rist and some other scholars posit that suicide is for Seneca the highest free act, the free act *par excellence*<sup>65</sup>. Rist even goes so far as to say that it is «perhaps the only genuinely free act», a position taken over literally by Pierluigi Donini<sup>66</sup>.

In the eyes of Seneca suicide is indeed in several respects an important matter with regard to human freedom<sup>67</sup>. (1) By taking his own life man can pull himself from the grasp of *fortuna*. To always keep this in mind is relieving. In that sense suicide is the cornerstone of his freedom. (This can be read in 70.14.)<sup>68</sup> (2) Moreover, by killing oneself on rational grounds, man proves he does not fear death and is spiritually free. In that sense it is the free act *par excellence*. But nowhere do I find justification for the claim that suicide would be, for Seneca, the only truly free act.

For that matter, Rist believes that Seneca wrongly regards suicide as a «supremely free act»; he not unjustly points out that «Seneca seems to

<sup>63</sup> Cf. M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.*, p. 432. Compare to a certain extent M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 374.

<sup>64</sup> Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 216-217. I miss *prov.* 6.7-9 in D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>65</sup> J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 248; cf. p. 233 and 247. Does *epist.* 95.72 prove that Seneca viewed suicide as the highest level of internal freedom (thus D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 105-106)?

<sup>66</sup> *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (n. 5), p. 735; the quotation is from J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

<sup>67</sup> See i.a. *prov.* 2.9; 6.7; *de ira* III 15.3-4; *Marc.* 20.3 and *epist.* 12.10; 13.14; 26.10; 51.9; 95.72.

<sup>68</sup> I would not speak of suicide as «the ultimate justification of man's freedom», as does J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 233; self-killing is not the ultimate justification of freedom, but rather its ultimate guarantee.

regard freedom not so much as the opportunity to act» but «as a state in which one cannot be forced to act»; he further speaks of a negative concept of freedom<sup>69</sup>. But as argued above, freedom is here also implied in a different meaning.

Seneca's extolling of suicide is undoubtedly linked to the prestige of Cato's suicide, to the fact that the courage to take one's own life forms the supreme test for the extent to which one has become a Stoic, and to Seneca's pursuit of manliness and valour.

The link suicide — freedom with regard to the Stoic Seneca must also be viewed from another angle. A Stoic's freedom consists (in essence) in his complete acceptance on the basis of rational insight of what is set down and provided for by the divine Logos (*providentia*)<sup>70</sup>. In the view of the Stoa we are free when we have come to approach everything from the viewpoint of the Logos.

First of all, this view raises the general question (which cannot be dealt with here) how much space *providentia* leaves for human freedom. The answer depends on the question how one interprets *providentia*. In any event, the Stoics assumed that within this framework man still possessed the freedom needed to act responsibly, make moral choices, and whether or not to conform to the plan(s) of the Logos<sup>71</sup>.

However, there is also a more specific problem that does demand immediate treatment. Does the view of human freedom as sketched not entail that one must logically accept death as it comes upon us, in other words a natural death? The answer is: no! Freedom conceived as willing obedience to the divine Logos does not mean that we must passively undergo events, but rather that we keep trying to act according to reason, to make rational choices, for that is what the divine Logos desires. Now, just as one can opt on the basis of rational considerations to die for a friend or one's country, so too reason can choose suicide as the most rational solution in a given situation. The human logos of the individual involved assumes thereby to act in accordance with what divine *providentia* ultimately desires. Seneca accordingly regards suicide on rational

<sup>69</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 248. Compare, for the concept of freedom employed here, also M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 436ff. and 449ff.

<sup>70</sup> See for this problem in general J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 112ff.

<sup>71</sup> See P. VEYNE, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 134ff. and 147ff., in particular 136 with n. 104 (p. 182). Seneca deals with the problem *fatum – divinatio – libertas* in *nat. II* 35-38. A commentary on this discussion is provided by Harry M. HINE, *An Edition with Commentary of Seneca Natural Questions, Book Two*, New York 1981, p. 366-379.

grounds not as a revolt (cf. also above) or as a lack of *patientia* (cf. below). He even labels such a suicide as an act of *patientia*, since one is not yielding to a fear of death but accepting one's fatal end and sovereignly and rationally dealing with life and death.

The explicit coupling of suicide and human freedom and the labelling of suicide as the free act *par excellence*, together with the omission of an explicit reference to any divine sign, do not signify a break with Seneca's Stoic predecessors, but undoubtedly constitute some conspicuous differences.

As for the circumstances<sup>72</sup> that can justify suicide one may mention, as far as Seneca is concerned, besides the already cited physical deterioration and cruelty inflicted by others, also political situations (e.g. the circumstances of Cato's suicide, see *epist.* 24.6ff.). Some scholars also mention extreme poverty, partly on the basis of the Stoic tradition and partly on the basis of *De vita beata* 25.1<sup>73</sup>. In the latter passage, however, Seneca says first and foremost that his wealth does not give him a high opinion of himself and that he would not hold himself in low esteem if he were a beggar. He thereby drops the remark that even a beggar, when in extreme need, can take his own life, in other words, that an emergency exit is available (and that he is free and therefore a full-fledged person). In *epist.* 17.9 extreme poverty is for Seneca clearly a reason to part with life:

«At necessaria deerunt.» Primum deesse non poterunt, quia natura minimum petit, naturae autem se sapiens accommodat. Sed si necessitates ultimae inciderint, iamdudum exhibit e vita et molestus sibi esse desinet. etc

Elsewhere, in *epist.* 2.6, he says that to live happily the sage needs no more than what is required by nature, indeed that he is even content with less<sup>74</sup>.

<sup>72</sup> See esp. M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 376-382.

<sup>73</sup> See e.g. Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 212 and P. VEYNE, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 84-85. What was the advice in the event of extreme poverty? «They would have said, kill yourself, put an end to your days. Seneca, in *On the Happy Life*, replied to his critics, who made ironic fun of his immense fortune, saying that if he found himself reduced to begging in the streets, he would not make a fuss about it. He would, simply, kill himself» (p. 85).

<sup>74</sup> See W. EVENEPOEL, *Seneca, Epist. 2.6: Quod necesse est — quod sat est*, *Hermes* 125 (1997), p. 243-246; M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 376-377, correctly presents Seneca's position on this point.

Elsässer cites a number of passages (viz. *epist.* 70.3<sup>75</sup>, 5<sup>76</sup>, 15<sup>77</sup>, and 19<sup>78</sup>) from which it would appear that Seneca was very permissive about suicide. His conclusion: «jeder kann nach Belieben verfahren»<sup>79</sup>.

Seneca would probably be stunned to hear that his message was interpreted in this way. *Epist.* 70.5 *nec hoc (suicide) tantum in necessitate ultima facit* is in his eyes not a broadening of Zeno's position. For in *epist.* 104.21 we read: *alter (Socrates) te docebit mori si necesse erit, alter (Zeno) antequam necesse erit* (see the status quaestionis above: Griffin). That Seneca probably rendered Zeno's stance correctly (not interpreting it more broadly according to his own taste<sup>80</sup>) may in my view perhaps be deduced from Cicero, who in *fin.* III 60 wrote on the position of the Stoa: *in quo (scil. homine) autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere*. Seneca in 70.5 does not say that one may proceed to suicide long before the presence, or in the absence, of *necessitas*<sup>81</sup>. What can be read in 70.5 is in my opinion the same as in 58.34: suicide should not be postponed until the situation is no longer under control.

70.15 *Placet? Vive: Non placet? Licet eo reverti unde venisti*, in the context of letter no. 70 and also read in the light of explicit pronouncements in the correspondence, certainly does not mean one can simply do as one pleases.

I further think a distinction should be made between Seneca's unequivocal principle (for Seneca suicide is only allowed on rational grounds; note his actual conduct, for that matter) and the various facts he mentions

<sup>75</sup> On the subject of death Seneca says *numquam recusandus*. I cannot agree with the interpretation of D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 108-109.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>77</sup> *Hoc est unum cur de vita non possimus queri: neminem tenet. Bono loco res humanae sunt, quod nemo nisi vitio suo miser est. Placet? Vive: non placet? Licet eo reverti unde venisti.*

<sup>78</sup> *Non est quod existimes magnis tantum viris hoc robur fuisse quo servitutis humanae claustra perrumperent; non est quod iudices hoc fieri nisi a Catone non posse, qui quam ferro non miserat animam manu extraxit: vilissimae sortis homines ingenti impetu in tutum evaserunt ...*

<sup>79</sup> D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 112. Cf. several pronouncements p. 109, e.g.: «Der Freitod steht den Menschen immer, scheinbar ohne Einschränkung, als letzter Ausweg zur Verfügung» and «Nicht mehr kommt es Seneca, wie noch der alten Stoa, darauf an, feste Regeln aufzustellen, die die Zulässigkeit des Selbstmordes bestimmen». Elsässer finds in Seneca only remnants of an ethical foundation!

<sup>80</sup> *Contra* J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 247. He corrects himself in *Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy*, in: *ANRW* II 36.3 (1989), p. 1993-2012 (here 2004).

<sup>81</sup> *Contra* J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 247 and D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 117.

(e.g. 70.19)<sup>82</sup>. For instance, he points out that nature is so organized that one can step out of this life if one does not like it. Another fact is that some people who are not philosophically trained are still uncommonly courageous when faced with death and take their own life for serious or frivolous reasons. Seneca may say that one can flee from this life, but the rule is clear: no fleeing; one parts with life only after due deliberation<sup>83</sup>.

Finally, the concrete circumstances accepted by Seneca in which suicide is possible are virtually identical with those of the Stoic tradition, and even the difference with Plato in this matter is relatively small.

Elsässer could have pointed to the far-reaching pronouncement in *epist.* 77.4<sup>84</sup>. But I think that within his context this sentence must be read as the reverse of the notion — admittedly formulated in a rather extreme and misleading way — that life in itself has little value, does not amount to much; the meaning cannot be that the decision to commit suicide could be taken frivolously or thoughtlessly.

In this connection I would like to make one further point: Rist and Elsässer<sup>85</sup> emphasize that the older Stoa, in the matter of suicide, made a distinction between the position of the sage and that of others; Rist believes that for the wise it was possibly allowed to opt for suicide on the basis of his reason, whereas for the others a divine hint was required<sup>86</sup>. This view is not attested as such for Seneca's predecessors, nor can it thus be found in Seneca. Perhaps we may assume that he granted the right to one's own life more broadly than his Stoic predecessors: with his instructions he is anyhow addressing the *proficientes* (e.g. Seneca himself and Lucilius)<sup>87</sup>.

Seneca is not lax, but rather flexible. Concerning 70.11 *Non possis itaque de re in universum pronuntiare* etc. I would like to note (in line with Grisé<sup>88</sup>) that this passage clearly indicates that Seneca does not

<sup>82</sup> Thus rightly M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 384. There is no basis whatsoever for the claim that Seneca in 70.19 is calling («auffordert») people of all sorts to suicide (D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 109).

<sup>83</sup> I think Elsässer (*art. cit.*, p. 114) is wrong where he states that *fugere* would be acceptable for Seneca. *Exire e vita*, not *fugere*, is the rule. But in certain circumstances *fugere* may be appropriate, not unreasonable and therefore acceptable; cf. e.g. *fugere* or *fuga* in *prov.* 6.7 and *Marc.* 1.2 and 22.7.

<sup>84</sup> Maybe he does but without reference on p. 114, paragraph 1?

<sup>85</sup> J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 238-246; D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 109.

<sup>86</sup> See J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 243 and 245. Differently: M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 376 with n. 2.

<sup>87</sup> For the question of Seneca's laxity see also H.-P. BÜTLER, *op. cit.* (n. 57), p. 40-41.

<sup>88</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 207-209 and 210-211. Cf. M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 381-382 and 386.



formulate a strict rule; one must judge case by case in the light of the general principles and, if necessary, confer with friends. Seneca is equally appreciative of someone who, having become fatally ill, decides *aequo animo* not to take his own life as of someone who in the same situation makes *aequo animo* the opposite decision. Compare in this connection *epist.* 30 and 77: in the one case he lauds the elderly Bassus Aufidius for courageously bearing his deterioration, in the other he holds that the gravely ill *adulescens* Marcellinus' decision to commit suicide was the right one. In the context of suicide Seneca — unless I am mistaken — does not speak explicitly of Panaetius' doctrine of the *personae* or individual temperaments; but by offering his reader both *epist.* 30 and *epist.* 77 he does pronounce himself implicitly in the same sense<sup>89</sup>.

As already noted, Elsässer and Veyne<sup>90</sup> believe that Seneca's views on suicide contradict a number of his own elementary Stoic tenets. Elsässer speaks<sup>91</sup> of a «prinzipieller Widerspruch»: «Einerseits verlangt er [= Seneca] vom Menschen immer wieder die Bereitschaft zum 'omnia ferre', andererseits will er ihn beim geringsten Anlass («nec hoc tantum in necessitate ultima facit») aus seinem irdischen Dasein entlassen». If the sage can suffer everything<sup>92</sup>, why would suicide be necessary in the event of certain extreme conditions? If morality and happiness are a matter of one's inner disposition, how can Seneca find suicide the designated outlet in the event of physical deterioration or the confrontation with a tyrant?<sup>93</sup> According to Elsässer letter 71 would show that Seneca was aware of the contradiction, but also that he was unable to resolve it<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. on this question M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.*, p. 381-382; I do not agree here with D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 113. To *epist.* 30 can be added the conclusion of *epist.* 98 (i.e. the part after the lacuna).

<sup>90</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 85; cf., besides Elsässer and Veyne, also H.-P. BÜTLER, *op. cit.* (n. 57), p. 40. Griffin too pointed to some slight inconsistencies (*op. cit.*, p. 380-381 and *art. cit.* [n. 9], p. 77 n. 23). On contradictions in Seneca's philosophical œuvre see further G. CAMBIANO, *Seneca e le contraddizioni del 'sapiens'*, in: Giovanna GARBARINO – I. LANA (eds), *Incontri con Seneca* (...), Bologna 2001, p. 49-60. Cambiano points out a number of contradictions in Seneca's presentation of the sage and offers an explanation. He does not deal with suicide.

<sup>91</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>92</sup> *Const.* 5.4ff.; D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 110.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 380: «If the virtue of the wise man's action lies in its intention, not its result, what danger of disgraceful action can he be said to avoid through suicide?» (see also D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 110).

<sup>94</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 114-115.

Elsässer gives the impression he is the first to reveal the real or apparent contradiction in Seneca's position on suicide<sup>95</sup>, but in fact this discrepancy was already pointed out by Plutarch, Augustine, and Justus Lipsius<sup>96</sup>. Several ancient authors, for that matter, have pointed up contradictions in the Stoic doctrine. Plutarch indeed devoted one of his polemical essays to the topic, viz. *De stoicorum repugnantiis*<sup>97</sup>. And in Augustine, *civ.* 19.4 (ed. Dombart-Kalb, vol. 2, p. 359.21-5) we read: *Quae mala Stoici philosophi miror qua fronte mala non esse contendunt, quibus fatentur, si tanta fuerint ut ea sapiens vel non possit vel non debeat sustinere, cogi eum mortem sibi immet inferre atque ex hac vita emigrare*<sup>98</sup>.

In my opinion Augustine, Elsässer and others fail to do justice to Seneca in this matter.

The relevant basic tenets of the Stoic Seneca are that only rational conduct and moral good (*honestum*, *virtus*) can make man happy, and that *virtus* is in itself sufficient — this latter point is typically Stoic. Matters like life and death, physical pain, wealth, etc., i.e. things regarded by the man in the street as sources of happiness and misfortune, are considered by the Stoa *indifferentia* with regard to happiness, although some of these are preferable (*commoda*), others not so (*incommoda*). The happiness of the sage is not disturbed or thwarted by pain or similar *incommoda* thanks to his *patientia* (see e.g. *epist.* 71) or *apatheia* (as defined in *epist.* 9). Finally, it must be confirmed that for Seneca ethics and happiness are indeed a matter of the inner disposition with which a one acts.

Following on the paragraph about some of Seneca's basic tenets I would like to specify a few words in the pronouncements of Augustine and Elsässer: *Quae mala* (Augustine, *civ.*) = *Quae incommoda*; *omnia* in Elsässer «*omnia ferre*» is *omnia incommoda*.

<sup>95</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>96</sup> Kant too, who was vehemently opposed to Seneca's stance on self-killing, speaks of a contradiction in Seneca's views, but a different one from the one that repeatedly appears in the tradition and is the point of discussion here. See on Kant and the Stoa M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7).

<sup>97</sup> See in connection with suicide 18, 1042C-E and also *De communibus notitiis adversus stoicos* 11, 1063C-F. These *loci* are cited by J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 239-241, and M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.*, p. 431 n. 7.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. also Lipsius, *Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam* 3, 22-23, who quotes the cited passage from Augustine. Augustine and Lipsius are mentioned in Piet H. SCHRIJVERS, «*Seit ein Gespräch wir sind*»: *Het voortleven van de omstreeden Seneca, Lampas* 22 (1989), p. 345-346. Augustine is also in D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 113, and M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.*, p. 439.

One must thereby remember that the Stoa (and this includes Seneca) regards the sage as imperturbable and invincible, not the *proficientes*. The sage is an exceptional phenomenon, the ‘model’ within the Stoic system<sup>99</sup>, while the *proficientes* are those who try to live wisely and make significant moral progress. The latter, as Seneca more than once remarks, are not in the same measure ‘invulnerable / invincible’. But it must be conceded that Seneca extols in particular the suicide of Cato, who was in his eyes a sage<sup>100</sup>.

That the happiness of the sage is not disturbed by *incommoda* does not mean that he would be physically invulnerable (see rightly *epist.* 9 and 71), only that his *animus*, his *virtus* cannot be defeated by *incommoda* of whatever kind and that his well-being is not affected. The Stoa says that the *indifferentia* do not form the foundation of our happiness, they do not say that the *indifferentia* are of no importance in our life. Seneca’s letter 9 on friendship and autarky can be brought into the study to enable us to assess his position on suicide more sharply. In order to live happily (*beate vivere*) man requires nothing besides his own *virtus*, but to simply live (*vivere*) he does, as Seneca says in §13.

It is also important to realize that what Seneca wants to say is not that suicide is obligatory in the event of extreme *incommoda*, but that it must be an option; he wants to have suicide available as an emergency exit for all people (including the sage).

I also want to point out that Elsässer’s statement that Seneca condones suicide «beim geringsten Anlass» is without any doubt a gross exaggeration. If one (wrongly) posits, as Elsässer does, that Seneca is lax about suicide, then the tension *patientia* — suicide becomes much greater. In other words, Elsässer’s two propositions are linked: (1) Seneca is permissive on suicide (see above); (2) his position on suicide contradicts his Stoic tenet that the sage’s *virtus* is not thwarted by external tribulations (*patientia*). However, we must not lose sight of the fact that for Seneca suicide is an escape option, to be used only after due deliberation.

The coupling of suicide with a divine hint neutralizes the potential contradiction: there is in this case no longer a lack of *patientia*, for the sage is undeniably acting *patienter* upon a directive sign from the deity. Due to the absence of the divine hint in Seneca, *patientia* and suicide appear to collide head-on.

<sup>99</sup> P. VEYNE, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 67.

<sup>100</sup> That is why Elsässer concentrates his argumentation on Seneca’s treatment of Cato.

Seneca demonstrates in *epist.* 58 (rather than in *epist.* 71) that he is aware of a tension between his position on suicide and other stances he defends. Here, in my opinion, he also provides a reasonable answer: he posits that he would not depart from life because of pain, but would do so when the pain became so severe or the deterioration so extreme that the *virtus* lost any chance of significant activity. Seneca thus makes it clear that the sage does not commit suicide due to a lack of *virtus*, it is not that his *patientia* falls short.

Let us make the implications of this position more explicit. The sage and the (advanced) *proficiens* have inured themselves through (*prae*)*meditatio* and training against pain, so that their *virtus*-based happiness cannot be destroyed or endangered by hurt. But if the body no longer functions and completely hampers the activity of *virtus*, and if no change in the situation is to be expected<sup>101</sup>, then it is reasonable to opt for death — for life is not in itself something good, and death of itself not something bad. Instructive is *epist.* 98.16: *Quid ergo? Non si suadebit res exibat? Quidni exeat, si nemo iam uti eo poterit, si nihil aliud quam dolori operam dabit?*

*Patientia*, yes, but not without some perspective, there are (in a sense) limits: the sage's *virtus* can withstand all, but does not accept everything, does not wish to live at all costs. The *ratio* directs the *patientia* and does not demand unreasonable *patientia*<sup>102</sup>. It should be pointed out that Seneca sees the well-considered suicide itself also as an expression of *patientia*, it proves one can accept death in a rational manner. Also in the event of deliberated suicide Seneca will speak of victorious *patientia*<sup>103</sup>.

If the circumstances would entail that the sage (and the *proficiens*) according to their personal assessment of the situation would have to relinquish their ethical project and their integrity, then they are allowed to opt for death. Cato, with the *persona* proper to him, could hardly surrender to Caesar and remain himself in a credible way<sup>104</sup>; his suicide was

<sup>101</sup> The young Marcellinus (*epist.* 77) is afflicted by a chronic, very severe but not incurable illness. Partly on the advice of a Stoic he would eventually, after consultation, opt for suicide. Seneca appreciates the way Marcellinus faces death. Cf. above, where we have shown that Seneca formulates a flexible guideline. But not every Stoic must necessarily come to the same conclusion.

<sup>102</sup> *Contra* D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 108.

<sup>103</sup> See e.g. *epist.* 98.12. Cf. correctly D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.*, p. 111 (conclusion final paragraph); but how can this be reconciled with the preceding sentences?

<sup>104</sup> Cf. J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 245 (with reference to Cicero, *off.* I 112) and M.J. SEIDLER, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 431-432 and 436-437. On this problem see further M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 380-381.

morally more rewarding than a surrender, and therefore a rational choice by his *animus*; if suicide was not quite a compelling option, it was certainly a very rational choice.

The sage can bear anything, but this does not mean that he passively suffers all (see above); it means that he never lets himself be bested by *fortuna*, it means he manages everything rationally. Now, in certain conditions suicide can in the eyes of a person be the obvious / most rational option, in which he can retain control of the situation and remains himself. Therefore no contradiction between *omnia ferre* and suicide, rather the contrary. Thus it was concluded above that there is no contradiction between Stoic freedom and suicide.

Have all problems now been solved? No, I think there is still something to clarify on a deeper level, viz. about the sage's autarky.

The sage relies *ad beate vivendum* solely upon his own *virtus*, is dependent on nothing but himself (see letter 9 on autarky and friendship, esp. §13). That *virtus*, however, is more than a certain attitude: it is to be realized in a rational activity. In that, *fortuna* plays a role. In fact, *fortuna* provides the *materia* with which *virtus* can achieve some good (and with which the unwise do something bad) (see *epist.* 98.2ff.)<sup>105</sup>. That rational behaviour consists in the first instance in the fact that the sage does not submit to *fortuna*, but remains above it, is not mastered by it. The sage is capable of this in all circumstances. In that sense he possesses autarky. When in need, restricted in his capabilities but not lacking anything necessary for his happiness — there is no question of *egere* — he can fall back upon himself (see *epist.* 9.16). But this is not what he prefers (§17), and therefore he may find it appropriate, as master of the situation, to part with this life, which is something indifferent.

The sage wishes to continue living, if possible, and to do more than just fall back upon himself (see *epist.* 9.17). Yet it can be that a certain *materia* in his eyes offers only one rational outcome: suicide. The other possibilities have in his view been cut off by *fortuna*. The sage does not miss these possibilities and is happy, i.e. he dies happily. The sage's autarky, then, always prevails, if not always equally broadly. In other words, in his autarky the sage does not always have several morally useful options

<sup>105</sup> See for this presentation of the matter J. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 5-10. G. CAMBIANO, *art. cit.* (n. 90), also shows that Seneca allowed the external circumstances a role of importance in the actual realization of *virtus*. Note also *epist.* 113.7 *virtus... per se nihil agit, sed cum homine*.

at his disposal. His autarky is limited by what *fortuna* offers him in the way of possibilities.

As for *epist.* 104.3 — where Seneca asks to be considerate to loved ones; in certain situations this may lead to a refusal of suicide — Elsässer regards this stance as an additional inconsistency<sup>106</sup>. I do not think this is an inconsequence; if any capacity or opportunity for activity remains for the *virtus* (which implies commitment), Seneca will not kill himself<sup>107</sup>.

Seneca's conspicuous interest in death and suicide is explained, on the one hand, from his health problems (and psychological constitution) and, on the other hand, from the perilous political situation in which he lived<sup>108</sup>. As for the former, it should be remembered that the attacks he suffered from his respiratory ailment always caused a brief death-struggle (*epist.* 54.1-2) — physicians called such a confrontation with death *praemeditatio mortis*!

For that matter, we can already read in Plato's *Phaedo* 64C that whoever applies himself to philosophy in the right way is concerned only with dying and death! One can point further to Seneca's desire to behave grandly and frankly, like the Stoic sage, and to the influence of Cato's celebrated suicide, Seneca's inspiring model<sup>109</sup>. Rist probably goes too far when he says that Seneca gave so much space and importance to suicide because he hated life, adding: «fundamentally Seneca's wise man is in love with death»<sup>110</sup>.

I agree with Paul Veyne who emphasizes in his recent book that in Seneca's work death has such an important place also (and perhaps primarily) because the confrontation with death in his mind forms the ultimate test for the progress one has made on the way to Stoic wisdom<sup>111</sup>.

<sup>106</sup> D. ELSÄSSER, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 115-116.

<sup>107</sup> Just as one must be prepared to die for a loved one (*epist.* 6.2), one must also be prepared to stay alive! See W. BRINCKMANN, *Der Begriff der Freundschaft in Senecas Briefen*, diss. Köln 1963, p. 46 n. 1, and M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 378.

<sup>108</sup> See J. RIST, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 246; M. GRIFFIN, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 368; Y. GRISÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 206-207; A.J.L. VAN HOOFF, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 190.

<sup>109</sup> Note *ostendere* in *prov.* 2.4 and 12; see in this connection H.-P. BÜTLER, *op. cit.* (n. 57), p. 40. The influence of Cato's suicide is treated at length by M. GRIFFIN, *art. cit.* (n. 9), e.g. p. 197-198. The fame that death (self-killing!) can bring is discussed by Seneca in *epist.* 13.14 *Cicuta magnum Socratem fecit. Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem detraxeris gloriae*.

<sup>110</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 249.

<sup>111</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 112-113. Compare how the willingness to die for a loved one is the touchstone of the *vera amicitia* (cf. W. BRINCKMANN, *op. cit.* [n. 107], p. 48-49).

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that Seneca, unlike Epictetus, nowhere speaks of a divine hint as a prerequisite to suicide and that he stresses very strongly man's freedom. This stressed freedom is called a gift of divine nature, in other words his emphasis is not a revolt against god or nature. Therefore I prefer to speak not of a break with his Stoic predecessors, but rather of some conspicuous differences. However, his position, given the connection *Logos* — *logos*, is logical.

Striking too is Seneca's flexible attitude: he realizes that varying circumstances and divergent temperaments can result in a different approach and behaviour. But this flexibility is not laxness. One cannot say that Seneca in his explicit pronouncements speaks of suicide laxly; only when *epist.* 77.4 is viewed in isolation could one arrive at a different conclusion.

It is touching how Seneca, within the freedom he so ardently advocates, in *epist.* 104.3 puts aside personal preference in favour of a friend or wife. I do not think this is at odds with his radical pronouncements on human freedom or that his position on suicide really clashes with his viewpoint on the unconquerable *patientia* of the sage.

Seneca's defense of suicide on rational grounds, with attention for differences between people and situations, and the way in which he reckons with close friends and family, is edifying, still relevant, and commands respect.

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## PLUTARCH ON SELF AND OTHERS\*

### 1. INTRODUCTION:

#### THE RELATION OF SELF AND OTHER IN ANTIQUITY AND IN PLUTARCH

Plutarch strongly opposed the Epicurean ideal of a sequestered life: man should not withdraw from society, but should as a social being, ζῶν κοινωνικόν, enter public life, where he meets the other<sup>1</sup>. Now it is clear that there are many possible attitudes which one can adopt towards the other. They vary from violence against, and manipulation of, the other to sincere concern for the good of the other, from paternalism to responsibility for the other, from exclusion to love, from neglect and indifference to an encounter between an I and a Thou, based on mutual respect. What then is Plutarch's position with regard to this question? How does he conceive the relation Self-Other?

First of all, one should note that Plutarch's specific way of putting the question is highly relevant. He always sets the problem from the perspective of the self, hardly ever from the perspective of the other. He wants to examine which attitude one should adopt towards the other in order to act *oneself* in a virtuous way; he never asks which attitude should be adopted in order to take into account the wishes of the other, to bear in mind as far as possible the other's identity as being different from that of one's own. For that very reason, it becomes particularly interesting to examine to what extent Plutarch's ethics can precisely do justice to the perspective of the other.

Now the first question that should be asked is whether it is a remotely realistic thing at all to expect a certain respect for the other as other in Antiquity. To what extent the ancients really cared about the problem of the identity of the other as being different from that of oneself? In fact, the problem had already received some attention in traditional thinking<sup>2</sup>,

\* I would like to thank Prof. P.A. Stadter for many valuable remarks on an earlier draft of this article. Where I still disagree with him, it has been with hesitation, and any faults that remain are, of course, entirely my own. I'm also much indebted to Prof. L. Van der Stockt, to Prof. G. Schepens and to Dr. S. Verdegem.

<sup>1</sup> See especially the little essay *De latenter vivendo* (1128A-1130E); for Plutarch's controversy against Epicureanism on this point, see also the final section of *Adv. Colot.* (1124D-1127E).

<sup>2</sup> The seeds of the later problem were already present in ancient Greek thinking, which contains many pairs of opposites, often divided into a positive and a negative pole; see

and had become quite important in Plutarch's time. As to the relation between Greeks and Romans, for instance, the basic difference between both peoples was discussed earlier already<sup>3</sup> and was underlined more and more in the first centuries A.D.<sup>4</sup>, even though later authors tried to deny this difference<sup>5</sup>. In the same way, the differences between man and woman were emphasized long before Plutarch<sup>6</sup>, although in this case too, one sometimes tried, if not to deny, than certainly to nuance them<sup>7</sup>. It is clear, then, that in more than one domain, questions related to the problem of the difference between self and other had received already much discussion when Plutarch and his contemporaries had to seek their own, personal answers.

The question remains, however, whether such discussions in concrete contexts did also influence ethical thinking about the place of the other. Are there any traces of a moral position that could somehow do justice to the peculiar nature of the other as being different from that of the self? Usually, a respect for the other as other is absent from ancient thinking, even though there can be found some important, though limited, beginnings. According to Aristotle's theory of friendship, for instance, one wishes a friend good for his own sake<sup>8</sup>. However, in such ideal friendship, a friend is also another self<sup>9</sup>, so that respect for the friend is based on a kind of shared identity<sup>10</sup>. In different Hellenistic philosophical

G.E.R. LLOYD, *Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge 1966, p. 15-171. On the classical period, see P. CARTLEDGE, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford 2002.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* I 1-3 and Horace, *Epist.* II 1.156-163.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Lucian, *De merc. cond.* 40; Juvenal, *Sat.* III 58-125; Tacitus, *Ann.* II 88, III 60, IV 35, VI 18 etc.; more passages in H. HUNGER, *Graeculus perfidus — Ἰταλὸς ἱταρόφ.* *Il senso dell'alterità nei rapporti Greco-Romani ed Italo-Bizantini*, Roma 1987, p. 22-31.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Julian, *Orat.* IV 152d-153a and Libanius, *Orat.* XV 25; much more material in J. PALM, *Röm, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit*, Lund 1959.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Plato, *Leges* VI 781ab; *Republ.* V 453b and e, 455c-e; Aristotle, *Hist. an.* IX 1, 608a-b.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Plato, *Leges* VII 804de and 805cd; *Republ.* V 451c-456a (A.W. PRICE, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford 1989, p. 167-171); Musonius Rufus, fragm. 3 and 4 Hense.

<sup>8</sup> *EN* VIII 2, 1155b31; 4, 1156b9-11; 5, 1157a18-19; IX 1166a2-4; *EE* VII 6, 1240a24-25; *Rhet.* II 4, 1380b36-1381a1; cf. also Cicero, *De fin.* I xx-69 on the position of some Epicureans.

<sup>9</sup> *EN* IX 4, 1166a31-32; 9, 1170b6-7; *EE* VII 12, 1245a29-30 and 34-35; cf. also *EN* VIII 10, 1159b2-4.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. A.W. PRICE, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 130: «To love another actively for his sake is above all to identify with him in action by making his acts also one's own as realizations of choices that one shares with him»; cf. *EN* IX 9, 1170a2-4.

schools, due attention is given to real differences in talents between individuals<sup>11</sup>, although each individual should in the end realize the same ideal. In this case too, the perspective of the other as other is hardly taken into account.

Extremely important in this context is Panaetius. In his famous *personae* theory, he distinguishes four considerations that should be taken into account in order to determine the nature of propriety (τὸ πρέπον / *decorum*): the universal, rational nature of human beings (Cicero, *De off.* I xxx 107), one's own individual nature (xxx 107-109), external circumstances (xxxii 115) and one's personal deliberate choice (*ibid.*). Accordingly, an individual should not only refrain from opposing his universal human nature, but he should also follow his own particular nature instead of trying in vain to imitate the personal characteristics of others (xxxii 110-114). This implies that an action can be appropriate for one man, but inappropriate for another (xxxii 112). For instance, whereas suicide is the right alternative for a Cato, it would be wrong for others who have a less austere character (*ibid.*). And the behaviour that fits in very well with Ulysses would be completely at odds with Ajax (xxxii 113). In this way, Panaetius succeeded to develop an ethical theory that made it possible to give a certain place to the other without merely considering him from the perspective of the self.

With this position, Panaetius was a *rara avis* in Antiquity. Did Plutarch join him? To what extent Plutarch introduced a certain respect for the other as other in his ethical thinking? The question is important for two reasons. First of all, the problem of the relation between self and other returns in several domains of Plutarch's thinking. Much work has been done here. Nonetheless, the great number of detailed studies have not made all aspects of Plutarch's position equally clear. Did Plutarch, for instance, ever try to go beyond the different character of Greeks and Romans, in order to reach a unified Greco-Roman culture<sup>12</sup>? Or should he rather be regarded as a non-integrationist<sup>13</sup>? And whereas more than

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Seneca, *Epist.* 52.3-6 (= Epicurus, fr. 192 Us.); *Epist.* 95.36-37; *De benef.* V 25.5; Musonius Rufus, fr. I 2.23-5.2 H.; Philo of Alexandria, *Post.* xx-71; *Deus* xiii 61-64.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. BOULOGNE, *Le sens des 'Questions Romaines' de Plutarque*, REG 100 (1987), p. 474-475; ID., *Plutarque. Un aristocrate grec sous l'occupation romaine*, Lille 1994, p. 35-54 and *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. S.C.R. SWAIN, *Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250*, Oxford 1996, p. 137-186; cf. also T. DUFF, *Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford 1999, p. 291-308.

once Plutarch's very positive treatment of women has been emphasized<sup>14</sup>, others also nuanced to a certain extent Plutarch's philogyny<sup>15</sup>.

Secondly, Plutarch's great emphasis on mildness (πραότης) and humanity (φιλανθρωπία) seems to point to a certain respect for the other as other:

To the Platonist or Aristotelian, *eudaimonia* ('felicity') is self-evidently the goal. It may involve preferring honour to pleasure, death to disgrace, restraint to indulgence. But it can never lead one to think of the *eudaimonia* of some other person as to be preferred to one's own. What is notable in Plutarch is not his adhesion to these attitudes, but his tacit modifications of them. These come from the emphasis laid in all his moral judgments on mildness and humanity, *praotes* and *philanthropia*; these are qualities which, even if practised in a self-regarding sense, involve at least some degree of concern and understanding for the feelings and aims of others<sup>16</sup>.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the degree in which such concern and understanding really implies a respect for the other *as other*. This investigation will consist of two main parts. First of all, attention will be given to the place of the other *as other* in Plutarch's ethical thinking in general. Do there exist some openings in Plutarch's moral position that make it possible to respect the other as other? What is the precise scope of mildness and humanity in this context? Next, the conclusions of the first part will be checked through some concrete case-studies. These case-studies will show to what extent Plutarch's own position towards others is in line with the general outlines of his ethical theory.

The material object of this investigation should be Plutarch's whole oeuvre, that is, both *Moralia* and *Lives*. With regard to the *Lives*, the following preliminary observations should be made. It is clear that in general, Plutarch is not really interested in the specificity of his heroes, who are presented neither as types, nor as individual 'personalities', but rather as moral 'characters'<sup>17</sup>. Occasionally, historical circumstances are taken

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., Y. VERNIERE, *Plutarque et les femmes*, *AncW* 25 (1994), p. 165-169, or A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *Plutarch on Women and Marriage*, *WS* 110 (1997), p. 27-88.

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g., J. AUBERGER, *Parole et silence dans les Préceptes du mariage de Plutarque*, *LEC* 61 (1993), p. 297-308, and K. BLOMQUIST, *From Olympias to Aretaphila. Women in Politics in Plutarch*, in *Plutarch and his Intellectual World. Essays on Plutarch* (ed. J. Mossman), London 1997, p. 73-97.

<sup>16</sup> D.A. RUSSELL, *Plutarch*, New York 1973, p. 89-90.

<sup>17</sup> C. GILL, *The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus*, *CQ* NS 33 (1983), p. 470-478.

into account for understanding or evaluating the hero's actions<sup>18</sup>, but in general, Plutarch's heroes are timeless<sup>19</sup>, even while placed in a concrete, timely perspective<sup>20</sup>.

Sometimes, however, the career of a hero offers the opportunity to thematize one specific element that illustrates respect or lack of respect for the other in a certain context. The virtuous actions of women, for instance, often contrasted with the bad behaviour of wicked male antagonists, can raise the question of the peculiar characteristics of the virtue of women, and its difference with, or similarity to, that of man. Or the collaboration between heroes with a different philosophical background, such as the Academic Brutus and the Epicurean Cassius, can illustrate a possible attitude towards people of a different opinion. However, one should bear in mind an important *caveat*. The behaviour of the heroes does not necessarily give information about Plutarch's own position. For instance, the way in which Brutus and Cassius collaborated need not necessarily be the way in which philosophers of different schools should collaborate according to Plutarch himself. Now the question is not whether Plutarch's heroes were able to respect the others as others, nor even whether Plutarch presented his heroes as having or lacking such respect, but whether Plutarch himself gave evidence of such a respect in his writings.

In consequence, not all material of the *Lives* is a priori relevant. Passages or episodes taken from the *Lives* are relevant:

- when they contain Plutarch's explicit evaluation of the hero. Such passages, which are quite frequent and provide interesting information, will be taken into account in the following discussion.
- when one can show that Plutarch deviates from his sources and modifies traditional material in order to shed light upon his hero's respect or lack of respect for the others as others. Now such observation is not directly relevant, but it can lead to the interesting question why Plutarch

<sup>18</sup> *Marc.* 1.2-3, 20.1, 21.1-5; *Aem.* 2.3-4; *Cor.* 1.4; *Comp. Dion. et Brut.* 2.1-2 and 4.1-2.

<sup>19</sup> C.B.R. PELLING, *The Moralism of Plutarch's Lives*, in *Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday* (ed. D. Innes – H. Hine – C. Pelling), Oxford 1995, p. 205-220, esp. 208-217; cf. A. DIHLE, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie*, Göttingen 1970, p. 87.

<sup>20</sup> P.A. STADTER, *The Rhetoric of Virtue in Plutarch's Lives*, in *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society, Leuven, July 3-6, 1996* (ed. L. Van der Stockt), Louvain – Namur 2000, p. 493-510, esp. 505.

presents the matter as he does and how this illustrates his own position. This, however, presupposes a detailed examination of each separate *Life*, which falls outside the scope of this article. It is true, however, that such detailed studies can complete and / or nuance the conclusions of this contribution.

Finally, one should note that the approach in this article yields a double advantage: [1] it will throw light on one general aspect of Plutarch's thinking, which can be applied to different domains, and [2] those different domains are no longer isolated, but receive their place within a broader perspective, where they can be confronted with each other and thus enlighten one another. As such, it can offer a general framework into which the conclusions of many detailed studies can be placed.

## 2. THE LIMITS OF ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ AND ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΑ

In the field of Plutarch's *individual ethics*, the other has strictly speaking no place at all. Indeed, individual ethics concerns the relation of the self with the self. In this domain, one should grow through a moral amelioration of the own self towards a φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (*Maxime cum principibus* 777CD). When one has succeeded in reaching this final end, one will live in complete harmony with oneself. One will become a proud witness of one's own moral virtue<sup>21</sup>, without feeling the need of another's praise (*De prof. in virt.* 80EF; see also *Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.* 5.2), finding the sources of enjoyment in oneself (*De prof. in virt.* 81B). Hence, it is clear that in the field of individual ethics, the attention is exclusively directed towards the self.

And yet, the other is not completely absent there. Others can exert a negative influence on the process of one's own self-completion, by giving bad advice and by dissuading from adopting a philosophical course (*De prof. in virt.* 78AB; cf. also *Tim.* 6.1). Conversely, they can in a constructive way contribute to the individual's προκοπή (as parent, husband, friend or enemy, philosopher-physician and teacher). But in any case, at this level, the other is never respected for his own sake. He is never regarded as an end in himself; 'at best', he is used as a mere means to

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., *De prof. in virt.* 78C-E and 80E-81B; *De cap. ex inim.* 92DE; *De tranq. an.* 472D-F.

reach one's own τέλος of a φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτόν. This self-centred attitude towards the other is certainly not surprising at this level, but is closely connected with the self-centred perspective of individual ethics. In this domain, the perspective of the other, as opposed to that of the self, is simply irrelevant.

Individual ethics, however, should be completed by *social ethics*. There, the self will meet the other; there, the solipsistic (though basal) φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτόν has to be completed by its complement φιλία πρὸς ἕτερον (*Maxime cum principibus* 777C). Indeed, a φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτόν should never develop into a φιλαυτία. Such φιλαυτία appears as a basic vice in Plutarch's moral-philosophical writings<sup>22</sup>. It is connected with self-conceit (*De ad. et am.* 65EF), and wilfulness (*De aud.* 40F), with harshness (*Comp. Thes. et Rom.* 2.2), jealousy (*De frat. am.* 491AB; cf. also *De se ipsum laud.* 542B) and love of fame (*De gar.* 514A; cf. also *De tranq. an.* 471D). It leads to boasting (*De se ipsum laud.* 546B) and to outbursts of anger (*De coh. ira* 461A), and is diametrically opposed to φιλανθρωπία (*Comp. Thes. et Rom.* 2.2), to φιλοκαλία (*De frat. am.* 492C; *Arat.* 1.4) and to concern for the public interest (*Dion* 46.2). Furthermore, φιλαυτία makes one blind to one's own shortcomings, for «what loves is blinded about the thing it loves»<sup>23</sup>. In that way, it proves to be a serious obstacle to truth and self-knowledge (*De ad. et am.* 49AB; 65EF) and a potential threat to healing παρηγησία (*De ad. et am.* 65F-66A). For that very reason, it gives interesting opportunities to flatterers (*De ad. et am.* 48EF) and even makes everyone his own greatest flatterer<sup>24</sup>.

This strong rejection of φιλαυτία implies a certain openness towards the other: a φιλία πρὸς ἕτερον becomes possible. Now according to Plutarch, friendship in general comes into being through likeness (*De am. mult.* 96D: τῇ φιλίᾳ γένεσις δι' ὁμοιότητός ἐστιν). This is illustrated

<sup>22</sup> Cf. also G. SIEFERT, *Plutarchs Schrift περὶ εὐθυμίας*, Naumburg 1908, p. 15 n. 6; R. HIRZEL, *Plutarch*, Leipzig 1912, p. 26; H.G. INGENKAMP, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele*, Göttingen 1971, p. 131-132; J. OPSOMER, *In Search of the Truth. Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism*, Brussel 1998, p. 151-155; ID., *Plutarch's Defence of the 'Theages', in defence of Socratic Philosophy?*, *Philologus* 141 (1997), p. 114-136, esp. 132; L. VAN DER STOCKT, *A Plutarchan Hypomnema on Self-Love*, *AJPh* 120 (1999), p. 575-599, esp. 594 n. 46.

<sup>23</sup> *De ad. et am.* 48F: τυφλοῦται γὰρ τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον; cf. also *De cap. ex inim.* 90A and 92F; *Quaest. Plat.* I 1000A; Plato, *Leges* V 731e; Galenus, *De propr. an. c. aff. dign. et cur.* I II-6, p. 4.17-18 Marquardt.

<sup>24</sup> *De ad. et am.* 48F-49A; on the negative character of φιλαυτία, see also *Cons. ad Apoll.* 111E; *De tranq. an.* 468E; *De se ipsum laud.* 546F; *De Stoic. rep.* 1036C.



by means of a striking comparison with the world of animals: even the brutes only mix with others unlike themselves (τὰ ἀνόμοια) if they are forced to do so, and they crouch down, they show their displeasure and run away from one another, whereas they are glad to consort with those of the same race (τοῖς συγγενέσι καὶ οἰκείοις). *A fortiori*, friendship among human beings can never arise in people with different characters, feelings and fundamental choices of life (*De am. mult.* 96DE). In such a perspective, the peculiar character of the other as being different from that of the self can hardly receive a positive evaluation, but appears to be considered rather an obstacle for true friendship<sup>25</sup>.

In conformity with this position, Plutarch attaches great importance to brotherly love, which he even valued more highly than a relation of friendship<sup>26</sup>. In any case, friendship should not take the place of brotherly love: for according to Plutarch, a man who quarrels with his brother, and takes a stranger as his comrade, appears to do nothing but cut off voluntarily a congenital (συμφυές) limb of his own flesh, while attaching to his body a foreign (ἄλλότριον) member (*De frat. am.* 479B). At the background reappears the same opposition between what is congenital and like oneself (and what is to be preferred), on the one hand, and what is strange, unlike oneself, on the other.

However, the basic openness towards the other becomes evident not only in the relation of friendship and brotherly love, but also in the demand of πραότης<sup>27</sup> and φιλανθρωπία<sup>28</sup>, basic virtues in the domain of social ethics. Indeed, Plutarch frequently underlines the importance of mildness and gentleness in social contact. This mildness, moreover, should go hand in hand with feelings of humanity. Such φιλανθρωπία includes usefulness as an essential component: the public-spirited philosopher can show his humanity by contributing to the good of his whole community, effacing his personal interests for the sake of the common good. On the other hand, it also comprehends an important

<sup>25</sup> The same is true for Stoic and Aristotelian doctrine; see A.-J. VOELKE, *Les rapports avec autrui dans la philosophie grecque d'Aristote à Panétiüs*, Paris 1961, p. 183-185 (esp. 184: «Mais il reste vrai que l'autre de l'amitié aristotélicienne est l'autre moi-même, et non pas l'autre que moi-même, l'autre en tant qu'autre, irrémédiablement différent de moi-même»).

<sup>26</sup> See fr. 86 Sandbach (on Hesiod, *Erga* 707, quoted also in *De frat. am.* 491A).

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., H. MARTIN, *The Concept of Praotes in Plutarch's Lives*, *GRBS* 3 (1960), p. 65-73; J. DE ROMILLY, *La douceur dans la pensée grecque*, Paris 1979, p. 275-307.

<sup>28</sup> See, e.g., R. HIRZEL, *op. cit.* (n. 22), p. 23-32; H. MARTIN, *The Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives*, *AJPh* 82 (1961), p. 164-175.

degree of sympathy: the politician should share the joys and griefs of his fellow citizens (*Praec. ger. reip.* 823AB). It is clear that virtues such as *πραότης* and *φιλανθρωπία* give evidence of one's respect for the other. Even while finding the source of happiness in oneself, one should not neglect the other, but one should communicate with him in a courteous, gentle way. Moreover, this attitude of mildness and humanity should not only be adopted towards those who have already reached virtue, but also to the great crowd that is still overgrown with viciousness<sup>29</sup>.

However, the question remains as to what extent the demand of *πραότης* and *φιλανθρωπία* does also give evidence of respect for the other *as other*. The answer to this question appears to be negative. The philosopher always maintains his mildness towards others, even if the latter give evidence of 'foolishness' by trying to deter him from his philosophical life (*De prof. in virt.* 78BC) or by abusing him in public<sup>30</sup>. This mildness, however, is not based on a positive respect for their (freedom to have) 'foolish convictions'; the philosopher remains mild because mildness is a virtue, and because he has to avoid at all costs the vice of *ὀργή*.

Nor does *φιλανθρωπία* in the end imply a respect for the other as other. The philosopher shows his humanity by contributing to the public interest, to be sure, but he serves what *he himself* regards as such, *not* what the *other* considers to be good (for himself and) for the whole community. In that sense, *φιλανθρωπία* contains a strong *paternalistic* component: one can manipulate the other and neglect the other's freedom (*Praec. ger. reip.* 813A-C and 818E-819B). One can even force the other to serve one's own conception of the 'common good'<sup>31</sup>. The personal convictions which the other holds himself do not count much, but disappear completely behind the high claims of one's own honourable project.

And yet, it is undoubtedly *φιλανθρωπία* that comes closest to a respect for the other *as other*. Indeed, *φιλανθρωπία* is not confined to mere usefulness, but also includes feelings of sympathy with the other (*Praec. ger.*

<sup>29</sup> According to R. HIRZEL, *op. cit.* (n. 22), p. 27, Plutarch's *φιλανθρωπία* even extends to barbarians; *contra*, however, Th.S. SCHMIDT, *Plutarque et les Barbares. La rhétorique d'une image*, Louvain – Namur 1999, p. 7-8.

<sup>30</sup> *De cap. ex inim.* 90B-E; *Praec. ger. reip.* 810CD; cf. also *Per.* 5.2-3; *Fab.* 5.4-6; *Pel.* 25.2.

<sup>31</sup> *Praec. ger. reip.* 821AB (cf. also 818C: *δεδιττόμενος*); this was also the position of Cleomenes; see *Cleom.* 1.3: *ἐφαίνετο δὲ κάλλιστον μὲν αὐτῷ κρατεῖν ἐκόντων, καλὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ πετιομένων περιεῖναι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκβαζόμενον*.

*reip.* 823AB). Of course, there always remains a certain distance between the self and the other: sympathy with the other should not include a rejection of one's own position. But this distance is certainly good: respect for the peculiar identity of the other should of course not damage one's own identity. However, in Plutarch's perspective, this respect for the other's own identity is limited to mere feelings of sympathy, and does not imply that one attaches much importance to the other's point of view. In factional discord, for instance, one should feel sympathy with the party who thinks to be the more wronged (or better: one should appear (δοκοῦντα) to do so), but the next move consists in educating that party to one's *own* honourable project, by teaching one's own insights (which, by the way, have an ideological bias; *Praec. ger. reip.* 824DE). And more than one passage from the *Lives* appears to suggest that those humane feelings of sympathy are in the first place interesting as a political means to gain followers among the people<sup>32</sup>. Here as well, respect for the other *as other* remains quite limited.

### 3. SOME TEST CASES: PLUTARCH'S OWN ΠΙΠΑΟΤΗΣ AND ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΑ TOWARDS 'OTHERS'

#### 3.1. *Plutarch's Self*

At the most abstract, theoretical level, Plutarch's fundamental demand of *πραότης* and *φιλανθρωπία* apparently fails to do justice to the perspective of the other to the extent that this perspective differs from that of the self. It implies an important component of respect for the other, to be sure, but is completely devoid of respect for the other *as other*. The question remains whether this conclusion still holds at a more concrete level. To what extent do Plutarch's own *πραότης* and *φιλανθρωπία* towards others, as they appear from his writings, give evidence of respect for the peculiar nature of the other as being different from that of himself? Is he able to surpass the general limits of his conception of mildness and humanity in his own concrete position towards others? Or does he fail to respect the other as other both at a general and at a more concrete level?

The structural point of departure of this discussion can only be Plutarch's own self. Indeed, Plutarch first of all has to reach a basal *φιλία πρὸς*

<sup>32</sup> See e.g. *Ca. Mi.* 50.2; *Nic.* 11.2 and *Crass.* 3.3, with the comments of H. MARTIN, *art. cit.* (n. 28), p. 168-170.

ἑαυτόν, before he can turn himself towards the other. Of course, such a discussion of Plutarch's self is doomed to be concise: what, after all, do we know about Plutarch himself? Our only evidence for his character is the persona projected through his writings. There, he appears as a Greek, male, aristocratic, Platonic philosopher. He showed feelings of Greek patriotism and was attached to his home town Chaeroneia (*Dem.* 2.2; *De Her. mal.* 854F and fr. 86 Sandbach). Even if he agreed that the virtues of men and women are one and the same, he never called into question the fundamental superiority of men (cf. *infra*, p. 264-269). His passionate appeal to maintain the concord among the πρῶτοι (*Praec. ger. reip.* 815B and 824C-825F), and his violent attacks on the short-sighted members who endanger the privileges of their group (*Praec. ger. reip.* 814A-C and 814E-815B), sufficiently betrays his own attachment to his aristocratic class. The consciousness of having made, as philosopher, the correct προαίρεσις for moral virtue will no doubt have given him much satisfaction, and his adherence to the Platonic school will even have added to his happiness<sup>33</sup>. The meagre evidence seems to suggest that Plutarch reached at least a certain φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτόν; what then is his attitude towards others?

### 3.2. Romans

Plutarch's position towards the Romans gives evidence of a clear respect. Several elements show Plutarch's desire to communicate. First of all, he has sufficiently (though not perfectly) mastered Latin<sup>34</sup>, a language the

<sup>33</sup> On the advantages which Plutarch ascribed to his own school in the epistemological field, cf. *Quaest. Plat.* I 1000BC; J. OPSOMER, *art. cit.* (n. 22), p. 131-134; *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 22), p. 156 and 160-161.

<sup>34</sup> For Plutarch's knowledge of Latin, the *locus classicus* is *Dem.* 2.2-3; see further A. SICKINGER, *De linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et reliquiis et vestigiis*, diss. inaug., Friburgi Brisgovlæ 1883, p. 5-87; G. VORNEFELD, *De scriptorum latinorum locis a Plutarcho citatis*, diss. inaug., Monasterii Guestf. 1901, p. 5-7 and 70-71; J.J. HARTMAN, *De Plutarchi studiis Latinis*, *Mnemosyne* NS 34 (1906), p. 307-316, esp. 308-311; O. GÖLDI, *Plutarchs sprachliche Interessen*, diss. inaug., Zürich 1922, p. 20-24; H.J. ROSE, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch. A New Translation with Introductory Essays and a Running Commentary*, Oxford 1924, p. 11-19; A.A. PAPADOPOULOS, Τὰ Λατινικὰ τοῦ Πλουτάρχου, *Athena* 57 (1953), p. 78-82; C.P. JONES, *Plutarch and Rome*, Oxford 1971, p. 81-87; L.J. SIMMS, *Plutarch's Knowledge of Rome*, diss. inaug., Chapel Hill 1974, p. 44-114; M. DUBUISSON, *Le latin des historiens grecs*, *LEC* 47 (1979), p. 89-106, esp. 95-97; A. DE ROSALIA, *Il latino di Plutarco*, in *Strutture formali dei 'Moralia' di Plutarco. Atti del III Convegno plutarcho. Palermo, 3-5 maggio 1989* (ed. G. D'Ippolito – I. Gallo), Napoli 1991, p. 445-459; F. MOYA DEL BAÑO – L. CARRASCO REJA, *Plutarco, traductor del Latín al Griego*, in *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y Naturaleza. Actas del II Simposio Español sobre Plutarco. Murcia 1990* (ed. J. García López – E. Calderón Dorda),

advantages of which he sometimes explicitly acknowledges<sup>35</sup>. He had a good topographical knowledge of the city of Rome<sup>36</sup>. He shows a wide interest in the rich variety of the Roman cultural tradition<sup>37</sup>, and in Roman political institutions and history. Finally, L. Mestrius Plutarchus was himself a Roman citizen, surrounded by a group of influential Roman friends. It is clear that the Roman world is not neglected (let alone despised) by Plutarch, but that there can be detected some unambiguous tokens of respect in his works.

And yet, it is highly relevant that Plutarch never in his surviving works presents himself as a Roman citizen. His sincere interest in the Romans is certainly not strong enough to question his own Greek identity<sup>38</sup>. In that sense, the fundamental difference between Greeks and Romans continues to exist: the Romans remain ἀλλόφυλοι ἄνδρες, just as they were in Flamininus' day (cf. *Flam.* 2.4 and 11.4). The question then remains how Plutarch approaches this Roman identity. Is his respect for the Romans also based on a respect for their own, non-Greek identity? This fundamental question can be subdivided into two interconnected questions. [1] Does Plutarch understand Roman identity? Does his clear interest in the Romans lead to an understanding of the typically Roman character and to a respect for it, so that true communication becomes possible (descriptive level)? And [2] is this understanding of, and respect for, Roman identity also taken into account in Plutarch's moral evaluation of his Roman heroes (moral, normative level)?

[1] The answer to the first question appears to be negative. Far from understanding the typically Roman characteristics, Plutarch in general

Madrid 1991, p. 287-296; A. STROBACH, *Plutarch und die Sprachen. Ein Beitrag zur Fremdsprachenproblematik in der Antike*, Stuttgart 1997, p. 33-39. One should note that Plutarch's description of his language learning in *Dem.* 2.2-3 is highly rhetorical; J. MOSSMAN, *Is the Pen Mightier Than the Sword? The Failure of Rhetoric in Plutarch's 'Demos-thenes'*, *Histos* 3 (<http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1999>).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Ca. Ma.* 12.5 and *Ca. Mi.* 14.4; H.S. GEHMAN, *Plutarch's Observation of the Superiority of Latin over Greek as a Means of Expression*, *CJ* 11 (1916), p. 237-238; see also *Caes.* 50.2.

<sup>36</sup> See L.J. SIMMS, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 115-177; J. BUCKLER, *Plutarch and Autopsy*, *ANRW* II 33.6 (1992), p. 4788-4830, esp. 4821-4825.

<sup>37</sup> In his *Quaest. Rom.* and in many digressions in the *Lives* and in other works, Plutarch deals with various religious customs of the Romans, with their habits concerning family life, and with their social practices; see, e.g., L.J. SIMMS, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 178-237; J. BOULOGNE, *op. cit.* (n. 12), p. 75-146.

<sup>38</sup> L.R. LIND, *Concept, Action, and Character: The Reasons for Rome's Greatness*, *TAPhA* 103 (1972), p. 235-283, esp. 256, obviously exaggerates when he says that «Plutarch was a diplomat and a Romanophile. His modern counterpart is the New Englander who is more British than the British».

tends to deny that the Romans fundamentally differ from the Greeks. He is convinced that the «Roman language» (τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν διάλεκτον) has its origins in Greek<sup>39</sup>, and hence that many Latin words are in fact Greek (*Quaest. Rom.* 276A). He apparently does not attach much importance to Latin literature<sup>40</sup>, and his interest in typically Roman religious phenomena is confined to some *curiosa*, which are moreover more than once explained in a typically Greek way (*interpretatio graeca*)<sup>41</sup>. In the domain of politics, Plutarch often looks for Greek equivalents of Roman institutions, and he more than once makes mistakes when such analogies do not exist<sup>42</sup>. In general, he approaches Roman political history from a Greek perspective<sup>43</sup>. In that way, Roman identity (as opposed to the Greek one) is usually destroyed: Rome

<sup>39</sup> See *Marc.* 8.4; *Rom.* 15.3; *Num.* 7.5; cf. also *Quaest. conv.* VIII, 6, 726E-727A; *Quaest. Plat.* X 1010D; J. BOULOGNE, *op. cit.* (n. 12), p. 50-51; A. STROBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 84-87; *contra*: S.C.R. SWAIN, *Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch*, *JHS* 110 (1990), p. 126-145, esp. 126; ID., *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 140.

<sup>40</sup> His knowledge of Latin literature remains for the greatest part limited to the historians; cf. C.B.R. PELLING, *Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives*, *JHS* 99 (1979), p. 74-96, esp. 75; ID., *Plutarch. Life of Antony*. Cambridge 1988, p. 6. On Plutarch's limited knowledge of the Latin poets, see A.V. ZADOROJNYI, *The Roman Poets in Plutarch's Stories*, in *Plutarco y la Historia. Actas del V Simposio Español sobre Plutarco. Zaragoza, 20-22 de junio de 1996* (ed. C. Schrader – V. Ramón – J. Vela), Zaragoza 1997, p. 497-506. However, it is important to ask — as Prof. Stadter rightly pointed out to me — whether Plutarch's canons of style would have permitted him to quote a Latin poet. See also K. ZIEGLER, art. *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*, *RE* XXI 1 (1951), col. 636-962, esp. 927: «Es ist charakteristisch, daß P. bei aller seiner Wertschätzung römischen Wesens doch nicht geglaubt hat, für philosophische Dinge bei einem Römer etwas profitieren zu können».

<sup>41</sup> Cf., e.g., Plutarch's attitude towards Janus Bifrons (*Quaest. Rom.* 269A and 274EF), Mater Matuta (*Quaest. Rom.* 267DE; *De frat. am.* 492D; *Cam.* 5.1-2), the Veneralia (*Quaest. Rom.* 275E); see also J. BOULOGNE, *art. cit.* (n. 12), p. 473-474; ID. *op. cit.* (n. 12), p. 115-124; F. GRAF, *Plutarco e la religione romana*, in *Plutarco e la religione. Atti del VI Convegno plutarqueo. Ravello, 29-31 maggio 1995* (ed. I. Gallo), Napoli 1996, p. 269-283, esp. 277-283.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. C.B.R. PELLING, *Plutarch and Roman Politics*, in *Past Perspectives. Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing. Papers presented at a Conference in Leeds, 6-8 April 1983* (ed. I.S. Moxon – J.D. Smart – A.J. Woodman), Cambridge 1986, p. 159-187, esp. 177-181; cf. also L. DE BLOIS, *The Perception of Politics in Plutarch's Roman 'Lives'*, *ANRW* II 33.6 (1992), p. 4568-4615, esp. 4578-4583; M. MAZZA, *Plutarco e la politica romana. Alcune riconsiderazioni*, in *Teoria e prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco. Atti del V Convegno plutarqueo. Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 giugno 1993* (ed. I. Gallo – B. Scardigli), Napoli 1995, p. 245-268, esp. 247-265.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. C.B.R. PELLING, *art. cit.* (n. 42), p. 166-175 (on the βουλὴ-δῆμος-conflict); A. DEREMETZ, *Plutarque: histoire de l'origine et genèse du récit*, *REG* 103 (1990), p. 54-78, esp. 62; cf. also L. DE BLOIS, *art. cit.* (n. 42), p. 4570; M. MAZZA, *art. cit.* (n. 42), p. 246-265; T. DUFF, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 119 n. 65 and 302-303. According to J. GEIGER,

becomes a Greek city (cf. *Cam.* 22.2 = Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 102 Wehrli) with a Greek name (cf. *Rom.* 1.1).

[2] As Plutarch is usually not inclined to recognize a fundamental difference between Roman and Greek identity, he cannot take such a difference into account in his moral evaluation of Roman heroes either. It is well-known that Plutarch in such evaluations attaches great importance to the degree of familiarity with Greek παιδεία on the part of his Roman heroes<sup>44</sup>. Indeed, the Romans are only appreciated to the extent that they have left behind the uncultivated, barbarian stage and have assimilated Greek culture. Accordingly, men like Marius (*Mar.* 2.1-3) and Coriolanus<sup>45</sup> (*Cor.* 1.2-4; 15.3) are explicitly blamed for their lack of Greek παιδεία. Also Cato the Elder is criticized for his notorious aversion to Greek culture. He used to laugh at pro-Hellenic persons (*Ca. Ma.* 12.4-5) and preferred a typically Roman education for his son (20.4-6). He refused to make use of the Greek language (12.4), declared himself in favour of a quick return of the famous Greek delegation of philosophers (22.4-5), despised Socrates (23.1; cf. also 20.2) and Isocrates (23.2), and had a profound distrust of Greek physicians (23.3-4). In general, he was convinced that the Romans would lose their empire when they had become infected with Greek letters (23.2). According to Plutarch, however, time put Cato in the wrong, for it was precisely at the moment that the affairs of Rome were most thriving that the city made Greek παιδεία her own (23.3). Moreover, Cato himself was punished by the gods (cf. οὐκ ἀνεμέσσητος) because of his suspicions about Greek medicine, for he lost his wife and his son (24.1). On the other hand, men like Marcellus (*Marc.* 1.2; 20.1; 21.1-5), Aemilius (*Aem.* 6.4-5) and Lucullus<sup>46</sup> are praised because they were all well-disposed towards Greek παιδεία. And King Numa is even warmly commended because he is *more Hellenic*

*Plutarch's Parallel Lives: the Choice of Heroes*, *Hermes* 109 (1981), p. 85-104, esp. 99, Plutarch's knowledge of Roman Republican history was commonplace and superficial.

<sup>44</sup> See C.B.R. PELLING, *Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation*, *ICS* 13 (1988), p. 257-274, esp. 260-261; ID., *Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture*, in *Philosophia Togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* (ed. M. Griffin – J. Barnes), Oxford 1989, p. 199-232; ID., *Rhetoric, Paideia, and Psychology in Plutarch's Lives*, in *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch* (n. 20), p. 331-339; S.C.R. SWAIN, *art. cit.* (n. 39), p. 126-145; ID., *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 139-145; L. DE BLOIS – J.A.E. BONS, *Platonic Philosophy and Isocratean Virtues in Plutarch's Numa*, *AncSoc* 23 (1992), p. 159-188, esp. 162.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. T. DUFF, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 206-215.

<sup>46</sup> *Luc.* 1.4-5; 42.1-4; cf. also S.C.R. SWAIN, *Plutarch's Characterization of Lucullus*, *RhM* NF 135 (1992), p. 307-316.



than Lycurgus<sup>47</sup>. Also at a normative level, Plutarch thus fails to respect the Romans *as Romans*: a Roman is praised to the extent that he is a Greek.

### 3.3. Barbarians

A similar story, though with its own accents, can be reconstructed about Plutarch's attitude towards barbarians. Here as well, there can be found a certain orientation towards the other; here as well, Plutarch gives evidence of a certain desire to communicate. He probably wrote a work *Quaestiones barbaricae* (Lamprias catalogue, no. 139), which, unfortunately, has not survived. Elsewhere, he shows a sincere interest in the history<sup>48</sup>, culture<sup>49</sup> and language<sup>50</sup> of the barbarians, and recognizes the wisdom of the East. He has a great regard for the Egyptian tradition<sup>51</sup>, and occasionally refers to the values of the Iranian<sup>52</sup> and Indian<sup>53</sup> traditions.

However, Plutarch's interest in barbarians is obviously more limited than his interest in Romans. He was not proficient in barbarian languages<sup>54</sup>,

<sup>47</sup> *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 1.5. However, Numa's great political achievements were doomed to disappear at the moment of his death, since they lacked παιδεία; *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 4.6.

<sup>48</sup> Cf., e.g., the digression on the origins of Cimbri and Teutones; *Mar.* 11.3-7.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. his description of the royal initiation of Artaxerxes; *Art.* 3.1-2; D.P. ORSI, *La rappresentazione del sovrano nella Vita di Artaserse plutarchea*, *AncSoc* 19 (1988), p. 135-160, esp. 143-149.

<sup>50</sup> For Plutarch's etymologies of barbarian words, cf. *Mul. virt.* 261E; *Quaest. Graec.* 302A; *De Is. et Os.* 360B; *Quaest. conv.* IV 6, 671E; *Alex.* 31.3 and 65.3; *Mar.* 11.3; *Art.* 1.2; A. STROBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 136-140; on Plutarch's (etymologies of) Egyptian (words), see E. GUIMET, *Plutarque et l'Égypte*, Paris 1898, p. 23-24; P.D. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, *De Iside et Osiride*, *JHS* 29 (1909), p. 79-90, esp. 83-84; L. PARMENTIER, *Recherches sur le traité d'Isis et d'Osiris de Plutarque*, Bruxelles 1913, p. 81-99; J.G. GRIFFITHS, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride*, edited with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary, Cambridge 1970, p. 101-110; A. STROBACH, *op. cit.*, p. 116-136; cf. also R. MARCUS, *Note on an Aramaic Etymology in Plutarch's Isis and Osiris*, *AJPh* 63 (1942), p. 335.

<sup>51</sup> As appears in the first place from his essay *De Is. et Os.*, and from his discussion of Egyptian wisdom in the *Amatorius* (cf. 762A and 764AB; F.E. BRENN, *Plutarch's Erotikos: The Drag Down Pulled Up*, *ICS* 13 (1988), p. 457-471, esp. 462-471). Plutarch also underlines the fact that the wisest of the Greeks (τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ σοφώτατοι) went to Egypt, where they associated with the priests; cf. *De Is. et Os.* 354D-F.

<sup>52</sup> See *De Is. et Os.* 369D-370C; *De def. or.* 415A; *De an. procr.* 1012E and 1026B; J. HANI, *Plutarque en face du dualisme iranien*, *REG* 77 (1964), p. 489-525; E.D. PHILLIPS, *Plutarque interprète de Zoroastre*, in *Actes du VIII<sup>e</sup> Congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* (Paris, 5-10 avril 1968), Paris 1969, p. 506-510.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. the story of Alexander and the Gymnosophists; *Alex.* 64.1-5.

<sup>54</sup> See A. STROBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 115-116. Only few Plutarchan heroes have mastered a barbarian language, and all were somehow or other forced to learn it; cf. *Them.* 29.3; *Eum.* 14.5; *Sert.* 3.2; *Publ.* 17.2; A. STROBACH, *op. cit.*, p. 163-165.

and conversely did not regard the Greek language as suitable for barbarians (*De def. or.* 412A; *Them.* 6.2; cf. also *Ca. Ma.* 23.3 on the position of Hippocrates). Furthermore, he evaluates the typical character of barbarians in very negative terms. Barbarians are associated with the savageness (ἄγριότης) of beasts<sup>55</sup>. They frequently show over-boldness (θρασύτης)<sup>56</sup>, and attach excessive importance to wealth and luxury<sup>57</sup>. Finally, they are superstitious and stick to all kinds of aberrant religious practices<sup>58</sup>. In short, the barbarian as barbarian is vicious, and as such opposed to the virtuous Greek<sup>59</sup>. Therefore, barbarians as barbarians are φύσει πολέμιοι (*Cim.* 18.2; *Arist.* 16.3; *Ca. Ma.* 23.3; *Alex.* 50.5); therefore, the characterization of Herodotus as φιλοβάρβαρος is intended as a true reproach<sup>60</sup>.

Now it is true that exceptionally, even a barbarian is able to reach virtue (as far as possible)<sup>61</sup>, but to the extent that he is indeed virtuous,

<sup>55</sup> See, e.g., *De sup.* 170C; *De fort. Rom.* 320C; *De Al. Magn. fort.* I 329B; *Quaest. conv.* VII 4, 703DE; *De Stoic. rep.* 1049B; *De comm. not.* 1075A; *Non posse* 1099B; *Ca. Mi.* 63.3; *Mar.* 46.1; *Pomp.* 51.2; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, Ἑλληνικός — βαρβαρικός. *Plutarch on Greek and Barbarian Characteristics*, WS NF 20 (1986), p. 229-244, esp. 241-242; Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 27-67.

<sup>56</sup> See, e.g., *De aud. poet.* 29F; *De def. or.* 418E; *Marc.* 10.1; *Mar.* 16.3; *Sert.* 16.1; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 55), p. 232-233; J.-P. MARTIN, *Plutarque: un aspect de sa pensée et son temps*, in *Mélanges offerts à Monsieur Michel Labrousse* (ed. J.-M. Pailler), Toulouse 1986, p. 59-78, esp. 59; Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 69-106.

<sup>57</sup> See, e.g., *Art.* 20.1; *Pel.* 34.2; *Agis* 3.6; *Alex.* 20.6-8; 24.2; 36.1; 37.2; *Cim.* 10.8; 9.2-4; 13.2; *Luc.* 7.4; 24.1; 37.3-4; 41.6; *Aem.* 12.6; *Tim.* 29.1-2; *Mar.* 12.4; *Sull.* 16.2-3; *Caes.* 25.2; *Ca. Ma.* 26.2; *Pomp.* 36.4-7; *Sol.* 27.2-3; *Arist.* 5.5; *Alc.* 23.5; *De Al. Magn. fort.* II 342A; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 55), p. 237-238; Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 107-139.

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., *De sup.* 166A and 171B-E; *Quaest. Rom.* 283F; *Amatorius* 756C; *De Her. mal.* 857A; *De facie* 935B; *Sert.* 11.3; *Alex.* 2.5-6; *Pel.* 21.4; *Marc.* 3.4; *De comm. not.* 1075A; Ps.-Plutarch, *Parall. Graec. et Rom.* 311BC; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 55), p. 233-236; Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 224-234.

<sup>59</sup> *De Al. Magn. fort.* I, 329CD; cf. also *De aud. poet.* 29D-30C; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 182C; G.J.D. AALDERS, *Ideas about Human Equality and Inequality in the Roman Empire: Plutarch and some of his Contemporaries*, in *Equality and Inequality of Man in Ancient Thought. Papers read at the Colloquium in connection with the Assemblée générale of the Fédération internationale des Études Classiques held in Helsinki in August, 1982* (ed. I. Kajanto), Helsinki 1984, p. 55-71, esp. 60; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 55), p. 229-244; D. FAUSTI, *Lo stereotipo della superiorità della cultura greca: la situazione in epoca imperiale attraverso le testimonianze di Plutarco e Galeno*, *Prometheus* 19 (1993), p. 265-277, esp. 271-274; J. PELEGRIN CAMPO, *La noción de barbarie en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco de Queronea*, in *Plutarco y la Historia* (n. 40), p. 367-378, esp. 372-374; Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), *passim*; ID., *La rhétorique des doublets chez Plutarque: le cas de βάρβαρος καὶ [...]*, in *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch* (n. 20), p. 455-464.

<sup>60</sup> *De Her. mal.* 857A; according to Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 6 n. 21, 44 n. 90, and 280 n. 33, the term φιλοβάρβαρος was created by Plutarch himself.

<sup>61</sup> Hasdrubal of Carthago (who assumed the Greek name Kleitomachos) and Diodorus of Babylon became philosophers (*De Al. Magn. fort.* I 328D), just like Anacharsis,

he ceases from being a barbarian and becomes a Greek. In that way, Spartacus turns out to be more Greek than his Thracian origins would make likely<sup>62</sup>. Also in the case of barbarians, Plutarch thus fails to respect the other as other: a barbarian is good insofar as he is a Greek, that is to say, insofar as he is intelligent and virtuous. In general, he would no doubt have agreed with his master Plato, who was grateful for having been born as a man and a Greek, not as an irrational beast and a barbarian (*Mar.* 46.1).

Plutarch's evaluation of Alexander's achievements is a very interesting test-case to check the validity of this general conclusion. For the Macedonian king did not only subject barbarians and make them acquainted with Greek culture, but he also adopted certain elements of their own barbarian culture and customs. Now the question is not whether Alexander thus showed a certain respect for the identity of the barbarians, but how Plutarch evaluates Alexander's behaviour, and how this evaluation enlightens Plutarch's own position towards barbarians as barbarians. Plutarch deals with the problem both in his *Life of Alexander* and in the rhetorical work *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*. As both works have their own characteristics and show a different approach, they should be discussed separately<sup>63</sup>.

In the *Life of Alexander*, Plutarch gives a more nuanced image of the Macedonian king. Now and then, he refers to Alexander's adoption of barbarian customs, although he is usually rather sparing of information

who participates in Plutarch's *Septem sapientium convivium*. On Olthacus, Spartacus, Surena, Hannibal and Artaxerxes, see Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 244-252. Also barbarian women such as Camma (*Mul. virt.* 257E-258C; *Amatorius* 768B-D), Empona (*Amatorius* 770D-771C), Stratonice (*Mul. virt.* 258CD), Chiomara (*Mul. virt.* 258D-F) and many others gave evidence of moral excellence; cf. Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 253-258.

<sup>62</sup> *Crass.* 8.2: Σπάρτακος, ἀνὴρ Θρᾷξ τοῦ Νομαδικοῦ γένους, οὐ μόνον φρόνημα μέγα καὶ ῥώμην ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέσει καὶ πραότητι τῆς τύχης ἀμείνων καὶ τοῦ γένους Ἑλληνικώτερος. Somewhat similarly, the barbarian sage in *De def. or.* turns out to profess Greek wisdom (cf. 422D: οὐ βάρβαρος ἀλλ' Ἑλλήν γένος ἦν); H. DÖRRIE, *Die Wertung der Barbaren im Urteil der Griechen. Knechtsnaturen? Oder Bewahrer und Kündler heilbringender Weisheit?*, in *Antike und Universalgeschichte. Festschrift Hans Erich Stier zum 70. Geburtstag am 25. Mai 1972* (ed. R. Stiehl – G.A. Lehmann), Münster 1972, p. 146-175, esp. 162 n. 34; ID., *Der «Weise vom Roten Meer». Eine okkulte Offenbarung durch Plutarch als Plagiat entlarvt*, in *Festschrift für Robert Muth zum 65. Geburtstag am 1. Januar 1981 dargebracht von Freunden und Kollegen* (ed. P. Händel – W. Meid), Innsbruck 1983, p. 95-110; but cf. Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 268-269; see also A. STROBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 50 and 158-159.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. also Th.S. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (n. 29), p. 272-299.

and evaluation<sup>64</sup>. Comparatively little is said about the marriages between the Greeks and barbarian women (70.2). Alexander himself married Roxane for love, but used the marriage also as a political means (47.4; a similar utilitarian attitude towards marriage in 10.1-3), and had intercourse with Barsiné because she had received a Greek education (21.4).

Alexander's adoption of the barbarian dress is discussed in greater detail. The general tenor of the whole discussion is rather defensive, which is relevant in itself: the king should apparently be defended because he took up the customs of other people. Furthermore, Plutarch's arguments underline the limitedness of Alexander's barbarization and the importance of the Greek component. The king did not choose the extravagant Median dress, but preferred a more moderate one (45.2), and wore this first only among barbarians (45.2), thus taking into account the Greek identity (cf. also 47.5). Furthermore, the new barbarian dress did not take away his virtue (45.3). His decision should either be regarded as a political means in order to establish a unity based on good will rather than force, or as an attempt to introduce the προσκύνησις among the Macedonians (45.1). The former motivation, which is described in positive terms and is preferred somewhat later (47.3), is a typically Greek course (cf. *infra* on *De Al. Magn. fort.*); the latter, which gives evidence of a barbarian point of view (cf. 51.3), would certainly bring Alexander into discredit. Indeed, it is with regard to the προσκύνησις that Plutarch is most clear and explicit in his criticism (54.2; cf. also, more implicit, 74.1-2).

It is clear, then, that Plutarch's evaluation of Alexander in the *Life* does not illustrate a respect for the peculiar identity of the barbarians. The Macedonian king is praised because and to the extent that he realizes Greek ideals, he is criticized because he adopts barbarian customs, and is again praised to the extent that he remains moderate in this adoption and continues to respect and maintain the Greek identity.

The general tone of the rhetorical work *De Al. Magn. fort.* is much more positive and less nuanced. Again and again, Plutarch underlines that Alexander is a true and great philosopher, and even matched or surpassed the greatest philosophers among his predecessors and succeeding generations (327E-329B; 330E-331A; 331E-332C; 332E-333C). One of the

<sup>64</sup> In *Alex.* 69.1, for instance, Plutarch mentions, without any further evaluation, that Alexander took up the custom of the Persian kings to divide money among the women.

most important arguments in favour of this thesis is the fact that the Macedonian king spreads Greek civilization among the barbarians, thus replacing their savagery and brutishness by Greek law and order (328B; 328C-329A; 332A and C). Accordingly, those barbarians who were defeated by Alexander were happier than those who managed to escape, as they were not forced into happiness and thus continued their wretched life (328EF; cf. 330DE and 343B). In short, Alexander is good and is a philosopher because he turns barbarians into Greeks.

But what about the fact that Alexander also took up barbarian customs? Plutarch realized very well that the king wished to combine barbarian and Greek things (332A: τὰ βαρβαρικά τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς κερᾶσαι διεννοούμεν), and does not hesitate to thematize the question. In general, Alexander did not follow Aristotle's advice to distinguish between barbarians and Greeks, but rather realized Zeno's dream of one general well-ordered and philosophical community (329AB). In uniting Greek and barbarian customs into a new combination (329CD; cf. 342AB), Alexander thus turns out to pursue a Greek philosophical ideal. This ideal also entails a new parameter for distinction: from then on, the Greek element is distinguished by virtue, the barbarian by vice (329CD: τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ἀρετῇ τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικὸν κακίᾳ τεκμαίρεσθαι). In Plutarch's interpretation, Alexander's accomplishments thus resulted in a redefinition of what is Greek and barbarian, rather than in a respect for what is typically barbarian. After this redefinition, even more than before, the barbarian as barbarian remains bad.

Of course, one could object that the redefinition of what is Greek and barbarian was the result of Alexander's adoption of some originally barbarian customs. In the end, Alexander has established a new identity, to be sure, but this new identity includes some elements that were originally typically barbarian. Did Alexander, then, in establishing this new identity, give evidence of a certain respect for the barbarian as barbarian? Not according to Plutarch. In any case, the famous marriage between hundred Persian brides and hundred Macedonian and Greek bridegrooms should not be regarded as evidence for Alexander's respect for the peculiar character of the barbarians, but should rather be considered an excellent political means to guarantee the unity of the two peoples. Alexander even surpasses the barbarian Xerxes by joining the two peoples not with violence but with love (329D-F; cf. 338D).

Also Alexander's decision to adopt the barbarian dress is no indication of a certain respect for a typical feature of the barbarian's culture. First of all, Plutarch again underlines that the adoption was limited and moderate, and

that Alexander's clothing also contained Macedonian elements (329F-330A; 330C). Secondly, one should realize that clothing is in itself indifferent for a philosopher (330A), and should thus be reduced to its proper proportions: each excessive devotion to one pole only is in any case wrong (330AB). Finally, the new dress should be regarded as a mere means in order to save the unity, and as such even shows Alexander's wisdom (σοφία; 330C).

To conclude, Plutarch's position with regard to barbarians in the *declamatio* is fundamentally the same as that in the *Life*. Alexander is praised because he turns barbarians into Greeks. His adoption of barbarian customs is either omitted (προσκύνησις in the *declamatio*), or rejected (προσκύνησις in the *Life*), or explained away as a mere means in the service of a higher, Greek ideal. Whether Alexander himself really respected the barbarians *as barbarians* remains to be seen; Plutarch certainly did not.

### 3.4. Women

Plutarch often shows a great respect for women. His *Consolatio ad uxorem* is a beautiful testimony of his own love for his wife Timoxena<sup>65</sup>. Several titles of lost works point to a discussion of topics regarding women<sup>66</sup>, and also in the surviving works (both *Moralia* and *Vitae*), much attention is given to women, who are moreover frequently described and evaluated in a very positive way<sup>67</sup>. In his statements about legislation concerning women, Plutarch often sides with the female sex<sup>68</sup>. But in the

<sup>65</sup> But cf. D.A. RUSSELL, *Self-Disclosure in Plutarch and in Horace*, in *Philanthropia kai Eusebeia. Festschrift für Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag* (ed. G.W. Most – H. Petersmann – A.M. Ritter), Göttingen 1993, p. 426-437, esp. 429-430; S.B. POMEROY, *Reflections on Plutarch, 'Advice to the Bride and Groom'. Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed*, in *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and A Consolation to His Wife. English Translations, Commentary, Interpretive Essays, and Bibliography* (ed. S.B. Pomeroy), New York – Oxford 1999, p. 33-57, esp. 44.

<sup>66</sup> See Ὅτι καὶ γυναῖκα παιδευτέον (fr. 128-133 Sandbach); Περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ζῆν γυναῖκα πρὸς ἄνδρα (Lamprias catalogue, no. 126b; cf. F.H. SANDBACH, *Plutarch's Moralia* (Loeb), vol. XV, p. 19, note e [29, note b]); Τιτθευτικός (Lamprias catalogue, no. 114); Αἰτίαι γυναικῶν (Lamprias catalogue, no. 167).

<sup>67</sup> The most complete survey for the *Vitae* is F. LE CORSU, *Plutarque et les femmes dans les Vies parallèles*, Paris 1981, p. 25-256; cf. also P.A. STADTER, *Plutarch's Historical Methods. An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes*, Cambridge (MA) 1965, p. 5-7; R. FLACELIERE, *La pensée de Plutarque dans les 'Vies'*, BAGB 1979, p. 264-275, esp. 268-271; Y. VERNIERE, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 165-169; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 27-88.

<sup>68</sup> See esp. A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 40-51; cf. also L. GOESSLER, *Plutarch's Gedanken über die Ehe*, diss. inaug., Zürich 1962, p. 78-92 and 109-119; F. LE CORSU, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 11-23.

first place, his opinions concerning marriage, which is considered to be the most sacred union of man and wife (*Amatorius* 750C), implies an attitude of respect for women. According to Plutarch, the natural love between man and woman leads to a relation of friendship (*Amatorius* 751D) in which to love is a greater good than to be loved (*Amatorius* 769DE: τὸ γὰρ ἐρᾶν ἐν γάμῳ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ; cf. also 767D). This marital reciprocity requires marital fidelity, both on the part of the wife<sup>69</sup> and on the part of the husband<sup>70</sup>. It also expresses itself in a great community, not only in material goods (*Con. praec.* 140D-F and 143A; *Quaest. Rom.* 263EF and 265F-266A), but even in mind (*Amatorius* 767DE; *Brut.* 13.4). Marriage is not συνοικεῖν but συμβιοῦν (*Con. praec.* 142F; cf. also 138C and 140A). Even more, it is a real κρᾶσις δι' ὧν of a man and a woman who love one another (*Con. praec.* 142F-143A; *Amatorius* 769F). Therefore, Plutarch's *Coniugalia praecepta* can only be a κοινὸν δῶρον for Pollianus and Eurydice (*Con. praec.* 138C; cf. also 138B).

It is thus clear that Plutarch generally treats women with much respect<sup>71</sup>. And it should be underlined, it is true, that Plutarch was certainly much more positive about women than most of his contemporaries or predecessors. Nonetheless, the question remains as to what extent this remarkably great respect on the part of Plutarch also implies a respect for the peculiar nature of women as distinct from that of men. Once again, the answer proves to be negative, as appears from many of Plutarch's statements (often, though not always, *obiter dicta*) where he describes what he considers to be the proper nature of the woman in very negative terms. In this, he no doubt remained strongly influenced by the previous

<sup>69</sup> *Amatorius* 768B: ἡ δὲ γενναία γυνὴ πρὸς ἄνδρα νόμιμον συγκραθεῖσα δι' ἑρωτος ἄρκτων ἂν ὑπομείνειε καὶ δρακόντων περιβολὰς μᾶλλον ἢ ψαῦσιν ἄνδρὸς ἄλλοτρίου καὶ συγκατάκλισιν; cf. also *Con. praec.* 144A and B. Examples of marital fidelity are, e.g., Camma (*Mul. virt.* 257E-258C; *Amatorius* 768B-D); Chiomara (*Mul. virt.* 258D-F); Empona (*Amatorius* 770D-771C); Octavia (*Ant.* 53.1-2; 54.1-2; 57.3); Cornelia (*Pomp.* 74.1-75.2; 76.1; 78.4; 79.3; 80.6); Chilonis (*Agis* 17.1-18.2); the wife of Panteus (*Cleom.* 38.3-4), the Sabine women (*Rom.* 19.1-7) and the women of Ceos (*Mul. virt.* 249DE); cf. also S.B. POMEROY, *art. cit.* (n. 65), p. 40.

<sup>70</sup> See *Con. praec.* 144B and 144D; *Ca. Mi.* 7.3; see, however, also *Con. praec.* 140B.

<sup>71</sup> He was even regarded as a precursor of feminism; cf. Y. VERNIERE, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 165; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 87-88; see also R. FLACELIERE, *art. cit.* (n. 67), p. 269: «Si, d'aventure, un jour ou l'autre, le M.L.F., Mouvement de Libération de la Femme, voulait se choisir un patron, il pourrait, il devrait, à mon avis, songer à Plutarque de Chéronée»; cf. finally R. FLACELIERE, *Plutarque. Œuvres morales* (Budé), vol. I 1, p. CVIII-CIX.



age-old misogynic tradition and by the prevailing contemporary culture. Women are jealous (*De tranq. an.* 465D; *De cur.* 517C; *Lyc.* 15.6), inquisitive (*De gar.* 507BC), loquacious (*De gar.* 507B-508A; 508AB; *Brut.* 13.5)<sup>72</sup> and superstitious (*De tranq. an.* 465D; *Per.* 38.2; *Caes.* 63.7). They are inclined to mourn excessively<sup>73</sup>, and get angry more quickly than men (*De coh. ira* 457B and C). They give evidence of a certain simplicity<sup>74</sup>, deriving pleasure from listening to fables (*De aud. poet.* 16EF) and taking delight in beautiful but useless garlands (*De aud.* 41F; *Quaest. conv.* III, 1, 645D). In general, female nature is thus characterized by many negative features<sup>75</sup>. It is perfectly clear, then, that nobody should be proud if he is subject of much talk among women<sup>76</sup>, and that towards the failings of one's wife, the best reaction remains: «I knew that my wife was a woman»<sup>77</sup>.

According to Plutarch, women are thus clearly inferior to men, not only physically<sup>78</sup>, but also with regard to their soul. Indeed, women prove to have a weaker soul than men (*De coh. ira* 457AB; but cf. *Brut.* 23.4).

<sup>72</sup> The exception is Leaena; *De gar.* 505D-F. Accordingly, women are chattering (λαλέω) rather than conversing (διαλέγω); see J. AUBERGER, *art. cit.* (n. 15), p. 297-308; cf. also F. MESTRE, *Plutarco contra el Sofista*, in *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. Madrid – Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999* (ed. A. Pérez Jiménez – J. García López – R.M. Aguilar), Madrid 1999, p. 383-395, esp. 394.

<sup>73</sup> *Cons. ad Apoll.* 113A: θῆλυ γὰρ ὄντως καὶ ἄσθενές καὶ ἀγεννές τὸ πενθεῖν γυναικες γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εἰσι φιλοπενθέστεραι; cf. also *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102E; *Sol.* 12.5 and 21.5; *Dem.* 22.4; *Cleom.* 38.1; *Tim.* 15.6; *Brut.* 23.2-3. The exception which proves the rule is in this case Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi; cf. *CG* 19.1-3. See also W.L. ODOM, *A Study of Plutarch: the Position of Greek Women in the First Century after Christ.* diss. inaug., Univ. Virginia 1961, p. 78-81.

<sup>74</sup> *Comp. Ar. et Men.* 853D: τὸ ἀπλοῦν (see also W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.*, p. 115-116, who translates by «naïveté»); cf. also *De cap. ex inim.* 90B; *Reg. et imp. apoph.* 175BC.

<sup>75</sup> See also *Thes.* 27.1; *Num.* 22.7; *Crass.* 32.3; *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102E; *De vit. pud.* 528F; *Quaest. conv.* VII, 8, 711C; *Mar.* 34.2 (see also *Gryllus* 990B); cf. finally *De coh. ira* 460C; *Gryllus* 988B; *Dem.* 16.2.

<sup>76</sup> *De ad. et am.* 70A; only in Sparta, the praise of maidens could be taken seriously by men; cf. *Lyc.* 14.3.

<sup>77</sup> *De coh. ira* 463E; *De tranq. an.* 474E. This sentence may express an acceptance of the fact that the nature of a woman fundamentally differs from that of a man, but certainly it does not express respect for this typically female nature.

<sup>78</sup> See *Brut.* 23.4; *Galba* 25.1; *Quaest. Rom.* 289E; *De Al. Magn. fort.* I, 331D; *Apoph.* *Lac.* 240E. For that reason, a city that is surrounded by a high wall is fitting for women, not for men; *Reg. et imp. apoph.* 190A; *Apoph.* *Lac.* 212E; 215DE; 221F; 230C; cf. also *Apoph.* *Lac.* 223C. Because of their corporeal feebleness, women make use of their own, appropriate means in order to reach their ends, resorting to magic and drugs; *Praec. ger. reip.* 819D (see also W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.* (n. 73), p. 113-114). Plutarch was also convinced that the woman merely plays a passive role in the process of conception, functioning as a kind of breeding ground, and that only the seed of the man has creative powers; see *Quaest.*

Consequently, they reach less frequently tranquillity of mind (*De tranq. an.* 465D); they are more easily enchanted by external ostentation (*Gryllus* 989E); they do not immediately recognize virtue under bad circumstances (*Pel.* 28.4); they fear pain more than disgrace (*Adv. Colot.* 1126E; but contrast the Milesian women; *Mul. virt.* 249B-D) and they collapse under great pressure (*Brut.* 15.4-5).

Hence, it is obvious that men are superior to women, just as Eros prevails over Aphrodite (*Amatorius* 756DE), Osiris over Isis<sup>79</sup>, and odd (male) numbers over even (female) ones<sup>80</sup>. Also in marriage, the man occupies the dominating position. The wife should not have her own emotions, but should share in those of her husband (*Con. praec.* 140A), neither should she have her own friends or even her own gods, but only those of her husband (140D). She should never take the initiative in making advances, nor should she refuse them if her husband begins (140CD). Finally, she should only be seen in the company of her husband; if the latter is absent, she has to remain inside<sup>81</sup>. The virtue *par excellence* of the good woman is in the end her σωφροσύνη<sup>82</sup>, which becomes evident in her obedience to her husband<sup>83</sup>. The latter, on his part, should be a guide, philosopher and teacher for his wife (145C). He holds the reins<sup>84</sup>,

*Rom.* 263E; *De Is. et Os.* 364D; 372EF; 373F-374A; 374F; *De E* 388B; *Quaest. conv.* III, 4, 651C; *Amatorius* 770AB; *De facie* 943E; *De an. procr.* 1015DE.

<sup>79</sup> *De Is. et Os.* 372E; 374F-375A; 377AB; 382CD; P.A. STADTER, *Philosophos kai Philandros. Plutarch's View of Women in the Moralia and the Lives*, in *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom* (n. 65), p. 173-182, esp. 176-177.

<sup>80</sup> See, e.g., *Quaest. Rom.* 264A and 288D; *De Is. et Os.* 374A; *De E* 388A-C; *De def. or.* 429A-D; *De an. procr.* 1018C.

<sup>81</sup> *Con. praec.* 139C; cf. also *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 3.5-6; *Con. praec.* 142CD; *Apophth. Lac.* 217F and 220D; see, however, *Mul. virt.* 242E.

<sup>82</sup> See W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.* (n. 73), p. 105-113 and 117-118; S. ZEDDA, *Spiritualità cristiana e saggezza pagana nell'etica della famiglia: Affinità e differenze tra San Paolo e i Coniugalia Praecepta di Plutarco*, *Lateranum* 48 (1982), p. 110-124, esp. 122-123; Y. VERNIERE, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 169; A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 63-64.

<sup>83</sup> *Con. praec.* 142E; *Quaest. Rom.* 288DE; see also F. LE CORSU, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 274: «Pour notre moraliste, la femme idéale est l'épouse soumise, menant une vie discrète et digne, toute de dévouement à son mari, sans tapage et sans luxe».

<sup>84</sup> *Con. praec.* 139A and 139CD; *Amatorius* 754B; *Ad princ. iner.* 780C. A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, *art. cit.* (n. 14), p. 76, rightly observes that «the husband's superiority [...] is not based on gender; it is rather founded on some moral and intellectual qualifications which the husband supposedly possesses and his wife lacks». Accordingly, a sensible older woman can guide a younger man; cf. *Amatorius* 754D: τί δεινὸν εἰ γυνὴ νοῦν ἔχουσα πρεσβυτέρα κυβερνήσει νέου βίον ἀνδρός, ὠφέλιμος μὲν οὖσα τῷ φρονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ δέῃα δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ προσηγήs. However, such case remains very exceptional, for usually, Plutarch is critical of men being dominated by women; cf. *De fortuna* 100A; *De virt. et vit.* 100E; *Con. praec.* 139A; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 198D (~ *Ca. Ma.* 8.2-3;

and even if he has to bear in mind the position of his wife (139B and 144F-145A), she unmistakably proves to be his inferior: the man rules his wife *just as the soul rules the body* (142E).

And yet, Plutarch is convinced that also women can reach a high level of virtue, both intellectually<sup>85</sup> and morally. He explicitly emphasizes that the virtues of man and woman are one and the same<sup>86</sup>. Women are capable of achieving great political<sup>87</sup> and even military<sup>88</sup> deeds, often when actions of men for some reason prove to be insufficient<sup>89</sup>. In short, they can reach *the same virtue as men*<sup>90</sup>. However, a woman is not simply laudable because and to the extent that she succeeds in matching the

*Them.* 18.5; Ps.-Plutarch, *De lib. educ.* 1CD); *De tranq. an.* 471B; *Amatorius* 753D-F and 755C; *Ant.* 10.3; *Alex.* 68.3; *Cleom.* 33.1-3 and 37.6; *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 3.5.

<sup>85</sup> *Con. praec.* 145CD and 146A; *Amatorius* 769B. Examples of cultivated women are Plutarch's own wife Timoxena (who probably wrote a work *Περὶ φιλοκοσμίας*; cf. *Con. praec.* 145A; R. VOLKMANN, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea*, Berlin 1869, I, p. 29 (with note); K. ZIEGLER, *art. cit.* (n. 40), col. 646-647; see also Lamprias catalogue, no. 113); Clea (to whom *Mul. virt.* and *De Is. et Os.* are dedicated; on Clea, see Th. RENOIRTE, *Les 'Conseils politiques' de Plutarque. Une lettre ouverte aux Grecs à l'époque de Trajan*, Louvain 1951, p. 137-138; K. ZIEGLER, *art. cit.*, col. 677; P.A. STADTER, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 2-3; ID., *art. cit.* (n. 79), p. 173-175; G.W. BOWERSOCK, *Some Persons in Plutarch's Moralia*, *CQ* NS 15 (1965), p. 267-270, esp. 267-268; J.G. GRIFFITHS, *op. cit.* (n. 50), p. 17 and 253-254; Ch. FROIDEFOND, *Plutarque. Œuvres morales* (Budé), vol. V 2, p. 18-23; B. PUECH, *Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque*, *ANRW* II 33.6 (1992), p. 4831-4893, esp. 4842-4843; Eumetis (*Sept. sap. conv.* 148DE; cf. also *Con. praec.* 145E; W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.* (n. 73), p. 63-64; L. GOESSLER, *op. cit.* (n. 68), p. 104-107); Aspasia (*Per.* 24.3-4); Cornelia (*Pomp.* 55.1); Cleopatra (*Ant.* 27.2-4); and Aretaphila (*Mul. virt.* 255E). And yet, women probably remain inferior to men in this domain; cf. at least the conclusion of W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.*, p. 65: «Women in general cannot reach or surpass the mental attainments of men in general; yet women can learn a great deal».

<sup>86</sup> *Mul. virt.* 242F-243A: τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν; cf. also *Amatorius* 767B and C; *Lyc.* 14.4; *Cleom.* 39.1; K. O'BRIEN WICKER, *Mulierum virtutes* (*Moralia* 242E-263C), in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H.D. Betz), Leiden 1978, p. 106-134, esp. 114-115.

<sup>87</sup> See F. LE CORSU, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 121-128; cf. K. BLOMQUIST, *art. cit.* (n. 15), who convincingly shows that women and politics do not really mix according to Plutarch.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. the accomplishments of the women of Argos (*Apophth. Lac.* 223BC; *Mul. virt.* 245C-F; P.A. STADTER, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 45-53; C. SANTANIELLO, *Plutarco. Detti dei Lacedemoni* (*Apophthegmata Laconica, Instituta Laconica, Lacaenarum apophthegmata*). *Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento*, Napoli 1995, p. 352-353), of Tutula and her fellow maid-servants (*Cam.* 33.2-4; *Rom.* 29.3-6) and of the Spartan women (*Pyrrh.* 27.2-5; 29.3).

<sup>89</sup> L. FOXHALL, *Foreign Powers. Plutarch and Discourses of Domination in Roman Greece*, in *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom* (n. 65), p. 138-150, esp. 148-149; P.A. STADTER, *art. cit.* (n. 79), p. 178-179.

<sup>90</sup> *Amatorius* 769BC; K. O'BRIEN WICKER, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 107 (on *Mul. virt.*): «These accounts do not directly demonstrate that there is no difference in ἀρετή between the sexes,

accomplishments of men. Even if she reaches that level, she ought to be conscious of her own limits as woman. Paradigm of the virtuous woman is Aretaphila of Cyrene, who first saved her country from two tyrants (*Mul. virt.* 255E-257D), thus showing truly masculine courage and virtue, and who then withdraws into the women's quarters in order to spend the rest of her life in peace and quiet among her friends and her family, refusing the request of the people to share in the government of her city<sup>91</sup>. Dominant women such as Aspasia, Cleopatra or Olympias, on the other hand, who are involved in politics like men, pursuing their own great ambitions and manipulating others in order to secure their personal interests, are sharply criticized<sup>92</sup>.

In conclusion, Plutarch has a great respect for women when they [1] realize that they belong to the weaker, inferior sex and thus remain loyal and obedient to their husbands, or [2] when they match the man in virtue by accomplishing most honourable deeds, while realizing nonetheless that they always remain women, and thus inferior to men. It is clear that Plutarch fails to respect women *as women*<sup>93</sup>. Of course he has a certain respect for women, but only for those who meet his (by far too male) image of them.

### 3.5. Lower classes

Free citizens and foreigners constitute together the undifferentiated crowd<sup>94</sup>. This crowd is usually judged very negatively by the aristocratic Plutarch. The crowd is not amenable to reason<sup>95</sup>; it is a courtesan (*Praec.*

but only that women can perform deeds traditionally considered masculine. The reverse case, that men also demonstrate traditionally feminine characteristics, is not made».

<sup>91</sup> *Mul. virt.* 257DE; K. BLOMQUIST, *art. cit.* (n. 15), p. 85-87. Also other women immediately withdraw after their intervention; see *Pyrrh.* 29.6 (on the Spartan women); *Cor.* 36.4 and 37.2-3 (on Volumnia). Eumetis, too, sets a good example: she participates in the dinner of the sages (*Sept. sap. conv.* 150B and 155E), but always keeps in the background, even when she is attacked by Cleodorus, and in spite of her desire to answer (*Sept. sap. conv.* 154AB; W.L. ODOM, *op. cit.* (n. 73), p. 84-85; L. GOESSLER, *op. cit.* (n. 68), p. 107-109; J. MOSSMAN, *Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and its Place in Symposium Literature*, in *Plutarch and his Intellectual World* (n. 15), p. 124-125). See finally L. FOXHALL, *art. cit.* (n. 89), p. 148, and P.A. STADTER, *art. cit.* (n. 79), p. 180-181.

<sup>92</sup> See K. BLOMQUIST, *art. cit.* (n. 15), p. 77-82. That Cleopatra is not a purely negative paradigm is shown by P.A. STADTER, *art. cit.* (n. 79), p. 181.

<sup>93</sup> See also F. LE CORSU, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. 272-273.

<sup>94</sup> *Quaest. conv.* IV 1, 661C:... καθάπερ ἐν πόλει μιγάδων καὶ συγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος; cf. also *Brut.* 18.6; *Rom.* 14.2; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 201F.

<sup>95</sup> See, e.g., *Alc.* 20.5; *Per.* 2.4 and 37.2; *Dion* 28.1; *Cor.* 20.2; *CG* 3.1; *Cam.* 31.1-2; *An seni* 789D and 796C; cf. also *De Stoic. rep.* 1043F; *Non posse* 1090E. Accordingly,

*ger. reip.* 821F), a bold (*Them.* 19.4; *Cam.* 36.3; *Cor.* 5.4 and 16.2; *Dion* 32.3; *Praec. ger. reip.* 801E), suspicious and capricious beast (*Praec. ger. reip.* 800C), which can only with difficulty be controlled and appeased (*Num.* 4.8; *Sol.* 25.5; *Ca. Ma.* 27.2; *De Al. Magn. fort.* I, 330B). In short, the greatest honour the multitude can receive from its rulers is that of not being despised (*Nic.* 2.4: τοῖς γὰρ πολλοῖς τιμὴ μεγίστη παρὰ τῶν μειζόνων τὸ μὴ καταφρονεῖσθαι). It is clear that Plutarch, far from showing respect for the crowd (let alone respect for its peculiar identity), looks upon it with aristocratic contempt.

And yet this attitude of disdain is sometimes mitigated, and some traces of a certain respect can be detected. The people has high opinions on political leadership (*Praec. ger. reip.* 800EF and 823D) and it is able to see through the characters of its rulers (*Ad princ. iner.* 782EF; *Praec. ger. reip.* 800F-801C and 823C-E). The Athenians, for instance, listened to other leaders by way of entertainment, but turned to Phocion whenever they wanted a commander (*Phoc.* 8.2), and even though they were strongly influenced by Cleon, they nonetheless were aware of his wickedness and preferred Nicias (*Nic.* 2.3). Occasionally, the people is led by a remarkable sense of justice (*Arist.* 6.1; *Dem.* 25.5; *Aem.* 31.1), as when they decided to reject Themistocles' advantageous purpose because it was unjust (*Arist.* 22.2; *Them.* 20.1-2). Even then, however, Plutarch's apparent respect, to the extent that it can indeed be taken seriously<sup>96</sup>, is clearly not based on a respect for the people's own characteristic qualities. The multitude is only respected when and insofar as it meets Plutarch's own high moral standards. To the extent that it fails to do so, it is despised, and regarded as an object that can be manipulated and forced in accordance with one's own more honourable desires and insights.

Still lower on the social ladder are the slaves. Plutarch declares himself in favour of a certain mildness towards slaves<sup>97</sup>. He sharply criticizes Cato the Elder for selling his old slaves (*Ca. Ma.* 5.1-2 and 5.5) and commends Crassus for his good treatment of them (*Crass.* 2.5-7). He also

Phocion was opposed to everything the people did and said; *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 187F-188A; *Phoc.* 8.2-3.

<sup>96</sup> One should note that also in Plutarch's day, a politician could not completely neglect the people, but had at least to keep up the appearance of a certain respect; cf. C.P. JONES, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 111.

<sup>97</sup> For Plutarch's attitude towards slaves, see also O. GRÉARD, *De la morale de Plutarque*, Paris 1885, p. 112-118; E.R. DODDS, *The Portrait of a Greek Gentleman*, G&R 2 (1933), p. 97-107, esp. 103; G.J.D. AALDERS, *art. cit.* (n. 59), p. 59-60.

rejects unnecessary atrocities on the part of the master: slaves should only be punished when they indeed deserve to be punished (*De coh. ira* 459B-460A; cf. also Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* I 26.4-9). This demand, however, is not based on great respect for slaves, but on the necessity to remain virtuous as master. Even more, respect for slaves proves to be a sharp oxymoron, a *contradictio in terminis*, since *a priori*, true respect for the other (as other) is diametrically opposed to a recognition of slavery.

### 3.6. *Philosophical opponents*

Plutarch's *πραότης* and *φιλανθρωπία* did not remain confined to the members of his own philosophical school, but extended to his philosophical opponents as well. Occasionally, the fundamental differences of opinions could even be overcome in a relation of mutual friendship. Indeed, Plutarch counted several Stoics<sup>98</sup> and Epicureans<sup>99</sup> among his personal friends<sup>100</sup>, and more than once gives evidence of his sincere respect for them<sup>101</sup>.

Here as well, however, the question remains as to what extent Plutarch was able to respect the peculiar identity of his philosophical friends. Was he able to respect his Stoic friends *as Stoics*, and his Epicurean friends *as Epicureans*? Once again, the answer proves to be negative. In his polemical writings, the doctrine of the Stoics appears as an absurd, ridiculous, irrational, abominable, ludicrous, insipid, foolish stammering of dotards<sup>102</sup>, without any practical result and unfit for use and action in public affairs (*De Stoic. rep.* 1034B), completely self-stultifying (*De Stoicorum repugnantiiis*) and at odds with the common conceptions

<sup>98</sup> See D. BABUT, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, Paris 1969, p. 239-265; J.P. HERSHBELL, *Plutarch and Stoicism*, ANRW II 36.5 (1992), p. 3336-3352, esp. 3339.

<sup>99</sup> See R. FLACELIERE, *Plutarque et l'épicurisme*, in *Epicurea. In memoriam Hectoris Bignone. Miscellanea philologica*, Genova 1959, p. 197-215, esp. 201-202; J.P. HERSHBELL, *Plutarch and Epicureanism*, ANRW II 36.5 (1992), p. 3353-3383, esp. 3355-3356.

<sup>100</sup> On Plutarch's Pythagorean friends, see J.P. HERSHBELL, *Plutarch's Pythagorean Friends*, CB 60 (1984), p. 73-79. The Pythagoreans, however, though strictly speaking members of another philosophical school, were not opponents of Plutarch.

<sup>101</sup> For the Stoics, see D. BABUT, *op. cit.* (n. 98), p. 260-265; J.P. HERSHBELL, *Plutarch and Stoicism* (n. 98), p. 3339; for the Epicureans, see R. FLACELIERE, *art. cit.* (n. 99), p. 201; J.P. HERSHBELL, *Plutarch and Epicureanism* (n. 99), p. 3356.

<sup>102</sup> *De Stoic. rep.* 1034A; 1036A; 1039A; 1039D; 1042C and F; 1043A; 1044C; 1044EF; 1045B; 1049B; 1052B; 1053C; 1054A; 1054D; *De comm. not.* 1060B; 1062B; 1062C; 1063EF; 1065C; 1065E; 1066D; 1069B; 1071B; 1071C; 1071D; 1072F; 1073DE; 1074D; 1075B and D; 1077A; 1078C and E; 1079E; 1080A; 1081B; 1082E; 1083A and E; 1084A; 1084E.

(*De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos*). Chrysippus, their great scholar, is characterized as arrogant, ambitious and reckless in his argumentation<sup>103</sup>, writing down anything that comes into his head (*De Stoic. rep.* 1047B; *De comm. not.* 1079F). His followers appear to be vainglorious and are led by φιλαυτία (*De Stoic. rep.* 1036C; *De comm. not.* 1069CD); they try to adjust the facts to fit their doctrines instead of adjusting their theories to fit the facts (*De prof. in virt.* 75F). The doctrine of the Epicureans is not a whit better: it is a philosophy of the belly, an absurd, confused, bestial, atheistic, artificial, joyless, empty, sordid, ecstatic and girlish myth, defiled with mire and confusion<sup>104</sup>. Epicurus himself is excessively shameless and thirsting for fame (*Non posse* 1100A-D; *Adv. Colot.* 1111B; *De lat. viv.* 1128A-C); his followers are conceited, jealous, cowardly, coarse, soft, ignorant, bold fools, pretenders and parasites, grooms and shepherds, sophists and charlatans, slaves, resembling boys who have just learned to read<sup>105</sup>. If Plutarch no doubt showed a certain respect towards his Stoic and Epicurean friends, he nonetheless only respected them to the extent that they met his own criteria. In other words, he respected them as philosophers, *not* as Stoic, *casu quo* Epicurean philosophers.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Plutarch's social ethics culminates in the comprehensive demand of πραότης and φιλανθρωπία: the virtuous man should be mild and humane in his association with other people. Even if this attitude of mildness and humanity implies a certain respect for the other (both at the most general and at a more concrete level), it is not based on a respect for the other *as other*. Indeed, the other is only respected because and insofar as he meets the standards of the self; to the extent that he fails to do so (and

<sup>103</sup> *De Stoic. rep.* 1037A and C; 1041A; 1051A; cf. also 1055B; *De comm. not.* 1079F.

<sup>104</sup> *De sup.* 164F-165A; *De Stoic. rep.* 1046E; 1050BC; 1052B; *Non posse* 1087B; 1087D; 1088B; 1089C; 1089D; 1090A; 1091C; 1092A-D; 1094A; 1095B; 1095C; 1095D; 1097C; 1097E; 1098B; 1098D; 1099B; 1100C; 1100D; 1101B; 1102B; *Adv. Colot.* 1108C; 1108D; 1110E; 1111B; 1117A; 1119C; 1119EF; 1121E; 1124B; 1124D; 1124E-1125C; 1125A; 1125B; 1125D-F; 1127B; *De lat. viv.* 1129B; 1130C.

<sup>105</sup> *Non posse* 1086E; 1086F; 1090A; 1091E; 1096C; 1098B; 1101AB; 1102BC; *Adv. Colot.* 1108B; 1113F; 1115A; 1115C; 1118E; 1118F; 1119BC; 1119E; 1120C; 1120F-1121A; 1124C; 1125A; 1126F-1127A; 1127C; cf. also *Non posse* 1091E on Epicurus and Metrodorus themselves.



that he gives evidence of his own identity, different from that of the self), he is criticized if not despised. In this, Plutarch was not merely a child of his time: he was in the first place a child of his culture, of the Greek παιδεία which he valued so highly.

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THE RAPTOR AND THE DISGRACED GIRL  
IN SIDONIUS APOLLINARIS' *EPISTULA* V 19\*

Sidonius Apollinaris became the bishop of the Auvergne, at Clermont Ferrand, in AD 469 after his return to Gaul from the office of Prefect of the City of Rome<sup>1</sup>. As a bishop, Sidonius continued to attach great value to the virtue of *pietas* and was more open to the common people than many of his former colleagues in the lay world, and more sensitive in his desire to be of service<sup>2</sup>. He resembles a kind of universal patron, in a sense the patron of the whole *civitas*, who acted as a *grand seigneur* and meted out summary justice to ordinary people in his congregation. As P. Garnsey and G. Woolf write, he was a Roman aristocrat, educated in the classical literary traditions, and a great landowner devoting a good deal of his correspondence to promoting the interests of his immediate social inferiors and juniors, just as Cicero, Pliny and Fronto had done in earlier generations<sup>3</sup>. Being a Roman aristocrat, Sidonius appeared to maintain the aristocratic frame of mind, and being of episcopal rank, he was in a position, as one correspondent put it (*Ep.* IV 2), to «lavish [his] wealth upon the poor».

Ph. Rousseau notes that Sidonius had to attend to the *querimonia desiderantum* with patience, a virtue more humane than condescension; and he had to do so precisely from a sense of episcopal duty<sup>4</sup>. One such case can be found in Sidonius' letter to a certain Pudens<sup>5</sup> written after the year 469, some terminology of which I will examine here.

Sidonius Apollinaris, *Ep.* V 19<sup>6</sup>:

(1) Sidonius Pudenti suo salutem. Nutricis meae filiam filius tuae rapuit: facinus indignum quodque nos vosque inimicasset, nisi protinus

\* I am very grateful to Dr Antti Arjava (University of Helsinki) for his reading of this paper in preparation. Clearly, I alone bear the responsibility for any imperfections.

<sup>1</sup> J. HARRIES, *Sidonius Apollinaris and the Fall of Rome*, Oxford 1994, p. 169.

<sup>2</sup> Ph. ROUSSEAU, *In Search of Sidonius the Bishop*, *Historia* 25 (1976), p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> P. GARNSEY – G. WOOLF, *Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World*, in: A. WALLACE-HADRILL (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London–New York 1989, p. 165.

<sup>4</sup> Ph. ROUSSEAU, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 365.

<sup>5</sup> On Pudens, a local landowner, see R.W. MATHISEN, *Some Hagiographical Addenda to P.L.R.E.*, *Historia* 36 (1987), p. 448-461 = *Studies in the History, Literature and Society of Late Antiquity*, Amsterdam 1991, p. 347-360: 357.

<sup>6</sup> Sidonius, *Poems and Letters*, with an English translation by W.B. ANDERSON. Vol. II, Cambridge (Mass.) 1965, p. 238-241.

scissem te nescisse faciendum. Sed conscientiae tuae purgatione praelata petere dignaris culpa calentis impunitatem. Sub condicione concedo: si stupratorem pro domino iam patronus originali solvas inquilinatu. (2) Mulier autem illa iam libera est; quae tum demum videbitur non ludibrio addicta sed assumpta conjugio, si reus noster, pro quo precaris, mox cliens factus e tributario plebeam potius incipiat habere personam quam colonariam. Nam meam haec sola seu compositio seu satisfactio vel mediocriter contumeliam emendat; qui tuis votis atque amicitiiis hoc adquiesco, si laxat libertas maritum, ne constringat poena raptorem. Vale.

(1) Sidonius to his friend Pudens, greeting. The son of your nurse has run off with the daughter of mine — a scandalous thing, which would have estranged you and me had I not known that you knew nothing of the deed being done. But after some words disclaiming complicity you think fit to beg that this flagrant offence go unpunished. I consent on one condition — that you release the ravisher from his hereditary position of inquilinus, becoming his patron instead of his master. (2) The woman is already free. The only thing that will cause her to be regarded as taken in lawful marriage, not made over as a plaything, will be that our culprit, on whose behalf you plead, should promptly be made a client instead of a tributary payer and so begin to have the standing of a plebeian rather than of a colonus. For nothing short of this arrangement or amends can in any degree set right this insult to me: and I am content to make this concession to your prayers and to our friendship — that, if the conferring of freedom releases the husband, no punishment shall fetter the ravisher. Farewell.

#### I. THE LATE ANTIQUE REGULATION FOR MARRIAGE BY ABDUCTION

There are some different readings of the situation Sidonius discussed. A. Segrè has suggested that the *colonus* of Pudens seduced the *ancilla* of Sidonius and this understanding has more recently been accepted by J.-M. Carrié and M. Mircović<sup>7</sup>. However, what meaning could ‘seduction’ have in this case? Does it mean that the young man deflowered the girl and her mother applied to Sidonius for help? J.-U. Krause translates the term *rapere* as «vergewaltigen» (to violate) and arrives at the

<sup>7</sup> A. SEGRE, *The Byzantine Colonate, Traditio* 5 (1947), p. 105; cf. J.-M. CARRIÉ, «Colonato del Basso Impero»: la resistenza del mito, in: E. LO CASCIO (ed.), *Terre, proprietari e contadini dell'impero romano. Dall'affitto agrario al colonato tardoantico*, Roma 1997, p. 146-147; M. MIRKOVIĆ, *The Later Roman Colonate and Freedom*, Philadelphia 1997, p. 122.

conclusion that the man from Pudens' estate raped the girl who belonged to the estate of Sidonius<sup>8</sup>. The same reading *rapere* as 'raped' is embraced without additional commentary by B. Sirks<sup>9</sup>. It can be understood in the sense that Sidonius' strong feelings were aroused by the violent behaviour of the young man of his neighbour. Another interpretation might be that the young people were living in sin, though residing separately in their mothers' houses which were on two different estates, and after the misconduct came to light, Sidonius wrote the letter to Pudens. To save his *nutrix's* daughter, who lost her virginity, from infamy, Sidonius compelled Pudens to force the man to marry the girl or, otherwise, threatened punishment. With such an interpretation, the situation looks like Sidonius' anger was aroused because his *nutrix's* daughter could singe her reputation.

In either interpretation, Sidonius, as the patron of the young girl, could go to the law for satisfaction. The seduction could be qualified as *adulterium* or *stuprum* and prosecuted under the *lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis* (Dig. XLVIII 5). Against rape as such, there was no legislation in classical Roman law, but forcible sexual assault could be prosecuted as 'illicit sex by violence' (*stuprum per vim*) and punished under the *lex Iulia de vi publica* (Dig. XLVIII 6). Anyone who ravished a girl or married woman should be punished with death<sup>10</sup>. Sidonius, however, did not bring suit in a law court for redress, but offered a compromise solution.

Another approach is that of W. B. Anderson who has translated '*rapuit*' in the sense that the son of Pudens' nurse ran off with the daughter of Sidonius' nurse<sup>11</sup>. In his translation, the man who committed the crime is defined as a 'ravisher'<sup>12</sup>. The 'ravishment' produces some questions and the first being whether it means that the crime was a rape (*violatio*) or an abduction (*raptus*). What was the purpose of this ravishment? If they ran

<sup>8</sup> J.-U. KRAUSE, *Spätantike Patronatsformen im Westen des römischen Reiches*, München 1987, p. 93, 97.

<sup>9</sup> B. SIRKS, *Reconsidering the Roman Colonate*, ZRG 110 (1993), p. 351 n. 66.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. J.F. GARDNER, *Women in Roman Law and Society*, London-Sidney 1986, p. 118-121.

<sup>11</sup> See the same reading without commentary by P. ROSAFIO, *Coloni e clienti: analogie e differenze*, in: E. LO CASCIO (ed.), *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 251.

<sup>12</sup> The same understanding is in the French translation in: *Sidoine Apollinaire, Lettres*. Texte établi et traduit par André LOYEU, Paris 1970, p. 207. The son of nurse who ravished («a enlevé») the girl is called by A. Loyeu a seductor («le séducteur») and a ravisher («le ravisseur»).

away together, the question is where were they at the moment when Sidonius was writing his letter — on Pudens' estate or in a third place? The situation can be understood in the sense that the man of Pudens abducted the girl from the estate of Sidonius, and this solution seems to be the most preferable. F.-M. Kaufmann correctly argues against Krause's translation of *rapere* in the sense 'vergewaltigen' and emphasises that the subject of Sidonius' letter is not a rape but rather a *raptus*, an abduction<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, Sidonius' letter is understandable as an answer to Pudens' information on the event where he asked (*pro quo precaris*) do not punish the man, who trespassed without his master's knowledge (*nisi protinus scissem te nescisse faciendum*).

The subject of such a *raptus* was considered in a law of Constantine:

If someone who has not previously made any agreement with a girl's parents should seize her unwilling or lead her away willing (*si quis nihil cum parentibus puellae ante depectus invitam eam rapuerit vel volentem abduxerit*), hoping for protection from the response ... the consent of the girl shall be of no advantage to him, as it would have been under the ancient law, but rather the girl herself shall be held liable as a participant in the crime<sup>14</sup>.

Although the lawmaker seems make a distinction here between *invitam rapuit* and *volentem abduxerit*, he states one and the same penalty in both cases. It meant that the verbs *rapuit* and *abduxerit* had the same *de jure* sense.

However, the discrepancy between *invitam* and *volentem* is essential for understanding the real situation in Sidonius' letter because, in one case, the man 'almost raped' the girl (*rapuit*) but in the other he 'merely abducted' her from her parents' home (*abduxerit*). Indeed, *rapere* could simply mean 'seize by force' and an abduction of a girl does not necessarily involve rape; the kidnapping is enough to raise the suspicion that the abducted girl is no longer a virgin<sup>15</sup>. Constantine's law of AD 326 assumed that if the girl allowed herself to be taken, forcibly or not, she consented to the union. The law treated the abduction (*raptus*) as an elopement, a marriage made without the permission of the bride's parents and without the proper preliminaries. The abducted girl was to suffer the

<sup>13</sup> F.-M. KAUFMANN, *Studien zu Sidonius Apollinariis*, Frankfurt am Main 1995, p. 245 n. 770.

<sup>14</sup> *C.Th.* IX 24.1 (AD 326).

<sup>15</sup> J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family in Late Antiquity: the Emperor Constantine's Marriage Legislation*, Oxford 1999, p. 185.

same penalty as her abductor. Parents, who agree in the end to a *de facto* marriage, are also punished because they are considered accessories after the fact; they should instead, according to the lawmaker, have avenged their daughter's abduction.

J. Evans Grubbs argues that Constantine was attempting to eradicate the custom of marriage by abduction<sup>16</sup>. She defines this so-called 'bride theft' as the seizure of an unmarried young woman by a man who is not betrothed to her but hopes to obtain her parents' consent to what is essentially a *de facto* marriage. The situation in Sidonius' letter, at first sight, is similar to that described in the law of Constantine: a man has not made an agreement (a betrothal pact) with a girl's parents but instead has abducted her, perhaps hoping to receive her as a spouse in this way.

Kaufmann suggests that the *filius* and *filia* wished to enter into legal marriage (*conubium*) but, with their different personal status, their marriage could be only *contubernium*<sup>17</sup>. In his opinion, the *nutricis filia* of Sidonius was free but her lover continued to be a slave. Marriage with a slave could be only cohabitation and Constantine's legislation confirmed this norm of classical Roman law<sup>18</sup>. In order to legitimate the marriage of the freed girl, it was necessary to liberate her lover from servitude. However, there is a doubt about the slave status of the man. Sidonius used the word *stuprator* to identify the guilty man and this is a basis for executing the *lex Iulia de adulteriis*<sup>19</sup>. In his commentary on this law (*Dig.* XLVIII 5.6), Papinian emphasises that this law was executed only for free people (*inter liberas tantum personas*) and similar actions towards slaves pertained (*quod ad servas pertinet*) to the *lex Aquilia*. To receive the protection of the law, Sidonius stresses that the girl is now free (*iam libera est*). The *inquilinus* of Pudens does not seem to be a slave but he was also not free, being

<sup>16</sup> J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Abduction Marriage in Antiquity: a Law of Constantine* (C.Th. ix.24.1) and *Its Social Context*, JRS 79 (1989), p. 59-83; ID., *Law and Family* (n. 15), p. 183-185. Cf. D. GRODZYSKI, *Raves et coupables: un essai d'interprétation de la loi 9,24,1 du Code Théodosien*, MEFRA 96 (1984), p. 697-726; L. DESANTI, *Constantino, il ratto e il matrimonio riparators*, SDHI 52 (1986), p. 195-217.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. B. RAWSON, *Family Life among the Lower Classes at Rome in the First Two Centuries of the Empire*, CP 61 (1966), p. 73-78; S. TREGGIARI, *Contubernales* in CIL, 6, Phoenix 35 (1981), p. 48-50; P.R.C. WEAVER, *The Status of Children in Mixed Marriages*, in: B. RAWSON (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives*, London-Sidney 1986, p. 145-169.

<sup>18</sup> C.Th. XII 1.6 = C.J. V 5.3 (AD 311): ... *neque conubium cum personis potest esse servilibus et ex huiusmodi contubernio servi nascuntur*.

<sup>19</sup> *Dig.* XLVIII 5.6.1 *Papinianus*; XLVIII 5.35pr.; 1; L 16.101 pr. *Modestinus*.

dependent on Pudens. Therefore, the proposed future marriage would be not illegal but unequal (*inequale conjugium*), if Pudens did not release his man<sup>20</sup>.

After Constantine, the law on marriage by abduction developed in two different ways. The first was the way of imperial law that continued the classical Roman tradition, and the second was Christian canon law.

(1) The classical, and Constantine's, approach to marriage by abduction was renewed by the law of Constantius of AD 349<sup>21</sup>. In fact, as studies of bride theft have shown, parents would be quite likely to agree to their daughter's marriage with the abductor since her reputation would be irretrievably damaged, and they might even have encouraged the abduction before it occurred<sup>22</sup>. In Marcian's commentary on the *legem Iuliam de vi publica*, in the case of the abduction of a non-betrothed girl, he provided for an opportunity for her father, moved by prayers, to pardon the injury, perhaps to get himself a son-in-law (*Dig. XLVIII 6.5.2*). This implies that classical Roman law disapproved of such marriages but the development of the legal dogma differed from real life.

We can find some constitutions in post-classical legislation which contained a flavour of real provincial life. For example, the law of AD 374, addressed to Maximus, praetorian prefect of Gaul, establishes a five-year statute of limitations on the prosecution of «marriage contracted by the crime of abduction»<sup>23</sup>. After five years, «there will be no opportunity for accusation or for contesting the marriage or the offspring». Thus, unions made by abduction can indeed turn out to be as successful and fruitful as marriages contracted through a formal betrothal<sup>24</sup>. The law of AD 420 stated a new punishment for the abductor of the girl or widow consecrated to God: whereas earlier he suffered capital punishment, now his goods should be confiscated and he should be punished with exile<sup>25</sup>.

However, on the whole, the law continued to be intolerant to marriages by abduction. The former rules of Constantine's and Constantius' laws were included in the Theodosian Code issued in AD 439, and that implies that the common approach continued to be the same.

<sup>20</sup> On an unequal marriage, see J. GAUDEMET, *Le mariage en droit romain: justum matrimonium*, in: *Sociétés et mariage*, Strasbourg 1980, p. 46-103.

<sup>21</sup> *C.Th.* IX 24.2 (AD 349), cf. *C.Th.* IX 25.1 (AD 354); IX 25.2 (AD 364).

<sup>22</sup> J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family* (n. 15), p. 186 n. 145 with literature.

<sup>23</sup> *C.Th.* IX 24.3 (AD 374).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family* (n. 15), p. 193.

<sup>25</sup> *C.Th.* IX 25.3 (AD 420), cf. *Const. Sirmond.* X (AD 420).



A. Arjava notes that, in the Western Empire, there were no mitigations by the early sixth century<sup>26</sup>. All the participants in a *raptus* were to be executed and the girl's parents exiled if they did not prosecute the crime. The barbarian codes derived these rules from Roman law<sup>27</sup>. Justinian only slightly modified the law in the east: an abducted girl escaped the affair without penalties while an ensuing marriage remained strictly forbidden and the man was punished by death, as before<sup>28</sup>. Thus, in the context of the imperial legislation of the fifth century, the solution of Sidonius seems to be atypical.

(2) Tolerance towards marriages formed by abduction developed in Christian church law following the canons of the Council of Ancyra of AD 314. Christian sources assumed that the abducted girl was a passive victim and did not suggest that she or her parents were responsible for what happened. By allowing the marriage of the girl to the man who violated her, church authorities were offering a solution counter to imperial law<sup>29</sup>.

In 375, Basil, bishop of Caesarea, in his epistle to Amphilochius concerning the Canons (*Ep.* 199), refined the role of the parents of the abducted free girl or persons who substituted for them. He insisted the marriage is to be considered perfectly valid if the parents and the girl agree to a union (Canon 22):

Regarding men who hold women by abduction ... if anyone takes a girl who is not betrothed, it is necessary to take her away and restore her to her relatives, and commit her to their discretion, whether they are parents or brothers, or whoever have authority over the maiden: and if they choose to surrender her to him, the marriage must stand, but if they refuse, violence is not to be employed<sup>30</sup>.

In Canon 44, Basil considered an abducted girl («suffered through violence») to be free from censure, i.e., guiltless.

<sup>26</sup> A. ARJAVA, *Women and Law in Late Antiquity*, Oxford 1996, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup> *C.Th.* IX 24.1-3 = *Lex Rom. Visig.* IX 19.1-2; *Lex Rom. Burg.* IX 1-3; *Ed. Theod.* 17-20.

<sup>28</sup> *C.J.* IX 13.1 (AD 533): *De raptu virginum seu viduarum nec non sanctimonialium*; *Nov. Just.* 143 = 150 (AD 563): *De raptis mulieribus et quae raptoribus nubunt*; J. BEAUCAMP, *Le statut de la femme à Byzance (4e-7e siècle)*, Paris 1990, p. 114-118; R. HAASE, *Justinian I. und raptus*, *ZRG* 111 (1994), p. 458-470.

<sup>29</sup> J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family* (n. 15), p. 191.

<sup>30</sup> Basiliius Caesarienses, *The Letters*. With an English translation by Roy J. DEFERRARI, vol. III, London 1962, p. 113-115. Cf. J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family* (n. 15), p. 188.

The ecclesiastical point of view, based on practice, existed long before Constantine. Being free from classical legal tradition, the new canon law could more fit the rules for ordinary life. In Canons (22, 25, 26, 38) by Basil of Caesarea, the case of fornication and rape did not prevent the man from marrying the girl if she and her parents consented. In a case where the disgraced girl was of free and independent social status, the parents played the main role in permitting the marriage (38): «A girl who follows a man contrary to the wish of her father commits fornication, but, if her parents are reconciled, the matter seems to admit of a remedy». Canon 40 presumed the case of a girl under someone's authority: «A girl who has given herself over to a man against the will of her master has committed fornication, but, if after this she has engaged in a freely authorized marriage, she is married. So the former was fornication; the latter, marriage». The case obviously concerned subject people, for instance colons, but not slaves because servile conjugality could not be marriage. However, the problem was resolved only in the case of a matrimonial relationship between people subject to one and the same master. Concerning this problem Basil's next words could be understood in the sense that there could be no legal marriage between people subject to different masters: «For, the contracts of those who are subject to another have no force».

This rule is similar to contemporary imperial law for colons whose marriages outside their estates were considered illegal<sup>31</sup>. Later in the fifth century, the regulation dealt with the marriages between colons of two different landowners. The colons, as other manpower on the estate, could be alienated to another landowner only together with the land they worked. But such order was sometimes difficult to keep. Constantine's constitution of AD 325 reports the division of the fiscal fields on Sicily among many new landowners (*C.Th.* II 25.1). The lawmaker prescribed the distribution of slaves on the land in such a manner that the servile kinship was not broken and neither wives were separated from their husbands nor children from their parents<sup>32</sup>. The lengthy evolution of the later antique society gave to Justinian's lawyers the right to extend this law to colons, interpreting the colons as being near slaves with the same regulation for both (*C.J.* III 38.1).

<sup>31</sup> *C.J.* X 32.29 (AD 365); *C.J.* VI 4.2 (AD 367); *C.J.* XI 68.4 (AD 376); *C.Th.* X 20.10 = *C.J.* XI 8.7 (AD 380); *C.Th.* XIV 7.1 (AD 397).

<sup>32</sup> Though conjugalities of slaves were not legal and Roman owners had full right to alienate their own slaves without restrictions, classical lawyers supported the custom of preserving slaves' families unbroken and not to separate husbands from wives and children from parents (*Dig.* XI 3.17; XXI 1.35; XXIII 3.39; XXIII 3.67; XXXIII 7.12.33; XXXIII 7.20.1; XXXIII 7.27.1; XXXVIII 10.10.5; L 16.220.1).

Thus, the discrepancy between legal dogma and reality were equal in both imperial and canon laws. Actually, Basil of Caesarea followed the old Roman practice of favouring marriages between slaves and subject people. This prescription could not become a strict legal norm in imperial law, only an executive order, while the recommendation could be only a norm in canon law. At the same time, the idea that marriages were legal only between landworkers of one landowner became common for both laws after the second half of the fourth century. The imperial and canon regulations complemented each other.

Accordingly, by allowing the marriage of the girl to the man who had ravished her, Bishop Sidonius followed canon law quite well in his letter. The church regulation in this case was different than the imperial one, and it seems to be the reason why the mother of the girl applied to Bishop Sidonius rather than to an ordinary judge<sup>33</sup>. Sidonius acted more for advantage of the girl and her family than for his own interests. It is clear from his emphasising the fact that the girl came to harm from *raptus* and was not merely abducted because, we have seen above, the law made a difference between (*invitam*) *rapuit* and (*volentem*) *abduxerit*. The role of Sidonius as a bishop-judge, not a private person, is clear from his use of the law. He begins the letter with the words: *facinus indignum quodque nos vosque inimicasset, nisi protinus scissem te nescisse faciendum* («a scandalous thing, which would have estranged you and me had I not known that you knew nothing of the deed being done»). Pudens' knowledge of the abduction could cause him serious trouble. In the *Edictum Theodorici* (21-22) the rule was preserved, obviously originating from Roman law, which, in a case of *raptus* performed by a slave or colon, his landlord was considered guilty if he knew of the crime. Sidonius did Pudens a favour, laying aside the question of his knowledge or not, with an eye to making him agree to release his *inquilinus*.

Apparently Sidonius wrote the letter to Pudens at the moment when the abducted girl was carried away from her mother's home and taken to an unknown place. After a successful abduction, the girl was usually taken

<sup>33</sup> On Episcopal consistory, see *C.Th.* I 27.1 (AD 318); *Const. Sirmond.* I (AD 333); *C.J.* I 4.1 (AD 398); *C.Th.* I 27.2 (AD 408); *Nov. Val.* 35 (AD 452); Augustinus, *Ep.* 24\* (CSEL LXXXVIII 126-127). Cf. Cl. LEPELLEY, *Liberté, colonat et esclavage d'après la Lettre 24\**: la juridiction épiscopale «de liberali causa», in: *Les lettres de Saint Augustin découvertes par Johannes Divjak: Communications présentées au colloque des 20 et 21 Septembre 1982*, Paris 1983, p. 329-342; P. GARNSEY – C. HUMFRESS, *The Evolution of the Late Antique World*, Cambridge 2001, p. 74-80.

to a place outside the village, perhaps in the woods, where she could not be found. Supposedly, the abductor went beyond the law because the mother (*nutrix*) of his mistress had not agreed to their marriage due to his dependent status (*inquilinus, tributarius*). After the abduction had succeeded, he apprised his own master Pudens and the girl's mother of his wish to marry. In his arrangement, being presented with a *fait accompli*, the mother had to fall in with the marriage. But his act brought unexpected troubles not only to the mother but also to Pudens, and they both seem to have applied to the local bishop Sidonius asking him for help. Pudens wished to escape being accused as an abettor to the abduction. The *nutrix*-mother, who appreciated the future marriage as inescapable, wished to change the dependent status of the bridegroom. Sidonius took her side and based his argument upon canon law and the existence of the two kinds of law gave him an opportunity to manoeuvre. Apparently, he was bearing in mind the imperial law when he suggested to Pudens «that, if the conferring of freedom releases the husband, no punishment shall fetter the ravisher».

## II. THE ABDUCTOR'S STATUS

A peculiarity of the situation is that the guilty abductor and abducted girl were not only dependent people but pertained to two different estates. The status of Pudens' inquiline, whose behaviour was the cause of the letter of Sidonius, is the much discussed problem. The view of the subjects of the letter as slaves is accepted by some scholars<sup>34</sup>. The abductor and the girl are considered as children of wet nurses (*nutrices*) and, according to the collective opinion, slaves and freedwomen predominated in this occupation<sup>35</sup>. At this rate, the problem seems to have arisen because the daughter of Sidonius' nurse was given her freedom and her marriage with a slave could

<sup>34</sup> W.E. HEITLAND, *Agricola. A Study of Agriculture and Rustic Life in the Graeco-Roman World from the Point of View of Labour*, Cambridge 1921, p. 426-431; J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 98; F.-M. KAUFMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 245-247; J.-M. CARRIÉ, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 146-147.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. G. HERZOG-HAUSER, *Nutrix*, in: *RE* XVII 2 (1937), col. 1491-1500; N. KAMPEN, *Image and Status. Roman Working Woman in Ostia*, Berlin 1981, p. 109; R. GÜNTHER, *Frauenarbeit — Frauenbindung. Untersuchungen zu unfreien und freigelassenen Frauen in den stadtrömischen Inschriften*, München 1987, p. 79; K.R. BRADLEY, *Discovering the Roman Family. Studies in Roman Social History*, New York—Oxford 1991, p. 19-20.

not be legal. Therefore, the landowner Sidonius tried to instigate his neighbour Pudens to free his slave so he could marry Sidonius' foster-sister.

However, K. Bradley's recent analysis demonstrates that, among nurses, even in classical times, there were quite many freeborn, not only freedwomen and slaves<sup>36</sup>. In addition, the terminology of the letter makes most researchers consider the *nutricis filius* a dependent colon of Pudens<sup>37</sup>. Indeed, it seems to be correct on the strength of the fact that Sidonius demanded to change the status of the abductor from *originali inquilinatu* and to make him a *cliens* from a *tributarius* and a plebeian (*plebeam personam*) from a colon (*personam colonariam*). The terms *originalis*, *inquilinus*, *tributarius* were normal among colonate terminology; in late antiquity, they marked different features in a colon's status. If the *nutricis filius* were a slave, Sidonius would write of him as a potential *libertus*, not a *cliens*. However, what did *originali inquilinatu* mean in the mid-fifth century and how could the landowner liberate his colon from this form of dependence?

(1) At first glance, the turn of phrase *originali inquilinatu* seems to be illogical among the legal terminology of the late antique imperial legislation<sup>38</sup>. In the strict sense, the term *originales* marked persons of local origin (from *origo*), while those who had no *origo* but only a domicile were *incolae* > *inquilini*<sup>39</sup>. In classical Roman law, inquilines were considered as house-tenants while colons were land-tenants. The phrase that the man of Pudens was bound by *originalis inquilinatus* ought to indicate his hereditary position of *inquilinus* in Pudens' house. It meant only that

<sup>36</sup> K.R. BRADLEY, *Wet-Nursing at Rome: a Study in Social Relations*, in: B. RAWSON (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives*, New York 1987, p. 201-229, esp. Table 8.1: 'Status of Nurses and Nurslings', p. 204-206. Cf. also S.R. JOSHEL, *Work, Identity and Legal Status at Rome. A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions*, London 1992, p. 98.

<sup>37</sup> N.D. FUSTEL DE COULAGES, *Le colonat romain. Recherches sur quelques problèmes d'histoire*, Paris 1889 (repr. 1984), p. 104 n. 1; A. SEGRE, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 105; M. PALLASSE, *Orient et Occident à propos du colonat romain au Bas-Empire*, Lyon 1950, p. 82-83; R. GÜNTHER, *Probleme der Darstellung des Eigentums in den Schriften von Apollinaris Sidonius*, in: J. KÖHN – B. RODE (eds.), *Eigentum: Beiträge zu seiner Entwicklung in politischen Gesellschaften. W. Sellnow zum 70. Geburtstag*, Weimar 1987, p. 162-168; J. HARRIES, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 212; B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 351; M. MIRKOVIĆ, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 122; P. ROSAFIO, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 250-251; P. GARNSEY – C. HUMFRESS, *op. cit.* (n. 33), p. 86.

<sup>38</sup> On the terms *colonatus* and *inquilinatus*, see *C.Th.* XII 1.33 (AD 342); *C.Th.* XIV 18.1 (AD 382); *C.Th.* XII 19.2 (AD 400); *C.Th.* V 6.3 (AD 409).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. D. NÖRR, *Origo. Studien zur Orts-, Stadt- und Reichszugehörigkeit in der Antike*, TRG 31 (1963), p. 548.

his mother was an inquiline of Pudens and, therefore, her son was born as an inquiline, too.

His mother, as a nurse, could originate from landworkers who once had come to the estate as inquilines and became colons there. Such *coloni inquilini* had been residing in the African Villa Magna since the second century, according to the inscription of Henchir Mettich<sup>40</sup>. They could be both labourers on the estate and tenants of the land<sup>41</sup>. Although modern historians sometimes write of their bondage, in the third century they were not yet bound to the estate or soil<sup>42</sup>. In late antiquity, the rural inquilines were rather treated as workers on another's land than as lessees of another's house. From the definition given by Isidore of Seville (*Orig.* IX 4.37), it appears that working another's land is an essential characteristic of *inquilini*. The former difference between the colons, indigenous to the territory of the estate and living in their own houses, and inquilines, newcomers to the estate who also needed to lease a house, disappeared in the sense that both were rural landworkers similarly inscribed on the tax-roll<sup>43</sup>.

There has existed a long tradition, from Ch. Revillout to P. Rosafio, of seeing the essential difference between colons and inquilines in that the latter were not *originarii* of the place where they lived<sup>44</sup>. The late antique texts utilise various terms for alien people coming to an estate: *advena*, *inquilinus*, *incola*, *paroikos*. According to Isidore of Seville, some of them came to an estate and remained there forever; he applies the term *incolae adventicii* or *advenae* to such people<sup>45</sup>. Other newcomers lived on

<sup>40</sup> CIL VIII 25902 = FIRA<sup>2</sup> No. 100: IV 26-27. Cf. D. FLACH, *Inschriftenuntersuchungen zum römischen Kolonat in Nordafrika*, *Chiron* 8 (1978), p. 460-461; P. ØRSTED, *From Henchir Mettich to the Albertini Tablets. A Study in the Economic and Social Significance of the Roman Lease System (locatio-conductio)*, in: J. CARLSEN et al. (eds.), *Landscape in the Roman Empire*, Roma 1994, p. 115-125.

<sup>41</sup> On their tie with land, see the commentary of Marcian (*Dig.* XXX 112) and Ulpian (*Dig.* L 15.4.8). Cf. A.H.M. JONES, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey*, Oxford 1964, p. 799.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. G. POLARA, «*Inquilini qui praediis adhaerent*» ed «*aestimatio*» di un legato nullo, *BJDR* 11 (1967), p. 139-179.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. L. CRACCO RUGGINI, «*Coloni*» e «*inquilini*»: «*miseri e egeni homines*»? , *AARC* 8 (1990), p. 199-216. More detailed on the term *inquilinus*, see D. EIBACH, *Untersuchungen zum spätantiken Kolonat in der kaiserlichen Gesetzgebung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Terminologie*, Diss. Köln 1977, p. 233-245.

<sup>44</sup> Ch. RÉVILLOUT, *Etude sur l'histoire du colonat chez les Romains*, *RHDFFE* 2 (1856), p. 417-460; P. ROSAFIO, *Inquilinus*, *Opus* 3 (1984), p. 121-131.

<sup>45</sup> Isidorus Hispalensis, *Orig.* IX 4: [37] *Inquilini vocati quasi incolentes aliena. Non enim habent propriam sedem, sed in terra aliena inhabitant.* [38] *Differt autem inter inquilinum et advenam. Inquilini enim sunt qui emigrant, et non perpetuo permanent. Advenae*

the estate only a short time and then went away; in Isidore's opinion, the term *inquilinus* was more appropriate for them. Both had no *origo* on the estate but *incolae adventicii* received a *domicilium* while the *inquilini* did not (*propriam sede*). At the same time, according to Augustine, this terminological difference was not essential and all the terms equally defined the same people<sup>46</sup>. There existed another discrepancy among the newcomers and perhaps it was the same as among the perpetual inhabitants of the estate. Some of them were labourers on the estate and were included in the tax declaration together with the estate under the name of the landowner while others were land-tenants and were enrolled in the tax-roll under their own names (*Dig. L 15.4.8*).

The constitution issued in AD 400 to Vincentius, praetorian prefect of the Gallic provinces, is the first known evidence of the dissolution of the discrepancy between colons and inquilines in respect to *origo*: *inter inquilinos colonosve, quorum quantum ad originem pertinet vindicandam indiscreta eademque paene videtur esse condicio, licet sit discrimen in nomine* (*C.J. XI 48.13*). Beginning with the Code of Justinian, the law treated the colons and inquilines together, but in the fourth and fifth centuries, both colons and inquilines were divided into two groups of rural labourers, those with contracts and those without<sup>47</sup>. The constitution of AD 419 from the Theodosian Code (*V 18.1*) illustrates this. In the *praefatio* of the constitution, the inquilines as well as *coloni originales* were proclaimed free from returning if they lived outside of the estate more than thirty years. Then, the constitution mentions *originarii* who had to be returned before thirty years of their living in another place had passed. Were the *originarii* identical to the *coloni originales*? In my opinion, the *coloni originales* were those who had their *origo* on the estate, while the *originarii* were the people who could not leave their estate and there were colons, inquilines and even slaves among them. The *ius originarium* developed in the late fourth century as a surrogate for the classical *ius*

*autem vel incolae adventicii perhibentur, sed permanentes; et inde incolae, quia iam habitatores sunt, ab incolendo. [39] Indigenae sunt inde geniti, et in eodem loco nati, ubi inhabitant. [40] Incola autem non indigenam, sed advenam indicat. [41] Peregrini dicti eo quod ignorantur eorum parentes, a quibus orti existunt. Sunt enim de longinqua regione.*

<sup>46</sup> Augustinus, *Enarr. in Psalm. CXVIII 8.1* (CCL XL 1684-1635): *quod est enim in Graeco paroikos atque nostri inquilinus, aliqui incola, nonnumquam etiam advena interpretati sunt. Inquilini non habentes propriam domum habitant in alienas, incolae autem vel advenae utique adventicii perhibentur.*

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *C.J. XI 48.8* (AD 371) and the commentary of B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 362-364.



*originis*<sup>48</sup>. Therefore, the *originalis inquilinatus* of the colon of Pudens marked his condition as a labourer without a formal contract, not a leaseholder on the estate.

At the time of Sidonius, Salvian, bishop of Marseilles, depicted poor people as oppressed by heavy taxes and driven by fear of an enemy,

who could not keep either the home or the dignity in which they were born, knowingly take on the yoke of despised inquilines (*iugo se inquilinae abiectiois addicunt*), reduced to such that they are deprived not only of property but of status, driven out not only from their own land but alienated from their very selves, thereby losing all they have and ceasing to exist as they were formerly, remain both without property and without the rights of free people (*et rerum proprietate careant et ius libertatis amittant*). ... Those whom the rich receive as outsiders and newcomers (*advenae*) they begin to possess as their own: those who were known to be freeborn men are turned into slaves (*quos esse constat ingenuos vertuntur in servos*)<sup>49</sup>.

The newcomers in Salvian's text became the inquilines who worked on the rich estates without contracts and it is the reason why they lost their liberty and resembled slaves. Actually, they become like the indigenous colons (*originarii*) that never leave their *origo* on the estate and live under the control of the landlord.

(2) Sidonius defined the *inquilinus* as a taxpayer (*tributarius*): «...our culprit ... should promptly be made a client instead of a tributary payer and so begin to have the standing of a plebeian rather than of a colon...» In this phrase, *tributarius* means the same as *colonus* (*persona colonaria*) but differs from *plebeus* (*persona plebea*). There are two pairs of terms in Sidonius' letter which are contrasted with each other, *tributarius* and *persona colonaria* against *cliens* and *persona plebea*. Where Sidonius speaks of changing the worse status of the man for the better one, he compares his future *plebea persona* with a *persona colonaria*. The latter obviously was the status of Pudens' man as well; he was a colon.

<sup>48</sup> *Ius originarium* is known only in *C.J.* XI 52.1 (AD 393): (*colonus*) *originario iure teneatur*. Cf. *C.J.* XI 48.13 (AD 400): (*colonus*) *ad originem pertinet vindicandum*; *C.Th.* V 18.1 (AD 419): *loca, cui natus est*; *Nov. Val.* 35 (AD 452): (6) *iugum natalium declinantes*; (18) *originis iure et titulo revocari*. There are two other surrogate terms similar to *ius originarium* in legislation: *ius agrorum* — *C.Th.* X 20.10 = *C.J.* XI 8.7 (AD 380); *C.Th.* V 18.1 (AD 419); and *iure colonatus* — *C.Th.* XII 1.33 (AD 342); *C.Th.* XIV 18.1 = *C.J.* XI 26.1 (AD 382); *C.Th.* V 6.3 (AD 409); *Nov.Val.* 31.1 (AD 451); Victorius Viten-sis, *Hist. persec. Vand.* 3.20 (*MGH AA III* 45); *Nov. Just. app.* 9.4 (AD 558).

<sup>49</sup> Salvianus, *De gub. Dei* V 44-45; cf. *C.Th.* V 7.2 — X 10.25 (AD 408).

In later legislation, the term *tributarius* was also applied to colons<sup>50</sup>. Clearly, the colon was also not an autonomous taxpayer; the term *tributarius* was applied only to those colons whose taxes had been paid by a landowner. Most of them were peasants who constantly resided on the land of the estate (*originarii*)<sup>51</sup>. But the *inquilines* could also be among the tributary colons if the landowner included them in his tax declaration under his name but not under their own names. Ulpian mentions that anyone who does not declare an *inquilinus* or a *colonus* is himself liable for the tax<sup>52</sup>. This suggests that if the owner declares his landworkers, they should themselves be responsible for the tax. The typical objection is raised, for instance, by Mircovič, who argues that a *colonus* did not pay the tax himself because he did not own any land<sup>53</sup>. Mircovič quotes the law of AD 366 and argues that the law «establishes in the same unambiguous manner the landowner's responsibility for taxation of his *colonus*»<sup>54</sup>. However, the law establishes the responsibility of the landowner only for the *colonis originalibus* who were included on the tax-roll of the estate (*in locis isdem censos esse*). As we have seen above, the newcomers settled down on the estate without any formal contract, dependent on the goodwill of the landlord (*fide dominica*), and could be equal to the resident population<sup>55</sup>. The indigenous population was defined by the terms *originarii* or *tributarii* depending on which feature of their condition the lawmaker wanted to emphasise. They were included in the tax

<sup>50</sup> The attempt of D. EIBACH (*op. cit.* [n. 43], p. 235) to treat the constitution of AD 396 (C.J. XI 48.12) in favour of the existence of *servi tributarii* and *servi inquilini* is doubtful and the suggestion of A.H.M. JONES (*Later Roman Empire* [n. 41], p. 799, 1329 n. 68) about Justinian's interpolation of *tributarios vel inquilinos* in this phrase seems more fruitful.

<sup>51</sup> C.Th. X 12.2 (AD 368? 370? 373?) gives occasion to the *tributarii* differed from the *inquilini* in the fourth century as the *coloni* and *inquilini*. The discrepancy between them was still doubtful in the 360s-370s (C.J. XI 48.6 (AD 371) and C.J. XI 53.1 (AD 371) and disappeared after the law of AD 400 (C.J. XI 48.13).

<sup>52</sup> Dig. L 15.4.8: *si quis inquilinum vel colonum non fuerit professus, vinculis censualibus tenetur*.

<sup>53</sup> M. MIRCOVIČ, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 20-22.

<sup>54</sup> C.Th. XI 1.14 = C.J. XI 48.4 (AD 366): *Penes quos fundorum dominia sunt, pro his colonis originalibus, quos in locis isdem censos esse constabit, vel per se vel per actores proprios recepta compulsionis sollicitudine implenda munia functionis agnoscant*.

<sup>55</sup> Colons who worked *fide dominica* (Dig. XXXIII 7.12.8; 18.4; 19.1; 20.1; Paulus, Sent. III 6) or *nudo consensu* (Dig. XIX 2.14) were similar to the *coloni partiarum* (Dig. XIX 2.25.6) and *coloni indigenae* (Columella, *Re rust.* 1.7; Isidorus Hispalensis, *Etym.* IX 4.39). Cf. P. DE NEEWE, *Colon et colon partiaire*, *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984), p. 125-142; R. SORACI, «*Voluntas domini*» e gli *inquilini-coloni* sotto *Commodo e Pertinace*, *QC* 8,16 (1986), p. 261-339.

declaration of the estate among other components for which their landlord paid taxes himself. Perhaps this was the background for the combining of both groups and still under Valentinian I *tributarii* and *inquilini* could not freely leave their landlord: *si quis etiam vel tributarius reperitur vel inquilinus ostenditur, ad eum protinus redeat, cuius se esse profitetur*.<sup>56</sup>

The colons and inquilines, who were not declared by the landowner as the *instrumentum* of his estate, paid taxes themselves. They were free land-tenants with formal lease contracts<sup>57</sup>. It is likely that they were those who, much later in the east, were given the name *coloni liberi* and were tied to the soil<sup>58</sup>. In the fourth century, their tenancy was short-term and therefore they were casual labourers on the estate.

(3) The turning of the tributary colon into *cliens* and *plebeus* is designed by Sidonius as the method of obtaining freedom (*libertas*)<sup>59</sup>. For P. Rosafio, it means that the legal position of colons was clearly inferior to that of clients<sup>60</sup>. But from another standpoint, the fact that Sidonius insisted on granting liberty to the inquiline could be used as support for viewing the man as a slave. It is true to say that modern scholars consider late antique colons as free people with restricted legal capacity rather than similar to slaves. However, the problem of the colon status in the legislation of the fifth century is not easily explicable: we can find evidence for both free<sup>61</sup> and slave<sup>62</sup> positions of colons. These passages show the

<sup>56</sup> *C.Th.* X 12.2.2 (AD 368? 370? 373?).

<sup>57</sup> Supposedly, they were mentioned in the next clause of the law of AD 366 (*C.Th.* XI 1.14 = *C.J.* XI 48.4): *Sane quibus terrarum erit quantulacumque possessio, qui in suis conscripti locis proprio nomine libris censualibus detinentur, ab huius praecepti communione discernimus; eos enim convenit propriae commissos mediocritati annonarias functiones sub solito exactore cognoscere.*

<sup>58</sup> Cf. J.-M. CARRIÉ, *art. cit.* (n. 7), p. 100-101; B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 351-358.

<sup>59</sup> According to Salvian (*De gub. Dei* V 44-45), turning the plebeian newcomers into inquilines on rich estates was regarded as a loss of *ius libertatis* and a degradation from the condition of freeborn people (*ingenui*) to a servile one.

<sup>60</sup> P. ROSAFIO, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 250-251.

<sup>61</sup> *C.J.* XI 52.1 (AD 393): (*coloni*) *condicione videantur ingenui; C.J.* XI 50.2 (AD 396): *Coloni censibus dumtaxat adscripti, sicuti ab his liberi sunt, quibus eos tributa subiectos non faciunt ...*

<sup>62</sup> *C.J.* XI 52.1 (AD 393): *servi tamen terrae ipsius, cui nati sunt, existimentur; C.J.* XI 50.2 (AD 396): *coloni... annuis functionibus et debito condicionis obnoxii sunt, paene est, ut quadam debiti servitute videantur adstricti; C.Th.* VIII 2.5 = *C.J.* X 71.3 (AD 401): [*colonus*] *obnoxius servituti; Nov. Val.* 31.1 (AD 451): *vindicet iure colonario servitutum.* The law of AD 465 (*Nov. Sev.* 2) applied the term *iugum servitutis* to colons, thought in previous legislation it had been applied only to slaves (*C.Th.* IV 12.6 [AD 366]; *C.Th.* X

difficulty in defining the status of *coloni*: at least some texts are ambiguous, defining the situation «as if they were slaves» (*quadam servitute*) or similar, but still accepting the fact they were not slaves. The other texts (from the late fifth century or from the time of Justinian) may then already have almost assimilated the *coloni* and *servi*.

The late imperial legislation attempted to describe the dependence of colons by using the legal terms of classical law which were helpless in this situation. A person in classical law could be free or slave, citizen or peregrine, *sui iuris* or *alieni iuris*. A colon, as an independent tenant (free holder) on another's land, could be a free citizen and person *sui iuris*. The late antique colons who belonged to the estate under the control of its landowner ceased to be considered as *sui iuris* because they were under another's power and rule<sup>63</sup>. According to the classical legal system, the colon should be considered as *alieni iuris* similar either to a *filius familiae* or to a slave, though neither statement is true. Perhaps the influence of the classical concept caused the late imperial legislation to treat the colons as owned by and possessions of their landlord<sup>64</sup>. Scholars note that the position of the colon resembled to a great extent that of a free person *in mancipio* or a debtor *in servitute*. B. Sirks argues that a *filius familiae* might come under the *potestas* of somebody else by a *mancipatio* or a *noxae deditio* and then be *servorum loco*, 'as if a slave'<sup>65</sup>. Unfortunately, we know of no text which would compare the position of a *colonus* to a *filius familiae*, although there were attempts to consider colons among *personae familiae*<sup>66</sup>. In this situation, the late antique lawyers were forced to use the term 'slave' and other slave terminology to describe the position of colons, though officially most colons were free people and citizens<sup>67</sup>.

10.25 [AD 408]; *Nov. Val.* 27.2 [AD 449]; *Nov. Val.* 33 [AD 451] Cf. Gregorius Magnus, *Ep.* VI 12 [AD 595]; IX 107 [AD 599]).

<sup>63</sup> *Nov. Val.* 31.6 (AD 451): *in eorum iure et dominio, apud quos creati sunt vel creantur, colonario nomine*; cf. *C.J.* XI 52.1 (AD 393): *Possessor eorum iure utatur et patroni sollicitudine et domini potestate*; *Nov. Sev.* 2 (AD 465): *agnationem eorum ad eos dominos pertinere, quorum inquilinus vel colonus fuisse constiterit*.

<sup>64</sup> *C.Th.* IV 23.1 = *C.J.* XI 48.14 (AD 400): *coloni quos bona fide quisque possidet; causam originis et proprietatis agitari*; *C.Th.* V 6.3 (AD 409): *non proprios colonos*; *C.Th.* V 18.1 (AD 419): *[colonos] de cuius proprietate certatur*. Cf. Sulpicius Severus, *Ep. app.* 6 (CSEL I 254-256); J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 95 n. 49.

<sup>65</sup> B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 351.

<sup>66</sup> *C.J.* I 12.5 (AD 466): *servus aut colonus vel adscripticius, familiaris sive libertus et huius modi aliqua persona domestica vel condicioni subdita*.

<sup>67</sup> The modern consideration of the term *colonus iuris alieni* by M. MIRKOVIĆ (*Colonus iuris alieni and the Taxation*, *Opus* 5 [1986], p. 53-73; *op. cit.* [n. 7], p. 47-64) does not

(4) Sidonius says that, in granting freedom to the son of the *nutrix*, Pudens should change his own legal position from being a master (*dominus*) to being a patron. The definition *dominus* for Pudens is one more reason why some scholars lean towards the opinion that the son of the *nutrix* was a slave<sup>68</sup>. But the landlord of colons was also their *dominus*.

There are some texts where the terms *dominus* and *patronus* have been equally applied to both slaves and colons<sup>69</sup>. This evidence did not mean equality of these terms in late antiquity and these words did not always infer an assimilation of slaves and colons. Strictly speaking, the term *dominus* defined the owner of a slave or the owner of the land which was cultivated by a colon (for instance, Sidonius *Ep.* II 2.9). In a non-juridical meaning, the term could be applied to the master of both a slave and a colon. The non-classical sense of the term *dominus* began to be used by the legislators of the fifth and early sixth centuries in the meaning of a 'master' or 'owner' of colons<sup>70</sup>. But only under Justinian was the status of colon directly assimilated with the servile one by lawmakers.

account for the legal meaning of this term. The earliest mention of *colonus iuris alieni* in the law of Constantine, issued in AD 332 (*C.Th.* V 17.1), had no more than the common meaning *alienus colonus* (Ch. SAUMAGNE, *Du rôle de l'«origo» et du «census» dans la formation du colonat romain, Byzantion* 12 [1937] = *Les cahiers de Tunisie. Revue de sciences humaines* 37-40 [1962], p. 135; M. PALLASSE, *op. cit.* [n. 37], p. 30 n. 47; W. GOFART, *Caput and Colonate: Towards a History of Late Roman Taxation*, Toronto 1974, p. 71-72; cf. P. ROSAFIO, *Dalla locazione al colonato: per un tentativo di ricostruzione, AION* 13 (1991), p. 268; *id.*, *Coloni imperiali e coloni privati nella legislazione del quarto secolo, AARC* 10 [1995], p. 454). The new status of tied tenants rose not under Diocletian or Constantine but only by the late fourth century after the whole social system of the Empire was reshaped and required a new legal form for itself.

<sup>68</sup> W.E. HEITLAND, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 430-431; J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 97-98; F.-M. KAUFMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 245-249.

<sup>69</sup> M. BANG, *Über den Gebrauch der Anrede 'domine' im gemeinen Leben*, in: L. FRIEDLAENDER, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms* IV, Leipzig 1921, p. 82-88; W. SEYFARTH, *Soziale Fragen der spätrömischen Kaiserzeit im Spiegel des Codex Theodosianus*, Berlin 1963, p. 87-88; J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 90-93; F.-M. KAUFMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 245-246.

<sup>70</sup> *C.J.* XI 52.1 (AD 393): *Possessor eorum iure utatur et patroni sollicitudine et domini potestate*. The discrepancy between *dominus* and *patronus* of the colon is obvious in the text of the constitution of AD 365 (*C.Th.* V 19.1: *Non dubium est, colonis arva, quae subiungunt, usque adeo alienandi ius non esse, ut, et si qua propria habeant, inconsultis atque ignorantibus patronis in alteros transferre non liceat*) and its later interpretation in *Breviarium Alaricianum* (*Lex Rom. Visig.* V 11 *interpretatio*: *In tantum dominis coloni in omnibus tenentur obnoxii, ut nescientibus dominis nihil*). The colons were regarded *sub dominio possessorum* by Augustine (*De civ. Dei* X 1.2 [CC XLVII 272]: *coloni, qui conditionem debent genitali solo, propter agriculturam sub dominio possessorum*; cf. Isidorus Hispalensis, *Etym.* IX 4.36) as well as *cultores mancipianae* were *sub dominio Fl. Gemini Catullini flaminis perpetui* in the *Tablettes Albertini* (cf. M. PALLASSE, *Les «Tablettes*

The term *patronus* pertained to the category of a not real (*in rem*) but personal relationship. The legal term defined the patron of a client or freedman but, in common parlance, its use was allowed towards anyone who could protect another person of less importance. The owner and master of a slave was his natural patron in situations outside of the law (as protecting the marriage and kinship of slaves). For instance, Ambrose mentions a *dominus vel patronus* of a woman of *servilis condicio*, and Pope Gelasius entitles a landowner 'the patron of a slave': *Antiochum servum iuris patronae suae*.<sup>71</sup> Accordingly, the landowner had been considered as the natural patron of the cottagers and tenants on his land without reference to their status<sup>72</sup>. Augustine, in one of his sermons, said that colons, inquilines, and clients, if they suffered a loss, would appeal to their patron<sup>73</sup>.

The strict difference between *dominus* and *patronus* in Sidonius' letter reflects his engagement in the legal problem and was connected with the contraposition of two statuses, *persona colonaria (inquilinus tributarius)* and *persona plebea (liber cliens)*<sup>74</sup>.

(5) In the eastern legislation of the late fifth century, there arose two new terms for colons, *adscripicii* and *coloni liberi*, which marked a separation of the colons into two categories. Scholars often accept that the eastern *adscripicii* were the same as the *originarii* in the west<sup>75</sup>. Their landowner had the legal title of *dominus* and they themselves were not considered free people<sup>76</sup>. The land they cultivated was considered their

Albertini » intéressent-elles le colonat romain du Bas-Empire?, in: *RHDFE* 2 [1955], p. 277-280).

<sup>71</sup> Ambrosius, *Ep.* 5.8 (Migne *PL* XVI 932); Gelasius, *Ep.* 21 (Thiel 388).

<sup>72</sup> J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 88-89.

<sup>73</sup> Augustine, *Enarr. in psalm. XCIII* 7 (CCL XXXIX 1308): *Invenis enim pauperem hominem, qui quando patitur aliquam iniuriam, non adtendit nisi patronum suum, in cuius forte domo manet, cuius inquilinus est, cuius colonus est, cuius cliens est; et ideo se indigne pati asserit, quia ad illum pertinet ...*

<sup>74</sup> The western constitution of AD 447 distinguishes plebeians and colons on the basis that the plebeians are freeborn (*ingenui*) while the colons are subject to their landlords, similar to slaves (*Nov.Val.* 23.1.3-4).

<sup>75</sup> A.H.M. JONES, *The Roman Colonate*, in: P.A. BRUNT (ed.) *The Roman Economy. Studies in Ancient Economic and Administrative History*, Oxford 1974, p. 298-299; *Later Roman Empire* (n. 41), p. 799. More detailed on the *adscripicii*, see D. EIBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 147-204.

<sup>76</sup> As K.-P. John notes, an appearance of the term *coloni liberi* indicated that other colons would not be considered free yet (K.-P. JOHNE – J. KÖHN – V. WEBER, *Die Kolonen in Italien und den westlichen Provinzen des römischen Reiches*, Berlin 1983, p. 152).

*peculium*. The other eastern group called *coloni liberi* had no parallels in the west. These 'free colons' preserved their free status<sup>77</sup>. Their landowner had no rights of mastership over them and the land, cultivated by them, therefore, was not considered as their *peculium*<sup>78</sup>. In common parlance, their landowner was named *patronus* over his *coloni liberi* and they themselves were considered as kinds of clients.

The term *adscripicii*, from *adscribitio censibus*, demonstrates a key feature of these colons: they seemed to be declared in the tax register under the name of their landlord while the free colons were supposedly declared under their own names and were themselves responsible for the tax. Thus, the *adscripicii* were those who were discussed above as *tributarii*. They were permanent landworkers without formal contracts and indigenous people (*originarii*) on the estate, who naturally differed from the land-tenants on short-term leases who were casual dwellers. According to the law of Emperor Anastasius, the short-term land-tenants became *coloni liberi* after permanently living thirty years on the estate (*C.J.* XI 48.19). This law developed a rule of prescription introduced by the Theodosian Code and affirmed by the new laws of Theodosius II in 447-449<sup>79</sup>.

In the west a similar prescription had applied to colons since 400 and in 449 this was added with a general rule by Valentinian III<sup>80</sup>. Actually the two legal models of colonate status also existed in the west though without such an exact definition as made by Anastasius in the east. Thus it seems quite probable that the change of the abductor's status that Sidonius demanded could mean his transformation from a tied tenant to a kind of 'free colon', rather than to an independent person.

(6) The problem is that we do not know how Pudens could satisfy the demand of Sidonius and emancipate the colon in order to make him a free plebeian. Scholars almost always deny any possibility for colons to

<sup>77</sup> Scholars often accept that the *coloni liberi* arose in the fourth century (A.H.M. JONES, *Roman Colonate* [n. 75], p. 300-302; *Later Roman Empire* [n. 41], p. 802; B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* [n. 9], p. 335, 351-354). They refer to the law of AD 371 (*C.J.* XI 53.1) which, however, used the collocation *liberi coloni* in the sense that they were not freedmen. Cf. J.-M. CARRIÉ, *Un roman des origines: les genealogies du «colonat du Bas-Empire»*, *Opus* 2 (1983), p. 221. *Coloni liberi*, as a special term, appeared only in the late fifth century (*C.J.* XI 48.19). Cf. P.J. ZEPOS, *Servi e paroeci nel diritto bizantino e postbizantino*, *RAL* 35 (1980) p. 419-435. Another view for this law, see B. SIRKS, *art. cit.*, p. 354-358, esp. 356 n. 84.

<sup>78</sup> *C.J.* XI 48.19 (Anastasius); *C.J.* XI 48.23 (Justinianus).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 354-355.

<sup>80</sup> *C.Th.* XII 9.2 = *C.J.* XI 66.6 (AD 400); *C.Th.* V 18.1 (AD 419); *Nov. Val.* 27 (AD 449), 31 (AD 451).



change their dependent status because of their bondage to the land. E.M. Wightman sees in Pudens a kindly patron who raises his tied tenant to the rank of an unregistered *colonus* responsible for his own taxes and clearly enjoying a higher status, and rather easier circumstances<sup>81</sup>. Simultaneously, she emphasises the illegality of the act, which might be performed only in special circumstances.

B. Sirks assumes three ways of liberating someone from a tied colonate. In his opinion, the colonate would normally end by a registration for the *iugatio* on account of ownership of land, or by release by the landlord; a third, additional, way arose from the elapse of the prescribed time<sup>82</sup>.

(a) Sirks supposes that the taking of the parcel of land away from the management by the owner himself and leasing it to *adscripticius* changed the latter's status, from tied-colon to free-colon. Therefore, the most painless solution for Pudens seems to be to give a parcel of land to his inquiline and make him a farmer. The land received did not convert the colon to an independent landowner. Like an emancipated slave becoming a freedman, the release of the colon from the management of his landowner only lightened his dependence. The landowner enrolled his colon on the list of taxation, not among the equipment of the estate (*instrumentum fundi*) but on the separate parcel of land under the colon's own name<sup>83</sup>. Such a holding was not regarded a *peculium* of the colon, and the latter became a western variant of the *colonus liber*<sup>84</sup>. Then, the landowner was no longer his master but his patron only, and therefore such a colon could be called a *persona plebea* and client<sup>85</sup>. According to the constitution of 399 addressed to Vincentius, the praetorian prefect of the Gallic provinces, the custom of binding plebeians to estates existed in Gaul<sup>86</sup>.

<sup>81</sup> E.M. WIGHTMAN, *Peasants and Potentates: an Investigation of Social Structure and Land Tenure in Roman Gaul*, *AJAH* 3 (1978), p. 112.

<sup>82</sup> B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 354, cf. 351, 357.

<sup>83</sup> On slaves and colons in an *instrumentum fundi*, see A. KOPTEV, *Époque du rattachement des esclaves ruraux au domaine dans l'Empire romain*, in: M.-M. MACTOUX – E. GENY (eds.), *Esclavage et dépendance*, Paris 1995, p. 103-126.

<sup>84</sup> Possibly their land was considered as their *possessio*, as it is in *C.Th.* XI 1.14 = *C.J.* XI 48.4 (AD 366) (text in n. 54 and 57). Cf. Gaius, *Instit.* IV 153. *Possidere autem uide-mur non solum, si ipsi possideamus, sed etiam si nostro nomine aliquis in possessione sit, licet is nostro iuri subiectus non sit, qualis est colonus et inquilinus.*

<sup>85</sup> *Cliens* in the meaning of *colonus*, see L. BIELER, *Zur Mosella des Ausonius: «cliens» in der Bedeutung «colonus»*, *RhM* 86 (1937), p. 285-287; E.M. WIGHTMAN, *art. cit.* (n. 81), p. 113, although J.-U. KRAUSE, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 90 n.19, argues against.

<sup>86</sup> *C.Th.* XI 1.26 (AD 399): *praedium, cui certus plebis numerus fuerit adscriptus.*

(b) B. Sirks supposes that the inquiline could be released from the colonate by his master by way of manumission in a similar manner as a slave or a free person *in mancipio* has been freed<sup>87</sup>. In favour of his point of view, he quotes the constitution of Justinian which equated an *adscripticius* to a slave: «For does any difference exist between slaves and *adscripticii*, both being under the control of their masters, as a slave can be manumitted with his *peculium*, and an *adscripticius* be released from ownership along with the land to which he is attached?»<sup>88</sup>. The law emphasizes the emancipation of colons from the control of their master only together with the land which they cultivate. Unlike a slave, a colon could not be released without the land cultivated by him. Actually, this passage dealt with selling the land together with the ascribed colon to another owner. The Roman government demanded that landowners alienate their land only together with the manpower, both colons and rural slaves. A widespread fraud consisted of selling a small part of the land with a large part of the manpower, leaving the remaining land without cultivators<sup>89</sup>. From this standpoint only, there really was no difference between slaves and tied colons, but that did not convert the colonate from a public obligation, which it was from its origin, into a personal condition similar to slavery. The quoted text of the constitution of AD 530 does not allow for the conclusion that the land was granted to the colon himself and, thus, transformed him into an independent peasant.

Thus, the sentence of *C.J.* XI 48.21 (AD 530), that the landlord *possit ... adscripticium cum terra suo dominio expellere* means selling the land to which the colon is attached, rather than leasing him that parcel of land<sup>90</sup>. In the constitution such a release from the colonate is compared with the right of the master to emancipate his slave with the *peculium* (*servum cum peculio manumittere*), and this comparison embarrasses modern scholars impeding them to distinguish both the situations. Similarly to a manumitted slave, the ‘*expulsus*’ *adscripticius* appears manumitted. Below I will suggest a way of release from the colonate by manumission in the actual reality of the fifth century, but neither post-classical nor Justinianic Roman law allowed this possibility.

<sup>87</sup> B. SIRKS, *art. cit.* (n. 9), p. 351.

<sup>88</sup> *C.J.* XI 48.21 (AD 530): *quae etenim differentia inter servos et adscripticios intellegitur, cum uterque in domini sui positus est potestate, et possit servum cum peculio manumittere et adscripticium cum terra suo dominio expellere?*

<sup>89</sup> *C.Th.* XI 3.2 (AD 327); *C.Th.* XIII 10.3 (AD 357); *C.J.* XI 48.7 (AD 371); *C.Th.* XI 1.26 (AD 399); *Nov. Val.* 31.4 (AD 451).

<sup>90</sup> More detailed on this constitution, see D. EIBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 165-167.

(c) Another way of releasing tied colons depended on the good will of their master. The law of AD 419 states that the colon or inquiline could leave the estate and not return, residing in another place for many years if there was no demand from his landlord (*C.Th.* V 18.1). According to the common practice of the fourth and fifth centuries, the search for escaped *tributarii* and *inquilini* commenced either after an application by the landlord, or when local authorities detected doubtful vagabonds and there arose a suspicion that they were fugitive colons or slaves<sup>91</sup>. Under Justinian, sons of ascribed colons could live a long while in cities, if their parents executed their duties and their landlord made no claim:

Again, a doubt, which is not unreasonable, formerly arose, where the son of an *adscripticius* had remained at liberty free for the term of thirty or forty years, or even longer, while his father was still living, and cultivating the soil, and the owner of the land, for the reason that he was satisfied with the services of his father, did not require the presence of the son on his premises, whether, after the death of the father or after he had become infirm, and incapable of agricultural toil, his son could be excused on the ground of his long-continued freedom; and because for many years he had neither cultivated the soil, nor performed any other of the labors of an *adscripticius*, his master could only blame his own neglect, as every duty which he required was performed by his father (*C.J.* XI 48.22 [AD 531]).

The thirty-year prescription made such colons free from their colonate, and only Justinian's law prescribes them to be under the control of their former landowners as long as their relatives remained on his estate.

Thus, there were two, not three, ways to enfranchise a tied colon in the second half of the fifth century. Pudens could enroll his tied colon on the tax list on a separate parcel of land under own name and the abductor thus would become a 'free colon' with plebeian status. The second method would be that Pudens would permit his colon to live freely outside his estate until the thirty-year prescription would make him an independent plebeian. Theoretically, the latter possibility is admissible. The tributary colon of Pudens was a young man whose status descended from the condition of his parents. If he had no father and his mother was a nurse, not a landworker, he had no hereditary agricultural duties. For Pudens, it would be enough to blot his name out of the tax-roll of the estate, and the young man should be free inasmuch as he had no *origo* on the estate. Even in the case that his mother-*nutrix* was not a nurse but a *colona*, the

<sup>91</sup> *C.Th.* X 12.2 (AD 368); *C.Th.* IV 23.1 (AD 400).

landowner had the choice of ascribing his colon or inquiline on his tax-roll or not. Actually, however, Sidonius seems rather to have in mind the first way of release where the young man becomes not an independent plebeian, but a client of Pudens.

### III. THE ABDUCTED GIRL'S STATUS

The girl's status is also not clear. In Kaufmann's and others' opinion, she was a slave-nurse's daughter. But in scholarship, there arises the question of whether *nutrix* is to be taken literally as a nurse, or simply denotes a female client of Sidonius<sup>92</sup>. In another letter to a friend, Sidonius described his farm at Avitacum which came to Sidonius with his wife. Among other things, he refers to a covered passage at the end of which was a division forming a cool chamber where, Sidonius writes, a chattering crowd of female clients and nursemaids spread a feast for the gods, but they retreated when Sidonius and his family set out for their bedrooms<sup>93</sup>. Who were these women, *clientulae* and *nutrices*? They must have been quite familiar to Sidonius' family to get together for a religious meeting in his house. Some of them could be domestic servants who invited others to their assembly room. Clearly, the term *nutrices* is applied to such servants among whom could be wet nurses, nursemaids, and nursery governesses. Were they slaves or free? In Sidonius' letter, they are first called *clientulae* and only than (*sive*) *nutrices* which seems to exclude their servile status. Apparently, these women were wives or daughters of tenants and other workers on the estate (*coloni* and *inquilini*). The *clientulae* were the same sort of women: either it was a duplicate-term for nurses, or they were the wives and daughters of the humble and distressed people who put themselves under the protection of the great landowners in those troubled times, as Salvian described.

Why were these *nutrices* so closely connected to Sidonius' family and why did he show such great kindness to his *nutrix*'s daughter in the letter to Pudens?

The *nutrix* was a very common figure in the Roman Empire since the late Republican period, employed by women of means to breast-feed their

<sup>92</sup> Cf. E.M. WIGHTMAN, *art. cit.* (n. 81), p. 126 n.105. On figurative sense for *nutrix*, see G. HERZOG-HAUSER, *art. cit.* (n. 35), col. 1492-1493.

<sup>93</sup> Sidonius Apollinaris, *Ep.* II 2.10: *ubi ... clientularum sive nutricum loquacissimus chorus*.

children and, at times, by slave owners to nurse the offspring of their slaves<sup>94</sup>. The nurses were women of humble origin, often servile; their salaries were half that of wage-workers, and their work was connected with some restrictions on their personal life. In scholarship, the dominant opinion is that only extreme misery could cause a woman to consent to this job<sup>95</sup>.

At the same time, the nurses influenced the early lives of children and their influence on their foster-children was too important to be overlooked. The Romans believed that the disposition of the nurse and the quality of the milk played a great part in forming the character of the child. This question was disputed by philosophers: «for the milk, although imbued from the beginning with the material of the father's seed, forms the infant offspring from the body and mind of the mother as well»<sup>96</sup>. According to the widespread opinion, the nurse transferred her natural qualities to the child through her milk and this is the reason why the Greek medical man Soranus in his *Gynaecology* (2.19 (88)) warns against bad-tempered wet nurses. Frontinus warned that those who give their offspring to others to nurse would sever that bond with which nature attaches parents to their children. The child's feelings are centered wholly on his nurse instead of his mother who gave him birth. Researchers note that the association between nurse and nurslings was maintained well beyond the children's infancy<sup>97</sup>. Supposedly, wet nurses regularly continued to function as nannies to children they had previously nursed until the nursling reached maturity.

On the other hand, the nurses were often an integral part of children's familial world as a non-kin member of the family. There are known some epitaphs to nurses from their foster-children with such affectionate words as *nutrix sanctissima* (CIL XIV 486), *nutrix pientissima* (CIL VI 15655), *nutrix piissima* (CIL VI 16329), *nutrix sancta, pia, amantissima* (CIL VI 7290). Roman burial customs usually involved only those inside the

<sup>94</sup> Cf. K.R. BRADLEY, *Discovering the Roman Family. Studies in Roman Social History*, New York–London 1991, p. 13–36 (Chapter 2: 'The Social Role of the Nurse in the Roman World').

<sup>95</sup> K.R. BRADLEY, *Sexual Regulations in Wet-Nursing Contracts from Roman Egypt*, *Klio* 62 (1980), p. 321–324; J. GARDNER, *op. cit.* (n. 10), p. 243–244.

<sup>96</sup> Frontine by Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XII 1.20; cf. Columella, *Re rust.* VI 37.8; VII 12.12–13.

<sup>97</sup> S. DIXON, *The Roman Mother*, London–Sidney 1988, p. 146–146; K.R. BRADLEY, *op. cit.* (n. 94), p. 18–20; H.S. NIELSEN, *Quasi-kin, Quasi-Adoption and the Roman Family*, in: M. CORBIER (ed.), *Adoption and Fosterage*, Paris 1999, p. 257–258.

familial circle and this fact tells us that the nurses were considered more closely connected to the nurslings' family than their own. This reality is illustrated in the legal provision that a nurse was one of the few women permitted to bring an action for untrustworthiness against a guardian on behalf of a ward, the others being the mother, grandmother, or sister (*Dig.* XXVI 10.1.7). Her status of substitute-mother gave the nurse a special legal protection in the trial *extraordinaire* of the provincial governor, ranked together with professors, teachers, doctor and advocates (*Dig.* L 13.1.14). Ulpian does not explain why the low-born nurses are listed among the people of 'fine professions', not *artes sordida*; however, this seems to be clear from their important role in care for moral and corporal health.

Thus, the nurse, with her humble condition in life, was a quite significant figure, not casually appearing in the letters of Sidonius. Her particular position, lowly but important, made the figure of *nutrix* a sort of Christian symbol for illustrating the idea: «Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are ye that hunger now: for you shall be filled»<sup>98</sup>. Clearly, the *nutrices* could be either nurses of the landlord's own family or women who were nursing the children of his servants. However, it is not improbable that Sidonius used this word in a figurative sense, to emphasise the importance for caring for people of humble rank who also have feelings and dignity. In his letter to Pudens, Sidonius mentioned two mothers-*nutrices*; one of whom, the mother of the abductor, was a daughter or wife of a tied-landworker, as we have seen above. This makes it tempting to suggest that the daughter of Sidonius' *nutrix* also originated from among his colons or clients. What makes this suggestion problematic is the phrase *iam libera est* used by Sidonius. The phrase can be understood in two different ways.

(1) The fact that the *nutrix*' daughter was made free generates the supposition that she was a slave at the moment of *raptus* and became a freed-woman after her liaison with the inquiline of Pudens was manifested. As a slave, the girl would be Sidonius' property and by changing her status, he demonstrated more care for her destiny, than for her as his own property. From the other side, being a rural slave, she should pertain to the estate (*fundus instructus*) and be an object of taxation together with other people residing on the estate despite whether they were slaves or colons.

<sup>98</sup> Luke VI 20-21; cf. Matthew V 3: «Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven».

In the legislation of the fourth and fifth centuries, both sorts of land-workers on an estate, slaves and colons, were considered *originarii* and could not separate themselves from the estate<sup>99</sup>. Actually it meant that, if she was a slave, the girl continued to be tied to the estate even after manumission<sup>100</sup>. To make her really free, Sidonius had to emancipate her from her servile status and release her from dependence on the estate.

(2) According to an alternative approach, the phrase *mulier autem illam libera est* in the context of Sidonius' letter could be understood merely as 'seeing as she is free unlike the inquiline of Pudens'. This could mean that the girl's parents were free people, perhaps clients or 'free colons', in comparison to the abductor's parents who were tied-tenants on the estate of Pudens, *inquilini* and *tributarii*. At this rate, to release the girl from the colonate ties was only a question of Sidonius' good will because she was not yet liable for any land work.

As we have seen above, the release of colons in late antiquity was problematic because Roman classical law knew no such rule, nor tied tenants as colons. A landlord, who wanted to liberate his colon or a member of his family from the estate, could not do this lawfully. The landlord was not able to change the colon's personal condition; he could change only his public obligation in the framework of the registration system. However, among the canons of the Gallic church councils of the mid-fifth century, there are acts which perhaps can facilitate interpreting the situation. Canons of the Councils in Auvergne and Arles report: *In ecclesia manumissos, vel per testamentum ecclesiae commendatos, si quis in servitutem vel obsequium vel ad colonariam conditionem imprimere tentaverit, animadversione ecclesiastica coercebitur*.<sup>101</sup> For the authors of this document, the *manumissio in ecclesia* was performed equally towards slaves and colons. Although church councils, similar to the imperial legislation, distinguished between *servilis* and *colonaria condicio*<sup>102</sup>, in reality they

<sup>99</sup> A rural slave-*originarius* is mentioned in *C.Th.* IV 12.3 (AD 320). Cf. *C.J.* XI 48.7 (AD 371): *quemadmodum originarios bsque terra, ita rusticos censitosque servos vendi omnifariam non licet*. More detailed, see D. EIBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 70-71; 100-101.

<sup>100</sup> *C.J.* XI 53.1 (AD 371): *Colonos inquilinosque per Illyricum vicinasque regiones abeundi rure, in quo eos originis agnationisque merito certum est immorari, licentiam habere non posse censemus. ... in libertis etiam, quos pari usurpatione suscepit, is modus sit, quem circa liberos duximus colonos retinendum*.

<sup>101</sup> Consilium Arausicanum AD 441, 6(7) (*CCL CXLVIII* 79); Consilium Arelatense secundum AD 442-506, 33(22) (*CCL CXLVIII* 121).

<sup>102</sup> Consilium Aurelianense AD 538, 29(26) (*CCL CXLVIII* 124-125): *Ut nullus servilibus colonariisque conditionibus obligatus iuxta statuta sedis apostolicae ad honores*



were too close each other. Therefore, the *manumissio in ecclesia* possibly could be such a form with the help of which the canon law extended the idea of 'emancipation' to the category of tied colons.

The problem of marriages between peasants tied to different estates especially arose in the legislation of the fourth and fifth centuries, and the letter of Sidonius appeared as a particular example of the matter. The problem was added to the older question of marriages between free women and extraneous slaves, which had been governed by a *SC Claudianum* of AD 52, according to which a free woman, joined to another's slave, would lose her free status. The *SC Claudianum* was reworked in the fourth century: the master of the slave was obliged to warn the woman three times before she became enslaved<sup>103</sup>. A reason for the change seems to be in the adaptation of new form of binding to corporations, land or residency in the social system of the Empire. Justinian's lawyers abrogated the ancient *SC Claudianum* in AD 531 (*C.J.* VII 24.1) and, arguing to this purpose, they referred to both slaves and *adscriptionarii*, who wedded free women, while the senate rule never treated colons. In the mid-fifth century, the law did not consider colons as the equivalent of slaves in the *SC Claudianum*'s regulation. According to the law of Valentinian III:

By a like law, I order that freeborn women will be detained if a union with slaves or colons has been sought and chosen by them, in order that they may not be permitted to depart. The children of such women, if a formal notification did not precede their birth, will remain under the title of colons, in the ownership and power of those persons on whose property they have been born or may be born. But We adjudge that according to the divine imperial decrees, children born after such notification will be slaves. Thus, as has been said, the bond of the

*ecclesiastecus admittatur, nisi prius aut testamento aut per tabolas eum legeteme constirrit absolutum.*

<sup>103</sup> *C.Th.* IV 12.1-7 (AD 314-398); XII 1.179 (AD 415) and *Nov. Val.* 31.6 (AD 451), cf. B. BIONDI, *Vicende postclassiche del SC. Claudiano*, *Iura* 3 (1952), p. 142-154; R. ANDREOTTI, *L'applicazione del 'Senatus Consultum Claudianum' nel Basso Impero*, in: E.C. WELSKOPF (ed.), *Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte der Alten Welt*, Bd. II: *Römisches Reich*, Berlin 1965, p. 3-12; D. EIBACH, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 69-70; J.L. MURGA GENER, *Una nueva version del contubernio Claudiano en el Codex Teodosiano*, *RIDA* 28 (1981), p. 163-187; T. YOGÉ, *Die Gesetze im Codex Theodosianus über die eheliche Bindung von freien Frauen mit Sklaven*, *Klio* 64 (1982), p. 145-150; W.E. VOSS, *Der Grundsatz der «argeren Hand» der Sklaven, Kolonen und Hörigen*, in: *Römisches Recht in der europäischen Tradition: Symposium aus Anlass des 75. Geburtstages von Franz Wieacker*, Ebelsbach 1985, p. 126-136; C. GEBBIA, *Il SC. Claudianum e l'emancipazione femminile dal I al IV secolo*, *Seia* 3 (1986), p. 25-37.

colonnate will always hold obligated the former, the condition of slavery, the latter ...<sup>104</sup>

Thus, if the free girl married the inquiline of Pudens, she and her children would forever be under the colonate. Therefore, perhaps, her mother appealed to Bishop Sidonius who could use canon law instead of imperial. According to the fifth century marriage legislation for colons, in the case of two colons from different estates marrying, the owner of the woman could be given a substitute for her and half of her children from the landowner of the husband<sup>105</sup>. Sidonius says nothing of such compensation for the girl under his patronage. This could mean that the abduction qualified as a liaison, not a marriage. At the same time, the silence concerning compensation allows us to suppose that the girl was actually free, even if she was not freeborn and the daughter of a freeborn woman.

Thus, taking part in the destiny of the girl, Sidonius acted as a bishop who was obliged to protect the marriages and freedom of the common people rather than as a landlord. It could be supposed that he wittingly did not mention the girl's father, as if the latter did not exist at all, pointing out only her mother. Of course, there could be a special reason why Sidonius did not mention the girl's father, such as that his marriage with the girl's mother was not legal. But Sidonius apparently wanted to give the impression that he was dead and the girl's mother was a widow. It was a necessary part of the trial performance inasmuch as Sidonius himself played the role of a judge. As a bishop, Sidonius charged himself with care for the widows and orphans among his congregation and, in this case, he himself performed this role.

At the same time, his advocacy of his nurse's and her daughter's interests was understandable to his neighbours. The family of the newlyweds would go under the patronage of Pudens because his tributary colon would be converted to his client. However, the marriage between the colon-farmer and the free girl should be an equal marriage, i.e., legal, and the girl should not become a tied worker on the estate of Pudens.

<sup>104</sup> Nov. Val. 31.6 (AD 451): *Pari lege mulieres ingenuas iubeo detineri, a quibus coniunctio appetita est et electa servorum vel colonorum, ut his abire non liceat. Filii earum, si denuntiatio non praecessit, in eorum iure et dominio, apud quos creati sunt vel creantur, colonario nomine perseverent: post denuntiationem vero editos secundum scita divalia servos esse censemus, ut illos nexus, sicut dictum est, colonarius teneat semper obnoxios, hos condicio servitutis...*

<sup>105</sup> C.Th. V 18.1 (AD 419); Nov. Val. 31.2-3 (AD 451); Nov. Val. 35.18-19 (AD 452); Nov. Major. 7.2 (AD 458).

## IV. CONCLUSION

In scholarship there is a tendency to consider Sidonius, in some sense, among the heirs of a Celtic tradition of social relationships where patrons had clients of low status<sup>106</sup>. From this point of view, his *nutrix* seems to originate from those people who saw in Sidonius a kind of traditional Celtic noble. The bishopric appears, in this sense, a new form of Sidonius' traditional authority. He made use of the church canon law to help her against the adjusted imperial regulation. His letter's style allows the supposition that the author attempted specify a more universal sense to a concrete case. Therefore, in contradiction to widespread opinion, in the situation described by the letter, Sidonius acted as a patron rather than as a landowner.

Actually his activity was instigated by a woman originating from among his clients. It is not obvious rather the *nutrix* was his family's wet nurse or she merely one of his servants. The abductor of the *nutrix*'s daughter was certainly a colon, not a slave of Pudens. Sidonius appealed to Pudens to change his peasant's status from tied-colon to free-colon, perhaps by emending the tax-roll of his estate in such a manner that the colon acquired the responsibility to pay the tax himself for the land he worked. In that case, the young family would receive the status of free colons.

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<sup>106</sup> Cf. E.M. WIGHTMAN, *art. cit.* (n.81), p. 115-116; P. GARNSEY – G. WOOLF, *art. cit.* (n. 3), p. 166.